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ABSTRACT
The development and commercialisation of genetically modified (GM) 
agricultural crops has drawn attention to a complex challenge facing trade diplomacy 
-  the challenge of regulatory regionalism created by social regulatory barriers. Social 
regulations associated with GM crops have been enacted to ensure food safety, 
environmental protection and moral, ethical and religious preferences. Regulatory 
regionalism exists at the transatlantic level where GM crops approved as safe in North 
America have been delayed or denied market access in the EU because of divergent 
social regulations.
As domestic social regulations have emerged on the trade agenda trade 
diplomacy is at a crucial crossroads because the traditional integration approach of 
trade diplomacy fails to acknowledge the endogenous political economy factors 
responsible for the social regulations within a particular jurisdiction. The research 
reveals that maintaining the traditional approach will erode public support for trade 
diplomacy and marginalise it as a viable force in international integration.
Given the shortcomings of the traditional trade approach, this study then 
identifies a regulatory development and integration framework contributing to 
regulatory stability and enhancing the potential for transatlantic regulatory integration. 
This Ideal Regulatory Framework essentially builds social credence into the scientific 
rationality approach. Social credence is built in by ensuring consumer information, 
trust and choice. The result is a trade diplomacy approach that contributes to 
regulatory stability and integration by balancing the competing interests within an 
operational, dynamic, rules-based approach capable of managing the social concerns 
associated with advanced technologies such as GM crops.
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PARTI THE ISSUES
The international trade of genetically modified (GM) agricultural crops has 
drawn attention to a controversial and complex challenge facing trade diplomacy -  the 
challenge of regulatory regionalism created by social regulatory barriers to trade. In 
fact, the thesis of this study is that this challenge leaves trade diplomacy at a crucial 
crossroads. Applying the traditional approach of trade liberalisation to the market 
access barriers caused by regulatory regionalism will increasingly erode public 
support for the international trade regime and marginalize trade diplomacy as a viable 
force in international integration. Amending the traditional trade liberalisation 
approach will instead enhance the prospects that trade diplomacy can effectively deal 
with regulatory regionalism and promote international integration. Essentially, the 
objective of this study is to define the traditional trade diplomacy approach, identify 
why it is unable to address the challenge of regulatory regionalism associated with 
GM crops and, given the shortcomings, how that approach may be amended to 
effectively address this challenge.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the fact that trade diplomacy now faces 
this crucial crossroads is that trade diplomacy has arrived here because of its success. 
The objective of trade diplomacy is to enhance market access for traded products 
(including goods, services and investments) by removing barriers to trade. Initially, 
trade diplomacy was focused on reducing or removing border measures such as tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions by establishing rules that disciplined the type of border 
measures that trading partners could apply against foreign products. As border 
measures have come under international discipline, domestic regulations have 
assumed a greater importance as a source of trade barriers. Domestic regulations may 
become the basis for trade barriers against foreign products whose production, 
processing or composition contravenes domestic preferences embodied in the 
regulations. When regulatory approaches differ between jurisdictions regulatory 
regionalism is created potentially hindering market access and generating trade 
tensions. Given the success of trade diplomacy in disciplining border measures, the 
same approach has been used to discipline the type of regulations that governments 
can introduce. Hence, trade diplomacy now faces the challenge of regulatory 
regionalism because its success in dealing with traditional border measures has 
allowed domestic regulations to emerge on the trade agenda.
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Yet, as trade diplomacy disciplines the type of domestic regulations that 
nation-states may use it reaches deep into areas of national competence and enters 
controversial territory. Indeed, the 1999 Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in Seattle, besieged by a vast coalition of interest groups, 
exemplified the controversy that arises when traditional trade diplomacy and domestic 
regulations interact. In fact, the development, commercialisation and international 
trade of GM crops has been portrayed as the epitome of an invasive trade diplomacy 
strategy designed to strip nation-states of their regulatory policy autonomy in order to 
serve the profit-maximisation interests of faceless multinational corporations. Given 
such a sensational and negative view of trade diplomacy it is not difficult to 
understand why regulatory regionalism and regulatory barriers represent a 
controversial and complex challenge to trade liberalisation efforts. But from where 
has this view of trade diplomacy emerged? And, perhaps more importantly, is this 
view accurate?
Clearly, as domestic regulations increasingly emerge on the trade agenda, the 
time has come for a critical assessment of the problems associated with applying the 
traditional trade diplomacy approach to the market access problems of regulatory 
regionalism and regulatory trade barriers. Moreover, it appears that there is no better 
case study of this trade diplomacy challenge than the international trade of GM crops. 
The development and commercialisation of GM crops has prompted the establishment 
of what may be called social regulations to ensure domestically preferred levels of 
food safety, environmental protection and to address broader social norms such as 
moral, ethical and religious concerns about the use of advanced technologies. These 
social regulations are fundamentally shaped by endogenous political economy factors 
that can be quite unique to a particular regulatory jurisdiction. In fact, differing 
political economy factors within North America and the European Union have 
produced transatlantic regulatory regionalism where GM crops approved as safe in 
North America and widely used in commercial production have been delayed and 
denied market access in the European Union because of social regulatory barriers. 
While Canada and the United States have proposed dealing with the trade tensions 
through the traditional trade diplomacy approach of the WTO, the European Union 
has rejected this course of action. In other words, a transatlantic stalemate has 
emerged with no apparent method in sight for dealing with the regulatory regionalism.
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Therefore, this study is a critical assessment of the traditional trade diplomacy 
approach in the context of the transatlantic regulatory regionalism associated with GM 
crops. This critical assessment is built on the fundamental proposition that 
overcoming regulatory regionalism requires a strategy of regulatory integration, yet 
the prospects and limits of regulatory integration are a function of the domestic 
regulatory development process shaped by endogenous political economy factors. 
Hence, in order to identify the degree of concert or conflict between regulatory 
jurisdictions and the prospects and limits for regulatory integration, this critical 
assessment of the trade diplomacy approach to regulatory regionalism must include a 
comprehensive assessment of the political economy factors shaping the development 
of domestic regulations.
Given the controversy surrounding the development, commercialisation and 
international trade of GM crops it is important, at this point, to specify the scope of 
this study. This study is not a critical assessment of the science of genetic 
modification. Rather, it is a critical assessment of the social implications of GM crops; 
specifically the way that this science is promoted and regulated according to the 
international trade regime and the problems associated with this approach. Moreover, 
this study adopts four premises. First, the focus of agricultural production must be on 
achieving greater environmental sustainability while meeting demands for safer, 
higher-quality products. Second, as the dominant agricultural production system is the 
intensive agricultural system1 it is most practical to examine ways to make it more 
environmentally sustainable. Third, and perhaps most controversial, GM crops can be 
congruent with a sustainably intensive (Sage, 1999) agricultural production system, 
using for instance, less synthetic chemicals to achieve greater productivity while 
meeting consumer demands for safer and higher quality products. This does not 
imply, however, that this study unreservedly supports technological progress over 
technological precaution. Instead, the fourth premise of this study holds that it is the 
application, management and distribution aspects of technology that set the 
parameters for technological precaution and the boundaries for technological progress.
This study is organised into four parts. In Part I is an examination of the issues 
associated with GM crops. In Chapter One, the academic context of regulatory 
regionalism is established and the precise research question is specified. The research
1 The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that up to 95% of global agricultural 
production is intensive production, as opposed to, say, organic production methods.
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methodology employs an International Political Economy (IPE) analytical approach 
for two important reasons. First, the analysis of social regulatory barriers requires an 
analysis of the ‘regulatory arena’ (Dezalay, 1996) between the state and the market 
(Strange, 1988) both within a regulatory jurisdiction, as the domestic regulatory 
approach is developed, and between regulatory jurisdictions, as regulatory integration 
occurs. Assessing the regulatory arena requires a multi-disciplinary approach that 
deliberately combines traditional economic, political, sociological and legal academic 
approaches to regulations. Second, the analysis of regulatory development and 
integration requires a simultaneous assessment of the political economy factors within 
a particular regulatory jurisdiction. As the fundamental objective of an IPE approach 
is to assess the relative power of various interests and events representing the political 
economy factors, underlying this critical assessment will be an examination of the 
‘policy power’ or policy influence of various interests in the development and 
integration of GM crop regulations. It will be argued that these political economy 
factors can be categorised into either economic or social dimensions -  a simple 
categorisation with significant explanatory power. Contrary to conventional economic 
approaches that hold the social dimensions constant (Malchup, 1979), it will be 
argued that it is unacceptable to address social regulatory barriers from the economic 
perspective alone. From a technical point of view, there is a lack of quantitative 
analytical options. Social regulatory barriers are not quantitative trade restriction 
measures and the economic analysis of regulatory barriers is currently too complex 
and underdeveloped for systematic economic analysis (Roberts et al., 1999). From a 
social legitimacy point of view, the predominant calls for social regulatory barriers 
are from non-trade, social interests and not from traditional trade or commercial 
interests (Perdikis et al., 1999). These non-trade interests view ‘social protectionism’ 
as a legitimate constraint on trade liberalisation and they reject attempts to quantify 
social regulatory barriers as economic costs that create social market failures.
Instead, they support the notion that regulations play a crucial social function that 
cannot be decomposed into simply an economic cost. Furthermore, focusing on the 
interaction between the economic and social dimensions of the regulatory arena 
avoids the ‘trap of institutionalism’ (Dezalay, 1996) whereby analysis from one 
perspective in isolation fails to recognise the belief system that the perspective is 
based on and which is central to the subsequent analysis. Accounting for the 
competing belief systems embedded in the economic and social dimensions is to adopt
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a ‘reflexive methodology* (Bordieu and Wacquant, 1992) that avoids the trap of 
institutionalism. In Chapter Two is a brief examination of the science of agricultural 
biotechnology, its application to crop production, the economic implications of this 
development upon the agricultural sector as well as an examination of the consumer 
concerns that have created so much controversy. Together, Chapters One and Two 
establish the conceptual framework for analysing regulatory regionalism created by 
social regulatory barriers.
In Part II, the process of regulatory development and the subsequent 
challenges of regulatory integration are examined. In Chapter 3 is a discussion of 
those economic interests supporting the traditional trade diplomacy approach to 
regulatory development and integration. This includes a comprehensive assessment of 
how the international trade regime deals with social regulatory barriers. In Chapter 4 
is a discussion of the regulatory development and integration approaches supported by 
social or non-trade interests opposed to the traditional trade approach. In Chapter 5 the 
competing interests are brought together to examine the vociferous debates associated 
with the development and integration of GM crop regulations. In short, Part II 
establishes a conceptual model for determining the regulatory framework, the type of 
specific regulations and, consequently, the regulatory integration approach within an 
particular jurisdiction.
In Part III is a case study of transatlantic regulatory regionalism. In Chapters 
Six and Seven, respectively, the North American and the European Union approaches 
to regulatory development and integration are identified according to the conceptual 
model developed in Part II. Particular attention is given to the policy power of the 
competing interests influencing the regulatory development and integration 
approaches.
In Part IV, Chapter Eight brings together Parts I, II, and III in order to assess 
why the traditional trade diplomacy approach is incapable of addressing the 
transatlantic regulatory regionalism associated with GM crops and, hence, stands at a 
crucial crossroads. Given this analysis, an amended trade diplomacy approach is 
proposed and examined.
A particularly important methodological issue is the time frame of this study. 
The critical assessment of trade diplomacy and transatlantic regulatory regionalism 
includes developments up to June 2000, with the major focus on regulatory 
development and integration strategies that have emerged in the late 1990s. In other
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words, this study is not a critical assessment of a ‘closed* trade diplomacy issue. 
Instead, it is a critical assessment of an ‘open* trade diplomacy issue that aims to 
clarify a complex and controversial challenge that has left trade diplomacy stranded at 
a crucial crossroads.
Finally, this study makes several general and specific contributions to the 
academic discourses associated with regulations, international trade and international 
integration. In general, it contributes to an understanding of the complex challenge 
that regulatory regionalism and regulatory barriers to trade, especially those driven by 
social interests, pose to the traditional trade diplomacy approach to international trade 
and integration. It also contributes to an understanding of the position that various 
interest groups hold with respect to advanced technologies, regulatory development, 
regulatory integration and trade liberalisation. Specifically, this study contributes a 
balanced assessment of a highly polarised issue. It goes beyond the interest-driven 
rhetoric of both supporters and critics of GM technology in order to identify the root 
of the controversy and to encourage an informed policy debate over the application, 
management and distribution of this technology, including the international 
distribution through trade.
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CHAPTER ONE SOCIAL REGULATORY BARRIERS
The objective of this chapter is to locate the challenge of social regulatory 
barriers to trade diplomacy within an academic context. This chapter is organised as 
follows. First, social regulations are defined along with their propensity for instability 
and their trade barrier-aspects. Then the concept of international integration is 
introduced and an assessment of both the economic and the social perspectives on 
regulatory development and integration are discussed within this context. Next a 
theoretical framework identifying the regulatory development and integration 
parameters faced by a regulatory jurisdiction when dealing with social regulatory 
barriers is proposed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the specific case 
study -  the transatlantic trade of GM crops -  and the specification of the precise 
research question.
1.1 Social Regulations: Instability and Market Access Barriers
When discussing regulations, it is important to disentangle regulations from 
the regulatory framework. The regulatory framework includes the meta-principles and 
features of the regulatory approach within a jurisdiction. This includes principles such 
as: which government agency is responsible; is the agency accountable to an elected 
official or is it an arm’s length, independent agency; what are the regulatory principles 
that regulators must achieve (e.g. safety/hazard prevention only or broader socio­
economic development targets); what type of liability laws exist.
Regulations refer to the specific rules developed within the regulatory 
framework and they are mandatory, legal measures adopted by governments to 
influence the outcome of economic and social activity within the regulatory 
jurisdiction, which is often synonymous with the nation-state. Caswell and Henson 
(1997) argue that regulations can be in the form of either direct regulations or specific 
liability laws. The former are proactive measures setting the parameters of acceptable 
behaviour. The latter are reactive measures used to discipline behaviour found to be 
unacceptable. Together, direct regulations and specific liability laws establish a 
relevant rule of law within the regulatory jurisdiction. Economic and social activity 
then occurs within the context of the rule of law.
In a very broad sense, regulations essentially perform two general functions. 
The first is an economic function such as ensuring the productivity and
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‘competitiveness’ of commercial activity within the nation-state (Porter, 1990). This 
can include tax measures to stimulate investment in research and development, 
competition laws to ensure the presence of a competitive commercial environment 
and employment programs to support worker training and skills acquisition 
strategically targeted to the competitive needs of the jurisdiction. The economic 
function of regulations tends to focus on improving the allocative efficiency of the 
market system. The second general function of regulations is a social function which 
channels market activity to meet non-market, domestic preferences and expectations. 
Social regulations include, for example, food safety measures (Spriggs and Isaac, In 
Press), environmental protection measures (Wheale and Williams, 1996), labour 
standards (Langille, 1996), as well as measures to address social norms such as moral, 
ethical and religious concerns. The social function of regulations tends to focus on 
improving the equity within the jurisdiction. Of course, this categorisation of 
regulations is simplistic because all regulations are in fact a blend of economic and 
social objectives. The purpose of this categorisation is, however, to illustrate that 
some regulations are dominated by efficiency or competitiveness concerns (economic 
regulations) while other regulations are dominated by equity or non-commercial 
concerns (social regulations).
The development of a regulatory framework as well as specific regulations 
within that framework involves building consensus and cohesion through a political 
process of balancing the rights and interests of stakeholders within the jurisdiction 
(Picciotto, 1996; Dezalay, 1996). Given the political balance required of regulatory 
development, once the regulatory framework is set institutional stability is necessary 
for the rule of law to become established in a manner beneficial to both economic and 
social interests. Economic benefits of a stable regulatory framework include 
commercial certainty and predictability. Social benefits include confidence in the 
regulatory approach. A regulatory framework that changes frequently appears to 
indicate that regulators lack control, decreasing public confidence in the regulatory 
approach. In other words, economic and social benefits arise because the regulatory 
framework is operational and stable.
Accordingly, changing the regulatory framework is not an easy process. It has 
been argued that institutional inertia makes change difficult and it requires a high- 
level political push (Frost, 1998). The impetus for such a political push is often 
changes in the economic and social dimensions of the nation-state. Two crucial causes
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are technological innovations and political crises (Dezalay, 1996) and there is a 
synergistic relationship between them. The public may poorly understand advanced 
technologies and their development and commercialisation can cause a political crisis 
as public concern grows about the level of regulatory oversight governing the risks of 
the new technology. Further, the introduction of advanced technology can set the 
economic or commercial function of regulations in conflict with the social function. 
For instance, the innovation may promise economic productivity and efficiency 
benefits so that economic regulations aim to encourage technological progress. In this 
case, economic regulations are used to set the pace and dispersion of advanced 
technology (Zilberman et al., 1999). On the other hand, public anxiety about the 
innovation requires social regulations encouraging technological precaution in order 
to maintain public confidence in the regulatory approach (Kraus, 1998).
While stability may an appropriate goal of the regulatory framework, it is not 
necessarily the appropriate goal of the precise regulatory rules. For instance, given 
significant public anxiety about the commercialisation of advanced technologies, 
flexibility in regulations may be appropriate so that the regulations are seen to be 
reacting to the anxiety in a publicly acceptable manner. Stability, in this case, may 
appear to result in regulatory decisions about product approvals that fail to account for 
social dimensions. Therefore, stability in the regulatory framework is necessary, but 
the specific regulatory rules may need to be flexible in order to be socially responsive.
1.1.1 Social Regulatory Instability: Advanced Technologies
As mentioned above, the development and commercialisation of advanced 
technologies such as GM crops is rife with controversial debates that challenge the 
social consensus of the regulatory framework, motivate political action and result in 
regulatory instability as the regulatory framework and the subsequent specific 
regulations are developed and revised.
The common approach to regulating new technology is according to the Risk 
Analysis Framework. First outlined in 1983, the Risk Analysis Framework seeks to 
identify procedures to effectively perform risk assessment, risk management and risk 
communication (National Academy of Sciences, 1983). The objective of this 
regulatory framework is to establish stable and predictable regulatory principles upon 
which to base the specific regulations.
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Regulatory instability arises because there are significant debates associated 
with how the Risk Analysis Framework should be applied. The debates reflect 
conflicts between those who seek to maximise technological progress and those who 
seek to maximise technological precaution. Establishing a cohesive and consensual 
regulatory framework is extremely difficult in the face of highly polarised views about 
the risks of new technologies. These debates as they pertain to the development of 
GM crop regulations will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 5. It is important to 
emphasise at this stage, however, that stable framework principles for regulating GM 
crops have not been established within regulatory jurisdictions, let alone the specific 
regulations within this framework. Supporters and critics of the technology are 
actively lobbying government regulators to establish regulations congruent with their 
views. In reaction, government regulators have been unable and perhaps unwilling to 
nail down the framework principles that will become the basis for the regulatory Risk 
Analysis Framework within that jurisdiction. It will be shown (in Part III) that even in 
jurisdictions with a seemingly established and stable regulatory framework there is 
evidence of potential regulatory instability.
1.1.2 Social Regulatory Barriers
Unstable social regulations can incur market access barriers during the 
international trade of advanced technology products because political economy factors 
such as political processes and the influence of various economic and social interests 
and events differ between nation-states. As a result, divergent jurisdictions develop 
different regulatory frameworks such as the Risk Analysis Framework and subsequent 
regulations can differ significantly. Hence, divergent frameworks create different 
regulations that can become the basis for market access difficulties faced by foreign 
products whose production, processing and/or composition contravene the preferences 
and expectations embedded in the regulatory framework and regulations of the 
domestic market, despite the fact that these products have been approved in their 
home market.
In the context of trade barriers, social regulatory barriers represent a new and 
complex challenge for trade diplomacy. Figure 1.1 provides a categorisation of 
various types of trade barriers. Trade diplomacy has been successful in reducing 
tariffs on manufactured goods and in bringing greater discipline on the use of non­
tariff barriers such as quantitative restrictions (Jovanovic, 1998e; Grimwade, 1996).
18




























Fig. 1.1: Classification of Trade Barriers
Yet, trade diplomacy has not been as successful with regulatory-type barriers 
to trade. Building on the general distinction introduced above between the economic 
and social function of regulations, there are two types of non-tariff regulatory barriers. 
Economic regulatory barriers tend to be driven by commercial interests who seek 
government assistance in competing with foreign firms. In this sense, economic 
regulatory barriers represent economic or commercial protectionism that is often 
deliberate and can take the form of, for instance, commercial laws on foreign direct 
investment and ownership. Alternatively, social regulatory barriers tend to be driven 
by non-commercial interests such as consumer and environmental organisations. In 
this sense, social regulatory barriers represent social protectionism. They differ from 
economic regulatory barriers because often the trade barrier aspect of social 
regulations is a secondary consequence. That is, social regulations are established to 
meet domestic social preferences and expectations, although they may also have an 
impact upon trade flows.
While regulatory barriers in general and some social regulatory barriers in 
particular are not new to the trade agenda, the depth of food safety and environmental 
protection regulations into national regulatory competence is a complex challenge for 
trade diplomacy. For instance, the 1995 Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary 
Standards under the WTO aimed at disciplining the use of food safety-type social 
regulatory barriers (see Chapter 3). Rather than facilitating an international 
centralisation of domestic food safety regulations, the Agreement has revealed that 
social regulations are a formidable challenge to traditional trade diplomacy. In a 
controversial trade dispute decision the WTO ruled against the European Union (EU) 
ban on imports of beef treated with growth hormones, yet the EU has not removed the 
import ban. The key result is that in defence of their social regulatory barriers, the EU
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is willing to remain in contravention of the WTO trade regime and this should stand 
as a vital warning to trade diplomacy efforts.
It is important to disentangle the concepts of social regulatory barriers and 
regulatory regionalism. Social regulatory barriers are market access barriers facing 
imported products because the products fail to meet the domestic regulations focussed 
on social objectives. Specifically, social regulations enacted to deal with GM crops 
remain unstable and susceptible to influence from all interested stakeholders including 
the agricultural biotechnology sector and non-governmental organisations such as 
environmental groups. Regulatory regionalism exists when not only do regulatory 
jurisdictions differ on specific regulations they differ on fundamental framework 
regulatory principles underlying the specific regulations. Again with respect to GM 
crops, there is no internationally harmonised regulatory framework. Instead there are 
two dominant regulatory jurisdictions - North America and the European Union -  
with different regulatory frameworks and social regulations. This transatlantic 
regulatory regionalism has created a trade situation where GM crops approved as safe 
for food and feed use and for the environment in North America have faced delayed 
and prohibited market access approvals according to EU social regulations. The key 
point to make is that while the traditional trade diplomacy approach may be able to 
deal with social regulatory barriers when the underlying frameworks are congruent, it 
appears that there are significant challenges posed when the underlying regulatory 
frameworks differ significantly.
1.2 International Integration
As the thesis of this study is that traditional trade diplomacy cannot adequately 
deal with the challenge of regulatory regionalism associated with GM crops, the 
assessment must now identify the traditional trade diplomacy approach along with 
competing or alternative approaches. Perhaps the most illustrative way of 
accomplishing this is within the broader context of international integration.
International integration is the dynamic process whereby the economic and 
social (i.e. political, cultural, normative, etc.) dimensions of a nation converge with 
those of other nations. International integration occurs regionally (bilaterally or 
plurilaterally) and globally (multilaterally). Moreover it is a neutral term. For 
supporters, international integration is predicated on the belief that collective action 
among individual nation-states can lead to greater overall gains than those possible
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when nations act alone. This belief is best exemplified by the mandate of the United 
Nations; to achieve global stability and security by promoting economic and social 
development through the co-ordinated efforts of individual nation-states. For critics, 
international integration is a corrosive force that erodes national economic and social 
distinctiveness. This study does not aim to address the debate over the efficacy of 
integration. Instead, it adopts the premise that good or bad, integration is inevitable 
and the important issue is not about choosing between integration or disintegration but 
about managing integration in an acceptable manner.
The challenge of social regulatory barriers to international trade diplomacy is 
in essence a challenge for international integration because trade is really only one 
aspect of international integration, although a highly visible aspect. As the 
commercial activities of independent nation-states have become increasingly 
enmeshed, differences in social regulations have become more apparent. These 
differences have hindered integration and in some cases have led to calls for greater 
social protectionism.
A notable characteristic of the academic discourse on international integration 
is the separation of international economic integration from international social 
integration. The basis for the separation is the perspective that is adopted.
International economic integration adopts an economic perspective to explain the 
regulatory development process and the regulatory integration strategies adopted 
within a jurisdiction. According to this perspective, rational, optimising behaviour 
should govern policy development, shape social regulations and be the basis for 
dealing with social regulatory barriers through trade diplomacy. It will be argued that 
this perspective has been the basis for the traditional trade diplomacy approach. 
Alternatively, international social integration adopts a social perspective arguing that 
markets are embedded in social constructs so that the economic perspective is 
meaningless if separated from social realities. That is, the development of regulatory 
and trade policies must target more than just an economic function, they must also 
fulfil important social functions. As a result, the social perspective suggests that trade 
diplomacy must be more socially responsive when dealing with social regulatory 
barriers.
Crucially, the economic and the social perspectives on international integration 
support divergent paths for regulatory development within a jurisdiction and divergent 
recommendations on how regulations should be integrated between jurisdictions. The
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key to understanding the challenge of social regulatory barriers to traditional trade 
diplomacy is to understand the differences in the two perspectives because essentially 
trade diplomacy has emerged from the economic perspective while social regulations 
emerge from the social perspective. Given this crucial disjuncture, these perspectives 
are discussed in greater detail below.
1.2.1 Economic Perspective: Scientific Rationality
Since at least 1947, the economic perspective has dominated trade diplomacy, 
which has been a relatively successful example of international economic integration. 
It has facilitated the development of a rules-based international trade regime 
characterised by commercial regularity, orderliness and predictability (WTO, 1995), 
allowing for a substantial growth in global trade flows.
The basis of the economic perspective is that decentralised and distributed 
decision-making can lead to economically optimal outcomes (Bratton et al., 1996). 
The key goal of the economic perspective is to improve market efficiency and 
effectiveness. It aims to deliberately separate economic dimensions from social 
dimensions in an attempt to de-politicise the policy development process. This 
removes protected social positions that create social and political market failures 
hindering the attainment of economically optimal outcomes. Removing social and 
political market failures allows national policy development to focus on real market 
imperfections with first-best policies.
This does not imply, however, that social dimensions are sacrificed. Instead, it 
is held that improved market operations increases growth and development. This in 
turn, increases income and the demand for social regulations such as food safety and 
environmental protection because, it is argued, they are income elastic (Caswell,
1997). These income elastic social preferences are internalised by the competitive 
strategies of private firms because they are demanded by consumers, they enhance the 
firm’s social reputation and they increase investor confidence (Woolcock, 1996). 
Ultimately economic growth produces improved social regulations; a regulatory race 
to the top. In short, the economic perspective holds that it is vital to first remove social 
and political market failures in order to produce the best conditions for economic 
growth and that this in turn allows for the establishment of optimal social regulations 
with a tendency to become more stringent, not less.
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The economic perspective has been used to assess how regulatory 
development should occur within a nation-state or regulatory jurisdiction and how 
regulations should be integrated between jurisdictions. With respect to how regulatory 
development should occur, public policies in the post-war period were significantly 
influenced by Keynesian economics and its reliance upon government policy 
expertise. It suggested that government intervention in the market could secure an 
optimal outcome that the decentralised market was unlikely to produce (i.e. 
government intervention preserves a long-term agenda to facilitate the economic 
prosperity of the nation). Underlying this theory were two important assumptions. 
First, it was assumed that policy-makers are aware of all economic and social 
preferences, through the political process, and could design first-best regulatory 
policies producing optimal outcomes. Second, it was assumed that government policy­
makers are benevolent agents whose primary goal is the improvement of national 
welfare and no other objectives obfuscate this goal. These assumptions did not go 
unchallenged.
Public Choice Theory challenged the ability of policy-makers to be aware of 
all economic and social preferences. Samuelson (1954) argued that the political 
process could not accurately reflect all preferences because the nature of public goods 
encourages market failure. Voters can either under-represent their utility derived from 
a public good because they have not had cause to consume the good (Samuelson, 
1954). An example might be local fire services. Alternatively, voters can over­
represent their utility because they do not know the true cost of public goods 
(Malchup, 1979), such as food safety or environmental protection measures. Malchup 
(1979) argued that if the true cost were known then the demand for the public goods 
would fall.
Similarly, Social Choice Theory also challenged the assumption that 
government policy-makers could be aware of all economic and social preferences. 
Arrow (1963) argued that because voting paradoxes prevent the aggregation of all 
preferences, the preferences that policy-makers target are at best only partial 
preferences. Further, Olson (1965) argued that the problem lies not just with the 
voting process because regulators are easily captured by, and respond to, special 
interests resulting in government intervention in pursuit of only limited objectives, not 
overall national welfare.
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Both Public and Social Choice Theory argued that despite the best efforts of 
government policy-makers the combination of failures with the political process and 
the prevalence of regulatory capture result in protected political positions. Without an 
awareness of all economic and social preferences a true first-best regulatory policy 
could not be established. In order to correct the policy problems, the Public and Social 
Choice Theories adopted the economic perspective of de-politicising the policy 
process by separating the economic objectives of market efficiency from social 
objectives of equity. Once the market was working efficiently, then optimal levels of 
social regulations could be established rather than the ex ante establishment of sub- 
optimal regulations that then hinder market efficiency. Additionally, it was proposed 
that a subsidiarity or devolution policy be adopted in the regulatory development 
process in order to decrease the variance in economic and social preferences, decrease 
the number of special interests lobbying the process and to enhance the link between 
the regulators and those that the regulations affect. The economic perspective thus 
supports a competitive decentralisation and de-politicisation of the regulatory 
development process.
The economic perspective also led to challenges to the second assumption of 
the Keynesian-type interventionist theories; that government policy-makers are 
benevolent maximisers of national welfare. Clearly, government does play a more 
active role including intervening to fulfil its own preferences and objectives. For 
instance, according to the Constitutional Political Economy approach, Brennan and 
Buchanan (1980) argued that government regulation is not in pursuit of social welfare. 
Instead, governments are ‘regulatory monopolists’. At the governmental level, the 
political concerns of re-election dominate long-term economic and social 
development concerns. Within government, departments compete with one another to 
secure revenues and preserve regulatory power or authority. In this sense, regulations 
must be viewed as political instruments created by policy-makers in pursuit of their 
own self-interest instead of in pursuit of national welfare. In response, it was argued 
that the economic perspective must be adopted in order to avoid the political market 
failures caused by governmental self-interest.
With respect to the political crisis driver for regulatory development and 
change, the economic perspective has little support for a reactive, socially responsive 
regulatory approach. Instead, it supports a regulatory framework that is de-politicised 
in order to disentangle political and social market failures from real market failures
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(Majone, 1990). Underlying this perspective is the belief that government regulatory 
intervention adversely impacts economic and social prosperity because it increases 
market distortions driving up costs and decreasing commercial competitiveness, 
productivity and market efficiency (Woolcock, 1998). This in turn, decreases 
economic growth and development and decreases the demand for income elastic 
social regulations.
With respect to the technological innovation driver for regulatory development 
and change, the economic perspective generally assumes that technology and 
innovation are vital factors of economic growth and welfare2. As a result, it supports a 
regulatory framework encouraging technological progress. For instance, it is quite 
common for economic analysis to support ‘scientific rationality’ (van den Daele et al., 
1997) approaches to regulating the risk of new technology. The economic and 
scientific rationality perspectives are similar in that they decompose complex 
behaviour and actions into causal-consequence models, which are then used to 
forecast outcomes (see Chapter 5.1.1 for further discussion).
In short, the economic perspective on regulatory development holds that an 
efficient regulation is one that corrects a market failure and improves the resource 
allocations of the free market encouraging technological innovation and growth. 
Accordingly, policies must be activated by market failure and focused only on 
economic factors in order to improve the prospects for economic growth allowing for 
the optimal establishment of social regulations, free from the distortions of protected 
political positions.
International economic integration is simply an extension of the national 
economic perspective on regulatory development to the international level where the 
nation-state, as the regulatory jurisdiction, remains the primary actor. The rationale for 
international economic integration is to facilitate scale economies and the optimal 
allocation of factors of production according to comparative advantage (Jovanovic, 
1998e). The principle of comparative advantage is simply the principle that national 
welfare can be maximised by allocating factors of production to where they are most 
efficiently utilised and then trading the products to meet consumer demand. A 
division of the factors of production is widely accepted as an organising principle at
2 It is important to note that while this is a widely established economic tenet, not all economists hold 
this view. For an insightful discussion of the ‘steady-state’ or ‘zero-growth’ economy see Daly (1997).
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the national level and comparative advantage extends this notion to the international 
level (Malchup, 1979).
From the perspective of international economics, trade barriers hinder market 
access and distort comparative advantage. They fragment international markets, limit 
economies of scale, increase costs and create market access uncertainty. In fact, 
economic trade analysis considers barriers to be ‘economic costs’ placing 
distortionary constraints on a firm’s production function and collectively, on a 
nation’s production possibilities frontier. Such analysis focuses on the cost, price and 
allocation effects of trade barriers in order to demonstrate their impact on comparative 
advantage and economic welfare.
Economic trade analysis has long shown comparative advantage to be a 
compelling argument for non-discriminatory, liberalised trade because it results in the 
optimal and efficient allocation of production and consumption patterns. Indeed, 
international economic integration literature generally assumes that any type of 
economic integration is positive (Grimwade, 1996). However, debates exist regarding 
the level of economic integration that is most optimal in terms of national welfare. For 
instance, Jovanovic (1998a,b,c,d,e) assesses the economic benefits of and limitations 
to greater economic integration at a regional (bilateral or plurilateal) and global 
(multilateral) level.
As mentioned above, international economic integration has been the 
foundation of trade diplomacy since at least the establishment of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948. Trade diplomacy according to the 
economic perspective aims to separate economic integration from social integration in 
order to disentangle political and social market failures from real market failures. 
According to the WTO, the goal of trade diplomacy (based on the international 
economic integration perspective) is to develop multilateral rules to remove social and 
political protectionism; to de-politicise trade and make it a function of comparative 
advantage not political advantage (WTO, 1995). The threat is that political and social 
market failures would become locked-in to the regulatory approach, preventing the 
identification of an optimal regulatory standard and hindering economic integration, 
innovation and growth (Arthur, 1989; David, 1987; Katz and Shapiro, 1986).
Further, the economic perspective holds that economic integration does not 
imply a loss of sovereignty or policy autonomy. It is argued that international trade 
treaties or agreements represent concessions by all signatories in order to realise
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mutually beneficial gains from economic integration (Jovanovic, 1998e). In this sense, 
there is no loss of policy sovereignty as all signatories or contracting parties have 
given up the exact same degree of autonomy. For example, in discussing the impact of 
the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement on Canadian sovereignty, Lipsey (1988) 
concluded, “Canada can establish and maintain its own distinctive social policies, 
while liberalising its trading arrangements with other countries”. In other words, 
economists tend to argue that economic integration and trade liberalisation do not 
result in an absolute loss of domestic policy autonomy vis-a-vis other countries.
It should be noted, however, that the discussion on the economic perspective is 
not to suggest that social dimensions have never factored into the economic analysis 
of integration. Indeed, both Cooper and Massell (1965) and Johnson (1965) 
introduced a ‘public good’ rationale for regional economic integration whereby 
economic integration permitted the increased production and consumption of public 
goods. Also, agricultural economics has often adopted a view of economic integration 
where social dimensions have played a primary role in trade policy development. For 
instance, popular social arguments for supporting and protecting domestic agriculture 
include strategic arguments of ensuring a domestic food supply and 
‘multifunctionality’ arguments claiming that the agriculture sector not only produces 
food but that it also provides social benefits in the form of the protection and 
preservation of the countryside and the rural lifestyle. Political economy models of 
tariff determination have been developed to cope with the agricultural sector’s social 
protectionism (Frey, 1984; Frey, 1985). The key point, however, is that the analytical 
focus is on determining the effects of the social dimensions on economic efficiency, 
hence, the economic perspective not the social perspective dominates.
With respect to regulatory regionalism, there are two fundamental trade 
concerns about the impact of social regulatory barriers upon traditional international 
economic integration. First, social regulatory barriers are seen as an easy target for 
protectionist rent-seekers because there is virtually no discipline on their use under 
international trade rules. Second, income elastic social regulatory barriers could 
fragment international markets into exclusionist social regulatory jurisdictions that 
hinder multilateral economic integration and, consequently, limit the gains from trade. 
Therefore, to deal with these concerns the economic perspective advocates that social 
regulatory barriers be subject to multilateral economic integration rules according to 
the traditional trade diplomacy framework of the WTO -  a method that has been
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successful in (discussed further in Chapter 3). That is, the barriers should be subject to 
an economic interpretation of efficiency, they should have a minimum trade impact 
and trade diplomacy should avoid considering social arguments for the trade barriers.
The regulatory integration approach supported by the economic perspective is 
one of regulatory competition associated with the ‘free traders’ school of trade theory 
(Bhagwati and Hudec, 1996). The regulatory competition paradigm rejects efforts to 
co-ordinate or harmonise, ex ante, national regulations because regulatory differences 
are considered to be a basis for comparative advantage and trade opportunities 
(Lavoie and Sheldon, 1999). For instance, income elastic social regulations such as 
food safety and environmental protection would be different among trading partners at 
different levels of economic development. Yet, this may create a comparative 
advantage and gains from trade for firms in jurisdictions with a different regulatory 
framework. In other words, this paradigm supports national sovereignty or authority 
over regulatory policy because of the belief that distributed regulatory development 
enhances both commercial opportunity and social welfare. Accordingly, it favours 
shallow international integration based on the economic perspective with no aim to 
develop international social and political institutions other than those necessary to 
facilitate a rules-based regulatory framework for international economic integration.
Over time, international regulatory competition may produce ex post 
regulatory integration where either the market decides which approaches are optimal 
or a trade dispute mechanism determines which approaches are permissible from the 
perspective of a rules-based regulatory framework designed to promote international 
economic integration. Alternatively, the regulatory competition paradigm may not 
produce regulatory integration and regulatory divergence would prevail.
Therefore, with respect to social regulatory barriers, the economic perspective 
suggests that regulatory development should focus on technological progress and 
market efficiency while regulatory integration should focus on economic integration 
according to the regulatory competition paradigm. The result is support for a rules- 
based regulatory framework ensuring stability, orderliness and predictability during 
the process of international economic integration. With respect to the international 
trade of GM crops, this would take the form of an international regulatory framework 
focused on technological progress and market access with very little regard for social 
dimensions in the regulatory process beyond fundamental principles such as safety or 
hazard.
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1.2.2 Social Perspective: Social Rationality
Competing with the economic perspective on regulatory development and 
integration is the social perspective. Fundamentally, the social perspective reverses 
the causation between market performance and social objectives. The social 
perspective insists that underlying the ‘market’ is a normative construct composed of 
domestic preferences, concerns and expectations (Bratton et al., 1996). This 
normative social construct, including moral, ethical and religious concerns, cannot be 
separated from the market because social norms organise market operations. 
Consequently, the social perspective holds that neo-classical economic policies do not 
represent an independent ideal but rather a set of policies congruent with a neo-liberal 
normative social construct. Without this construct, these economic policies would not 
be appropriate. Hence, the social perspective posits that economic policies are 
crucially constrained by the normative social construct.
According to the social perspective, the development of a regulatory 
framework within a nation-state is not simply an exercise in correcting market 
failures. Instead, regulatory development also plays a more important social function 
in channelling the economic activities of the nation-state to achieve normative social 
development objectives identified through the domestic political process. In this 
sense, social responsiveness is the main driver for regulatory change where regulators 
are expected to react to social dimensions such as political crises in an accountable 
manner. Underlying this view is the belief that government regulatory intervention 
improves economic and social prosperity because it increases public participation and 
accountability improving productivity and competitiveness (Woolcock, 1998).
Regulatory effectiveness is assessed according to whether or not regulations 
successfully respond to legitimate social concerns such as equity as opposed to 
whether or not they meet economic measurements of efficiency. From the social 
perspective, it has been argued that the economic perspective leads to a ‘hollowing 
out’ of the nation-state (Picciotto, 1996) whereby social dimensions are sacrificed to 
enhance economic performance.
With respect to the technological innovation driver for regulatory development 
and change, a popular socio-political treatment of the social perspective may be found 
in Risk Society Theory (Beck, 1992) and its extensions (i.e. Grove-White et al.,
1997), which focus on the regulation of risk, such as the risk from new technology.
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This ‘social rationality’ approach holds that it is insufficient to view new technology 
and innovations only as a positive force in economic growth. Instead, the social 
implications of science must be considered and under this consideration new 
technology may not always be greeted without reservation -  despite its potential to 
improve economic growth. For instance, Habermas (1971) cautioned that the 
scientific complexity of advanced technologies erodes the established political process 
because it has rendered elected decision-makers nothing more than “mere agents of a 
scientific intelligentsia” as policy decisions are made about new technologies outside 
democratic accountability and in pursuit of economic objectives only. The social 
rationality approach argues that it is the social dimensions, such as the application, 
management and distribution of the technology that are most crucial in deciding 
whether or not a new technology is necessary. Hence, the general tendency is to 
support regulations which encourage technological precaution and which are capable 
of responding to broader social concerns about new technology beyond just the 
potential economic benefits (Beck, 1992). Contrasting the two perspectives then, the 
social perspective supports social rationality and technological precaution over the 
scientific rationality and technological progress supported by the economic 
perspective.
With respect to the international integration of regulations, a key concern of 
(but not limited to) the social perspective lies with the impact of integration upon the 
policy autonomy of the nation-state -  as the primary regulatory jurisdiction -  to 
support its own unique normative social construct. Does international integration 
strengthen or weaken the sovereignty and authority of the nation-state? With respect 
to the former, it has been argued that increased integration is not necessarily an 
internationalisation of the nation-state, but rather a domestication of the international 
arena; strengthening the social authority of the nation-state (Hanreider, 1978; in 
Picciotto, 1996). This comes about because integration is based on a shared normative 
social framework (Milward, 1992), possibly promoting a regional or even global 
normative framework (Global Governance, 1995). On the other hand, it has been 
argued that the social authority of the regulatory jurisdiction is eroded as nation-states 
accept limits on their power (Dezalay, 1996; Picciotto, 1996) and adopt an 
increasingly top-down framework reflecting the economic perspective, unaccountable 
to the domestic political process and insensitive to the unique political economy 
factors of particular regulatory jurisdictions (Giddens, 1985).
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Given the ambiguous impact of integration on the policy autonomy of the 
nation-state it is important to assess the social rationales for integration, that is, why 
would international integration be supported at all? A fundamental rationale is the 
‘neo-functional’ rationale, which posits that integration promotes interdependence, 
and can facilitate broader global stability and security objectives (Frost, 1998). To 
achieve this goal, economic and social integration are promoted by policy networks 
(Keck and Sikkink, 1994), epistemic communities (Haas et al., 1992) and by an 
emerging global civil society (Lipschutz, 1992).
Another rationale to pursue deeper social integration is to address social 
externality issues or ‘regulatory universals’ (Dezalay, 1996), such as food safety and 
environmental protection. Social externality issues are those whose impact is felt 
beyond the borders of the nation-state. Food products are widely traded and it is 
common for a consumption bundle to include foreign produced goods. Similarly, 
environmental degradation ignores political boundaries and often has international 
consequences. Social integration is proposed as a method for ensuring that the 
externalities created in a foreign jurisdiction but which impact the domestic 
jurisdiction are dealt with rather than left to the forces of international economic 
integration. This can include methods to enhance the co-ordination of divergent food 
safety and environmental protection regulations among regulatory jurisdictions. It is 
important to note that the implication of defining social externality issues or 
regulatory universals is that it fragments social regulations into two categories. The 
first is, of course, the social regulations addressing externality issues. The second is 
social regulations addressing exclusively domestic normative preferences such as 
moral, ethical and religious concerns. The importance of this categorisation of social 
regulatory barriers is that social externality regulations are more likely to be 
internationally integrated than exclusively domestic normative social regulations. 
Hence, it is important to identify the type of social regulations causing the regulatory 
barriers when assessing the propensity for integration.
An important aspect of the social perspective is that it generally supports either 
a deeper regulatory integration between nation-states than that supported by the 
international economic integration approach or no integration at all. This support is 
rooted in an increasingly popular dichotomy suggesting that a nation-state can pursue 
either greater international economic integration through liberalised trading 
arrangements or it can pursue stringent domestic social regulations, but not both
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(Garvey, 1995). That is, this dichotomy views these objectives as mutually exclusive 
where increased trade liberalisation must produce decreased social regulatory 
protection. It views economic integration only as a negative, corrosive force that 
imposes market competition upon non-market, social dimensions. Further, it is argued 
that because non-market, social dimensions are improperly valued in the economic 
perspective, international economic integration leads to a social regulatory race to the 
bottom (Drache, 1996).
The reason for this negative view is that the social perspective does not 
consider the international economic integration approach of trade diplomacy to be de­
politicised. On the contrary, it is argued that the economic integration is in fact a 
highly interventionist form of governance which imposes neo-liberal economic 
policies onto national governments for the benefit of only a minority of international 
capitalist entrepreneurs (Dezalay, 1996). Further, it puts social polices beyond the 
authority of domestic governments (Langille, 1996). It has been argued that the 
international trade regime represents subversive liberalism (Rhodes, 1994), symbolic 
imperialism (Dezalay, 1996), and global unilateralism (Strange, 1986; Whitman,
1984) of the neo-liberal economic perspective.
The social perspective’s rejection of international economic integration creates 
a propensity to support social protectionism; regulatory regionalism based on social 
values and concerns where jurisdictions cluster together to fend off the influence of 
international economic integration. Two general implications of social regulatory 
regionalism may be identified. First, in order to establish a regional regulatory 
integration approach Winters (1994) argued that the block must adopt the most 
precautionary position of the most hesitant, anti-integrationist member. This 
implication is especially important when considering integrating the various 
regulations for the risks of new technologies. Second, as social regulations are income 
elastic, regulatory regionalism is inherently exclusionist as it excludes less developed 
countries without the same level of income (Wang and Caswell, 1997). In short, it has 
been argued that social regulatory regionalism represents social protectionism that 
represents a stumbling block for multilateral regulatory integration.
In order to deal with social regulatory barriers and to develop a global or 
regional normative framework, the social perspective proposes that a co-ordinated 
approach to regulatory integration must be employed. The regulatory co-ordination 
strategy of integration is associated with the ‘fair traders’ school of trade theory (van
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Scherpenberg, 1998). This strategy supports ex ante bilateral, plurilateral or 
multilateral efforts to level the social regulatory playing field. This is predicated on 
the belief that centralised regulatory approaches enhance welfare by explicitly 
addressing social dimensions rather than leaving them to the forces of economic 
competition. Crucially, regulatory co-ordination is a conciliatory or cooperative 
approach to overcoming divergent social regulatory barriers emphasizing shared 
objectives and establishing social regulatory floors -  preventing a regulatory race to 
the bottom. If deeper social integration cannot be pursued, then the social perspective 
supports a rejection of international integration based only on regulatory competition. 
For instance, the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 1998 and the 
launch of a round of trade negotiations at the WTO Ministerial 1999 in Seattle were 
prevented in part by the influence of social interest groups who refused to support an 
integration agreement that was limited to international economic integration only.
In short, the social perspective suggests that regulatory development should 
focus on technological precaution and social responsiveness according to a social 
rationality approach, while regulatory integration should pursue social integration 
according to the regulatory co-ordination paradigm. The result is the creation of a 
socially rational approach to the international regulation of social externalities such as 
food safety and environmental protection.
1.2.3 Regulatory Development and Integration
An important similarity between the two perspectives discussed above is that 
the nation-state retains social regulatory autonomy or sovereignty. Yet, Table 1.1 
reveals crucial differences between the economic and the social perspectives. The 
economic perspective supports regulatory development and integration focused on 
economic market efficiency and technological progress through a de-politicised and 
de-centralised process of international economic integration through regulatory 
competition. The social perspective supports regulatory development and integration 
based on social principles of meeting non-market public preferences, expectations, 
concerns and fears.
The challenge of social regulatory barriers to traditional trade diplomacy 
emerges because the economic perspective has dominated trade diplomacy while the 
social perspective dominates social regulations such as food safety and environmental 
protection regulations. Given that the trade diplomacy challenge is to reconcile the
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economic and the social perspectives, the objective now is to examine ways to 
encourage a stable regulatory framework and an effective regulatory integration 
strategy that appropriately acknowledges the social dimensions of the social 
regulatory barriers.
Economic Perspective Social Perspective
Regulatory Development Scientific rationality approach Social rationality approach
Focus: correcting market failure Focus: social responsiveness
Technological progress Technological precaution
Regulatory Integration Economic integration Social integration
Regulatory competition Regulatory co-ordination
Table 1.1: Comparison of Economic and Social Perspectives
With respect to developing a stable regulatory framework and subsequent 
regulations, a jurisdiction must find some way to balance the scientific rationality 
approach of the economic perspective and its calls for technological progress, with the 
social rationality approach of the social perspective and its calls for technological 
precaution. Can the Risk Analysis Framework be used to achieve this balance?
Despite the polarity between the two perspectives, it will be argued that the scientific 
rationality and the social rationality approaches may be integrated to form an effective 
Risk Analysis approach. Beck (1992) argued “scientific rationality without social 
rationality remains empty, but social rationality without scientific rationality remains 
blind”. Building on this position, this study will explore ways to employ the Risk 
Analysis Framework in the development of GM crop regulations in a manner that 
effectively acknowledges the competing interests and balances technological progress 
with technological precaution.
With respect to creating an effective integration strategy that accounts for both 
the economic and the social perspectives, a regulatory jurisdiction faces three 
integration parameters (Fig. 1.2). First, the regulatory jurisdiction must establish the 
level of integration to be pursued; regional (bilateral or plurilateral) or global 
(multilateral). Second, the regulatory jurisdiction must choose the depth of integration 
to be pursued; shallow economic integration or deeper social integration. Third, the 
regulatory jurisdiction must choose what type of integration or convergence strategy 
to pursue; the regulatory competition approach or the regulatory co-ordination 
approach. The various integration approaches along with some examples of each are 
















Fig. 1.2: Integration Parameters of the Regulatory Jurisdiction
There are two crucial and interrelated domestic factors influencing the 
integration approach adopted the regulatory jurisdiction. First, the traditional 
regulatory role of the state will influence the regulatory framework developed 
(Woolcock, 1998) and this influences the integration approach pursued. Generally, if 
the regulatory tradition is closely associated with the economic perspective, then it is 
likely that shallow economic integration based on regulatory competition will be the 
preferred approach (area A in Fig. 1.2). In contrast, if the regulatory tradition is 
closely associated with the social perspective, then it is likely that deeper social 
integration based on regulatory co-ordination will be the preferred approach (area D in 
Fig. 1.2).
Second, competitiveness of the jurisdiction is important or in other words, the 
integration approach is case specific. If, for instance, the regulatory jurisdiction 
enjoys a commercialisation lead and competitive advantage in a particular regulatory 
area, then it is likely that they will have well-developed regulations which domestic 
firms have already internalised so that the regulations of other jurisdictions will not be 
difficult to comply with. In this case, it is likely that the regulatory jurisdiction will 
support international economic integration according to regulatory competition. 
Alternatively, if the regulatory jurisdiction is at a commercial lag or competitive 
disadvantage vis-a-vis other jurisdictions it may be unlikely that it will have 
regulations well-developed enough to deal with the influx of advanced foreign 
technologies. In this case, it is likely that the regulatory jurisdiction will support social 
integration according to regulatory co-ordination as protection from the new 
technology and the competitive foreign products.
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A Aim is to facilitate economic integration according to the national treatment principle in order to 
allow decentralised market activity to achieve economically efficient and optimal outcomes.
This is the approach employed in international and regional economic analysis of customs 
unions and free trade areas (Grimwade, 1996; Jovanovic, 1998 a-e).
I: Multilateral: The traditional trade diplomacy framework exemplified by the GATT/WTO 
trade regime.
II: Regional examples include: Association of South-East Asian Nations Free Trade Area 
(ASEAN FTA); North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), Caribbean Economic Community 
(CARICOM); the former European Free Trade Area (EFTA); Mercad Comun del Sur 
(MERCOSUR); and the 1995 proposal for a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA).
B Aim is to facilitate economic integration (multilateral or regional) by co-ordinating divergent 
regulations in order to develop a common framework, thus removing market failures and access 
barriers and allowing decentralised markets to achieve economically efficient and optimal 
outcomes.
I: Multilateral examples include the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary 
Measures which attempts to remove domestic regulatory barriers for food safety by co­
ordinating regulations within international standards-setting organisations such as the Codex 
Alimentarius (see Chapter 3.2. l.C).
II: Regional examples include: the EU-US Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) 1995 
which is a forum for commercial interests to identify regulatory barriers; the Canada-EC 
Framework Agreement for Commercial and Economic Co-operation 1976; and the EC-Canada 
Trade Initiative (ECTI) 1998.
C Aim is to transform the market to ‘internalise’ or appropriately value traditionally non-market, 
social objectives so that decentralised market activity can achieve efficient and optimal 
outcomes.
I: Multilateral examples include: academic literature food economics (Spriggs and Isaac, In 
Press; Caswell, 1999; Perdikis et al., 1999; Caswell and Henson, 1997), environmental 
economics (Siebert, 1991: Paul, 1996; Swanson, 1997), labour standards (Langille, 1996)
II: Regional examples include: academic literature on corporate law (Carney, 1996; McCahery 
and Bratton, 1996; Romano, 1996) and the New Transatlantic Marketplace (NTM) initiative 
1995 and the follow-up Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) initiative 1998 which outline 
a transatlantic commitment to liberal market objectives as a stepping stone for multilateral 
integration.
D Aim is to develop a global or regional normative social construct through co-operative, ex ante 
co-ordination of domestic economic and social regulations.
I: Multilateral examples include: the overall mandate of the UN; the UNEP’s Biosafety 
Protocol (Isaac and Phillips 1999a,b and see Chapter 4.2); Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Basel Convention on Hazardous Waste (see 
Chapter 3.2.2.A); and efforts of international organisations including the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO).
II: Regional examples include: the EU Eco-Labelling Scheme (Isaac and Woolcock, 1999); the 
Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue (TACD) 1998; the Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue 
(TAED) 1998; the proposed 1995 EU-US Transatlantic Treaty; the Transatlantic Declaration on 
EC-Canada Relations 1990; and the EU-Canada Joint Political Declaration and Action Plan 
1996.
Table 1.2: Summary of Integration Parameters: Approaches and Examples
Clearly, there is a synergistic relationship between these two factors. A 
regulatory jurisdiction may enjoy a commercialisation lead because its traditional 
regulatory role supported technological progress and this technological progress may 
have brought tangible benefits that encouraged a regulatory framework even more 
congruent with technological progress. Moreover, as a result of these two factors there 
is a path-dependency aspect of the development of a regulatory framework and the
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subsequent support for a regulatory integration strategy. The various political 
economy factors (i.e. the economic and social interests) within a regulatory 
jurisdiction establish a trajectory for the regulatory framework that determines the 
type of regulatory integration strategy that can be adopted. Deviating from this 
trajectory can be very difficult.
The integration approaches and examples summarised in Table 1.2 are 
generalisations because, in reality, it is difficult to find a regulatory integration 
example that fits entirely into each category. Perhaps the most illustrative example is 
the regional integration of the European Union (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
7). The EU-style regulatory integration, set out in the 1985 White Paper on the Single 
European Market (European Commission, 1985), pursues both economic and social 
integration according to a blended strategy of regulatory co-ordination and regulatory 
competition (Woolcock, 1996). In fact, the EU-style integration straddles IIC and IID 
in Fig. 1.2.
Yet, despite its generalised nature, this conceptual model of integration is 
useful in capturing the complexity of the task of addressing social regulatory barriers. 
It reveals that traditional international trade diplomacy (IA in Fig. 1.2) is actually only 
a very narrow approach to regulatory development and integration that deliberately 
omits a significant array of issues and concerns raised by social regulatory barriers; 
especially its omission of the social perspective. As social regulatory barriers are 
inextricably linked to the social perspective and to the regulatory development 
process, this omission is completely unsustainable.
1.3 Social Regulatory Barriers: A Case Study
This research examines this fundamental shortcoming of traditional trade 
diplomacy through a case study of a current and complex issue -  the transatlantic 
trade of GM crops. This case study represents the conflict between the economic and 
the social perspectives on regulatory development and integration. The thesis is that 
social regulatory barriers can only be addressed through a regulatory integration 
strategy that acceptably accounts for the social perspective driving the development of 
social regulations. In other words, in order to remain a viable force in international 
integration, trade diplomacy must be amended. Yet, this study also goes beyond just 
comprehensively identifying a problem. In Chapter Eight, it also brings together the 
previous sections in order to propose a trade diplomacy approach that, although
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reaching deep into areas of national competence, is congruent with a stable, 
operational and socially acceptable regulatory framework capable of overcoming 
regulatory regionalism and social regulatory barriers to trade.
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CHAPTER TWO AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
Modem biotechnology represents very sophisticated technological innovations 
at the frontiers of science embedded with economic and social implications. It 
involves techniques capable of altering the functions and characteristics of living 
organisms. As its application across medical, pharmaceutical, chemical, forestry, 
fishery, environmental and agricultural uses is rapidly growing, the potential 
economic implications of modem biotechnology upon the industrial landscape are 
enormous. Specifically, modem agricultural biotechnology has already been used to 
alter the function and characteristics of agricultural crops and considerable research is 
underway aimed at applying the techniques to an increasing range of agricultural 
crops. Yet, while applications in other sectors have been readily accepted, agricultural 
biotechnology has been controversial.
The objective of this chapter is to define what is meant by ‘genetically 
modified’ agricultural crops, to describe both current and future applications and to 
assess the factors that have made the consumer acceptance of GM crops controversial. 
There are two important caveats. First, this description is not intended as a 
comprehensive introduction to biotechnology (see Grace, 1997; Ho, 1998; Krimsky 
and Wrubel, 1996; McHughen, 2000; Wartburg and Liew, 1999). Second, the science 
is discussed to the extent necessary to provide background to the regulatory policy 
debates involving various interest groups within regulatory jurisdictions.
2.1 Modern Biotechnology and Agricultural Crops
Although this study is focused on the social implications of science, it is 
necessary to provide a brief description of the science of modem agricultural 
biotechnology because it is clear that there is a broad ignorance of what genetically 
modified (GM) crops are, and perhaps more importantly, what they are not. While 
every effort is made to keep this section brief an understanding of GM crops is a 
cmcial prerequisite for any credible assessment of appropriate regulatory approaches.
2.1.1 The Science
Attempts to enhance the desirable characteristics of agricultural crops and to 
limit the expression of undesirable characteristics have always been an objective of 
agricultural production (Kenney, 1986). These attempts developed into sophisticated
39
techniques of plant breeding with the result that highly specialised crops were 
developed to meet a diverse range of human needs and ecological conditions. 
Although successful in developing increasingly useful agricultural crops, plant- 
breeding techniques were time-intensive and plant breeders lacked the specific 
knowledge of how characteristics were really expressed in the crops. As a result, there 
was a significant degree of uncertainty in the trial and error approach to varietal 
development. For instance, the hybridisation of com through traditional plant breeding 
took 20 years and involved several iterative steps (Harlander, 1993). First, two 
parental varieties with desirable characteristics were crossed to produce seeds. The 
off-spring were then grown-out in field trials to identify those plants that expressed 
the desired characteristic, while those that did not were discarded. Next, the desirable 
off-spring were back-crossed with the parents to further isolate the desirable traits.
This trial and error approach to traditional plant breeding continued until a desired 
hybrid variety was produced.
Modem agricultural biotechnology is differentiated from traditional plant 
breeding techniques because it combines the knowledge of the role of genetics in the 
expression of characteristics with the techniques and procedures capable of modifying 
the genetic make-up in order to modify the characteristics. This is primarily the role of 
molecular and cellular biology where the former is “the study of DNA” and the latter 
is “the study of the structure and function of living cells” (Barton, 1998).
The key to genetic modifications is that all organisms interpret DNA in the 
same way. In this sense, all organisms are related (Office of Technology Assessment, 
1984; Barton, 1998). However, sexual compatibility for the most part limits genetic 
transfer. Traditional plant breeding techniques, such as the hybridisation of com, 
attempted to isolate the expression of desirable characteristics by controlling the 
sexual reproduction of crops. Modem biotechnology allows plant breeders to isolate 
and control genetic traits at a much more specific level. The term genetic modification 
(GM) has been used widely to refer to all biotechnologies, there is, in fact, an 
important distinction. In genetic modification, the DNA of an organism is altered so as 
to produce some desired result but no ‘foreign’ DNA is added. In transgenic 
modification, DNA is actually transferred between organisms. Sequences of DNA are 
isolated in an organism, using techniques of molecular markers, and cut from an 
organism using restriction enzymes. These enzymes recognize certain sequences of 
DNA according to their nitrogenous bases. Once the pieces of DNA are cut from an
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organism, they then must be pasted into the DNA of another organism. There are three 
techniques for importing and pasting specific pieces of DNA (Fincham and Ravetz, 
1991). The first technique is employing a bacteria vector, such as the common Agro­
bacterium technique where desirable DNA is pasted into the bacteria, which then 
transfers inside the target cell. Similar in operation is the second technique, employing 
a virus vector. The disease symptoms and infectivity material of the virus are 
removed, but not its function for initial infections and replication. The third technique, 
is a vectorless technique, such as the ‘gene-gun’ where tungsten bullets coated with 
the desirable DNA are shot into the target cell. In contrast to the sexual transfer of the 
entire genetic blueprint all at once, as in traditional plant breeding, transgenic 
modifications can be quite precise and can circumvent the sexual compatibility 
limitation (Cape, 1986). Following the standard practice, genetic modification (GM) 
will be used synonymously with transgenic modification unless otherwise specified.
When the genetic modification is complete, other biotechnology techniques 
may be employed to assist the development of the genetically modified organism, 
such as tissue culture techniques and gene mapping or gene tracking techniques 
(Fincham and Ravetz, 1991; Harlander, 1993). Tissue culture techniques are 
essentially a conventional practice of traditional plant breeding, but with some 
improvement. The cells, with the transgenic modification are cultured into seeds and 
contained growth trials are performed to assess the viability of the transgenic variety. 
This is followed by controlled field trials performed to assess whether or not the 
transgenic variety expresses the desired characteristics. Gene-mapping and gene- 
tracking techniques allow plant breeders to identify if the desired transgenic 
modification is present in the target cells and seeds without having to grow out the 
seeds in field trials (Barton, 1998). One common, but controversial method is to use 
an antibiotic resistant marker gene to identify the desired genes. Cells are cultured in 
an environment of antibiotic, and only those that survive would have retained the 
gene1. Gene-mapping both decreases the need for field trials and, hence, decreases the 
risk of release of unwanted transgenic varieties because the desired traits will be 
identified in the seeds prior to the field trial.
1 Fincham and Ravetz (1991) argue that although the antibiotic resistant marker gene has been the most 
widley used, it is not the only gene-mapping technique available. Others include polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR) technique and Beta-glucuronidase (a blue pigment for ‘visual’ mapping)
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The point is that modem biotechnology is really a package of techniques 
allowing for the varietal development of agricultural crops at a more precise and 
perhaps more controlled level than ever before. It is a process or production technique 
with the power to alter conventional genetic processes creating GM varieties of 
traditional agricultural crops or creating novel GM varieties never before 
characterised.
This is not to say that there is no uncertainty with these techniques. Indeed 
there still exists considerable uncertainty with gene functions yet this uncertainty 
exists with traditional plant breeding as well. Modem biotechnology, however, offers 
the plant developer far more control over varietal development than that possible with 
traditional plant breeding techniques because the genes are known to the scientist and 
can be tracked in the cells of the GM crop. In fact, due to this precision, it has been 
argued that transgenic modifications are safer and more controlled than traditional 
plant breeding techniques which manipulate the entire genome of the parents, rather 
than just specific genes (van den Daele et al., 1997; Harlander, 1993; Hullar, 1993).
2.1.2 Current and Future Applications of Agricultural Biotechnology
The application of modem biotechnology to agricultural crops can generally be 
categorised into three types: production trait applications, output trait applications, and 
applications to create Bio-Engineered products (Brenner, 1998) . These three 
categories will be described below. The first type of application is currently the most 
widespread while applications to output trait applications or Bio-Engineered products 
are indicative of the future of GM crops.
Production trait applications of agricultural biotechnology represent a 
scientific response to long-standing agricultural problems, which had traditionally 
been addressed through domestic agricultural support programs. Agricultural 
production has always been a risky venture, characterised by a significant degree of 
possible variation in crop quantity (yield) and quality each year. The risks to the 
quantity and quality of agricultural production are from the weather (i.e. drought,
2 Other categorisations include: D. Zilbermann et al, (1997), ‘Agricultural Biotechnology: Economic 
and International Implications’ (Sacramento: Contributed Paper, XXII Conference of IAAE) supply- 
enhancing, pest-control, quality-modifying, new products; and S. Shimoda (1997), ‘The Biotechnology- 
Driven Transformation of Agriculture’, (Sacramento: Contributed Paper, XXII Conference of IAAE) 
input traits, output traits, performance traits. Although different, these categorisations indicate that 
modem biotechnology can either enhance conventional traits or create wholly new ones in agricultural 
crops.
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floods, hail, and frost), from soil conditions (i.e. salinity, nitrogen depletion, and 
erosion), from disease (i.e. rot, fimgal and rust), and from pests (i.e. bacteria, virus, 
nematodes, insects and animals). In both North America and Europe, various and 
financially significant domestic support policies are employed to stabilise the 
agricultural sector in the face of this risk.
GM crops provide scientific solutions to agricultural production risk through 
attempts to improve the production traits of agricultural crops. For instance, new GM 
varieties of conventional crops have been created (or are being developed) with a 
higher degree of stress tolerance to ecological conditions and with a higher degree of 
resistance to pests and disease.
Two of the most common production trait modifications are herbicide 
tolerance and insect resistance, traits which are targeted for the intensive agricultural 
system. With respect to herbicide tolerance, GM crops have been transgenically 
modified with a gene found in a soil bacteria that is able to metabolise (digest) the 
non-selective, broad spectrum herbicide glufosinate, rather than be destroyed by it 
(Moschini et al., 1999). With respect to insect resistance, several agricultural crops 
such as com and cotton have been transgenically modified to express the pesticidal 
characteristics of Bacillus turingiensis (Bt), a soil micro-organism that produces a 
protein toxic to certain insects (Harlander, 1993).
Production trait applications were the most common GM crops up to the 1999 
crop season (James, 1997; 1998; 1999). It has been estimated by Monsanto that global 
production of GM crops will involve over 98.5 million acres. Of these applications, 
most are single-trait stacking modifications whereby the genetic material for, say 
herbicide tolerance, is transferred creating a GM variety that is herbicide tolerant. The 
two most frequent single-trait stacking modifications were for herbicide tolerance and 
insect resistance. However, multi-trait stacking modifications represent the future of 
production trait GM varieties (Brenner, 1998). That is, transferring the genetic 
material for, say herbicide tolerance, insect resistance and vims resistance, to one 
plant organism creating a GM variety that simultaneously expresses the three desired 
traits. At the same time, new agricultural crops will be subject to production trait 
applications. Therefore, production trait applications will both deepen, with multi-trait 
stacking, and widen, include new crops without current GM varieties.
There are two important aspects of production trait applications. The first is 
that they do not require the adoption of new agronomic practices or farm implements.
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They can be produced within the traditional agricultural production system, although 
they may require changes in the chemical regimes. The second is that since the end- 
attributes of the GM varieties remain the same or ‘substantially equivalent’ to 
conventional non-GM varieties, they are both for the same end-use and sold into the 
same processing and distribution system as non-GM varieties and it is virtually 
impossible to distinguish between the two in the agricultural distribution system. In 
short, production trait GM crops have been developed to fit into the traditional 
agricultural commodity supply system.
The second broad type are output trait applications targeting those commercial 
characteristics of the crop that determine its value, in order to increase value by 
increasing the expression of the desirable characteristics. Improving crops to enhance 
value may be viewed as a scientific response to the problem of crop quality. GM 
varieties of crops are being customised to meet the specific demands of end-users, 
such as livestock feeders, food processors or industrial users, who may place a 
premium on high quality products. High quality characteristics include improved 
nutritional content (i.e. protein and oils), flavour, or the functionality of the crops such 
as delayed ripening or rotting. Functionality can also include enhanced processing 
characteristics such as ease of separation of fibres, oils, starches, sugars and proteins 
(Brenner, 1998), where increased processing ease would translate into decreased 
energy requirements.
Similar to the production trait applications, output trait applications do not 
require the adoption of new agronomic practices or massive investment in new 
agricultural implements. These varieties may be produced according to traditional 
agronomic practices. Unlike production trait applications, they do require changes in 
the distribution of agricultural commodities. These varieties have end-attributes that 
need to be differentiated from the conventional varieties in order to capture the value 
premium. Output trait applications create incentives for more active management of 
the crop distribution system through segregation. However, this degree of specificity 
is not yet part of the supply-chain. In fact, in North America, improved output traits 
made up less than 1% of total acreage of GM crops in both 1997 and 1998 (James 
1999), in part because the bulk nature of the agricultural commodity distribution 
system makes it difficult to ensure segregation between the desired varieties and other 
varieties without some sort of price premium.
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The third broad type of agricultural biotechnology application is to create Bio- 
Engineered products. Brenner (1998) suggests that with Bio-Engineered products “the 
power of sunlight and plant physiology are harnessed to replace expensive chemical 
synthesis processes”. Such applications would have industrial uses far beyond 
traditional agricultural products. Yet, Brenner (1998) also notes that such applications 
demand a level of biotechnological sophistication much more advanced than the 
current generations of single- and multi-trait stacked GM varieties.
Bio-Engineered GM varieties would be entirely novel, rather than just 
improvements to conventional varieties. For instance, in the pharmaceutical sector, 
such applications, known as ‘pharming’, would allow agricultural crops to be used as 
bio-factories producing high-value pharmaceuticals or edible vaccines that are 
currently produced using relatively expensive chemical synthesis processes, 
decreasing the use of chemicals. As well, agricultural biotechnology may be employed 
for high-tech nutritive fortification of foods designed for health care and disease 
prevention, essentially becoming nutriceuticals. For instance, a current research 
initiative involves the transgenic modification of potatoes with Cholera B toxin. 
Consumption of the novel GM product creates the production of human cholera 
resistance antibodies. Other edible vaccines include GM crops with enhanced cancer 
fighting anti-oxidants, probiotics and prebiotics. Another example is the nutritionally 
enhanced Vitamin A GM rice developed to address the serious Vitamin A deficiency 
in Thailand and other South-East Asian countries. Finally, an entirely industrial 
application of agricultural biotechnology would be the creation of plant-based 
polymers replacing petroleum-based polymers currently used in synthetic fibres, 
plastics and even fuels (Brenner, 1998). An example of this is a plant based credit card 
developed by Monsanto and endorsed by Greenpeace in Europe as an alternative to 
plastic credit cards (Globe and Mail, 1998). The potential benefit is the creation of 
completely bio-degradable polymers3.
Unlike production or output trait GM varieties, Bio-Engineered products 
would require substantially different agronomic practices. Also, to ensure that such 
crops grown for industrial non-food uses are kept out of the food supply, Bio-
3 Even one the most ardent critics of modem biotechnology, Jeremy Rifkin, views this potential 
contribution as beneficial. “The biotech age.. .holds great promise: a cornucopia of new plants and 
animals to feed a hungry world.. .and new genetically engineered sources of energy and fibre to propel 
commerce and build and ‘renewable society’” (Rifkin, 1998).
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Engineered products would require an effective segregation and identity preservation 
production system.
' Despite the potential of output trait applications and Bio-Engineered GM 
products, there are limits to what agricultural biotechnology can achieve. For instance, 
it has been argued that “no scientists will be able to take a tomato, add 20 genes from 
a cow and 30 genes from wheat, and come up with a crop that has the nutritional 
qualities of beef and bread.”(Brill, 1988 in Wiegle, 1991). Further, the challenge 
facing crop developers is not how to prevent GM crops from getting out of control, 
but rather, how to develop GM crops that are viable enough to grow within the 
agricultural system -  the very same problem that faced traditional plant breeders as 
well.
This brief examination of the current and future applications of agricultural 
biotechnology has revealed several important features. First, it appears that 
agricultural biotechnology is, in fact, poised to deepen and broaden its impact upon 
economic production. Second, it has been revealed that agricultural biotechnology and 
rDNA techniques represent another phase in the knowledge-intensification of 
agricultural production. Third, it has also been revealed that current applications of 
agricultural biotechnology are not significantly novel applications. Instead, they are 
more modest applications, incrementally made and very much in keeping with the 
systematic varietal development process characteristic of plant breeding.
From the point of view of regulatory policy development and integration there 
are four important distinctions to identify. First, not all genetic modifications are 
transgenic modifications. From a plant perspective, transgenic modifications, as 
discussed above, involve the transfer of genetic material between plants or other 
organisms. However, some modifications, such as antisense modifications4 and 
mutagenesis5, only alter the genetic material within a plant’s cell in order to achieve 
desired results, therefore there is no transfer of genetic material. It appears that the 
greatest opposition to genetically modified crops is actually directed at transgenically 
modified crops where genes from sexually incompatible organisms are combined. It is
4 From Harlander (1993); antisense modifications involve ‘switching-off the function of certain genes 
within the organism’s genome in order to produce desired affects e.g. the ripening genes in Monsanto’s 
FLAVR SAVR tomato had been selectively inactivated.
5 From Harlander (1993); mutagenesis involves exposing seeds to a mutagenic agent 
(ethylmethylsulfonate or EMS) and then growing seeds out to select those resultant plants with desired 
traits. In this case, the genetic modification is a more random or imprecise process than transgenic
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important to disentangle genetic modification techniques from transgenic modification 
techniques because not all biotechnology applications are associated with those 
concerns that are really only relevant for transgenic modifications6.
The second important distinction is between a GMO and a living modified 
organism (LMO). A LMO is a sub-set of GMO in that it is a GMO that retains 
metabolic activity. For an example consider GM canola/rapeseed. As a seed, it is both, 
technically, a GM seed and a LMO because it remains capable of propagation.
Crushed into canola oil it is no longer capable of propagation and is no longer a LMO, 
yet it remains a derivative of a GM crop in the strictest sense (see the discussion on 
the Biosafety Protocol Chapter 4.2).
Third, GM crops are not always ‘novel’ plants. Novel plants, known as plants 
with novel traits (PNTs) are those for which a naturally occurring counterpart does not 
exist. PNTs may be created either through the use of biotechnology or through 
traditional plant breeding techniques. Hence, novel does not imply the use of 
biotechnology. GM crops do, however, imply the use of biotechnology since they 
have been genetically modified, although not every genetic modification creates a 
PNT. For instance, if genetic modification is used to develop a new com variety from 
two parental varieties, then the resultant GM com is not novel, in the sense that it does 
not express traits never before characterised in com varieties. Instead, it simply has 
enhanced com traits that have been combined from the parents.
Fourth, and arising from the third distinction, GM crops do not always produce 
GM foods. For example, the oil and lecithin of oilseeds such as soybean and canola 
are used widely in food processing, however, oil and lecithin do not contain DNA or 
protein. So, although they may be derived from GM varieties, they do not contain GM 
material and subsequent foods produced with these inputs are not GM foods. This 
distinction is made clear by an examination of the difficulties of testing a food 
ingredient or product for GM material (Hanley and Johnson, 1999). From a technical, 
testing perspective a researcher can either test for the GM DNA sequence or the 
presence of the introduced protein encoding for GM DNA. In the former, the test is 
accurate but sophisticated and time-consuming, as the investigator must know exactly 
what GM DNA sequence to look for. In the latter, the test is rapid but less
modifications with the deliberate environmental release of less well characterised plants, yet this 
method has not been controversial.
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sophisticated and less accurate as it relies upon the binding of an antibody to the 
introduced protein. The problem is that food processing easily breaks down the 
protein and can also degrade the DNA to the point where it can no longer be identified 
as a GM food. In fact, foods which have been processed (e.g. heated, fermented, 
acidified, extruded, or highly refined) generally have no GM DNA left in them or at 
least highly degraded GM DNA. If the GM DNA was no longer in its unique sequence 
encoding for the particular protein then there is no risk that a consumer is ingesting a 
harmful protein resulting from the genetic modification. An exception, of course, is 
crops that are eaten raw or unprocessed, for example, GM maize or GM tomatoes. In 
these two examples, the GM crops would produce GM foods. The point is that with 
the exception of foods eaten raw or unprocessed the general term ‘GM foods’ is often 
applied inaccurately and inappropriately.
The four distinctions are important in considering how to appropriately 
regulate GM crops. For instance, if public concern really lies with the transfer of 
genes between sexually incompatible organisms -  transgenic modification -  then 
regulations should target TGM crops, not all GM crops. If it is plant novelty that is the 
concern, then novel-based regulations are more appropriate than technology-based 
regulations. If the concern lies with the protein structure of genetically modified 
organisms, than the focus should only be on those products that still contain the GM 
DNA sequences. The distinction between GM crops and LMOs is crucial because, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 4.2) the Biosafety Protocol is an international treaty 
governing the transboundary movement of LMOs. Yet, unless GM crops are shipped 
in seed form and capable of propagation then they should not fall under the regulatory 
principles of this protocol. Therefore, understanding these important distinctions is 
vital in establishing regulatory approaches that respond to actual consumer concerns 
rather than approaches built on vague, ambiguous fears about a misunderstood 
application of modem agricultural biotechnology techniques.
2.2 Agricultural Biotechnology: An Overview of Consumer Acceptance
To this point the application of modem biotechnology to agricultural crops has 
been examined as a scientific, technological innovation that promises to have vast 
implications upon agricultural production. Yet, at the most basic conceptual level all
6 For an example of a failure to disentangle this important distinction see Sheppard (1997) where the 
concerns really only associated with transgenic modifications are cast across all GM techniques.
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production is for consumption and some consumers have not accepted GM because 
they remain unconvinced about the consumer benefits or because they have concerns 
or fears about the technology.
Consumers are not just economic agents but also social agents who vote and 
participate as citizens, ultimately shaping the national social and political context 
within which, economic forces operate. For instance, venture capitalists may not be 
willing to fund GM crop developers if it would be publicly unpopular7. Similarly, 
producers may be unwilling to plant GM crops if either they cannot market them or if 
they will be vandalised by eco-warriors. More importantly, however, consumers have 
enormous influence over the research, development and commercialisation of GM 
crops primarily through their influence upon regulatory approaches. Therefore, a 
critical assessment of the social implications of agricultural biotechnology must focus 
on the issue of consumer acceptance and its role in shaping the domestic regulatory 
approach and the nation’s regulatory integration strategy.
The objective of this section is to identify the predominant issues associated 
with the consumer acceptance of GM crops because these issues are cited by various 
interests groups active in the regulatory development process. While the issues are 
presented here in a descriptive fashion they will be the basis for assessing the 
economic (Chapter 3) and the social (Chapter 4) interests influencing GM crop 
regulations.
2.2.1 Agricultural Biotechnology and Consumer Concerns
There are four types of consumer concerns: economic concerns, human health 
and safety concerns, biodiversity concerns (including animal, plant and environment 
health), and moral, ethical and/or religious concerns. A synergistic relationship exists 
between the four types of consumer concerns. They may be positively related and 
mutually reinforce a particular consumer position. Inversely, they may be negatively 
related, forcing the consumer to strike a balance between benefits on the one hand (i.e. 
lower price or improved nutritive content) and costs on the other (i.e. a moral 
perception that genetic modification is unnatural or wrong).
7 In 1999, Deutsche Bank Europe predicted that biotechnology firms will become a ‘pariah’ of 
shareholders and will suffer an ‘earnings nightmare’, while GM crops will be a liability for fanners. 
Also, the Public Ledger (No. 72,139 25 October 1999) reports that Monsanto’s shares have slumped 




Economic consumer theory presents consumers as economic agents, driven by 
the principle of non-satiation, who consume normal goods based upon the attributes of 
the goods and subject to a budget constraint. The attributes of the good, price and 
quality, are relative variables that assist the consumer in choosing the consumption 
bundle which maximises consumer welfare or utility. Much economic analysis is 
focused on the price to determine the cost/benefit to consumers from the use of GM 
crops. If the use of a GM crop reduces the relative price of a normal good, then 
according to economic consumer theory, the consumer will choose to consume more 
of that good and, subsequently, consumer welfare or utility is increased through the 
use of GM crops (Hoban, 1996; Moschini et al., 1999). Similarly, if the use of GM 
crops leads to increase in the price of that good then consumer welfare or utility is 
decreased (Giannakis and Fulton, 2000).
Economic consumer concerns may also involve concerns about the broader 
economic impact of GM crops, which may positively or negatively influence 
acceptance. For instance, a high concentration of research capacity providing well 
paying high-technology jobs and creating economic spill-over, may enhance the 
perception that GM crops are associated with wider economic benefits. Similarly, 
improvements in productivity and income among the rural sector may also be 
considered by consumers to be an economic benefit, positively influencing consumer 
acceptance. Inversely, the broader economic impact of GM crops may negatively 
influence consumer acceptance. Three examples are illustrative of this. First, 
consumers may view GM crops as facilitating the further industrialisation of 
agriculture and being socially destructive because of the economic displacement of 
rural communities . Second, they may perceive that all the economic benefits are 
accruing to the large private multi-national firms developing GM crops or to farmers, 
with no benefit to consumers from the new technology. Third, economic consumer 
concerns may be associated with the potential economic impact of GM crops used for 
import substitution upon developing countries.
Human Safety and Health Concerns
8 Cited by Britain’s Prince Charles as a negative aspect of agricultural biotechnology (London Times,
29 October 1998).
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Apart from economic concerns, consumers are concerned about the human 
safety and health implications of GM crops. Human safety concerns refer to the short­
term absence of illness immediately after consumption, while human health concerns 
refer to the longer-term health implications such as cumulative nutritional impacts. 
Essentially, the fear is that genetic modifications will result in toxigenic, pathogenic, 
infective, or invasive changes to the plant affecting human safety and health. Also, a 
secondary human health concern associated with GM crops arises from the use of 
antibiotic resistance genes in gene-tracking procedures. It is a secondary concern 
because although there are no direct consequences on human safety or health from 
consuming such marker genes, the concern is that their use will increase the incidence 
of antibiotic resistance in bacteria that are harmful to humans. Such concerns 
negatively impact consumer acceptance.
Yet, GM crops with improved nutritional characteristics, such as the Cholera B 
potato or the Vitamin A rice can have positive impacts upon public health and may 
enhance consumer perception of agricultural biotechnology. Further, GM crops 
eliminating or reducing the need for herbicides and pesticides would have significant 
impacts upon human safety, health and various allergies and sensitivities.
Biodiversity Concerns
There are also consumer concerns associated with the potential impact of GM 
crops upon biodiversity, which can positively or negatively influence consumer 
acceptance. From a biodiversity point of view, a current international focus is on 
sustainable development9, which for agricultural purposes translates into sustainable 
agricultural production techniques. While GM crops can have negative impacts on 
sustainable agriculture and biodiversity, they can also have positive impacts (Bonny, 
1999).
Biodiversity concerns involve the perception that GM crops will result in 
toxigenic, pathogenic, infective, or invasive changes producing aggressive crops that 
disrupt the ecosystem. For instance, one argument suggests that the transgenic 
modifications could transfer to either conventional non-GM varieties of the same plant 
(the so-called invasion of origin concern) or to non-target plants and organisms
9 The Brundtland Report defines sustainable development as ‘development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED,
1987).
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through vector mediated horizontal gene transfer and recombination. It has been 
argued that genomes are dynamic and predisposed to incorporate foreign DNA 
(Wheale and McNally, 1990). In fact, some observers have made dire predictions of 
genetic pollution, habitat destruction and destabilisation of entire ecosystems brought 
on by aggressive GM crops (Ho, 1998; Rifkin, 1998). Other biodiversity concerns are 
associated with the fear that farmers producing herbicide resistant GM crops will 
apply herbicides in a reckless, irresponsible fashion in an attempt to control weeds, 
harming biodiversity (Consumers’ Choice Council, 1999)10. Such concerns negatively 
influence consumer acceptance of GM crops.
With respect to the potential biodiversity benefits of GM crops it has been 
argued by many supporters that the future of GM crops is essentially chemical-free 
production congruent with sustainable farming trends. Agricultural production free of 
herbicides, pesticides and fertilisers would have enormous benefits on biodiversity. 
GM crops, tailored to meet the ecological conditions of various regions could increase 
the range of alternative crops and crop varieties that producers could choose to plant. 
This development would break the trend of mono-cropping and result in increased 
biodiversity. As already discussed, the techniques of gene-mapping and gene-tracking 
can provide greater control over crop development and effectively limit the number of 
field trials required to determine if the phenotypic characteristics are present or not. 
Further, GM crop developers are exploring ways to lock-in or turn-off the transferred 
genes in GM crops to prevent genetic drift. Such developments should positively 
influence consumer acceptance of GM crops.
Moral, Ethical and Religious Concerns
The acceptance of GM crops is associated with moral, ethical and religious 
concerns because it involves the modification and manipulation of the processes of 
life. Survey evidence from both North America (Einseidel, 1997) and from Europe 
(Eurobarometre, 1997) suggests that consumer acceptance of modem biotechnology 
broadly and GM crops specifically, is significantly influenced by perceptions of the
10 See also the comments of Britain’s Prince Charles (London Times, 29 October 1998) which seems to 
reveal a contradiction. On one hand he argues that the farmer is the responsible steward of the land, 
while on the other, he argues that farmers cannot be trusted with herbicide tolerant crops because they 
will apply herbicide in a reckless fashion. However, in general this particular concern about the abuse 
of herbicides does not seem very robust for two reasons. First, herbicide use is a significant input cost 
for producers who will always seek to minimize this cost instead of over-spraying in a reckless fashion.
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moral and ethical aspects of the applications. Acceptance is found to be positively 
associated with those applications that are perceived to be morally beneficial. The 
Eurobarometre (1997) study concluded that;
first, usefulness is a precondition for support; second, people 
seem prepared to accept some risk as long as there is a 
perception o f usefulness and no moral concern; but third, and 
crucially, moral doubts act as a veto irrespective o f people’s 
views on use and risk.
Further, with respect to religious concerns, the Eurobarometre (1997) survey evidence 
has revealed that nearly 40% of respondents believe that religious authorities should 
be involved in the public policy discussions and decisions regarding biotechnology 
applications. While North American survey evidence has revealed that acceptance of 
agricultural biotechnology is negatively related, in part, to religious concern (Hoban, 
1997).
The morality and ethics of the application of GM technologies to agricultural 
crops is also called into doubt because of the scientific rationality approach being 
pursued primarily by the large multinational Life Sciences firms. In the past, 
scientists, through the peer review structure of scientific investigation and disclosure, 
have been trusted to protect social norms in the face of new technology on behalf of 
the general public. Ho (1998) argues that the shift from public leadership in research 
on biotechnology to private leadership is associated with several substantial normative 
problems. First, the scientific research by private firms is ‘reductionist’ in nature, that 
is, it employs specific transgenic modifications to a variety and only assesses impact 
upon that crop. It fails to assess the impact of the GM crop upon the biological system 
in which the crop operates; a so-called inclusionist approach. Second, the reductionist 
science supports a false dichotomy between science, as non-negotiable laws of nature, 
and technology, as the application of science. According to this dichotomy, science is 
value-free and only when it is applied as a technology does any associated normative 
issues emerge. This dichotomy is challenged by the argument that science is only a 
tool for understanding nature and the scientific research is inseparable from social 
norms and morals. Third, the reductionist, profit-seeking motives supporting the 
science -  technology dichotomy fail to address the public interest since science and
Second, in most cases, the wealth of the producer is embedded in the agricultural land and it is unlikely 
that the producer will recklessly jeopardize that wealth.
53
technology are pursued outside the public debate (often protected by proprietary 
claims). Only when the technology is to be commercialised is the public interest 
considered. Indeed, it has been argued that the profit-motive means that private 
scientists can no longer be trusted to act in a moral or socially ethical manner 
(Monbiot, 1995). This argument implies as well that the national economic drivers to 
develop an internationally competitive agricultural biotechnology capacity means that 
government regulators cannot be trusted either. Accordingly, the result is GM crops 
without public consent.
Others argue, however, that having moral or ethical concerns about GM crops 
is a luxury enjoyed by North American and European consumers and made possible 
by an ample and well-distributed food supply. It has been queried whether it is more 
unethical to gene transfer or to allow starvation in less developed countries where the 
choice is not between GM crops or non-GM crops based on moral concerns but 
between living and dying (Sahai, 1997). Similarly, it has been argued that it is 
“irresponsible and immoral for the well-fed to spearhead fear-based campaigns and 
suppress research for ideological and pseudo-scientific reasons” (Prakash, 1999). In 
addition, an 18-month study by a working group of the Nuffield Council (the leading 
UK body on bioethics) concluded that there was, in fact, a moral obligation to 
continue to develop GM crops because of their significant potential11. It concluded 
that there were no grounds for a ban on GM crops because they were not sufficiently 
different from conventional, non-GM crops and, hence, do not raise moral objections 
if conventional crops do not. Similarly, the Vatican’s Pontifical Academy for Life 
stated that the use of GM technology in agricultural crops should not raise moral 
alarm because the advantages are greater than the risks and that the Academy does not 
agree with those organisations who argue that GM crops are against the will of God 
(AgraFood Biotech, 1999).
An important feature of the four types of consumer concerns is that they tend 
to reflect a concern about the application of modem agricultural biotechnologies for 
specific uses, rather than a concern about the technology per se. This is vital in 
determining what type of regulatory approach is needed: a process/technology-based
11 See also MAFF. 1993. ‘Report of the Committee on the Ethics of Genetic Modification and Food 
Use (London: MAFF) which concluded that there was no overriding ethical objection of genetic 
modification in relation to the food chain, including the use of human genes in food production.
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approach or a product/application-based approach. These issues will be discussed 
further in Chapter 5. The important point to make is that GM crops are inextricably 
linked to a broad range of public concern. The question now is: how is consumer 
acceptance linked to these concerns?
2.2.2 Consumer Information, Trust and Choice
The four types of concerns represent consumption parameters in the sense that 
consumers require these concerns to be addressed prior to making a consumption 
decision. The objective now is to examine the events involved in the acceptance of 
advanced technologies such as GM crops.
Neo-classical economic consumer theory assumes that consumer concerns are 
completely addressed through the provision of information. According to the Rational 
Choice Model, the consumer has access to perfect information about all of the 
attributes of the products including information about the inputs, the processing and 
production techniques as well as the costs per unit to produce the good. Implicitly 
then, the consumer also has access to all the information necessary to address the 
other consumer concerns, beyond just economic concerns.
12Access to perfect information allows the consumer to make rational 
consumption choices, creating consumer sovereignty. Consumer sovereignty is the 
notion that the consumer is the best judge of the ramifications of consumption upon 
consumer concerns, and does not require market interventions to enhance judgment. A 
consumer may be rational even without perfect information, provided the consumer 
chooses to be partially informed. The consumer may choose this because, for instance, 
the time, effort or cost required to gain complete information is not justified by the 
perceived benefits of being fully informed. In this case, the consumer is boundedly 
rational (Williamson, 1987). Generally, bounded rationality requires that the consumer 
trusts the partial information being provided. This suggests an important relationship 
between information, trust and choice. Essentially, “trust can be a functional substitute 
for knowledge” (Eurobarometre, 1997) in making either complete or boundedly 
rational consumption decisions, and consumer sovereignty depends upon the retention 
of choice.
12 The concept of ‘rational’ is subject to interpretation. For instance, Rayner (1992) argues that it is a 
subjective term. Here it is used in the economic sense, as the efficient allocation of resources according 
to optimising behaviour.
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Are agricultural biotechnology products congruent with the Rational Choice 
Model of consumer theory? Do consumers have access to all the information 
necessary to make rational consumption decisions? Do consumers trust the 
information providers? Do consumers always retain choice? The answer to each 
question is no and, hence, recent negative consumer reaction to the commercialisation 
of GM crops should come as no surprise.
Consumer goods may be categorised into three types (Tirole, 1988). First, 
search goods, are those goods where consumers can visually identify all product 
attributes prior to purchase and consumption. With search goods all information about 
the good is effectively transferred from the producer to the consumer. Second, 
experience goods, are those goods where the consumer isn’t able to identify all 
product attributes prior to purchase and consumption. There is a partial breakdown in 
the transfer of information from the producer to the consumer at the time of purchase. 
Yet, the consumer can gain the necessary information through consumption 
experience. Third, credence goods, are those goods where the consumer is not able to 
know the full attributes of the product before or after consumption (Bureau et al., 
1997; Purchase, 1997). With credence goods there is a total breakdown in the transfer 
of information from the producer to the consumer; an information gap. Yet, because 
of consumer trust in those developing the goods (i.e. in scientists), there is ‘credence’ 
associated with them.
At the present time, GM crops are credence goods (Isaac and Phillips, 1999). 
Defining GM crops as credence goods is intuitive since there is a large information 
gap between producers and consumers. This is due to two factors. First, many 
consumers do not understand the scientific techniques and procedures of modem 
biotechnology. In fact, general knowledge about genetics is often lacking among 
many consumers, let alone specific knowledge about transgenic modifications to 
agricultural crops. For instance, a recent report by the European Commission revealed 
that two-thirds of those surveyed did not realise that non-GM tomatoes also have 
genes or DNA in them13. Second, with the dominant role of the private sector, much 
information may be deemed proprietary and not available to consumers. Further since 
the research and development that underlies the application of modem biotechnology
13 European Commission report published in January 1999, reported in the Financial Times (15 March 
1999). Given such a lack of understanding of GM crops, it is remarkable, for instance, that Patrick
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is advancing rapidly, the information gap, created by the credence nature of GM 
agricultural crops is likely to widen, not narrow.
The credence nature of goods may be remedied through the provision of 
information permitting credence goods to shift to experience and then search goods. 
Evidence in the US has shown that increasing consumer information about GM crops 
has positively influenced consumer acceptance (James, 1997). An important element 
of information is transparency as was shown in a recent referendum in Switzerland 
where consumers/voters were asked about their position on the continued support of 
biotechnology research and development. Consumer support and acceptance rose as 
the industries applying biotechnology adopted the strategy of opening up their 
activities to the public. Eventually, referendum results revealed that two-thirds of 
‘informed’ voters supported the continued research, development and application of 
biotechnology (European Federation of Biotechnology, 1998). However, transparency 
has not always been the chosen strategy of both supporters and critics of agricultural 
biotechnology, resulting in a dual lack of transparency (Economist, 1998). Both sides 
have, at times, failed to be completely transparent about the opportunities and risks, 
exacerbating the information gap and consequently, the credence nature of GM crops.
Yet, simply providing transparent information will not remedy all consumer 
concerns. The information must be useful but there are, however, several challenges to 
providing useful consumer information. First, providing all the information necessary 
for consumers to completely understand agricultural biotechnology is impossible 
given the scientific sophistication of agricultural biotechnology. Consumers would 
soon experience an over-load of information (Chess, 1998; Eurobarometre, 1997; 
Hoban, 1997). This occurs because there are important limitations to the consumer’s 
ability to process information. For instance, labels cannot be expected to convey all 
the information that consumers may want. Indeed, it has been argued that simply 
labelling a product as ‘genetically modified’ is meaningless because consumers want 
to know more contextualised information such as which genes have been used (Grove- 
White et al., 1997). Consumers must then rely upon the judgement of others and this 
gives rise to the second challenge, who should provide the useful information?
Without first hand knowledge of the consumption ramifications of GM crops, 
consumers must trust that their concerns are being adequately addressed by either the
Holden of the the UK-based Soil Association describes consumer rejection of GM crops as based on 
‘informed public opinion’ (Independent on Sunday, 3 October 1999).
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industry, regulators or by a third-party. In both North America (Hoban, 1997) and 
Europe (Eurobarometre, 1997; Grove-White et al., 1997) consumers have indicated 
that they most trust third-parties with information about GM crops, especially 
environmental organisations at the international level. Trust is a delicate attribute of 
information providers, as it is hard to build but easy to lose (Chess, 1998). However, 
opinions are very diverse ranging from those who believe in the global welfare 
promise of GM crops to those who wish to see the technology completely abandoned. 
The polarity of opinions producing overly sensationalised information can leave 
consumers very confused.
The third challenge of providing useful information is determining who the 
information should target? Essentially, is it practical to try to inform every consumer, 
or is it more practical to target information to a few, who can disseminate it to many? 
It has been argued that “instead of trying to educate the public, we should focus our 
attention on the media, health professionals and other opinion leaders” (Hoban, 1996). 
This position recognises that information must be accessible for the concerned 
consumer, and these are the information channels that they are most likely to turn to 
when seeking information.
A further problem remains for consumer acceptance of GM crops. Even if 
trusted information providers satisfactorily inform consumers, consumers may still 
lack consumer choice or ‘informed consent’14. For instance, the global handling and 
distribution system for agricultural crops is a bulk-oriented system that involves co- 
mingling of different varieties of the same crop and co-mingling of different crops. 
Within this existing system, it is virtually impossible to ensure segregation of 
production improved GM varieties from non-GM varieties. In order to ensure 
segregation dedicated handling and storage facilities must be used, resulting in cost 
increases. In fact, due to a purely economic decision, GM varieties approved as 
substantially equivalent to non-GM varieties were initially co-mingled in the food 
supply in both North America and Europe without effective segregation and labelling.
With respect to the decision not to segregate, GM crop developers in both the 
North American and the European grains and oilseeds industry, argued two main 
points. First, the GM crops had been approved as safe and substantially equivalent to 
non-GM varieties, so there were no safety reasons to segregate. Second, it was argued
14 See also Balk (1993) for a discussion of consumer choice, referred to as ‘Informed Consent’.
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that the distribution system made it virtually impossible to segregate, with zero 
tolerance, GM from non-GM crops without significant economic costs, a view shared 
by both US and European industry participants15. Economic studies concluded that the 
costs of segregating would be substantial. An experimental identity preserved 
production (IPP) system for GM canola varieties was implemented in Canada in 1995 
and 1996. From this experiment, it was concluded that an IPP system created 
incremental costs of between $C 34-37/Metric Tonnes for grains and oilseeds 
(Manitoba Pool Elevators, 1997). Other estimates concluded that developing and 
implementing an international IPP system would require a commodity price rise of 
between 140-180% (EuropaBio, 1997). In this sense, the decision not to segregate GM 
crops was not taken as a cunning strategy to push GM crops into the North American 
and European food supply. Instead, it was made on the basis of the economic cost of 
developing an effective IPP system and with the view that such rises in crop prices 
and, subsequently, food prices could not be absorbed by the industry and consumers.
Regardless of the industry’s intentions to keep prices down at a competitive 
level, the current controversy surrounding the segregation issue is indicative of the 
danger of treating consumers as mere economic agents and failing to address their 
broader concerns.
The biotechnology industry currently faces another important decision 
associated with consumer information and choice, this time over labelling. Again, the 
stance of industry and shared by Canada and the US is that, since labelling is not for 
safety reasons, economics should determine what type of labelling prevails. They 
argue that certifiably non-GM crops and food products should bear a voluntary label 
in pursuit of niche market-premiums. Consumers’ organisations, however, 
unanimously support labelling of any use of GM crops in the production of food 
products as a consumer right to know issue. For instance, 98% in Canada, 85% in the 
US, while in aggregate 74% of EU consumers have indicated that they want GM 
labelling even if the GM crop has been approved as safe16. The issue of labelling will
15 See: Agrevo (Nov. 1997); GAFTA, ( May 1997); Central Soya, (Dec. 1996); NOP A, (Dec. 1996); 
ASA, (Dec. 1996) and Sparks Companies, (Sept. 1996).
16 Based on survey summaries found at Consumers International (1999) General Surveys on Foods 
Produced Through Biotechnology (www.oneworld.org/consumers//campaigns/food/codex/ 
survey0499.html). In particular: Canada: Toronto Star Poll (2 June 1998) ‘Public Prefers Genetically 
Modified Foods to be Clearly Labelled’; U.S.: Hoban and Kendall (1992) ‘Consumer Attitudes about 
the use of Biotechnology in Agriculture and Food Production’ Report to USDA Extension Service; EU: 
Biotechnology and the European Public Concerted Action Group (1997), ‘Europe Ambivalent of 
Biotechnology: A Commentary’, 387 Nature, 845-847
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be discussed further in both Chapter 3 and in Chapter 5 but the important point to 
make is that despite the negative consumer reaction to the decision to ignore the 
broader concerns and only focus on the economic issues of segregation, it appears that 
some countries are willing to make the same mistake again over the labelling issue.
The discussion above demonstrates the synergistic relationship between 
consumer acceptance and information, trust and choice. Even if consumers are willing 
to accept only partial information about credence GM crops and trust the regulators 
and information providers, the bulk nature of the global handling and distribution 
system for agricultural commodities restricts or prevents choice when segregation 
cannot be ensured. In this case, the consumer is unable to make even a boundedly 
rational consumption decision because of the absence of choice. Furthermore, this 
does little to ease consumer concerns. On the contrary, the credence nature of GM 
crops coupled with the inadequate information, lack of trust and absence of choice 
plays directly into consumer fears and rejection.
2.2.3 Asymmetrical Consumer Acceptance
Further complicating the assessment of consumer acceptance is the existence 
of discernible differences in consumer acceptance both across biotechnology-based 
products and between North American and European consumers.
Asymmetry of Consumer Acceptance Across Biotechnology Products
The asymmetry of consumer acceptance across biotechnology-based products 
is associated with two factors. The first is the consumer’s perception of the ‘primary 
beneficiary’, while the second is the consumer’s perception of control over the 
application. According to these two factors, modem biotechnology has been more 
accepted when applied to medical and pharmaceutical industries relative to 
agriculture17. Medical and pharmaceutical applications of biotechnology are clearly 
perceived by consumers to be focused on human health, therefore the consumer is the 
primary beneficiary. When the consumer is the primary beneficiary, there is a greater 
likelihood of acceptance of the benefits and the risks (Slovic, 1987; 1990). On the 
Other hand, GM crops with production-improved traits developed to increase yields 
and productivity are perceived to create supply-side production benefits only. In this
17 See: Eurobarometre (1997); Hoban (1997); Economist (1998); Eisseidel (1997); and Hullar (1993).
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case, consumers are being asked to accept something that seemingly provides them 
with no benefits. Medical and pharmaceutical applications are also perceived to be 
done in controlled research facilities while the field testing and commercial release of 
GM crops is perceived to be uncontrolled in the environment (Hullar, 1993). Some 
argue, however, that the difference in acceptance of pharmaceutical or medical 
applications over GM crops is also related to the fact that in the former, there is a long 
history of stringent pre-market approval processes while in the latter, food is not 
traditionally pre-approved in the same fashion (Horton, 1997). This implies that 
consumer acceptance is also related to regulatory approval.
Even within the broad spectrum of agricultural applications of modem
biotechnology there are asymmetries in acceptance. For instance, agricultural
applications to improve human health through nutritive fortification are more readily
accepted than applications to improve the commercial attributes of produce
(Economist, 1998). An example of a GM crop with direct consumer benefits is the
development of a GM sugar beet at the Centre for Plant Breeding and Research,
Wageningen, Netherlands. Researchers claim that they have developed a sugar with
low caloric value because the fructans have been modified to be long-chain fructans
which are not easily digested by humans. Interestingly, this GM sugar beet was not
given the label ‘Frankenstein Food’ in the UK media as other GM crops have (Metro,
8 June 1999). In addition, North American survey results indicate that respondents are
more likely to accept genetically modified fruits and vegetables than genetic
modifications to livestock (Chess, 1998). This indicates that consumer acceptance is
linked to perceptions of the morality or ethics of genetically modifying so-called
1 8higher-order organisms such as animals (Eurobarometre, 1997; Einseidel, 1997) .
The asymmetrical consumer acceptance across products appears to indicate an 
important principle; that it is the product-application that matters to consumer 
acceptance, not the technology per se.
Asymmetry of Consumer Acceptance Across Regions
The asymmetry of consumer acceptance across regions is a particular 
challenge to the international trade and market access of agricultural biotechnology 
products because regulatory integration efforts must acknowledge regional
18 For a comprehensive discussion of moral and ethical problems of genetically modifying animals see 
Fox (1990).
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differences. Essentially there are no universal consumer concerns. Instead, they are 
shaped by historical, cultural and economic conditions (Hoban, 1997). Additionally, 
consumer concerns are also influenced by the current information consumers receive. 
For instance, in the UK GM crops have been inaccurately portrayed as an ‘American’ 
technology or ‘Monsanto’s’ technology (Ecologist, 1998)19, despite the fact many 
European firms are highly active in the GM crop development along with European
*yc\universities and public research institutes . Therefore, the complicated mix of 
consumer concerns and asymmetries of acceptance across products must additionally 
be understood within a regional context. The focus of the analysis will be on 
asymmetries in consumer acceptance between North American and European 
consumers.
Broad support for modem biotechnology is greater in North America than in 
Europe. Hoban (1997) reports that between 66 and 75 percent of survey respondents 
in the United States indicated acceptance of biotechnology products, yet in Europe, 
the acceptance among respondents is just over 50%. Although North American 
acceptance is evidently higher than in Europe, it is important to note that this 
acceptance was not unconditional. In fact, concern over the use of recombninant 
bovine somatotrophin (rbST) in dairy cows in the US a decade ago is very similar to 
current European concern and action regarding the use of GM crops in the food 
supply. At the forefront of rbST concern, was the US-based Foundation for Economic 
Trends (Wiegele,1991). Due to the public concerns many industrial dairy farms 
refused to use rbST in their herds. As well several large food processors (e.g. Kraft 
USA, Borden Inc., Dannon Inc.) along with many food retailers (e.g. Kroger, 
Safeway, Pathmark, Stop & Shop, Vons) all boycotted milk and milk products 
produced from rbST herds. These boycotts remained in place until the scientific 
uncertainties surrounding the use of rbST had been addressed in a sufficient way to 
reduce consumer concerns.
To deal with the asymmetry in consumer acceptance of GM crops, both 
Monsanto and the European biotechnology industry association EuropaBio launched 
public information campaigns in 1998 in an attempt to increase European consumer 
information about the benefits of GM crops and, hence, increase acceptance.
19 See Chapter 7.3.1 for an examination of the role of the media in the UK in providing often 
incomplete and far from objective coverage of the issues around GM crops.
62
However, market research after these campaigns has revealed that they were very 
unsuccessful as consumer acceptance in Europe is falling, not rising. The percentage 
of European consumer ‘unacceptance’ with biotechnology has risen from 38% in 
October 1997 to 51% in October 1998. In Germany, the level of consumer 
‘unacceptance’ of biotechnology was reported to be over 80% (Financial Times, 18 
November 1998)21. As a result, in October 1999 the US-based firm Monsanto 
embarked on a consultation campaign with UK environmental and consumers 
organizations such as Greenpeace, the Soil Association, Friends of the Earth and the 
Consumers’ Association (Independent on Sunday, 3 October 1999)22.
Recent research also indicates that while education is positively related to 
consumer acceptance in North America, it is negatively related to consumer 
acceptance in Europe. Hallman and Metcalfe (1993) report that 80% of college 
educated respondents and less than 60% of respondents with a high school diploma or 
less indicated acceptance of agricultural biotechnology in New Jersey. On the other 
hand, research in Europe reported that consumer acceptance was negatively related to 
education as acceptance was reported as lowest in Denmark, Germany and The 
Netherlands, which were identified as the highest education states (Almas and 
Nygaard, 1995).
Previous research on food consumption trends in North America and Europe 
has concluded that European consumption patterns lag that in North America by about 
10 years (Connor, 1994). The implication here is that the divergence in consumer 
acceptance of GM crops is just a short- to medium-term phenomenon so that trade 
tensions will just disappear. However, this is not a likely conclusion with respect to 
GM crops for several reasons. First, the very perception of agriculture is different in 
the two regions (see Part III) resulting in a significant cultural clash. Second, many 
severe and well-publicised food safety crises in Europe have created a cultural context 
of distrust in the food industry and in food regulators (Spriggs and Isaac, In Press). 
Food safety, in general, has become a sensitive, highly politicised issue throughout 
Europe and credence GM crops, driven by multi-national corporations appear to be 
just another trend to fear. In fact, it has been argued that crises and controversy create 
irreversible effects implying that the regulations are on an unalterable trajectory (Joly
20 For the promotion of GM crops in Europe see Chapter 7.2.1. European multi-national firms include: 
Agrevo (Germany), Astra-Zeneca (UK), Novartis (Switzerland), Rhone-Poulenc (France).
21 See also: Financial Times (15 March 1999); and Consumers’ Association (1997).
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and Lemarie, 1998). Third, the politically significant environmental protection 
movement in Europe has made the opposition of GM crops a main theme (see 
Chapters 4 and 7). Fourth, and not to be over-looked, the commercialisation lead in 
North America creates pressures to protect domestic biotechnology firms in European 
Member States until they are ready to compete internationally.
2.3 Conclusions
The objective of Chapter Two has been to define what is meant by the term 
‘GM crops’ and to introduce the general factors that have made them so controversial. 
Essentially, GM crops are scientifically sophisticated knowledge-based developments. 
Like all new technology they promise great opportunity while their credence attributes 
raise legitimate consumer concerns about their risks. Perhaps unlike most other 
technologies though, consumers have concerns beyond just economic concerns about 
the price. They also have concerns about the human safety and health, biodiversity 
and broader moral, ethical and religious concerns about modem biotechnology. The 
information gap hinders consumer rationality while the lack of trust and choice 
hinders consumer sovereignty. In this sense, it is not hard to understand why many 
consumers lack confidence in GM crops demanding stringent regulatory responses.
The assessment of consumer acceptance reveals three important policy issues. 
First, different interests groups will focus on different concerns in an attempt to 
influence the regulatory development and integration strategy (as will be discussed in 
Chapters Three and Four). Second, it appears that with respect to consumer concerns 
associated with GM crops it is the application, management and distribution of the 
technology that matter most; rather than the technology per se. Third, the regulatory 
framework must address a broad range of concerns about the applications of GM 
technology to agricultural crops while simultaneously providing information, trust and 
choice.
In Part I, a conceptual framework for analysing regulatory regionalism created 
by social regulatory barriers facing the trade of GM crops has been established. It is 
clear that in order to understand the complexity of social regulatory barriers and the 
prospects and limits for regulatory integration it is vital to understand the regulatory 
development process -  a complex interaction domestic political economy factors.
22 For a further discussion of UK campaigns against GM foods see Chapter 4.3.1
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PART II REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION
To explain why the traditional trade diplomacy approach is unable to deal with 
regulatory regionalism, it is vital to examine the interests involved in the regulatory 
development process. This identifies the difficulties associated with regulatory 
integration and the limitations of traditional trade diplomacy.
In Chapter One, it was argued that, in general, there are two perspectives on 
regulatory development and integration. Building on this categorisation, it is proposed 
that various interests may be categorised into economic and social interests where the 
former hold a predominantly economic perspective on regulatory development and 
integration and the latter hold a predominantly social perspective on regulatory 
development and integration. Of course, as argued in Chapter One, these perspectives 
result in support for different regulatory development and integration frameworks.
The rationales for why the various economic and the social interests support particular 
frameworks for the development and integration of GM crop regulations will be 
examined in greater detail in Chapters Three and Four, respectively.
In Chapter Five, it will be argued that this perhaps simplistic categorisation of 
interests has in fact a significant degree of power in explaining the contentious debates 
associated with the development and integration of GM crop regulations, and hence, 
the problems associated with the traditional trade diplomacy approach. It will be 
argued that the debates and ensuing regulatory instability are the result of a lack of 
agreement between the two interests on even fundamental framework principles for 
regulating advanced technologies. It will also be argued that a failure to establish an 
international regulatory framework, which could be a basis for trade diplomacy, has 
resulted in a fragmented collection of international rules, guidelines, recommendations 
and codes of practice each more or less influenced by one of the two interests.
Without international leadership, two dominant regulatory frameworks have emerged; 
a North American and a European framework. Comparing the influence of the 
economic and the social interests in the development of these two dominant 
frameworks is the objective of Chapters Six and Seven in Part III of this study.
An important point to specify is that Part II assesses interests on a general or 
conceptual level in order to identify the underlying rationales for the regulatory 
development and integration approaches supported and to identify the roots of the 
contentious debates surrounding GM crops. The case study of the transatlantic
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regulatory regionalism (Part III), however, explicitly discusses the activities of various 
interest groups in North America and the European Union that have influenced the 
respective regulatory trajectories.
66
CHAPTER THREE ECONOMIC INTERESTS
In this chapter is an assessment of the regulatory development and integration 
approaches supported by economic interests. This includes the agricultural 
biotechnology industries, complementary agents in the agricultural sector, those 
farmers who have adopted GM crops as well as governmental and non-governmental 
organisations at various levels who view the commercalisation of GM crops as a 
positive development. Why do these interests support GM crop technology?
Generally, the economic interests argue that GM crops promise significant private and 
public economic opportunities and they must be viewed as a crucial component of 
national competitiveness. Accordingly, they support regulatory development 
encouraging technological progress and regulatory integration encouraging stable and 
predictable market access rules for international economic integration.
3.1 Regulatory Development
In this section, the economic implications of GM crops are considered at the 
producer, sectoral and at the national level. Essentially, GM crops promise 
considerable private and public economic benefits extending beyond the agriculture 
sector making them an important element in the industrial competitiveness of a nation. 
Economic interests, in pursuit of these outcomes, support a stable and predictable 
regulatory framework ensuring technological progress.
At the farm level, first generation production trait GM crops have, of course, 
been developed to address important production concerns of producers. For instance, 
herbicide tolerant varieties address producer concerns with weed control by replacing 
many synthetic chemicals with one broad spectrum, post-emergent herbicide. 
Producer’s costs are reduced as they do not have to spray their fields as often. Bt 
varieties with insecticidal characteristics reduce costs by eliminating the need for 
particular insecticides and by eliminating the costs of applying those insecticides. 
Further, the economic benefits of these GM crops are enhanced by their conformity 
with both conventional agronomic systems and with bulk commodity distribution 
channels thereby eliminating the need for investment in new implements and 
segregation practices. Given the economic benefits, GM crops have been rapidly 
adopted. For instance, in the United States in 1998 20.5 million hectares of transgenic 
crops were planted while in 1999 28.7 millions hectares were planted, a growth rate in
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adoption of 8.2%. In fact, the global growth rate of adoption was 12.1% (James,
1999).
The next generations of GM crops, output trait GM crops and Bio-engineered 
products, are intended to secure farm-level economic benefits because by exhibiting 
qualities demanded by specific end-users. In other words, they have value setting them 
apart from conventional agricultural commodities. Producers will receive price 
premiums to ensure that the valuable varieties are produced under precise agronomic 
regimes and segregated from non-desired varieties in the field during harvest, storage 
and distribution.
Beyond the farm level, the genetic modification of agricultural crops 
encourages the integration of agricultural production both vertically within the 
agricultural sector and horizontally across other sectors. Indeed, the knowledge- 
intensification of the crop development has created economic opportunities as it has 
opened up new customers for agricultural production.
Along with the private economic benefits, there are public economic benefits 
made possible by GM crop development. Consider first that GM crops are poised in 
the short- to medium-term to alleviate the demands on domestic farm support 
programs. As previously discussed in Chapter Two, GM crops essentially represent 
scientific solutions to the public policy problems of variance in agricultural crop 
quantity and quality. Endogenous technological innovation embedded in the seed can 
improve crop performance and decrease the reliance of the agricultural sector upon 
domestic support programs. In the long-term, GM crops are poised to become a major 
foundation of a nation’s industrial production base as applications are found across 
non-food industries. In fact, GM crops must be understood as a competitiveness issue 
of national economic importance with significant global implications. GM crop 
technologies allow for the creation of endogenous comparative advantage (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991), whereby comparative advantage is no longer based on the 
natural endowment of factors of production. Instead, the technologies allow countries 
to shape their own comparative advantage and determine their economic future. As a 
result, public policies have been designed to ensure an internationally competitive 
agricultural biotechnology capacity during the so-called agriculturalization o f  
industry.
Given the potential economic benefits of GM crops it is easy to understand 
support among some interests for the research, development and commercialisation of
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these varieties. Yet, in order to take advantage of the private and public economic 
opportunities of GM crops, the nation must have capacity. Capacity represents the 
ability of both private and public personnel to apply modem biotechnology. This 
requires a sophisticated national infrastructure in terms of human capital, capital 
equipment, and investment capital. Therefore, it is not difficult to see why domestic 
governments in pursuit of the enormous economic potential have supported the 
capacity-building of biotechnology in the agricultural sector through various public 
policy initiatives.
The development of GM crop capacity is a function of both time and space. 
With respect to time, it requires years to acquire the level of scientific human capital 
necessary to conduct research and development at the frontiers of agricultural 
biotechnology. According to Baltimore (1982), the acquisition of necessary human 
capital alone requires thirty years of educational development per researcher. In 
addition, since most of the current initiatives in agricultural biotechnology are driven 
by the private sector, capacity also requires a mature financial system capable of 
channelling investment capital towards specific agricultural biotechnology 
applications.
With respect to national capacity as a function of space, capacity is linked to 
the existence of a critical mass of research activity. As previously discussed in 
Chapter Two, advancements in modem biotechnology generally are applicable across 
more specific applications so that a critical mass of research activity focused broadly 
on advancements in biotechnology assists the development of capacity (Barton, 1998; 
Theodorakopoulou and Kalaitzadonakes, 1999). It is argued that such a research 
capacity must have a geographical profile (Zilberman et al., 1997). Even between 
developed countries the private and public economic importance of GM crops creates 
economic competition on the frontiers of science. Similar to other high-technology 
sectors, agricultural biotechnology is increasingly viewed as a sector of potential 
competitive international advantage. The concentration of capacity may result in the 
formation o f ‘agricultural industrial complexes’ in the developed countries (Shimoda, 
1997; Zilberman et al, 1997).
The capacity issue of agricultural biotechnology has dynamic economic scale 
effects. A critical mass of research activity increases the potential for the development 
of new GM products while learning effects decease the time required for GM product 
development (Barton, 1998).
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An important aspect of the capacity issue in developed countries is the fact that 
it has been driven by the private sector. As the state has retreated from both basic and 
applied research into the applications of agricultural biotechnology, the void has been 
filled by private firms. This shift in leadership has been readily supported by 
governments in North America and Europe. Indeed, Table 3.1 (page 78) provides 
evidence as to the ‘private’ capacity that exists in GM crop development.
Following this economic rationale, the supply-side of the agricultural sector 
has undergone structural change in order to build capacity. Increasingly, it has 
abandoned its traditional structure where agricultural products were bulk commodities 
and producers were considered to be a homogenous group. Very little integration 
occurred as commodities moved along the supply-chain through spot market 
transactions. As mentioned, production trait GM crops remain largely congruent with 
this traditional system, which is in part responsible for their popularity.
However, output trait applications or Bio-Engineered products require a 
greater level of vertical integration along the supply-chain to ensure segregation. End- 
users contract for the production of customised GM varieties tailored to meet their 
specific demands. These GM varieties grown for food or non-food use (e.g. 
pharmaceutical or industrial chemical uses) must be segregated from other varieties to 
ensure value capture. That is, to ensure the production and delivery of the high-value 
GM varieties that end-users want. Additionally, non-food use GM crops must be 
segregated for safety reasons to ensure that those GM crops are kept out of the food 
supply because they have not been designed for food production. The agricultural 
supply-chain must become vertically integrated in order to facilitate the research, 
development, production, distribution, marketing and end-use of customised, 
differentiated GM agricultural products.
Recent restructuring in the Agro-chemical industries supports this and is 
indicative of the economic need for vertical integration (see Table 3.1 for some 
examples). Much economic analysis has focused on the causes of vertical integration, 
where the key cause is the knowledge-intensification of the crop development process. 
In fact, the knowledge-intensification of the GM seed industry creates a practical need 
to ensure segregation for value capture and a commercial need to protect advanced 
knowledge has created powerful economic incentives for firms in the agricultural Life 
Sciences sector to engage in significant vertical and horizontal integration. The result
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of this integration is the ‘industrialization of agriculture’ or the ‘agriculturalization’ of 
the national economy (Barton, 1998; Zilberman et al., 1997; Shimoda, 1997).
Knowledge, embedded in the GM seed, has become the future of agricultural 
production as GM varieties will break the dependence of intensive agricultural 
production on chemicals. Realising this, Agro-chemical firms have moved upstream to 
acquire the seed and biotechnology firms and, hence, to own the knowledge. In the 
short-run, production-improved herbicide tolerant GM varieties have been developed 
as part of an integrated seed-chemical regime, supported by the Agro-chemical firms1. 
This shifts the chemical use from many different chemicals to one non-selective, 
broad spectrum herbicide.
Monsanto • 1997 acquires Calgene (bio and seed)
• 1997 acquires Agracetus (bio)
• 1997 acquires Asgrow Agronomics (seed)
• 1998 (May) strategic relationship in DelKab Genetics (bio and seed)
• 1998 (May) ownership position in Delta and Pine Land (seed); cancelled 
in January 2000 by Monsanto
• 1998 (May) Joint venture with Cargill for food processing and 
packaging
• 1998 acquires Holden’s Foundation Seeds (seed) $ 1.1 B
• 1999 merger with Pharmacia & Upjohn where Agricultural 
Biotechnology division would be made into a separate legal entity apart 
from the Pharmaceutical operations.
Dow Elanco • 1997 acquires majority in Mycogen (bio and seed)
Hoechst • 1997 In agribusiness venture with Agrevo and Schering acquires 
majority in Plant Genetic Systems (PGS) (bio) $730 m
• Proposed Merger with Rhone-Poulenc ‘Aventis’ where agricultural 
biotechnology (Aventis Agriculture) is separated from pharmaceutical 
biotechnology (Aventis Pharma)
DuPont • 1997 strategic partnership with Pioneer Hi-Bred 20% stake
• establish ‘Optimum Quality Grains’
• 1999 (March) acquires remaining stake in PHB $7.7 B
Novartis • merger of Sandoz (pharma), Ciba-Geigy, Ciba seeds, Northrup-King 
Seeds
• 1999 merger with Astra-Zeneca ‘Syngenta AG’ to take over the 
combined agricultural biotechnology
Astra-Zeneca • 1999 merger of Astra (phama), Zeneca 53 B GBPs
• 1999 merger with Novartis ‘Syngenta AG’ to take over the combined 
agricultural biotechnology
Table 3.1 Examples of Integration in the Agricultural Sector
But this is a short-run situation. The long-run is better characterised as 
chemical free production, due to the endogenous innovation within the seed. For
1 For instance, Monsanto’s Round up Ready Herbicide Tolerant GM varieties (cotton, com, soybean 
and canola/rapeseed) and Agrevo’s Liberty Link Herbicide Tolerant GM varieties (e.g. canola/rapeseed, 
com, soybean).
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instance, GM crops with Bt properties don’t just shift chemical use, they actually 
decrease overall chemical use. Consequently, the Agro-chemical firms have moved 
upstream to buy into the knowledge base of the future, rather than remain dependent 
on chemicals; an ever decreasing share of production inputs.
Economists argue that this upstream movement is both predictable and 
consistent with economic theory (Kalaitzandonakes and Hayenga, 1999). The Agro­
chemical firms seek to identify, patent and protect the industrial base of their future -  
knowledge of plant genomics (Joly and Lemarie, 1998). But this is no different than 
the multi-national pharmaceutical giants, which have long been accepted and 
tolerated. Agricultural ‘Life Sciences’ firms also face significant research and 
development costs for GM crops and capacity is made more efficient through 
economies of scale. Two economic studies have concluded that vertical integration is 
driven by an economically rational and efficient response to the need to identify, 
patent and protect the knowledge-intensification of the seed industry (Rausser et al., 
1999; Graff et al., 1999). This conclusion, combined with the conclusion that Agro­
chemical firms have moved upstream because of the limited future of their chemicals, 
challenges the popular argument among many critics of GM crops (see Chapter 4) that 
Life Sciences firms are monopolists in pursuit of anti-competitive market power in 
order to increase the dependence of agricultural production on chemicals. On the 
contrary, vertical integration is driven by both the knowledge-intensification of the 
seed industry and the subsequent need to build capacity and secure a competitive 
position in the agricultural sector by increasing a stake in biotechnology and 
decreasing the reliance on synthetic chemicals.
The firms developing GM crops face two important issues associated with the 
knowledge-intensification of agricultural crops. First, is how to be compensated for 
the knowledge embedded in the seed. One approach is the legal approach. Seed 
purchases have shifted from traditional spot transactions for conventional seeds to 
complicated technology use agreements (TUAs) for GM seeds, associated with a 
premium ‘technology fee’. In 1999, Monsanto charged a technology fee of $US 
6.50/bag of Round up Ready Soybean seeds, which represented a 40% premium on 
the GM seeds over non-GM seeds. Further, TUAs for Monsanto’s herbicide tolerant 
soybeans prohibit both the resale of the seeds by the producer (prior to planting) and 
the practice of seed-saving (using harvested seeds for the next crop). While the
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technology fee compensates the GM seed developer at the time of purchase, the TUAs 
attempt to ensure that the developer is compensated for the next crop as well.
An alternative approach for ensuring compensation for the commercial use of 
the knowledge embedded in the seed is the biotechnological approach through the use 
of so-called ‘terminator’ or ‘traitor’ technology2. The objective is to develop GM 
seeds that are sterile and cannot be used for a second planting or cannot cross- 
pollinate with other plants. Simply, this approach bypasses the need for legal TUAs. 
This is actually not a new approach as FI hybrid varieties of com seeds used for 
decades are sterile after harvest and cannot be successfully planted the following crop 
season.
The second important issue for GM crop developers, associated with the 
knowledge intensification of the seed industry, is how to protect their knowledge from 
other firms. A common approach to vertical integration has been through acquisition 
and consolidation (see Table 3.1), rather than other tools of industrial organisation 
such as licensing agreements or contractual arrangements for technology use between 
biotechnology, seed and agro-chemical firms. It has been argued that acquisition and 
consolidation have been the chosen strategy, again not for anti-competitive monopoly 
reasons, but because of the current regime for intellectual property protection (Rausser 
et al., 1999). Essentially, outright ownership of the knowledge is the sure way to 
protect it. If intellectual property protection laws were stronger and internationally 
respected then technology licensing would be the chosen strategy and not direct 
ownership. The economic rationale behind intellectual property rights (IPRs), such as 
patents and plant-breeders rights (PBRs), is that they provide an incentive for both 
investment in inventive activities and for technology transfer (Malchup, 1958). 
Zilberman (1999) argued that a weak EPR regime over GM crop technologies has 
encouraged too much agro-industrial concentration because only direct ownership will 
ensure that intellectual property is protected.
The horizontal integration of agricultural production simply represents an 
inter-industry extension of the issues associated with the vertical integration of the 
agricultural sector. Horizontal integration is motivated by the output trait applications
2 Terminator technology is patented by the USD A and Delta and Pine Land, now owned by Monsanto, 
while traitor technology is being developed by UK-based Astra-Zeneca. However, this technology is 
not in use.
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and Bio-Engineered products allowing GM crops to meet the demands of new end- 
users, such as pharmaceutical, nutriceutical or industrial firms.
Given the fundamental role of capacity in the research, development and 
commercialisation of GM crops, the significant public and private investment in 
capital that must be made in order to build capacity and the necessary restructuring of 
the agricultural sector, economic interests naturally support a stable regulatory 
framework that encourages technological progress through a scientific rationality 
approach to Risk Analysis and that clarifies intellectual property rights. This is not to 
suggest that economic interests ignore safety issues. On the contrary, economic 
interests generally provide significant scope for safety issues in regulatory 
frameworks. They often insist, however, that there is a sound scientific basis for 
- determining safety, subject to an objective, rules-based analysis of risk so that stability 
and commercial predictability are built into the framework.
3.2 Regulatory Integration: The Traditional Trade Approach
The objective of this section is to examine the type of regulatory integration 
supported by economic interests and to examine how the international economic 
integration approach has led to the current international trade regime characterised by 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), its agreements and its affiliated international 
institutions.
Given the central role that technological progress plays in the economic 
perspective, economic interests tend to support regulatory integration strategies that 
ensure international market access for advanced technology products. For instance, 
market access for GM crops is an important issue because they require significant 
research and development investment and, as a result, are often commercialised at the 
international level in order to maximise market share and recover the substantial R&D 
costs in short-lived markets for knowledge-based products.
The economic perspective of international economic integration and regulatory 
competition has dominated the traditional trade diplomacy approach to regulatory 
integration. This approach is characterised as closed-door, non-transparent market 
access negotiations resulting in political compromises and concessions between 
sovereign states. The negotiations are aimed at establishing trade agreements outlining 
certain and predictable rules for the market access of traded products. They have been 
built on the premise that industrial interests lobby domestic governments to provide
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commercial protectionism from foreign imports or support for domestic exporters. 
Trade agreements attempt to limit the ability of governments to acquiesce to this 
pressure in order to enhance international economic integration (Perdikis et al., 1999).
Further, the traditional trade approach attempts to disentangle trade barriers 
erected because of safety reasons, from those erected for non-safety reasons. The 
former are subject to a scientific justification for the safety measure. In the event of a 
justification, it is legitimate for a country to impose a unilateral safety barrier to 
particular imported products. The latter, non-safety measures, are subject to the 
traditional trade principles of non-discrimination. In the event that a country imposes a 
trade barrier against a certain product, this barrier must be equally enforced across all 
like products both domestic and foreign.
Social regulatory barriers facing GM crops have emerged as a contentious 
issue facing the international trading regime3. For instance, at the 1999 Ministerial 
Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle, Canada and the US 
jointly proposed a World Trade Biotechnology Initiative under the auspices of the 
WTO. There were two objectives. First, to establish an international fact-finding 
group to examine the trade issues raised by the development and commercialisation of 
GM crops and second, to establish binding international trade rules for GM crops. 
While the EU accepted the first objective, it completely rejected the second objective, 
stating:
We reject requests to deal with biotechnology exclusively on trade 
grounds. We reject market access negotiations for GMOs. We 
reject any attempt to undermine the EU right to regulate. And we 
reject any attempt to derail, divert or delay the biosafety talks.
This statement clearly illustrates the trade controversy associated with GM crops and 
social regulatory barriers. Basically, the controversy arises because some countries are 
in pursuit of an international economic integration approach to GM crop regulations 
(i.e. Canada and the US) which is largely the approach of traditional trade diplomacy 
while other countries are in pursuit of an international social integration approach to 
GM crops, as evidenced by the EU support for the Biosafety Protocol (see Chapter 
4.2). Moreover, due to the European Union’s rejection of the World Trade
3 For a history of the trading regime see Grimwade (1996) and Jovanovic (1998e).
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Biotechnology Initiative, there is no co-ordinated WTO initiative for addressing trade 
issues associated with GM crops.
The question may be raised: what is it about the traditional trade diplomacy 
approach that the EU rejects? To understand the traditional trade approach to 
regulatory integration supported by economic interests it is necessary to examine the 
traditional approach to social regulatory issues such as food safety and environmental 
protection. Essentially, the objective is to identify what are the ‘trade grounds’ that the 
EU has rejected for assessing social regulatory barriers.
There is common ground between food safety and environmental protection 
social regulations. First, both are traditionally domestic areas that have qualified for 
exemptions under international trade agreements and their relationship with the rights 
and obligations of trade agreements remains controversial and uncertain. Second, 
domestic standards and regulations to ensure food safety and environmental protection 
employ precaution in the face of uncertainty when scientific evidence is insufficient; 
the so-called precautionary principle. Third, the demand for food safety and 
environmental protection measures is generally social protectionism emerging from 
non-industrial actors, such as consumer and environmental organisations. Fourth, the 
demand for both food safety and environmental protection measures is income elastic, 
that is, countries with higher incomes have higher standards for food safety and 
environmental protection. In short, both food safety and environmental protection 
measures can be social regulatory barriers. In fact, it is difficult to disentangle GM 
crop regulations to ensure food safety from those designed to ensure environmental 
protection.
The principle trade concern with food safety and environmental-type social 
regulatory barriers is that, while they incur market access delay and prohibition, there 
are uncertain trade rules outlining their legitimate use. Currently under the WTO, 
there is greater discipline on food safety-type social regulatory barriers than those for 
environmental protection while there are no disciplines for the use of social normative 
regulations addressing moral, ethical or religious concerns with traded products. Yet, 
these food safety rules have been controversial and, in the case of hormone-treated 
beef, have created a significant transatlantic trade diplomacy challenge. Indeed, it is 
worth considering the threat that as the WTO reinforces its rules for food safety, anti- 
GM crop pressures will increasingly shift from food safety to environmental 
protection and social norm justifications for social regulatory barriers -  regulations
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that are less rules-based and less-science based, making them more difficult to 
integrate.
3.2.1 Food Safety and Trade
Both the international trade of agricultural products and the domestic 
regulation of food have a long history. Trade objectives of market liberalisation and 
the removal of market fragmentation have not always been congruent with domestic 
regulations designed to ensure the safety, wholesomeness and adequate labelling of 
food products. The purpose of this section is to examine how food safety issues are 
dealt with according to the traditional trade diplomacy approach of the WTO.
It is important to note that it is difficult to separate food safety issues from 
those associated with food quality. Some have argued that safety is only one of several 
attributes that together contribute to the quality of a food product (Caswell and 
Hooker, 1995). Therefore, although this section is focused on food safety, a discussion 
of food quality will at times be necessary.
In general, food safety issues are dealt with at the WTO under the Agreement 
on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) while non-safety food 
quality issues are dealt with at the WTO under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT). Both agreements defer to standards developed in international 
organisations. For instance, the SPS Agreement defers to the international measures 
on food safety and quality established under the Codex Alimentarius and the 
International Plant Protection Convention, two international institutions which will 
also be examined in their trade context. In fact, the International Plant Protection 
Convention provides an illustrative example of not only food safety measures 
established at the international level, but also of the difficulty with disentangling food 
safety measures from environmental protection measures.
A. The Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures
The SPS Agreement was the product of a convergence of economic interests 
such as food exporting countries and multinational food processing and distributing 
companies who shared a common concern about market access barriers facing food 
trade. They believed that previous trade agreements simple did not provide enough 
discipline in order to protect their international economic integration interests. In 
short, the SPS Agreement seeks to discipline the use of food safety measures in order
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to establish predictable and stable market access rules promoting international 
economic integration.
By way of background, the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT 1948) was built on the principle of non-discrimination, summarised by the 
following three provisions:
1. the national treatment provisions (Article I) which states that foreign products 
must be treated like domestic products;
2. the most-favoured nation principle (Article III) which states there should be no 
discrimination between products originating from different countries; and
3. a distinction between processes and products whereby all ‘like products’ were to 
be treated the same regardless of the process used in their production.
These principles essentially mean that ‘like’ or ‘substantially equivalent’ products 
must be subject to the same regulations in a particular regulatory jurisdiction 
regardless of their origin or the production and processing methods (PPMs) used in 
their production.
The GATT 1948 was, however, ambiguous on the issue of trade rules and 
domestic food safety measures as countries held significant discretion to establish 
their own food safety and food quality regulations. For example, a number of the 
GATT articles specifically permitted regulations setting out national “standards or 
regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international 
trade” (Art. XI) and the adoption or enforcement of measures necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health (Art. XX(b)). In an attempt to be consistent with 
non-discrimination, the discretionary measures under Articles XI and XX(b) could not 
be applied in such a manner as to cause arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries or disguised restrictions on trade.
The SPS Agreement, driven by economic interests, attempted to deal with the 
contentious ambiguities associated with discretionary food safety standards by 
specifically outlining permissible trade restricting measures that WTO Members may 
enact in order to protect human, animal and plant safety and health from the import of 
agricultural products. In this sense, it represents an economic approach to 
disentangling legitimate social regulatory barriers from illegitimate ones.
Accordingly, the objective of the SPS Agreement is to outline rules for when 
and how Members can deny market access to particular exporters because of the risk 
that imports will contain pests or diseases. Unsafe imports can jeopardise human
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safety and health either directly by making imported foodstuffs unsafe, or indirectly 
by infecting domestic food inputs including livestock and agricultural plants that are 
part of the domestic food chain. There is a crucial distinction to note. The SPS 
Agreement targets measures taken to protect the domestic food supply, not measures 
taken to target overall domestic biodiversity. In this sense, the SPS Agreement relates 
to food safety measures, not environmental protection measures, although in practice 
this distinction is blurred.
The SPS Agreement states that “no member should be prevented from 
adopting or enforcing measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health”4 which remains in accordance with the traditional exemption provisions under 
Article XX(b) GATT 1994. In the SPS Agreement, the risks that measures may target 
are those arising from:
• “the entry, establishment or spread o f pests, diseases, disease-carrying 
organisms or disease-causing organisms;
• additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, 
beverages or feedstujfs;
• diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof ”(SPS Agreement, 
Annex A).
To prevent imported products from jeopardising the safety of the domestic food 
supply, Members may restrict or prevent imports through the use of mandatory 
sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures. There are four important provisions of the SPS 
Agreement, which differ from traditional trade principles, and support the unilateral 
establishment of SPS measures by Members.
First, under the SPS Agreement, Members may discriminate against imports 
because of the presence of the above risks in the exporting country (SPS Agreement, 
Article 2:3). The agreement recognises that different regions with different 
geographical conditions and agronomic practices face different incidence of pests and 
disease. As a result, it is not possible to establish uniform SPS measures to apply to all 
exporters according to the principles of non-discrimination. Instead, trade measures 
need to specifically target those imports that may contaminate the domestic food 
supply, while other imported agricultural products may not face the same measures. 
This provision is an important exemption to the traditional non-discrimination
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principles. Members are not required to grant either national treatment or most- 
favoured nation status to agricultural exporters whose products risk contaminating the 
domestic food supply.
Second, according to the agreement, Members may also establish domestic 
SPS measures higher than the accepted international standard if there is scientific 
justification to do so (SPS Agreement, Article 3:3). Generally, international trade 
agreements commit Members to adopt international standards if available, however, 
the SPS Agreement permits Members to establish even higher standards.
Third, the SPS Agreement permits Members to establish SPS measures based 
on scientific risk as well as broader assessments of risk such as relevant economic 
factors that include:
• the potential damage in terms o f loss ofproduction or sales in the event o f 
the entry, establishment or spread o f the disease or pest;
• the costs o f control or eradication in the territory o f the importing 
Member;
• the relative cost-effectiveness o f alternative approaches to limiting risks 
(SPS Agreement, Article 5:3)
Trade agreements traditionally avoid such socio-economic assessments because of the 
subjectivity complications that are associated with them. Indeed, as previously 
discussed, the economic perspective attempts to de-politicise trade and make it a 
function of comparative advantage (WTO, 1995), yet the SPS Agreement recognises 
the socio-economic nature of food safety regulations and permits such consideration.
Fourth, and finally, under the SPS Agreement, Members may establish 
provisional SPS measures based on precaution, in the event that there is insufficient 
scientific evidence to conduct an appropriate risk assessment. The Agreement states: 
In cases where the relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a 
Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phyto-sanitary 
measures on the basis o f available pertinent information, 
including that from sanitary or phyto-sanitary measures applied 
by other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek to 
obtain additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment o f risk and review the sanitary or phyto-sanitary
4 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures, Uruguay Round of
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measure accordingly within a reasonable amount o f time. (SPS 
Agreement, Article 5:7).
That is, Members are permitted to establish trade barriers based on the precautionary 
principle. These barriers can remain in place until enough scientific evidence about 
the risk has been compiled. Indeed, the temporary barrier provision of the Agreement 
is a unique provision in terms of international trade agreements.
While the SPS Agreement allows Members considerable scope to impose 
unilateral social regulatory barriers, there are important conditions on the sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary measures that Members may unilaterally take in order to prevent them 
from being used as disguised protectionist barriers. It will be argued that these 
conditions reflect the predominant influence of the scientific rationality perspective on 
regulatory development and regulatory integration that is supported by economic 
interests.
To facilitate international trade, Members are committed to both the 
international harmonisation of SPS measures and to the mutual recognition of 
measures employed by other Members. With respect to harmonisation, Members 
commit to adopting international standards, guidelines or recommendations as the 
prevailing national standards in order to promote international harmonisation (SPS 
Agreement, Preamble). For food safety, the relevant international institution is the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), for animal safety the International Office of 
Epizootics (OIE) and for plant safety the International Plant Protection Convention 
(IPPC). With respect to mutual recognition, Members are committed, in principle, to 
granting equivalence to the SPS measures adopted by exporting countries “if the 
exporting Member objectively demonstrates to the importing Member that its 
measures achieve the importing Member’s appropriate level of sanitary or phyto- 
sanitary protection.” (SPS Agreement, Article 4:1). To facilitate the process, the 
importing Member must be allowed to conduct a conformance assessment including 
inspection, testing, monitoring and evaluation of the measures in place in the 
exporting Member.
Yet, as mentioned, Members are permitted to exceed international standards 
provided there is a scientific justification to do so. Hence, an important condition is a 
scientific justification. According to the Agreement, unilateral SPS measures must be
Multilateral Trade Negotiations Legal Texts, pp. 69-84 (the “SPS Agreement”), Preamble
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“based on scientific principles” and cannot be maintained “without sufficient scientific 
evidence” unless it is a temporary, precautionary measure (SPS Agreement, Article 
2:2). The science-based measures adopted must be proportional to the risk that is 
being targeted. In order to assess the risks, Members are committed to considering the 
risk assessment techniques used in the international standard setting institutions, even 
if the relevant international standard is not being used (SPS Agreement, Article 5:1). 
Further, the Agreement states that:
In the assessment o f risks, Members shall take into account 
available scientific evidence; relevant processes and production 
methods; relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods; 
prevalence o f specific diseases or pests; existence o f pest- or 
disease-free areas; relevant ecological and environmental 
conditions and quarantine and other treatment (SPS Agreement,
Article 5:2).
Hence, the SPS Agreement requires Members to provide a scientific justification for 
the adoption of measures where the scientific justification is crucial in supporting the 
domestic measure in the event of a trade challenge.
When a Member has reason to believe that a specific sanitary or 
phyto-sanitary measure introduced or maintained by another 
Member is constraining, or has the potential to constrain, its 
exports and the measure is not based on the relevant international 
standards, guidelines or recommendations, or such standards, 
guidelines or recommendations do not exist, an explanation o f the 
reasons for such sanitary or phyto-sanitary measure may be 
requested and shall be provided by the Member maintaining the 
measure (SPS Agreement, Article 5:8).
According to the Agreement, in the event of a trade dispute over the use of a 
food safety measure, the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel seeks the scientific advice of 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC). Without an acceptable scientific 
justification, it is unlikely that a trade dispute decision by the members of a WTO 
dispute settlement panel or an appellate body will support the unilateral SPS measure. 
In this sense, even if Members do not adopt international standards, it is important that 
domestic food safety measures remain congruent with the international Risk Analysis
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approach of the CAC in the event of a trade dispute. The CAC will be discussed in 
more detail in sub-section C, below.
The SPS Agreement also commits Members to publish a draft of the domestic 
measures to the SPS Committee and to allow for a 60-day review and comment period 
for all concerned exporters (SPS Agreement, Annex B:5). The logic is that such a 
review and consultation process may proactively avoid future trade disputes by 
ensuring that the food safety measures adopted by a Member take into account the 
process and production realities in exporting countries. The Agreement obliges, 
although does not require, the importing Member to take full account of the comments 
and endeavour to ensure that the SPS measure fulfils a legitimate and scientifically 
justifiable safety objective without unduly affecting agricultural trade.
The Marrakech Agreement 1994 included a provision for the SPS Committee 
to conduct a review of the Agreement in order to examine its progress in enhancing 
trade liberalisation and to identify points of clarification that may be addressed 
through amendments. The general interpretation of the 1998 review was that nothing 
could be amended without creating significant controversy and/or requiring an 
opening up of the Agreement. Essentially, the SPS Agreement has been established 
congruent with a scientific rationality approach to economic integration and decision­
making has favoured economic trade interests. Dealing with concerns would require 
an opening up of the Agreement to allow for greater influence from the social 
rationality perspective. As a result, the Agreement was virtually left unchanged.
Clearly, the SPS agreement outlines a scientific rationality approach to 
regulatory development supported by economic interests. It aims to establish 
predictable and certain rules for legitimate social regulations according to a sound 
scientific basis. It represents a ‘safe harbour’ for Members since it allows them to take 
unilateral trade restriction measures against agricultural imports to address domestic 
concerns about food safety in the face of risk and uncertainty. However, there are 
important conditions on the unilateral use of SPS measures in order to prevent 
unnecessary trade distortions. The challenge is finding the line between SPS measures 
that legitimately restrict trade in order to protect human, animal and plant safety or 
health and those SPS measures that unnecessarily restrict trade. According to the 
Agreement, the most objective way to define the line is through a scientific risk 
assessment procedure according to the Risk Analysis framework supported by the 
CAC. An SPS measure used by a Member will be considered legitimate if there is
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sufficient scientific proof for its use and if it is the measure with the lowest cost to the 
consumer and the international trading system (Roberts et al., 1998).
Indeed, this approach should come as no surprise as the SPS Agreement came 
about because it was in the economic interests of large, multinational agri-food 
companies and the economic interests of export-oriented countries. During the 
Uruguay Round negotiations these interests held significant policy power, even in the 
EU. Phillips (1991) argued that the EU approached the negotiations from the 
economic perspective and with an export-orientation. A broad coalition of interests 
including farmers and consumers viewed the SPS Agreement as a potential win-win 
situation whereby market access rules could be clarified, yet social food safety 
regulations would be protected. Hence, the EU was in support of the Agreement’s 
international trade rules for food safety-type social regulatory barriers.
With respect to the use of biotechnology in food production, the SPS 
Committee has deferred to the work of the CAC in establishing both legitimate 
scientific risk analysis procedures and regulatory guidelines based on those 
procedures. Hence, it is crucial to examine the CAC.
In summary, it is important to note at this point that according to the SPS 
Agreement food safety-type social regulatory barriers to GM crops will be assessed in 
terms of their scientific justification and their trade impact. In practice, this means that 
there is no scope under the WTO to impose legitimate trade barriers predicated on 
social preferences beyond a scientifically justified prevention of risk. In addition, 
social regulatory barriers that are justified must also meet the requirement of 
minimum trade disruption. In other words, trade and market access imperatives 
dominate even justified social regulatory barriers according to the economic 
integration approach of the SPS Agreement.
B. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) deals with the technical, 
non-safety food quality issues such as nutrition, analysis, grading, labelling, 
packaging, symbols, markings, terminology and protection against deceptive or 
fraudulent practices. The TBT Agreement also has provisions on establishing 
conformity assessments between trading partners. Conformity assessments, which are 
important for mutual recognition efforts, are any procedures used, either directly or 
indirectly, to determine that relevant requirements in technical regulations (mandatory
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requirements) and standards (voluntary requirements) are fulfilled which includes: 
sampling; testing and inspection; evaluation, verification and assurance; registration, 
accreditation and approval. Further, the TBT Agreement deals with broader issues of 
food trade not easily captured in a science-based framework of Risk Analysis. 
Therefore, the role of the TBT Agreement in food trade is important and needs to be 
assessed.5
Historically, concern about the potential impact of technical standards and 
product labelling upon international agricultural trade has been voiced at the 
multilateral level since the mid 1970s driven mainly by economic interests in 
Australia, Canada and the US. The primary concern was that technical food standards, 
including labelling schemes, might be used to either restrict market access or to confer 
an advantage to domestic products in the domestic marketplace. Yet, such standards 
could be used in a discretionary manner with no real discipline on their application.
The Tokyo Round of the GATT introduced international trade discipline of 
food quality regulations, including labelling measures, through the Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT) Code. The essence of the TBT Code was to establish international 
obligations on technical regulations, standards and conformance assessments for both 
transparency and notification based on the trade principle of non-discrimination 
(OECD, 1995b; Caldwell, 1998).
Yet, despite this code, agricultural exporters still had concerns with food 
quality measures because food safety measures were generally still exempt from any 
discipline. They wanted to see the TBT Code which only applied to a limited number 
of developed contracting parties, strengthened and extended to cover all WTO 
members. As a result, negotiations in the Uruguay Round produced the TBT 
Agreement.
There are three similarities between the SPS and the TBT Agreements. First, 
the TBT Agreement allows Members to establish trade-restricting measures in order 
to protect human and environmental health and safety and to ensure the quality of 
imported products, the so-called ‘legitimate objectives’, provided that the measures do 
not unnecessarily obstruct international trade (TBT Agreement, Article 2:2). That is,
5 The TBT Agreement also has relevance to environmental protection issues associated with 
agricultural biotechnology, to be discussed in Section 3.2.2 A. The relevance of the TBT Agreement to 
environmental protection lies with its jurisdiction over process and production methods (PPMs).
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similar to the SPS Agreement, the social regulations of Members may be trade barriers 
to imported products.
Second, it requires Members to base their national standards on international 
measures established by international standards setting bodies (TBT Agreement, 
Article 2:4). When internationally agreed standards cannot be adopted due to 
geographical, climatic or technological reasons, the Member must publish the draft 
measures in order to allow potentially affected foreign producers an opportunity to 
respond to them (TBT Agreement, Article 2:9). It is anticipated that concerns of 
exporters will then be incorporated into any subsequent measures.
Third, the TBT Agreement requires that, where applicable, national measures 
should be scientifically justifiable (TBT Agreement, Article 2:2). The Agreement 
includes specified criteria that Members must account for in formulating TBT 
measures in order to ensure that measures do not create unnecessary regulatory 
barriers to trade. Similar to the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement employs a 
scientific rationality approach in order to identify legitimate social regulatory barriers.
Despite the similarities, there are four differences between the SPS and the 
TBT Agreements. First, unlike the SPS Agreement, which permits discrimination in 
the application of trade-restricting measures, the TBT Agreement is based on the 
traditional trade principles of non-discrimination. The Agreement states that measures 
should be applied on a most-favoured nation (MFN) basis to all imported products 
from all contracting parties (TBT Agreement, Article 2:1 -  MFN Principle of Non- 
Discrimination). It also states that measures should not extend to imported products 
treatment that is less favourable than that extended to domestically produced ‘like’ 
products (TBT Agreement, Article 2:1 -  National Treatment Principle).
Second, whereas the SPS Agreement deals with mandatory national food 
safety measures, the TBT Agreement deals with both mandatory (technical 
requirements) and voluntary (standards) measures. Both mandatory and voluntary 
measures can address product characteristics, process and production methods 
(PPMs), terminology and symbols and packaging and labelling requirements (i.e. 
prevention of deceptive advertising practices). Voluntary standards are subject to the 
TBT Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of 
Standards which urges Members to use their best endeavours to ensure that voluntary 
trade-restricting measures are subject to the same principles and rules as mandatory 
standards (TBT Agreement, Article 4 & Annex 3). The Code urges Members to use
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international standards as a basis for national voluntary standards and to participate 
fully in the preparation of international standards.
Third, unlike the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement does not allow for 
provisional trade restriction based on precaution where scientific evidence is 
insufficient.
Fourth, although the TBT Agreement requires that measures should be 
scientifically justifiable, the problems with determining appropriate scientific risk 
assessment procedures for non-safety issues and other legitimate objectives, such as 
labelling for the consumers’ right to know, are enormous. As a result, the scientific 
justification principle under the TBT Agreement is considerably weaker than under 
the SPS Agreement. For instance, under the TBT Agreement labelling standards can 
prevent deceptive marketing practices that adversely impact informed consumerism. 
In such circumstances, domestic measures do not need a science-basis for 
justification. There does appear to be greater scope under the TBT Agreement to 
permit food quality-type social regulatory barriers. Specifically, with respect to GM 
crops, the TBT Agreement’s mandatory and voluntary labelling provisions are most 
relevant.
The WTO’s Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade provides a forum for 
Members to raise concerns about the labelling legislation of other Members and how 
this legislation might contravene the rights and obligations under the agreement. A 
recent example, is a US submission to the TBT Committee underlying concerns with 
the EU labelling regulation 1139/98 (the GM Soya/Maize Regulation) (WTO 1998). 
The US submission indicated that the US felt bilateral consultations with the EU on 
the proposed regulation did not address fundamental US concerns, supported by 
Brazil, Canada and New Zealand. The submission states that “the United States 
urgently requests that the EC address our concerns and comply with its obligations 
under the Agreement, with respect to these and future regulations.” Essentially, the 
US position is that Regulation 1139/98 cannot achieve its alleged ‘legitimate 
objective’ and that the implementation rules make compliance by producers from 
other Members overly difficult; concluding that it is an unjustified barrier to trade. 
Therefore, the TBT Agreement can become an important forum for dealing with the 
social regulatory barriers to GM crops. Labelling under the WTO is discussed more 
fully in Chapter 5.
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C. The Codex Alimentarius
Economic interests support the work of the Codex in establishing international 
food safety and food quality measures because the Codex approach has always been 
congruent with the scientific rationality approach to regulatory development. And, due 
to its focus on scientific rationality, economic interests supported the linking of Codex 
with international trade agreements. For instance, the formal linking of trade rules and 
Codex food standards was examined in 1991 at the FAO/WHO Conference on Food 
Standards, Chemicals in Food and Food Trade held in co-operation with the GATT 
Secretariat. The motivation for this conference was that the draft SPS Agreement cited 
the Codex Alimentarius as the international institution responsible for developing 
harmonised food standards. Essentially, the objective of this conference was to make 
the Codex procedures more trade congruent (this conference will be discussed in 
greater detail below).
In order to establish the science-basis sufficient to justify the use of SPS and 
TBT -  related measures, both the SPS and TBT Agreements defer to the international 
food safety and quality measures established under the Codex Alimentarius. The SPS 
Agreement states “Members shall base their sanitary or phyto-sanitary measures on 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations” (SPS Agreement, Article 
3:1). The TBT Agreement states that “(w)ith a view to harmonizing technical 
regulations on as wide a basis as possible, Members shall play a full part.. .in the 
preparation by appropriate international standardizing bodies of international 
standards for products for which they have either adopted, or expect to adopt, 
technical regulations” (TBT Agreement, Article 2:6). In other words, Codex food 
safety standards are relevant to the SPS Agreement while Codex food quality 
standards are relevant for the TBT Agreement.
Because of its focus on scientific rationality and its links with international 
trade agreements, the Codex is very vulnerable to criticisms from those who support a 
social rationality regulatory approach and who reject the traditional trade approach of 
international economic integration only. This is precisely the conflict that emerges 
with respect to GM crops. To better understand this conflict, the discussion begins 
with an examination of the scientific rationality approach of the Codex followed by a 
discussion of the current debates on GM crops and GM foods at the Codex.
The Codex Alimentarius, created in the early 1960s under the United Nations’ 
(UN) Food Standards Programme, is a joint agency of the UN’s Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO) and the World Health Organisation (WHO). The FAO, 
established in 1945, has responsibilities covering food nutrition and international food 
standards while the WHO, established in 1948, has responsibilities covering human 
health and food standards. The first meeting of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert 
Committee on Nutrition in 1950 concluded that there was a need for the international 
harmonisation of food standards based on science. The meeting report explained that: 
(f)ood regulations in different countries are often conflicting or 
contradictory. Legislation governing preservation, nomenclature 
and acceptable food standards often varies widely from country to 
country. New legislation not based on scientific knowledge is 
often introduced, and little account may be taken o f nutritional 
principles in formulating regulations. (FAO/WHO 1950).
In this sense, the initial motivation for a Codex Alimentarius was to establish science- 
based, international standards for food safety and quality in order to enhance 
consumer protection and reduce market fragmentation. In this sense, it is not difficult 
to appreciate why the Codex enjoys significant support from economic interests.
In 1960, the FAO Regional Conference for Europe endorsed the idea of 
creating an international food code governed jointly by the FAO and WHO and based 
on the Codex Alimentarius Europeaus. In 1961, the Eleventh Session of the 
Conference of the FAO established the Statutes and Rules of Procedures of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (CAC). Also, it was proposed that the start-up costs of the 
CAC be supported by a trust fund in which both national governments and industry 
groups made voluntary contributions (Frawley, 1987). In 1962, the Joint FAO/WHO 
Food Standards Conference requested that the CAC implement a joint FAO/WHO 
food standards programme and to create the Codex Alimentarius. Finally, in 1963 at 
the Sixteenth World Health Assembly of the WHO the establishment of the Joint 
FAO/WHO Programme on Food Standards was approved.
The creation of the Codex Alimentarius was driven largely by desires to ensure 
food safety and consumer protection in the context of rapidly growing international 
food trade. Widely different interests shared the demand for greater international co­
operation and international leadership in food standards. For instance, on one hand, 
international trade associations were frustrated by the market fragmentation of 
divergent regulations and, hence, supported international co-ordination efforts. While 
on the other hand, consumers’ concerns, including the food reform movements of the
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late 1940s and early 1950s were concerned with the lack of international co-ordination 
of food safety regulations as the international trade of food products increased. It has 
been argued that:
(t)he Codex Alimentarius was a response to a widely recognised 
need. It did not just happen. It was a product o f a long 
evolutionary process involving a wide cross-section o f the global 
community. Many people representing many interests and 
disciplines were involved in the process... (Frawley, 1987).
Therefore, the Codex emerged from a common desire for internationally co-ordinated 
food safety and quality rules.
Administratively, there are three separate Codex agencies which together work 
to develop the Codex Alimentarius; the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), the 
Codex Secretariat and the Codex Executive Committee. The first, and already 
mentioned, is the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) which meets every two 
years. To date, there have been 23 Sessions of the CAC. Commission membership is 
on a country basis where all member countries to the United Nations may be CAC 
members. Currently, the Commission has 165 member countries representing over 
97% of the world’s population who participate, in varying degrees, in the development 
of international food standards. Member countries are represented at CAC Sessions by 
national delegations composed of senior officials (usually health officials) appointed 
by their governments and may also include industry representatives, academics and 
representatives of non-governmental organisations. Although the CAC Sessions were 
initially the domain of the developed countries, the number of developing country 
delegations has steadily increased to nearly three times the number of developed 
country delegations (Frawley, 1987). There is also scope in the CAC Sessions for 
international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) to participate as ‘observers’ in 
order to express their points of view, with the restriction that observers cannot 
participate in final decision-making, only national delegations can. National level non­
governmental organisations are expected to participate through the national 
delegations of their home countries. Most Member countries have established a 
delegation contact point, for instance, in 1992 the UK established the National Codex 
Consultative Committee.
The CAC is governed according to Statutes and Rules of Procedures. The 
Statutes identify the reasons for the establishment of the Commission and the legal
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basis for its activities. For instance, according to Article 1 of the Statutes of the CAC, 
there are five guiding principles for the work of the Commission (CAC, 1997):
a) to protect the health of consumers and to ensure fair practices in food 
trade;
b) to promote the international co-ordination of all food standards among 
international governmental and non-governmental organisations;
c) to establish priorities for food standards and to initiate and guide the 
development of draft standards along with appropriate organisations;
d) to finalise draft standards and to publish final food standards including 
final standards developed by other international organisations which have 
been internationally accepted and to publish these standards in the Codex 
Alimentarius either as a regional or a world wide standard;
e) to amend published final food standards as new evidence is collected.
The Rules of Procedure of the CAC identify the how the intergovernmental body 
operates. The rules include the appointment of Commission officers, the frequency 
and operation of the Commission, procedures on voting, the establishment of 
subsidiary bodies and issues concerning the Commission’s budget and expenditures.
The CAC is the body responsible for establishing international measures and 
for co-ordinating an international dialogue on important food safety and quality issues 
through various expert committees and scientific consultations. According to the 
Rules of Procedure, the Commission can establish two kinds of subsidiary 
committees, Codex Committees and Co-ordinating Committees. The former, Codex 
Committees are made up of 15 Commodity Committees and 9 General Subject 
Committees (Table 3.2). Committees are chaired by a host member country and the 
committee may be active or dormant. Host members are very influential since they, in 
collaboration with the Codex Secretariat, establish the agenda of meetings and issue 
invitations to member delegations and observers.
Co-ordinating Committees have no host country because they are organised 
according to regions. There are five such committees representing Africa, Asia, 
Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean as well as North America and Southwest 
Pacific. Along with the Committees, there are joint FAO/WHO expert groups which 
provide advice and guidance to the Codex (Table 3.2).
The second Codex agency is the permanent Codex Secretariat which is located 
in Rome and administered by the FAO’s Food Quality and Standards Service within
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the Food and Nutrition Division. The purpose of the Secretariat is to provide day-to- 
day support for member countries as they attempt to interpret, develop and implement 
national food regulation congruent with the Codex Alimentarius. The Codex Secretary 
is an FAO official who serves also as the Chief of the Joint FAO/WHO Food
Standards Programme.
Vertical Commodity Committees Country
Cereals, pulses and legumes United States
Vegetable proteins Canada
Tropical fresh fruits and vegetables Mexico
Processed fruits and vegetables United States
Fats and oils United Kingdom
Processed meat and meat products Denmark
Meat hygiene New Zealand
Fish and fishery products Norway
Milk and milk products New Zealand
Sugars United Kingdom
Cocoa products and chocolate Switzerland
Edible ices Sweden
Soups and broths Switzerland
Natural Mineral Waters Switzerland
Horizontal General Subject Committees Country
Residues of veterinary drugs in food United States
Import/export inspection and certification Australia




Methods of Analysis and Sampling Hungary
Food hygiene United States
Nutrition and Foods for Special dietary uses Germany
Expert Committees
Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) 1955
Joint Meeting on Pesticide Residues (JMPR) 1963
Joint Expert Committee on Fruit Juices
Joint Expert Committee on Quick Frozen Foods
Table 3.2 Codex Commodity and General Subject Committees and Expert Committees
The third Codex agency is the Codex Executive Committee. The Executive 
Committee meets yearly and, unlike the CAC, is organised according to principal 
regions: Europe; Africa; Asia; the South Pacific; Latin America and North America. 
Hence, the Codex Executive Committee provides the regional perspective on food 
safety, consumer protection and, increasingly, agri-food trade.
The Codex Alimentarius, is composed of standards, codes of practice, 
guidelines and recommendations pertaining to food safety and quality. To date, 237 
Commodity food standards, 41 Codes of Hygienic or Technological Practice, 185
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Pesticide Evaluations, 3,274 Maximum Residue Limits for Pesticdes, 25 Guidelines 
for Contaminants, 1005 Food Additive Evaluations and 54 Veterinary Drug 
Evaluations have been developed (CAC, 1997).
Since the Codex Alimentarius attempts to develop universal food safety and 
consumer protection principles based on a tradition of consensual decision-making, it 
should come as no surprise that the administrative process is lengthy and subject to 
many iterative review processes. A Codex commodity food standard is adopted only 
after eight stages or steps of consultation have been completed. The eight steps 
include (CAC, 1997):
1. A food safety issue is identified by a national government or a subsidiary 
committee of the CAC and presented at a CAC plenary session (every two years), 
where, if it is determined that a Codex food standard ought to be elaborated, the 
CAC or the Codex Executive Committee assigns the issue to either a commodity or 
a general subject committee;
2. The committee presents its elaboration, based on Codex food standard elements, to 
the Codex Secretariat who produces a Proposed Draft Standard;
3. The Proposed Draft Standard is sent to all member governments and identified 
international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) for review and comments;
4. Comments from step 3 are returned to the Committee who initially elaborated the 
food standard;
5. The committee amends the Proposed Draft Standard subject to the review 
comments and the amended Draft Standard is presented to the CAC by the 
Secretariat at a plenary session where it may be adopted as a Draft Standard;
6. The adopted Draft Standard is sent to all member governments and identified 
INGOs for further comment;
7. Comments are returned to the Committee through the Secretariat for amendments 
to the Draft Standard;
8. The amended Draft Standard is presented to the CAC for adoption as a Codex 
Standard to be sent to member governments for acceptance.
Along with Codex commodity food standards, the Codex Alimentarius also 
includes Codex General Standards, developed by the horizontal General Subject 
Committees, which apply to all foods.
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A final Codex standard includes several elements. First, it includes a 
description of the product and the essential composition and quality factors which 
identify the product from close substitutes. Second, the standard includes both 
identification and analysis of any additives and potential contaminants in the food 
product. Third, the food standard incorporates established Codex requirements such as 
the Codex product hygiene requirements and the Codex labelling requirements.
Fourth, the standard includes a complete description of the scientific procedures used 
to sample and analyse the product during review. Fifth, the standard specifies any 
labelling requirements in accordance with the Codex General Standard for the 
Labelling of Pre-packaged Foods.
Determination of the safety of the food product is based on Risk Analysis as 
outlined by the Codex Committee on General Principles. Scientific risk assessment 
involves risk identification, characterisation and exposure assessment as defined in the 
Redbook6. This includes toxicological studies of pesticide residues, microbial 
contaminants, chemical additives and veterinary biologies.
In March 1995, a Codex sponsored joint FAO/WHO consultation proposed 
definitions for risk consideration activities in Codex (FAO/WHO 1995). The 
conclusions of this consultation were included in the 1996 CAC Progress report which 
clarified the definitions of risk, hazard, Risk Analysis, risk assessment, risk 
management and risk communication (CAC 1996).
At the 21st Session of the CAC (3-7 July Rome) amendments to the Codex 
Procedural Manual included four statements of principles concerning the role of 
science in the Codex decision-making process and the extent to which other factors 
are taken into account. The four statements of principle included:
1. The food standards, guidelines and other recommendations of Codex Alimentarius 
shall be based on the principle of sound scientific analysis and evidence, involving 
a thorough review of all relevant information, in order that standards assure the 
quality and safety of the food supply.
2. When elaborating and deciding on food standards Codex Alimantarius will have 
regard, where appropriate, to other legitimate factors relevant for the health 
protection of consumers and for the promotion of fair practices in food trade.
6 See Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 for a discussion of the Redbook’s principles of Risk Analysis.
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3. In this regard, it is noted that food plays an important role in furthering both of 
these objectives.
4. When the situation arises that the members of Codex agree on the necessary level 
of protection of public health but hold differing views about other considerations, 
members may abstain from acceptance of the relevant standard without necessarily 
preventing the decision by Codex (CAC 1995).
Economic interests supported these amendments. They were put forward by 
the US and supported by other agricultural exporters and many G77 nations and 
against the strong opposition of the EU and the Member State representatives in the 
EU delegation. The first principle was the major source of contention. It has been the 
traditional Risk Analysis approach of the Codex Alimentarius that risk should be 
scientific evidence of risk to human health. The EU was attempting to broaden the 
Risk Analysis approach to include broader concerns. The first principle, however, 
firmly supported the traditional scientific stance of Codex Risk Analysis. Although the 
second principle mentions the consideration of other legitimate factors, it is only 
within the parameters of the first principle that this is possible. That is, only those 
other legitimate factors that enhance the health protection of consumers from 
identified potential hazards may be considered. Further, the third principle reinforced 
the linkage between Codex and food trade. Therefore, the amendments to the 
procedural manual rejected the focus of food standards on broader concerns. Finally, 
the fourth principle pertains to the contentious role of Codex in risk management. 
Recall, risk management involves the evaluation of the risk identified in risk 
assessment in order to establish an appropriate regulatory response that reduces and 
prevents the hazard. Economic interests tend to argue that while an internationally 
harmonised approach to risk assessment is an appropriate role of the Codex, the 
response to risk is the domain of sovereign governments because risk management 
inevitably involves socio-economic issues that cannot be internationally harmonised. 
The pressure has been to create an opt-out situation so that a country may abstain from 
the Codex food standard decision, and the standard may still be adopted on the basis 
of its scientific justification. This is directly against the original intent of adopting 
standards by consensus and promoting the international harmonisation of food 
standards. Also, even if a country opts out of a Codex standard, the Codex standard 
would be considered the prevailing international standard under the SPS Agreement 
and would be relevant in the event of a trade dispute.
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Generally it takes about seven years to develop a Codex food standard (i.e. 
one-half year for each steps (l)-(6) while steps (7) and (8) take two years each). There 
is a fast-track procedure which can be employed if the proposed standard is relatively 
uncontroversial. Under the fast-track approach, it is possible for the amended Draft 
Standard to be adopted at step 6 as a Codex Food standard, instead of being sent for 
further review, if consensus has been achieved.
While the Codex decision-making process is preferably done by consensus 
among national delegations although it can be by vote in the CAC if consensus cannot 
be achieved on very controversial issues, such as the use of hormones in beef 
production.
An important aspect of Codex standards is that they are subject to revision, as 
new scientific knowledge becomes available. It is the responsibility of each member 
country to present to the Commission and the relevant subsidiary committee new 
information that may require revision to a Codex standard. This information must, 
however, meet the Codex standards for a scientific justification.
Once a Codex Standard is developed, member countries are expected to adopt 
the standard into national food regulations in order to promote international consumer 
protection and market access rules. According to the Codex General Principles, there 
are three forms of member state acceptance: full acceptance, acceptance with minor 
deviations and free distribution. In this sense, the regulatory convergence strategy of 
Codex is one of regulatory co-ordination according to mutual recognition. The FAO 
and the WHO provide assistance to developing countries in establishing the capacity 
and knowledge necessary to implement food legislation congruent with the many 
Codex measures.
Along with standards, the Codex also develops and publishes codes of 
hygienic practice, codes of technological practice, guidelines and recommendations on 
various food safety and quality issues. The purpose of these measures is to protect the 
health of consumers in areas where standards may not be practical (FAO, 1998). The 
codes of hygienic practice provide industry with guidance on the safe production of 
food products. The codes of technological practice provide industry with guidance on 
the safe use of process, storage and transport technology during food production. 
Guidelines and recommendations are more general than the codes of practice, and 
provide industry with guidance on wider issues such as the procedures for food trade 
following accidental nuclear contamination.
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To assist the Commission in ensuring consumer safety and health and 
protecting consumers from economic fraud, consumer organisations have participated 
in the development of Codex measures since 1965 (FAO, 1998; see also Houston, 
1987). At the 20th CAC session it was recognised that the Commission must continue 
to provide an opportunity for consumer organisations to participate. However, it was 
reiterated that Codex decision-making is done by national delegations, therefore, it is 
the responsibility of the national delegations to involve consumers more effectively in 
the decision-making process at the national level in the National Codex Committees.
The Codex also includes, in Volume 1A General Requirements, a Code of 
Ethics for International Trade in Foods established in 1979 and amended in 1995. The 
Code is non-binding but applies to all foods traded. This code explains that the Codex 
goes beyond facilitating the removal of barriers to trade. Instead, it also encourages 
food traders to adopt voluntary ethical practices to protect consumers and to ensure 
fair trade. According to the Codex General Principles:
(international trade in food should be conducted on the principle 
that all consumers are entitled to safe, sound and wholesome food 
and to protection from unfair trade practices (FAO, 1998).
Principally, the code is to prevent countries from exporting unsafe or poor quality 
food. It prohibits dumping of foodstuffs not suitable for the domestic market into 
foreign markets. Under the code, there are three responsibilities of the Party of Export. 
First, to employ as appropriate and practicable, legal or administrative controls aimed 
at preventing the exportation or shipment of food which does not comply with the 
laws of the Party of Import, or in the absence of applicable laws, with the Codex 
Alimentarius. Second, to promptly notify the Party of Import of the exportation of 
shipments of food found not to comply, when a legal or administrative means of 
preventing the exportation are not available or were unsuccessfully applied or where 
non-compliance was determined only after exportation. Third, to make available to the 
Party of Import, upon request, appropriate certification, inspection and other 
procedures as appropriate with the manner of compensation for these services to be 
agreed between the Party of Export and the Party of Import. If an importing country 
finds inappropriate imports, then it can request the Party of Export to pursue the 
exporter according to all legal and administrative procedures in order to rectify the 
situation, on behalf of the importer and the Party of Import.
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Essentially, Codex is a top-down approach to developing universally 
acceptable food standards through its elaboration and consultation procedures at the 
multilateral level. It reflects a scientific rationality approach to regulatory 
development. Once a food standard is adopted by member countries, the Codex 
requests and the SPS and TBT Agreements require Members to incorporate the 
standard into any relevant domestic legislation. Under the principles of both Codex 
and the SPS and TBT Agreements, Members retain the right to unilaterally impose 
more stringent food safety regulations that may be deemed necessary to ensure 
domestic consumer protection. However, it is anticipated that when countries do 
deviate from the Codex food standard, they do so in a scientifically justifiable manner, 
where scientifically justifiable is measured with respect to the Codex Risk Analysis 
approach.
Concerns associated with linking the Codex with international trade 
agreements were the focus of a 1991 conference. The 1991 FAO/WHO Conference on 
Food Standards, Chemicals in Food and Food Trade in co-operation with the GATT 
Secretariat, included several important proposed reforms to the Codex in order to 
make it more congruent with trade agreements. First, to accommodate the needs of 
trade agreements, it was proposed that the standards development process should be 
more rapid including a proposal for majority voting procedures. Specifically, it was 
proposed that a two-thirds majority vote in favour of a standard at stage 5 would be 
sufficient for the adoption of a standard. This departs from the Codex tradition of 
consensus based decision-making and shifts it towards judicious and timely decision­
making in order to support trade interests. There was considerable support for this 
linkage even among the EU. Recall from the discussion on the SPS Agreement, 
economic interests who supported clarified international food safety rules dominated 
the EU’s food trade policy.
Second, as the Codex Alimentarius is composed of standards, guidelines, 
codes of practice and recommendations, it was proposed that all types of Codex 
initiatives be considered as ‘standards’ under the trade agreements. This proposal was 
also included in the Report of the Twelfth Session of the Codex Committee on 
General Principles (CCGP) in 1996 (CAC, 1996a). In September 1998, the CCGP 
decided that with respect to the SPS Agreement all types of Codex initiatives are 
functionally the same. In April 1999, the CCGP decided that all types of initiatives 
were all ‘food standards’ according to the TBT Agreement as well. This decision was
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on the basis of a TBT Committee recommendation that “governments harmonise their 
regulations on the basis of international standards and in the framework of Codex this 
applies to all the provisions which do not address the protection of consumers’ 
health.. and “there is no difference between the various categories of Codex texts 
involved; for the purpose of the TBT Agreement all Codex standards and related texts 
correspond to the TBT definition of a standard”(Codex Secretariat, 1999).
Third, a proposal to increase the transparency of Codex was also included. 
Traditionally Codex was an international institutional arrangement dominated by 
technical discussions among leading scientists and food safety experts. Prior to its 
linking with the SPS Agreement, there was little reason for broader interest in the 
work of Codex. In this sense, Codex was not a deliberately untransparent institution, 
instead, there was no pressure for it to be accessible to interests beyond those 
interested in technical food standards issues.
The fourth proposal from the 1991 conference was to give priority to 
horizontal committees over vertical committees. That is, to move towards the 
development of general international standards or minimum requirements rather than 
numerous, specific vertical standards because the harmonisation of standards across 
specific categories was found to be very difficult and time-consuming.
Agricultural biotechnology and GM crops are dealt with under Codex on a 
product basis, not on a technology basis. In 1995, there was an unsuccessful attempt to 
permanently include foods derived from GM techniques on the agenda of the 
horizontal Codex Committee on Special Nutritionals. There is currently neither a 
vertical committee nor a horizontal ‘general subject’ biotechnology committee 
Instead, various vertical commodity and general subject committees address issues 
and concerns associated with agricultural biotechnology as it affects their traditional 
jurisdictions such as the Codex Committee on Food Labelling.
The use of biotechnology in food production emerged on the Codex agenda 
while considerable attention was focused on the EU-US dispute over beef hormones in 
the CAC meetings of 1991,1993 and 1995. Further, at the CAC meetings of 1997, the 
use of bovine somatotrophin (rbST) was the controversial agricultural biotechnology 
issue on the agenda. Indeed, an important development was that the Commission did 
not approve the use of rbST on the basis that ‘other legitimate factors’ should be 
examined. In this sense, the early considerations of agricultural biotechnology and 
GM crops appeared to be very uncontroversial. Yet, in recent years, GM crops have
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become an important, controversial topic of discussion and consultation in the Codex. 
GM crops raise two important issues for Codex. The first is determining what is the 
role of science in Codex standard-setting procedures while the second is determining 
what is the role of Codex in risk management procedures.
In 1990, a WHO/FAO Joint Expert Consultation (WHO/FAO, 1991) examined 
the issue of foods produced from GM ingredients and made seven recommendations.
1. GM (rDNA) foods should be evaluated for both safety and nutritional value.
2. New processes of production should be evaluated for safety.
3. Evaluations should have broad participation.
4. Evaluation can result in recommendations for animal testing.
5. Evaluation committee should have de facto authority over national policies on GM 
foods.
6. International organisations should harmonise risk (safety) assessments for both 
products and processes.
7. Consumer information should be scientifically based and only concerned with 
food safety issues.
These recommendations were crucial in forming a baseline approach for assessing and 
regulating GM crops. The first recommendation supported the product-basis for 
regulatory oversight, while the second recommendation suggested specific oversight 
in the instance of novelty. The third recommendation supported the need to include 
the ‘social dimensions’ in the regulatory development. The fourth recommendation 
encouraged more pharmaceutical-type assessment procedures for approval while both 
the fifth and sixth recommendations called for the development of a harmonised, 
international regulatory framework to GM crops overriding national regulations. The 
seventh recommendation only supported consumer information, such as labelling 
strategies, for food safety issues such as the possible presence of allergens and not for 
the consumers’ right to know.
Also in 1990, the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives developed risk 
assessment guidelines for the use of GM material additives in foodstuffs. The Medium 
Term Programme of Work for the period 1993 to 1998 included the development of 
Codex guidelines for the evaluation of foods produced from biotechnology and the 
application of risk assessment principles to the Codex work on agricultural 
biotechnology (Codex Secretariat, 1993). Unsurprisingly, these guidelines supported 
the scientific rationality approach to technology-based, novelty-based regulations.
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In 1996, a Joint FAOAVHO Consultation on Biotechnology and Food Safety 
was held. The purpose of this consultation was to examine the broad implications of 
biotechnology on food safety and to propose Codex procedures for dealing with 
biotechnological applications.
At the 23rd CAC Session in Rome, 28 June -  3 July 1999, the United States 
proposed a ‘Biotechnology Code’ that clarified the dominant role of science in the 
food standards associated with products of biotechnology. This code, of course, 
supported the North American regulatory approach. Although unsuccessful, the CAC 
agreed instead to establish an Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods 
Derived From Biotechnology to examine the issues facing Codex efforts to develop 
biotechnology standards, codes of practice, guidelines and recommendations. The 
Task Force is wider in remit than the Biotechnology Code, as it will allow for broader 
non-science issues to be considered such as consumer and environmental protection 
issues. Specifically, the Task Force will:
1. elaborate standards, guidelines and other principles, as appropriate, for food 
derived from biotechnology;
2. co-ordinate and closely collaborate, as necessary, with appropriate Codex 
Committees within their mandates as related to foods derived from 
biotechnology; and
3. take full account of existing work carried out by national authorities, FAO, 
WHO, other international organisations and other relevant international fora.
The Task Force has a four-year mandate from July 1999 to July 2003 and it must 
present a preliminary report to the 24th CAC in 2001, a mid-term report to the CEC in 
2002 and a Final Report to the 25th CAC in 2003 (AgraFood Biotech No. 19, 1999b). 
The first meeting of the Task Force was in Chiba, Japan 14-17 March 2000 and the 
issues covered included: establishing the scope and priorities of the Task Force, 
clarifying key concepts and definitions for core principles such as Risk Analysis and 
to examine national and regional experiences with the regulatory problems created by 
foods derived from biotechnology.
The Codex Draft Medium-Term Plan 1998 -  2002 also contains a proposal to 
establish Codex measures over the application of biotechnology. It requires 
‘consideration of a general standard for foods derived from biotechnology or traits 
introduced into foods by biotechnology’. Essentially, this means the formation of a
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Codex horizontal General Subject Committee on biotechnology would have to be 
established.
In summary, the Codex employs a scientific rationality approach to the 
development and integration of food safety regulations supported by economic 
interests. Accordingly, the development of Codex standards for the use of 
biotechnology in food production has tended to reflect this approach. Yet, there is 
significant dissatisfaction with this approach and debates have emerged over whether 
or not the Codex can effectively hold the line on its traditional scientific approach. In 
this sense, the development of international biotechnology standards at Codex remains 
unstable and uncertain.
D. International Plant Protection Convention
Similar to the Codex Alimentarius, the International Plant Protection 
Convention (IPPC) is supported by economic interests because it follows a scientific 
rationality approach for developing regulations to protect plant health. The reason for 
this is because international scientific experts on phyto-sanitary hazards have 
dominated the development of international plant health regulations. This work has 
been carried out far from public view. The IPPC is important for economic interests 
because it is the only international institution that establishes international phyto- 
sanitary standards and their legitimate use according to the SPS Agreement. However, 
similar to the Codex, this is controversial because this approach contravenes the social 
rationality approach.
The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN administers the IPPC.
Where the SPS Agreement is concerned, the IPPC standards are considered in the 
limited capacity for protecting the plant health of the domestic food supply from pests 
and disease. In this sense, IPPC standards may be used legitimately under the SPS 
Agreement to restrict imports of certain plants and products produced from plants 
because of the risk of transmission of diseases or pests to plants used in the domestic 
food supply. Hence, according to the SPS Agreement, the IPPC standards are for 
protecting the health of food supply plants, not for protecting overall plant 
biodiversity. In general, however, the IPPC is an environmental protection convention, 
despite its limited scope under the SPS Agreement. Therefore, while the IPPC’s 
phyto-sanitary standards are crucial to the SPS Agreement from a more limited food 
safety perspective, they are really about environmental protection and, thus, the IPPC
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straddles the divide between food safety and environmental protection measures. 
Consequently, the IPPC will be discussed first in its food safety context under the SPS 
Agreement, followed by a discussion of its environmental context in the next section 
on Environmental Protection and Trade (Chapter 3.2.2).
The IPPC is a multilateral treaty that was signed in 1951 and came into force 
in 1952. The scope of the convention is the protection of natural flora, cultivated 
plants and plant products. Similar to the Codex, the motivation for the IPPC was to 
develop international standards, applicable to all countries for the protection of plant 
health and, hence, remove the fragmented collection of standards in the various 
jurisdictions. To achieve this, the IPPC seeks to harmonise international measures 
designed to prevent the spread and introduction of diseases and pests to plants and 
plant products. Clearly, as the environmental biodiversity concerns about GM crops 
mostly include speculation on the risks, extent and consequences of vector-mediated, 
horizontal gene transfer between GM crops, non-GM or conventional crops, wild 
relatives and other natural flora and organisms, the scope of the IPPC is well 
positioned to focus precisely on these concerns.
Administratively, the IPPC is deposited with the Director-General of the FAO 
and administered through the IPPC Secretariat located in FAO's Plant Protection 
Service. One hundred and seven (107) governments are currently contracting parties 
to the IPPC. The Convention Secretariat, in collaboration with both regional and 
national plant protection organisations (RPPOs and NPPOs), provides a forum for the 
international co-operation, harmonisation and technical exchange of plant protection 
information.
The IPPC plays a vital role in international trade as it is the institution 
recognised by the WTO in the SPS Agreement as the institution responsible for 
developing international standards for phyto-sanitary measures affecting trade in 
plants and plant products. As a result, signatories to the convention agreed on 
amendments in 1997 in order to clarify its rules-setting procedures. The 1997 
amendments, captured in the New Revised Text of the IPPC, include provisions that: 
formalise the role of the IPPC Secretariat; update the standards-setting procedures; 
emphasise co-operation and the exchange of information toward the objective of 
global harmonisation; and establish the Commission on Phyto-sanitary Measures 
(CPM). The CPM will serve as the global agreement's new governing body. The 
members of the Commission are the contracting parties to the Convention.
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With respect to the international regulation of GM crops, the IPPC develops 
International Standards for Phyto-sanitary Measures (ISPMs). The ISPMs do not 
explicitly address agricultural biotechnology as a process. Instead, products of 
agricultural biotechnology that risk plant health are in-scope. In this sense, the risk 
assessment efforts of the IPPC have adopted the traditional trade principle of ‘like’ 
products or ‘substantial equivalence’.
There are currently nine ISPMs accepted by the contracting parties to the 
convention that reflect procedural standards. The ISPMs include: Principles of Plant 
Quarantine as Related to International Trade; Guidelines for Pest Risk Analysis; Code 
of Conduct for the Import and Release of Exotic Biological Control Agents; 
Requirements for the Establishment of Pest-Free Areas; Glossary of Phyto-sanitary 
Terms; Guidelines for Surveillance; Export Certification Systems; Determination of 
Pest Status in an Area; and Guidelines for Pest Eradication Programmes. An important 
aspect of the ISPM’s is that while they are based on a scientific framework of risk 
assessment, they tend to go beyond just providing risk information. Instead, they also 
include explicit risk management provisions in order to reduce and prevent plant 
health risks.
The development of ISPMs follows a three-stage procedure. First, suggestions 
to draft an ISPM are made by either the Secretariat, an NPPO, an RPPO, industry 
participants or by individuals. Draft standards are then developed and submitted to the 
Secretariat by the NPPOs or RPPOs. The draft standards are reviewed by the 
Committee of Experts on Phyto-sanitary Measures (CEPM), a group of phyto-sanitary 
experts from around the world that meets annually to review and comment on the 
suitability of documents prepared by the Secretariat. Alternatively, the draft standard 
may be reviewed by an international working group formed by the Secretariat. 
Recommendations to either develop an ISPM from the draft proposal or modify the 
draft proposal for further review are made. After the draft ISPM is developed, 
contracting parties and RPPOs are consulted. Comments are submitted to the CEPM 
and the Secretariat and a re-drafted standard is developed. This standard is then 
submitted to the Commission on Phytosanitary Measures (CPM) for approval and 
adoption as an ISPM. The Standard is published and distributed by the FAO.
The Convention is a legally binding agreement and member governments or 
contracting parties are expected to adhere to the ISPMs, but standards developed and 
adopted are not legally binding. Similar to Codex standards, measures that are based
104
on the international standards do not require supporting justification. Measures that 
deviate from international standards or measures that exist in the absence of 
international standards must be based on scientific principles and evidence in order to 
be considered as scientifically justified under the SPS Agreement. Emergency (or 
provisional) measures may be taken without such analyses, but must be reviewed for 
their scientific justification and modified accordingly in order to remain legitimate.
The most important initiatives of the IPPC, likely to have an impact on the 
international regulation of GM crops, are associated with the 1997 amendments to the 
convention. First, the creation of the Commission on Phyto-sanitary Measures (CPM), 
in effect, institutionalised the global role of the IPPC. The nascent Commission is 
scheduled to meet annually to establish priorities for standard setting and the 
harmonisation of phyto-sanitary measures in co-ordination with the IPPC Secretariat. 
Special sessions of the Commission may also be called. The functions of the 
Commission are to review the state of plant protection in the world, provide direction 
to the work programme of the IPPC Secretariat, and approve the ISPMs. In the sense, 
the IPPC must be considered an active player in the development and integration of 
GM crop regulations.
Second, the revised work programme of the IPPC Secretariat includes 
technical assistance through projects, including for emergency pest control and a 
forum for government consultation on shared concerns and for resolution of issues of 
contention, including trade issues. In other words, the IPPC has a built in agenda and 
mechanisms for dealing with phyto-sanitary risks to plant health.
Third, the Revised IPPC also prescribed specific obligations of member 
countries, including: to provide the IPPC Secretariat with an official Contact Point for 
the member country; to carry out regular pest surveillance and monitoring; to establish 
and maintain pest free areas; and to conduct pest risk analyses when scientific support 
for a phyto-sanitary measure may be needed. This requires pertinent data on pest 
biology, distribution, host range and potential for impact. From a risk assessment 
perspective, the IPPC supports scientific rationality approaches where contracting 
parties are obligated to be scientific in their approach to phyto-sanitary measures. To 
facilitate risk communication, a member government must appoint a Contact Point to 
provide communication, information sharing and transparency between contracting 
parties and the IPPC Secretariat.
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Fourth, the 1997 amendments also formalised the link between the IPPC and 
the WTO because the SPS Agreement identified the IPPC as the organisation 
providing international standards for phyto-sanitary measures implemented by 
governments to protect their plant resources. Both agreements are distinct in their 
scope, purpose, and membership. Neither agreement is supplementary to the other. 
The IPPC makes provision for trade in a plant protection agreement by ensuring that 
phyto-sanitary measures have a scientific basis for their establishment and hence are 
not used as unjustified barriers to international trade while the SPS Agreement makes 
provision for plant protection from a food safety perspective within a trade agreement.
Unlike the Codex, the IPPC also has built-in provisions for dispute avoidance 
and dispute settlement in the event that measures are challenged as unjustified barriers 
to trade. In this sense, the IPPC has an important risk management role to play. With 
respect to dispute avoidance, the IPPC provides guidance, support, and information to 
contracting parties concerning phyto-sanitary measures and it facilitates the exchange 
of information between the parties with respect to regulatory requirements and pest 
status. The dispute settlement process under the Revised IPPC provides a neutral 
forum for a technical dialogue on the dispute. Countries first consult bilaterally with 
the aim of resolving the problem. The IPPC Secretariat provides technical support and 
facilitates the exchange of views and information in this process. If further action is 
deemed necessary, the disputing parties can request that the Director-General of FAO 
form an expert panel to review the situation and recommend a course of action. 
Although the dispute settlement process in the IPPC is non-binding, the results of the 
process can be expected to have substantial influence in disputes that may be raised to 
the WTO level under the SPS Agreement. This is because the IPPC Secretariat both 
nominates experts for WTO dispute panels and provides technical background to the 
panel. Once a dispute is brought to WTO, the decision will be legally binding and can 
have serious economic and political consequences. Therefore, the EPPC encourages 
governments to begin with consultation and a technical exchange with the aim of 
dispute avoidance at this technical stage before the political stakes are raised in a trade 
dispute.
Together, the Revised IPPC Text and the WTO SPS Agreement now ensure 
that there are structured channels for the establishment and notification of 
internationally harmonised phyto-sanitary measures as well as channels for 
notification of any member country deviations in the relevant measures.
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There appears to be significant opportunity for the IPPC to enhance the 
international integration of GM crop regulations. First, the IPPC implements trade- 
related principles of plant protection and harmonises phyto-sanitary measures under 
the WTO SPS Agreement through multilateral negotiations among contracting parties 
or other relevant organisations. To this end, the phyto-sanitary standards developed by 
the IPPC aim to establish a rules-based approach to scientific risk assessment 
according to the principle of substantial equivalence.
Second, the IPPC Secretariat’s regulatory integration activities remain 
consistent with the overall objectives of the FAO including: capacity building and 
strengthening plant protection infrastructures; dispute avoidance; updating and 
aligning plant protection legislation; and the provision of emergency assistance 
programmes. Hence, the initiatives of the IPPC are broader than just the development 
of scientifically-based standards. Instead, they also involve risk management activities 
focused on other legitimate factors such as the capacity gap. Indeed, the IPPC 
recognises that the North-South capacity gap remains a significant obstacle for 
international regulatory integration of phyto-sanitary measures. Establishing, 
implementing and monitoring compliance with ISPMs demands a requisite level of 
technological sophistication, arguably lacking in many less developed countries. To 
address this obstacle, a specific obligation of developed member countries under the 
Revised IPPC, is the provision of technical assistance on phytosanitary measures for 
Less Developed members.
An important unknown remains the effectiveness of the dispute avoidance and 
dispute resolution provisions of the IPPC. In the event that trade barriers to GM crops 
are supported by phyto-sanitary measures, then it is possible that the dispute 
provisions in the IPPC are used to resolve the social regulatory barriers rather than the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism. However, the problem with the dispute 
settlement mechanism at the IPPC is that it thrusts the IPPC fully into the realm of risk 
management and top-down regulatory integration, rather than leaving it as an 
international forum for establishing science-based principles for risk assessment and 
for providing risk information. Technical decisions on risk management issues 
inadequately deal with the legitimate, broader concerns that risk management must 
also deal with. The IPPC dispute settlement decisions on appropriate domestic 
regulations will create winners and losers which in turn creates dissatisfaction among
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the losers towards an international institution that is supposed to be developing 
consensual, co-ordinated phyto-sanitary measures.
In Summary, it is easy to understand why economic interests support the IPPC 
as the international organisation responsible for developing internationally harmonised 
phyto-sanitary standards. The IPPC can possibly play an important role in the 
development of an international regulatory approach to phyto-sanitary measures 
governing GM crops. Its remit to promote the health of natural flora, cultivated plants 
and plant products allows it considerable scope to cover the various environmental 
biodiversity concerns which have been levelled against GM crops. The IPPC has 
built-in dispute settlement provisions which avoid having to settle phyto-sanitary 
disputes at the WTO. This is a far more credible and legitimate forum to settle plant- 
related environmental disputes.
3.2.2 Environmental Protection and Trade
To date, much of the discussion on GM crops and trade has focused on the 
relationship between food safety measures and the rights and obligations of trade 
agreements (Isaac and Woolcock, 1999; Perdikis et al., 1999). Yet, environmental 
biodiversity concerns are a big part of current consumer concerns about GM crops, 
and they create pressures to impose environmental protection measures that become 
social regulatory barriers. The trade threat is that the use of environmental protection 
measures is less disciplined under international agreements. Hence, it is important to 
understand how environmental protection measures are dealt with at the WTO. It will 
be argued that, in general, economic interests support a rules-based and science-based 
approach to environmental regulatory development and integration.
Generally, international food safety rules have been science-based while 
environmental protection rules have been less rules-based. Perhaps the most important 
reason for this situation what that the science of food toxicology tended to be more 
advanced than the science of predictive ecology, essentially limiting the extent to 
which environmental regulatory development could rely upon science. However, with 
the Uruguay Round Agreement, economic interests have, in fact, begun to formalise 
environmental protection measures under science-based trade rules. This has come 
about in two distinct ways. First, there has been an attempt to clarify safety-related 
environmental measures under the SPS Agreement’s link to the IPPC and to clarify 
non-safety-related environmental measures under the TBT Agreement. Second, there
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has been an attempt to demarcate the line between trade agreements and multilateral 
environmental agreements. These will be discussed in this order below.
A. Processing and Production Methods (PPMs)
The traditional focus of GATT 1948 was on products, not processing and 
production methods (PPMs) because products are traded and cross international 
borders. Increasingly, however, it became clear that that the manner in which a 
product was processed or produced was relevant to domestic regulations and hence 
international market access. For instance, the PPMs used in a particular industry may 
generate negative environmental externalities (i.e. pollution) which can 
indiscriminately cross international borders and pollute the global common. While 
recognizing the importance of PPMs in trade measures, the international trade regime 
sought to clarify the legitimate use of such measures. What has emerged is a two­
pronged approach for dealing with PPM-based environmental measures. Safety- 
related PPM-based measures are addressed under the SPS Agreement through the 
IPPC, similar to the way food safety measures are addressed under the SPS 
Agreement through the Codex. Non-safety-related PPM-based measures are addressed 
under the TBT Agreement. The key point is that, similar to food trade issues, the 
economic interests behind the trade regime have sought to disentangle safety measures 
from non-safety measures and make the former science-based and latter subject to the 
traditional trade principle of non-discrimination.
Under the SPS Agreement, economic interests have formalised the use of 
safety-related phyto-sanitary PPM-based measures in the international trade regime. 
This is very important for social regulatory barriers imposed on GM crops and 
justified as necessary to protect the safety of domestic environmental biodiversity. 
Such trade-restricting measures would be subject to the IPPC scientific risk 
assessment procedures. In this sense, the scientific rationality approach now covers 
safety-related PPMs. Phyto-sanitary measures imposed by Members would be subject 
to the scientific justification requirements outlined in the IPPC. The phyto-sanitary 
standards and standards-setting procedures must be considered as the parameters for 
the permissible phyto-sanitary measures that Members can legitimately adopt. This 
creates a rules-based and science-based approach to safety-related environmental 
protection regulation similar to the Codex approach to food safety regulation.
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Non-safety-related PPM-based environmental measures are not subject to the 
same degree of scientific justification as safety-related measures. Without this 
scientific basis, non-safety-related measures are disciplined under the TBT Agreement 
according to the traditional trade principle of non-discrimination. With respect to 
environmental measures pertaining to GM crops, the main TBT issue is the 
permissible use of non-safety trade-restriction measures based on the PPMs employed 
in the extraction, harvesting or manufacture of traded goods.
The relationship between non-safety-related PPMs and international trade was 
investigated in both the Tokyo and the Uruguay Round. In the Tokyo Round CPs 
differed as to how they thought PPMs should be dealt with. On one hand, some CPs 
including major agricultural exporters sought to have PPMs included in the TBT Code 
to prevent circumvention of the GATT trade principles by technical regulations. The 
aim was not to prevent the use of PPMs in product standards such as labelling 
requirements, but to have some discipline on their use. Other CPs did not want to have 
PPMs included in the Code and the result was a two-fold compromise. First, PPMs 
were divided into two types; product-related PPMs and non-product-related PPMs 
(OECD 1997c) to reclaim some of the traditional division between products and 
processes under the GATT. Second, to subject the use of PPMs to the dispute 
settlement provisions of the TBT Code (TBT Code, Article 14:25).
In the Uruguay Round, the US along with other agricultural exporters again 
tried to have PPMs disciplined under the TBT Agreement. By the end of the round, 
the only change was that product-related PPMs would be covered by the TBT 
Agreement, not non-product-related PPMs. This means that the rights and obligations 
of the TBT Agreement only apply to those PPM measures that have an effect on the 
safety or quality attributes of the final product. This is similar to the SPS Agreement, 
which focuses only on the safety of imported materials, either final food products or 
food inputs. Accordingly, there are no permissible circumstances for employing non­
product-related PPMs. As will be shown below (Chapter 5), GATT and WTO dispute 
decisions have concluded that trade restrictions based on the non-product-related 
PPMs of traded goods violate the trade principles of non-discrimination and they 
result in an unjustifiable extra-territorial extension of one Member’s environmental 
preferences upon another Member.
With respect to food trade, product-related PPMs can include, for instance, the 
type of veterinary practices and quality assurance systems that may be employed in a
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beef production system because these PPMs may affect the safety and quality of the 
final beef products. That is, product-related PPMs are associated with the 
consumption or use stage of the product and may cause negative consumption 
externalities. According to the TBT Agreement, coverage includes “product 
characteristics or their related processes and production methods” but only as they 
avoid “consumption externalities” (TBT Agreement, Annex 1). Therefore, only 
consumption externalities associated with product-related PPMs are within the scope 
of the TBT Agreement. Further, and similar to the SPS Agreement, there are limits to 
the permissible use of product-related PPM-based measures that Members may enact. 
Under the TBT Agreement the legitimate deviations are not as precise as the SPS 
Agreement and can include “different social objectives and priorities attached to 
environmental protection” (OECD, 1997c).
On the other hand, non-product-related PPMs in the trade of agricultural crops 
are generally associated with the agronomic system, but have no influence on the end 
product. For instance, the technologies employed or the soil cultivation or 
conservation strategies used are non-product-related PPMs. Although not responsible 
for consumption externalities, these PPMs may cause negative production 
environmental externalities. Yet, these PPMs are out of scope of the TBT Agreement, 
and are the sovereign domain of the Member government. From a trade perspective, 
such measures must follow the principles of non-discrimination.
The problem with non-product-related PPMs and agricultural crops from an 
environmental protection perspective is that the pursuit of sustainable development 
and the protection of biodiversity focus on production externalities and result in 
pressures on domestic governments to establish environmental protection measures 
pertaining to non-product-related PPMs which can become regulatory market access 
barriers. Specifically, GM crops are associated with concerns about their impact upon 
the environment and this concern has led to opposition in Member states to the 
domestic environmental release of GM crops. It is reasonable to suppose, however, 
that this may even lead to a Member enacting trade measures based on the non­
product related PPMs of GM crops grown elsewhere and imported into the Member 
country.
In the Uruguay Round, most developing countries did not want any linking of 
trade and the environment because often PPMs are considered to be a source of 
comparative advantage. They point out, with some justification, that the industrialised
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countries developed without environmental controls. Now that they have all the 
benefits conferred by industrialisation, especially higher incomes, they can afford to 
demand more income elastic environmental protection through PPM-based trade 
measures. This makes the industrialisation process harder for the South. Such 
measures may favour particular PPMs or technologies that are not employed and/or 
not available to developing country producers. Also, products crucial to developing 
countries (i.e. paper products/timber) are disproportionately covered by PPM 
measures. In other words, if PPMs favour new technologies, then the capacity gap 
means that the less technologically advanced will continue to lag behind.
Despite the importance of the issue, the compatibility of PPM-based 
environmental measures with the rights and obligations of the TBT Agreement 
remains uncertain (Caldwell, 1998). Moreover, with respect to GM crops, an 
additional unresolved issue exacerbates the trade uncertainty. It can be expected that 
this issue will be an important focus of the TBT Committee as trade issues associated 
with GM crops arise.
There is significant uncertainty about whether or not GM crops can even be 
categorised as having different PPMs than conventional, non-GM crops. Consider that 
genetic modifications are made to the cells of the crop, which are then cultured into 
seeds. In the case of production trait varieties, the GM crops are then grown in the 
exact same agronomic system as the conventional varieties. Then the crops are 
harvested and sold into the same processing and distribution system as non-GM 
varieties. Accordingly, GM crops which do not require a new or different agronomic 
or processing systems would not be grown under process or production methods 
different than conventional crops and there would be no difference in the non-product- 
related PPMs of GM crops and non-GM crops. As the approved GM varieties to date 
have been approved as like products or as substantially equivalent, there are no 
differences in product-related PPMs either and there are no consumption extemalties 
to consider. In this case, the TBT Committee will have to decide on, first, the 
applicability of PPMs to GM crops in the first instance, and second, on the legitimacy 
of the principle of substantial equivalence.
Of course, the TBT Committee does not have to proactively make this 
decision. Instead, it could allow differences of opinions among Members to escalate 
from social regulatory barriers, to trade tensions, followed by trade disputes brought to 
the WTO’s dispute settlement body. In Chapter 5, several WTO disputes based on
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food safety and environmental protection measures are examined, in order to 
extrapolate how the dispute settlement body may deal with such GM crop 
controversies.
B. Trade and Multilateral Environmental Agreements
In November 1999, the WTO’s Committee on Trade and the Environment 
(CTE) published a report on the environmental effects of trade (Economist, 9 Oct. 
1999). The report acknowledges that although trade, per se, is not harmful to the 
environment, it is not beneficial in all cases. The report concurs with environmental 
concerns on four issues. First, subsidies for export-oriented commercial activities such 
as farming, fisheries and subsidies for fossil fuel driven activities create incentives for 
economic activities that are not congruent with sustainable development. Second, 
voluntary third-party eco-labels are a valuable tool for providing consumer 
information about the use of acceptable non-product-related PPMs. Third, the CTE 
supports a comprehensive review by Members on the environmental effects of trade in 
order to increase the transparency of environmental concerns. Fourth, the CTE 
recognises that the WTO, although accountable to Member governments, is not 
accountable or transparent or accessible for non-Members, such as environmental 
organisations. The report suggests that the WTO must address these four areas if it is 
to address the harsh criticisms levelled against it by environmental organisations.
The report does recognise, however, that the primary goal of the WTO is to 
enhance trade liberalisation and that the WTO is not the proper venue for 
environmental concerns. For instance, first-best environmental policies, not second- 
best trade policies, must tackle negative environmental effects at source.
Consequently, the report concludes that trade rules, in pursuit of free trade, cannot be 
altered to accommodate environmental objectives. In this sense, there is only so much 
that the WTO is able and willing to do to meet environmental objectives. These 
limitations often give rise to negotiations for multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) outside the WTO framework. MEAs and their relationship with trade will be 
examined next.
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) are inter-governmental 
agreements on environmental objectives that reflect a regulatory co-ordination 
strategy of social integration. Their relationship with the traditional trade approach is
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crucial to understand, because generally the social rationality approach prefers the 
deeper social integration of the MEAs over the shallow, economic integration of trade 
agreements.
MEAs or the smaller regional environmental agreements (REAs) generally 
focus on the non-product-related PPMs that are outside the TBT Agreement. There are 
about 180 and they include the Kyoto Protocol, the Basle Convention on the 
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous and Toxic Waste and the Montreal Protocol. 
Generally, MEAs are agreements between like-minded countries. It has been argued 
that MEAs require a shared view of environmental harm that is often based on “moral 
values, ethical or cultural preferences or environmental choices which lack a scientific 
basis” (OECD, 1997). Also, as the demand for environmental protection measures is 
income elastic, they tend to be supported by higher-income, developed countries while 
LDCs generally view them as a threat. As mentioned, the reason for this is 
comparative advantage (OECD, 1993). Many LDCs view their PPMs as a source of 
advantage and resist the idea of limiting this advantage through MEAs.
MEAs, through ex ante regulatory co-ordination efforts aim to focus domestic 
environmental policies on agreed global objectives such as ozone depletion. MEAs 
tend to come into conflict with trade only when non-signatories are affected by the 
obligations that have been negotiated by signatories. For instance, a trade dispute 
requires a complaint to the WTO. Members can have and keep policies that 
contravene the rights and obligations of WTO Agreements provided no other Member 
complains. Signatories to a MEA would all share the same environmental protection 
philosophy so that even if domestic environmental regulations in one signatory are 
trade restricting other signatories would not complain because they appreciate the 
broader environmental objective. A non-signatory, however, who does not share the 
same environmental protection philosophy but is affected by the trade restricting 
measure is more likely to complain about the measure to the WTO.
Yet, the problem with MEAs is not always between signatories and non­
signatories. The Biosafety Protocol (discussed in Chapter 4.2) is an example of the 
difficulties that arise when MEAs encroach upon international trade. During 
negotiations, the Biosafety Protocol threatened to have significant impact upon the 
trade of GM crops, and as a result the Miami Group of agricultural exporting 
signatories effectively blocked agreement of the protocol in February 1999, indicating 
the dominance of trade concerns over environmental concerns.
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Additionally, MEAs are based on consensual negotiations involving wide 
participation, which is a time-intensive process. It is unlikely that a MEA can be 
negotiated rapidly enough to deal with the environment and trade concerns arising 
from PPM-based environmental measures in order to curtail the pressure for unilateral 
action and a trade complaint to the WTO.
As mentioned, the CTE has investigated the relationship between MEAs and 
the rights and obligations of the trade agreements. Specifically, it has examined the 
permissibility of non-product-related PPM-based measures that differentiate between 
physically or functionally similar products that exhibit no consumption externalities.
3.3 Conclusions
In this Chapter, the regulatory development and regulatory integration 
approaches for GM crops supported by general economic interests were examined. It 
was revealed that at the heart of the support is the demand for certain and predictable 
rules for the development, commercialisation and international market access of GM 
crops. Congruent with the economic perspective and the scientific rationality 
approach, economic interests support the correction of real market failures permitting 
economic growth and development, which in turn lead to higher income elastic social 
regulations.
Economic interests support regulations that ensure technological progress 
through capacity building. Capacity permits the development and commercialisation 
of GM crops, securing both private and public economic gains. Economic efficiencies 
are gained through the vertical and horizontal integration of the GM crop applications.
The commercialisation of GM crops requires stable and predictable regulatory 
rules and economic interests support a science-based framework for these rules. This 
includes rule for product development, testing, field trials and market approval as well 
as rules for intellectual property protection.
In addition, as commercialisation at the international level is required to 
recoup R&D costs, they also support international market access rules congruent with 
a science-based framework. They support the WTO approach to clarifying the trade 
compliant use of food safety and environmental protection measures through the SPS 
Agreement and its links with the Codex and the IPPC. The key feature is that the 
traditional trade approach attempts to disentangle safety-related measures from non­
safety-related measures. In order to be considered legitimate, safety-related food and
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environmental protection measures must be scientifically justifiable, while non-safety- 
related measures must meet the trade principle of non-discrimination.
The traditional trade approach as outlined in the WTO Agreements such as the 
SPS and the TBT Agreements, along with the accompanying international institutions, 
such as the Codex and the IPPC, provides a coherent approach to international 
regulatory development and integration. Member countries may unilaterally impose 
social regulatory barriers to GM crops, but only with appropriate scientific 
justifications.
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CHAPTER FOUR SOCIAL INTERESTS
In the previous chapter, the regulatory development and integration approaches 
supported by economic interests were examined. It was argued that these interests 
have dominated the development of the international trade regime with the result that 
it reflects a scientific rationality, rules-based framework encouraging regulatory 
competition among Members. Yet, in recent years, this framework has come under 
considerable criticism from non-economic or social interests who support a much 
different approach to regulatory development and integration.
The objective of this chapter is to examine the regulatory development and 
regulatory integration regimes supported by the social interests in order to understand 
their criticism of the traditional trade diplomacy approach. Broadly, this group is 
composed of various national and international non-governmental organisations.
Three types of social interests may be identified according to the consumer concerns 
that they predominantly focus on: consumer, environmental and social development 
interests. This is, however, only an illustrative categorisation. In most cases it is 
difficult to define social interest groups neatly as one of the three types because 
regardless of their primary mandate, many of the groups include consumer, 
environmental and social development advocacy.
It will be argued that social interests support regulatory development and 
integration approaches that are socially responsive. That is, they support the social 
rationality approach to regulatory development and a regulatory co-ordination 
approach to regulatory integration.
4.1 Regulatory Development and Integration
Prior to discussing each of the social interests separately, it is important to note 
that all three tend to share an important focus on the social rationality approach to 
regulatory development and integration. Social interests reject two important premises 
of the economic perspective. First, economic analysis generally assumes that 
technology and innovation are crucial elements of economic growth and social 
welfare1. Social interests argue technology is not an inherent factor in social welfare.
1 Although not all economists hold this view. For a insightful discussion of the ‘steady-state’ or zero 
growth economy see H. Daly (1997) ‘Towards a New Economics: Questioning Growth’ excerpted from
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Instead, it is the application, management and distribution of technology that can lead 
to increases in social welfare or in the case of misapplied, mismanaged and poorly 
distributed technology, decreases in social welfare. Second, the economic perspective 
tends to treat consumers as economic agents, where price is the only aspect of GM 
crops that they are concerned about. If prices fall, there are consumer welfare gains 
(i.e. Moschini et al., 1999). Social interests argue that this does not provide an 
accurate picture because consumers have legitimate concerns beyond just economic 
concerns. And in the UK, these concerns have lead to consumers actually spending 
more on food purchases in order to avoid products made from GM crops and to, 
presumably, increase their welfare (to be discussed more fully in Chapter 7.3.1).
Accordingly, the social interests argue that regulatory development must not 
simply be an exercise of correcting market failure in order to maximise technological 
progress. It must be responsive to social preferences and concerns, regardless of the 
economic rationality of those concerns. In addition, regulatory integration must be 
sensitive to divergent social normative frameworks between jurisdictions and must 
avoid sacrificing the social dimensions to the pursuit of economic efficiency and 
competitiveness; creating a so-called ‘hollowing-out’ of the nation-state (Picciotto,
1996). To avoid this, social interests support a regulatory co-ordination approach to 
deeper integration.
There are five similarities between the three types of social interest groups that 
are relevant to the development and integration of GM crop regulations. First, they 
hold a particular belief system or frame of reference, which tends to be based on 
normative beliefs that are not subject to scientific rules of evidence and debate. The 
belief systems of the three types of social interests will be discussed separately below, 
but it is important to note that some organisations can feel so strongly about their 
normative beliefs that they are willing to take illegal action, as evidenced the by the 
destruction of UK field trials of GM rapeseed (see Chapter 7.3.1). Further, the 
strength of the belief system may effectively limit the ability of social interest 
organisations to participate in activities that demand compromise. For instance, it has 
been argued that German environmental groups in a 1991 Participatory Technology 
Assessment of herbicide tolerant GM crops “had ambivalent feelings about being 
involved in a procedure in which they could not control the finding” (van den Daele et
‘Toward a Stationary-State Economy’ in J. Harte and R. Socolow (Eds.) Patient Earth (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971) (http//csf.colorado.edu/authors/hanson/page41.html).
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al., 1997). In fact, van den Daele et al. (1997) note that these organisations withdrew 
from the Participatory Technology Assessment and released their version of the 
findings prior to the release of the final, consensus-based report. In contrast, economic 
interests tend to have fluid belief systems reacting to market demand signals so that 
when demands change, economic policies change as evidenced by the shift to non- 
GM ingredients among UK supermarkets (see Chapter 7.3.1)
Second, for social interest organisations the public is the audience and these 
organisations tend to be very effective at conveying their position to the public in an 
easily understandable manner. These interests have traditionally not held much trade 
policy power. Indeed, to increase their policy voice, they have found populist and 
sensational ways to influence policy in an effort to circumvent traditional trade 
diplomacy channels. Hence, social interest organisations are important actors in 
shaping public opinion, which in turn has important influence upon regulatory 
development and the prospects for regulatory integration. The public-orientation of 
these organisations is in conflict with the traditional trade diplomacy strategy of 
closed-door negotiations that are neither publicly transparent nor accessible. It is also 
in contrast to the typical scientific rationality approach used, for instance, by the 
international scientific community (i.e. Codex and the IPPC), whose work is 
undertaken far from the public view and at a technical level not easily understood.
Third, they share the objective of promoting sustainable development and 
encouraging activities that promote sustainable development is an issue to which all 
three types of organisations converge. There has been a general international shift in 
the interpretation of ‘development’ as a goal of government policy. The traditional 
view of development is rooted in the economic perspective of continued growth and 
prosperity permitting higher income elastic social regulations. Now, development has 
taken on a decisively socio-economic character as it is now termed ‘sustainable 
development’; interpreted as “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”(World 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987). While this term does lack 
precision it is understood to mean a shift in policy focus from just the economic to the 
socio-economic gains.
Fourth, the social interests share concerns, in general, about democratic deficit 
and accountability issues associated with international institutions. For instance, social 
interest organisations have limited resources for which to participate in the myriad
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international institutions for GM crop regulatory development (i.e. WTO, Codex, 
IPPC, OECD, etc.) and they are concerned that their perspective may not be 
appropriately addressed when international standards are being developed. This 
concern was given credence at the 1999 G7/G8 Summit in Koln, Germany where the 
Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD, see Chapter 5) was allowed to participate 
but the Transatlantic Consumers’ Dialogue (TACD) and the Transatlantic 
Environmental Dialogue (TAED) were not allowed to (TACD, 1999).
The fifth concern of the social interests lies with the international economic 
integration approach of traditional trade diplomacy. They do not support the WTO as 
the dominant international institution for the integration of food safety and 
environmental protection regulations because they believe that it fails to deal 
appropriately with the social rationality approach. In fact, a recent petition headed by 
the environmental group Friends of Earth and signed by over 1200 other social 
interest groups from 85 countries was presented at the 1999 G7/G8 Summit in Koln, 
Germany (Independent, 10 October 1999). The petition demanded a complete review 
of all the WTO’s Uruguay Round commitments prior to embarking on another round 
of multilateral trade negotiations. They argue that the problem is that the WTO is 
“built on an outdated model of swapping tariffs, when it should really be based on a 
competition-based system of regulation and liberalisation” (Evans, 1999). Also, the 
dissatisfaction of civil society with ‘forced’ regulatory integration through the trade 
approach of regulatory competition has been incisively summed up, with respect to 
the Appellate Body decision in the beef-hormones dispute:
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body has, inter alia, placed the 
World Trade Organisation in charge o f determining the 
legitimacy o f domestic health regulations; misinterpreted the 
provisions o f the SPS text allowing countries to determine the 
level o f appropriate risk for their citizens; favouredfrequently 
lower international standards over higher domestic standards; 
dismissed the precautionary principle as a legitimate basis for 
health and environmental policy; and, destabilised the 
international trade regime by inserting itself into a dispute in 
which it lacks the necessary expertise and competence to 
adjudicate (Caldwell, 1998).
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The general rejection of the WTO’s regulatory integration approach and its perceived 
failure to adequately deal with broader, social concerns such as sustainable 
development has resulted in a dramatic convergence of opposition to the WTO 
manifested in widespread protests at the 1999 Ministerial meeting in Seattle. In 
contrast to the WTO regulatory integration approach, is the social integration 
approach exemplified by the Biosafety Protocol. This protocol has been widely 
supported by social interests and its negotiations and structure will be examined 
below, following the description of the three types of social interest organisations.
Despite the similarities, however, it is inaccurate to portray consumer, 
environmental and social development organisations as a homogenous group. Instead, 
there are important differences among them. In fact, these differences raise doubts 
about the compatibility of their belief systems and the potential for a lasting, cohesive 
opposition to GM crops. Below is an assessment of social interest organisations that 
have recently played very public roles in the policy debates associated with the 
development and integration of GM crop regulations. This assessment is intended to 
be an illustrative survey and not a comprehensive catalogue. In addition, the 
discussion will primarily focus on those organisations that are international, but many 
national organisations have also established an effective presence in the regulatory 
policy debates so that the distinction between international and national social interest 
organisations has become blurred.
4.1.1 Consumer Organisations
The differences between the three types of social interest organisations are 
especially distinct between consumer organisations and the other two. Consumer 
organisations advocate a comprehensive range of consumer objectives, including both 
economic and social concerns. Consider the four types of consumer concerns 
associated with GM crops (from Chapter 2.2.1). Consumer organisations have a 
traditional focus on the consumer’s economic concerns. They have long sought to 
ensure competition in markets, bringing the economic benefits of reduced price and 
improved quality, choice and service. Yet, while the economic concerns remain 
important, consumer organisations have never lost sight of the fact that consumers are 
not just economic agents. Consequently, they have also traditionally balanced the 
economic objectives with consumer health and safety objectives. The focus on 
sustainable development has also brought environmental biodiversity concerns fully
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into the agenda of consumer organisations. Finally, social norms including moral, 
ethical and even religious concerns have played an important role in establishing the 
policy parameters within which the economic objectives of consumer organisations 
are pursued. Therefore, consumer organisations have first-hand knowledge of the 
difficulty associated with balancing economic and social interests. In fact, the 
comprehensive range of objectives is precisely why consumer organisations in general 
support freer trade because of the economic benefits of competition. Yet, increasingly 
this support is qualified. Freer trade must not come at the expense of lower standards 
for food safety and environmental protection. The other two types of organisations, on 
the other hand, are more singular in purpose and don’t face the same kind of balancing 
act.
Consumer organisations essentially have two primary objectives associated 
with the regulation of GM crops. First, to ensure that regulatory development is fully 
focused on the consumers’ right to know and second, to ensure the democratic 
accountability and transparency of international regulatory integration strategies 
focused on deeper, social integration. Among these organisations, neither trade nor 
GM crops are bad per se, and in fact, most consumer organisations are not calling for 
a complete moratorium on GM crops. Instead, they view that the ‘economic’ 
perspective in favour of technological progress, national competitiveness issues and 
regulatory competition is at the expense of stringent consumer and environmental 
regulations. They argue that when consumers have concerns about a product like GM 
crops regulatory development and integration must be socially responsive enough to 
react to these concerns regardless of the economic rationality of such a regulatory 
reaction. Moreover, they argue that international institutions charged with developing 
international standards, such as Codex, cannot just be accountable to national 
governments because national governments, lobbied by industry and in pursuit of 
competitiveness, may collectively ignore broader consumer concerns. Nor can they be 
only science-based in the face of a large information gap and credence concerns. 
Essentially, the consumers’ right to know about perceived risks must be the primary 
focus, regardless of the lack of scientific justification for such a regulatory response.
Consumer organisations tend to share the same positions on trade and GM 
crops in both North America and the EU, despite the asymmetrical consumer 
acceptance. In the EU, the European Consumers’ Organisation, BEUC, argues that the 
primary goal of the EU’s GMO regulations (90/220 Directive) should be to satisfy
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consumer concerns and “thus, encourage consumer acceptance” (BEUC, 1999). This 
includes demands for greater consumer consultation at all stages of the GM crop 
approval process. The UK-based National Consumers Council argues that Codex must 
be committed to a full freedom of information policy and greater consumer 
participation in expert committees (NCC, 1998). Similar demands can be found in 
North America. The US-based Consumers’ Choice Council argues that the 
consumers’ right to know must be the dominant justification for labelling schemes 
(CCC, 1999). The Consumers’ Association of Canada argues that consumer concerns 
however broad should dominate regulatory development through wide participation 
(Consumers’ Association of Canada, 1994). More recently, the Transatlantic 
Consumers’ Dialogue (TACD), has argued for assurances that trade liberalisation will 
not compromise high food safety and environmental protection standards and that 
negotiations will encompass the broader concerns of consumers, rather than be 
focused on traditional trade interests (TACD, 1998). With respect to GM crops, the 
TACD has argued for a mandatory labelling scheme based on the consumers’ right to 
know in Codex standards-making procedures (TACD, 1999b).
Therefore, consumer organisations tend to call for greater democratic 
participation and accountability of regulatory and trade policy development within 
international institutions. This includes greater participation of all stakeholders, not 
just scientists and national delegations, in the formation of international standards and 
in trade dispute decisions. They also call for consumer and environmental safety 
regulations that keep pace with technological innovation while remaining focused on 
the consumers’ right to know (Evans, 1999; BEUC, 1999; CCC, 1999; Consumers’ 
Association of Canada, 1994).
Notable consumer organisations involved in issues of trade and GM crops 
include:
• Consumers’ International: observer status at Codex
• International Association of Consumer Food Organisations (LACFO): 
observer status at Codex
• BUEC (European Consumers’ Organisation):
• Consumers’ Choice Council (US): an association of US-based NGOs 
across all three types; consumer, environmental and social development 
organisations.
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• Consumers’ Association of Canada
4.1.2 Environmental Organisations
Environmental organisations differ from consumer organisations because of 
their traditional focus on a single objective - environmental protection. With respect to 
the four types of consumer concerns, environmental organisations target almost 
exclusively the environmental biodiversity concerns associated with GM crops. 
Unavoidably, of course, both human safety concerns and social norms also influence 
the position of environmental organisations. Yet, this position often disregards the 
legitimate and crucial economic factors. The benefit of having a virtually singular 
objective is that positions are not balanced between competing objectives. Instead, 
environmental protection is more of a belief system based on sustainable 
development, which tends to be incongruent with compromise or concession.
There are two general aspects of the environmental belief system, which are 
relevant for the international trade of GM crops. The first is that according to the 
belief system trade liberalisation and sustainable development objectives are not 
compatible. There have been many calls by environmental organisations for a revision 
of the WTO to focus less on trade liberalisation and more on sustainable development. 
In the event that the two objectives clash, they hold that environmental principles 
should dominate trade principles. Without such a shift, it is argued that the WTO 
should be dissolved, or at least ignored.
The second is that intensive agricultural production is incompatible with 
sustainable development objectives. Most environmental organisations support, 
instead, an organic system of production. Hence, GM crops targeted to the intensive 
agronomic system contravene the belief system in principle, regardless of the 
attributes of these crops. The result has been calls for complete bans or moratoriums 
on the technology because it has been commercialised for the intensive agricultural 
system. Environmental organisations in the UK have suggested that the UK 
government must decide between either organic production or GM crops in an 
intensive system. Yet, from a regulatory policy perspective this belief is problematic. 
Basically, there has been insufficient justification as to why GM crops and organic 
production are mutually exclusive. The real choice is between organic and intensive, 
not between organic and GM crops. GM crops have simply become the vector of 
concern because of their application. Indeed, it has been easy to cynically portray
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them as products of faceless mulitnational corporations designed for the intensive 
system. This portrayal fails to capture reality. Significant international research and 
commercialisation efforts are underway to develop GM crops to meet pressing 
economic, human health and biodiversity needs in both developed and in less 
developed countries. Moreover, GM crops can facilitate, and indeed have facilitated, a 
shift away from the agro-chemical paradigm of the intensive system, hence, 
facilitating more sustainable agriculture.
In summary, from the environmental perspective it is argued that GM crops 
are being developed by multi-national corporations who play by the trade rules of the 
WTO and who have developed the crops to fit into an intensive agricultural system 
(Ecologist, 1998). Yet, lying within this criticism is a crucial policy issue. Clearly the 
concern lies not with the technology per se but with the way it has been applied and, 
more importantly, who has applied it. Many wish to see the development of a strong, 
rules-based international institution, such as the BSP, with a global sustainable 
development remit that dominates trade liberalisation efforts, responsible for 
establishing socially responsive regulations that employ the social rationality 
approach.
Notable environmental organisations in opposition to GM crops include:
• Friends of the Earth (International with regional offices)
• Greenpeace (International with regional offices): early support from 
Greenpeace Europe for GM crops in the development of a renewable and 
biodegradable credit card, yet had to abandon support as it may have lent 
credibility to Monsanto and GM crop technology.
• World Wildlife Fund for Nature (International)
• Sierra Club
• European Environmental Bureau
• Genetix Snowball (UK)
• Research Foundation for Science and Technology (India)
• Grass Roots Environmental Effectiveness Network (GREEN)
4.1.3 Social Development Organisations
Social development organisations, as the name suggests, focus on social 
development at the national, regional and/or international level according to a
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particular normative belief system. In this sense, they begin from the fourth type of 
consumer concerns (moral, ethical and religious concerns) and this foundation then 
shapes the social development policies. Similar to environmental organisations, social 
development organisations are dissatisfied with the international trade of GM crops, 
although the reasons differ. With respect to trade and the WTO, they believe that the 
rules for international trade are designed to benefit the industrially powerful at the 
expense of the industrially weak and they argue that the WTO has become a vehicle 
for multinational corporations to dominate global production (Independent, 10 
October 1999). In other words, they support trade liberalisation if it were used 
explicitly to prise open the affluent markets of developed countries so that producers 
in less developed countries could earn foreign currency.
Consequently, with respect to global development, they argue that the 
international trade of GM crops furthers the divide between the north and the south. 
The socio-economic implications of agricultural biotechnology upon development are 
explicitly linked with capacity and developing countries have much at stake. 
Agriculture is often the largest sector in terms of income, employment and foreign 
exchange earnings. While some argue that GM crops will be beneficial for the 
economic prospects of developing countries, others argue that they will have serious 
adverse impacts upon development.
Some supporters of GM crops have promoted a global welfare promise of GM 
crops. They argue that that agricultural biotechnology will greatly enhance 
agricultural productivity in less developed countries. Indigenous seed varieties can be 
specifically modified to the ecological conditions challenging production resulting in 
greater yields of better quality with a reduced need for chemical treatments. An 
economic study of the adoption of GM virus resistant potatoes in Mexico concludes 
that GM crops can be conducive to and beneficial for small-scale farming operations 
in LDCs (Qaim ,1999). From an economic development perspective, agricultural 
productivity may be increased without the environmental degradation of land 
conversion and chemical treatments. Environmentally sustainable agricultural 
production can meet the food demands of a rapidly increasing global population. The 
argument follows then, that less developed countries should be assisted in building 
capacity in order to reap the significant benefits from GM varieties. Other potential 
gains for developing countries include revenues generated from the use of their 
biodiversity by researchers from developed countries.
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Social development interests argue that there are problems with this global 
welfare promise (Kneen, 1999; RAFI, 1998; Shiva, 1985). First, the leadership of the 
private sector in agricultural biotechnology means that much of the knowledge is 
proprietary and will not be shared without compensation, a price many producers in 
less developed countries cannot afford. As a result, the overwhelming majority of GM 
crops have been developed to meet the needs of developed country producers; those 
who can afford to pay for the technology.
Second, most developing countries lack the current scientific capacity 
necessary to be involved in GM crop development . This is not just an issue of 
technology transfer because these countries tend to lack the educational infrastructure 
to adapt scientifically, let alone the financial infrastructure to support competitive, 
private agricultural biotechnology ventures. The dynamic scale effects of increased 
potential for new GM varieties combined with decreased time for product 
development suggest that the capacity gap will only increase. Further, the capacity gap 
limits the possibility of developed countries relocating their research and development 
efforts to a developing country in order to share the knowledge. In fact, an alarming 
development from the perspective of global economic development is the potential 
import substitution of traditional exports from less developed countries. For instance, 
recent research efforts on canola (rapeseed) in both the US and Canada have focused 
on modifying the oil content of the seed to express the characteristics of palm oil. 
However, several developing nations rely heavily upon palm oil exports as a source of 
foreign currency.
Indeed, it appears that the potential economic development problems with GM 
crops for LDCs are institutional problems of access to and the distribution of 
technology. As agriculture increasingly becomes a high-technology industrial sector, 
driven by private firms, the competitive disadvantage of developing countries is likely 
to grow, with a dramatically decreasing likelihood for these countries to catch-up. 
Since knowledge is the key, industrial imitation is not possible as it was in other high- 
technology sectors of the past. In order to prevent such developments, institutional 
reform in both developed and developing countries, focused on capacity-building, 
technology transfer and the targeting of innovations to the production problems in 
LDCs must be undertaken (Falconi, 1999; RAFI, 1998).
2 The World Bank (1998) reports that the gap between developed and developing countries in 
knowledge capacity exceeds even the income gap.
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Accordingly, the currently commercialised production trait GM crops 
contravene the belief system of social development organisations because they are 
being developed by MNC’s driven by the profit motive with little regard for the socio­
economic need of the developing country farmers who may be displaced by the 
technology. Hence, social development organisations support regulatory development 
and integration policies built on moral, ethical and/or religious preferences.
Notable social development organisations in opposition to GM crops include:
• Council for Responsible Genetics (US): focus on bioethics, distributes 
GeneWatch newsletter
• Joint Centre on International and Public Affairs and International Centre
for Law and Development (US): focus on socio-economic issues
• Foundation for Economic Trends (US)
• Gen-Ethic Network (Germany): focus on bioethics and an informed public 
debate
• Christian Aid (International)
• World Development Movement
• Rural Advancement Fund International (RAFI)
• Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and Policy
• Third World Network
• Edmonds Institute
• Latin American Consortium on Agroecology and Development
4.2 Social Integration: A Case Study of the Biosafety Protocol
The Biosafety Protocol represents an international multilateral environmental 
agreement on the transboundary movement of biotechnology in pursuit of deeper 
social integration. It is important to assess for several reasons. First, the protocol is 
widely supported by social interests because it is based on the social rationality 
approach. Second, the EU has stated that rules and guidelines established under the 
protocol will be the foundation of the EU regulatory integration strategy dealing with 
biotechnology products (AgraFood Biotech No. 19, 1999). Hence, it is a proxy for the 
EU’s trade policy position on GM crops. Third, it effectively illustrates the conflict 
between trade-oriented economic integration and deeper, social integration.
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The UNEP was established in 1972 by the General Assembly as the UN’s 
official environmental agency. Its mandate was to safeguard and enhance the 
environment for present and future generations. In other words, the mandate of UNEP 
was of sustainable development. The UNEP is involved in both technical scientific 
research on the environment and in reconciling the global objectives of environmental 
protection with other objectives, such as trade and economic development. For 
instance, the UNEP is involved in negotiations to establish international 
environmental law through multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) such as the 
Montreal Protocol, the Basle Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal and the Convention on 
Biodiversity (CBD).
Perhaps the most ambitious initiative of the UNEP is the Convention on 
Biodiversity and the subsequent negotiations to create a Biosafety Protocol (BSP).
The BSP negotiations were an international effort, under the auspices of UNEP’s 1992 
Convention on Biodiversity (CBD). The CBD was the culmination of a decade-long 
effort, begun at the Third World Congress on National Parks and Protected Areas in 
Bali, Indonesia in 1982 (Swanson, 1997). The objective of the CBD was to develop an 
international convention to commit the global community to conserve and protect 
biodiversity. In June 1992 the CBD was included as Agenda 21 of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, the Earth 
Summit, and was signed by participating countries at the Conference. The Biosafety 
Protocol (BSP) represents a proposed initiative to regulate the transboundary 
movement of living products of modem biotechnology in order to protect biodiversity. 
Negotiations concluded in January 2000 after being suspended in February 1999 
because of significant obstacles. Essentially, the obstacles to the BSP are associated 
with the conflict between social interests supporting environmental objectives and 
economic interests supporting trade objectives; the BSP is driven from the 
environmental side, yet has significant potential trade implications.
In order to protect biodiversity, the initial scope of the BSP, according to the 
CBD, was to develop legally binding international rules governing the testing, 
importation and exportation (transboundary movement), deliberate release and 
commercial use of living modified organisms (LMOs). Specifically, the Advance 
Informed Agreement (AIA) principle was to be applied to shipments. This meant that 
the Party of Import would be notified prior to a shipment of LMOs. Further, the
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LMOs would be subject to a risk assessment conducted by the Party of Import, in 
order to identify any potential risk(s) to the biodiversity of the importing region. The 
Party of Import, upon completion of the risk assessment, could allow or restrict the 
importation of the LMO because of identified risk(s) to biodiversity.
Although the BSP is not explicitly intended to be a trade agreement, the fact 
that its scope includes export and import activities makes it an implicit or de facto 
trade agreement associated with the international trade of GM products. A successful 
protocol has the potential to positively influence international trade in three significant 
ways. First through increased trade transparency according to the use of the AIA 
principle. Second through increased trade fairness because the risk assessment 
procedures are intended to ensure that biodiversity risks from GM products, whether 
domestic or foreign, are assessed consistently using credible procedures. Third, an 
international protocol could overcome the lack of domestic regulations in those 
countries with little or no experience with regulating GM products (Mulongoy, 1997). 
In this sense, the successful negotiation of the BSP can be interpreted as a potential 
win-win outcome. The global benefit, shared by all countries, is the overall 
conservation and protection of biodiversity. From an industry perspective, successful 
completion of the BSP has potential benefits for the further research, development, 
adoption and commercial use of GM products because it would potentially increase 
predictability and market access opportunities.
The administrative centre for the BSP negotiations, the seat of the CBD 
Secretariat, is in Montreal, Canada. There are over 120 countries involved in the BSP 
negotiations. There have been seven negotiating sessions completed to date: July 
1996, Aarhus, Denmark; May 1997, Montreal, Canada; October 1997, Montreal, 
Canada; February 1998, Montreal, Canada; August 1998, Montreal, Canada; February 
1999 at Cartegena, Columbia (suspended talks); and January 2000, Montreal, Canada.
The negotiations began with the discussion of general issues, including who 
should be involved in the negotiating sessions [i.e. signatories, industry 
representatives, environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs)] and with a 
request for draft protocol submissions by October 1996. Ethiopia submitted a draft 
protocol on behalf of the African delegation and the Third World Network (TWN) in 
October 1996. This draft protocol, considered as representative of the views of many 
developing countries, used as a framework the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (McDonald,
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1997). As a result, the draft protocol treated shipments of LMOs with the same degree 
of prescriptive regulation as shipments of toxic or nuclear waste. Further, this draft 
protocol placed enormous burden upon the Party of Export and the exporter to ensure 
biosafety and to gain approval before any shipment of LMOs.
In response to the draft protocol submissions, the second negotiating session 
involved parties staking out their positions. The third session in October 1997 was 
characterised by the emerging awareness of the agricultural commodity trade issue 
and the potential impact of the protocol upon the international trade of products of 
modem biotechnology. Agricultural export countries reacted negatively to the 
Ethiopian draft protocol, highlighting the substantial differences of opinion between 
many developed and developing countries on what constitutes LMOs and their risks. 
The fourth and fifth sessions primarily involved the edification of crucial definitions 
and issues including the definition of LMOs, the roles of the Party of Export, the 
exporter, the importer and the Party of Import, the opportunity for exemptions, and the 
scope of the AIA. Many of these issues remain unresolved.
The sixth negotiating session was to be followed by the Extraordinary 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention (ECOP) where the final draft BSP was to 
presented for signing. However, on 24 February 1999, after it became clear that a final 
draft protocol was not going to be established, the decision was taken to push back the 
deadline for the final protocol for 18 months. The impasse emerged when the Miami 
group of countries (Canada, Australia, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) rejected 
European efforts, supported by the other 140 negotiating countries, to extend the 
coverage of the Protocol to include risks to human health and to agri-food shipments 
intended for processing.
The seventh negotiating session, 24-28 January 2000 in Montreal, Canada 
resulting in the signing, by 140 countries, of the Montreal Protocol on Biosafety. The 
protocol distinguishes between LMOs intended for environmental release and GM 
commodities not intended for environmental release. The former are subject to an AIA 
for the first-time shipment only. While the latter are not subject to an AIA, but require 
mandatory labelling of GM material for the consumers’ right know. The labelling 
rules are provisional pending further negotiations. The protocol also specifies that 
there must be a clear scientific justification to ban either LMOs or AIA, however, it 
also allows a ‘precautionary’ ban reflecting an environmental-type social
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interpretation of the precautionary principle that can include socio-economic risks 
such as impacts on local farmers (to be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.2.1).
With respect to the prospects for international regulatory integration, the BSP 
is intended to be one international regulatory approach to the protection of 
biodiversity within a package of international environmental regulations included in 
the CBD, Agenda 21 as well as other UNEP activities. Indeed, attempts have been 
made, by developing countries to link the BSP to other international environmental 
regulations including the UNEP International Technical Guidelines for Safety in 
Biotechnology, which are guidelines for the development of domestic regulations that 
deal with the safe handling and containment of GMOs within a country, and the UN 
Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, which are recommendations 
for the development of domestic regulations pertaining to the transport of hazardous 
and toxic materials. Notable by its absence is any effort to link the potential BSP with 
international trade agreements.
As it currently stands, the BSP is an environmental protection agreement 
dominated by the environmental social rationality ethos. It does have significant 
potential benefits for the transparency and fairness of the international trade of GM 
crops. Further, it is fundamentally congruent with the broader socio-economic 
concerns that the WTO framework fails to address and it favours a social 
interpretation of the precautionary principle. The BSP is based on consensus and the 
integration strategy of ex ante regulatory co-ordination. The proposed regulatory 
approach includes new horizontal and technology-based regulation for all products of 
modem biotechnology.
From the economic perspective, there are several important limitations to the 
BSP. First, unlike the IPPC there is no link to any international trade agreements, even 
though it is a de facto trade agreement, and there is no institutional mechanism for 
dispute settlement. Second, the US is not a signatory. Although not an official 
negotiating party (the US Congress has not ratified the 1992 CBD) the US remains the 
world leader in biotechnology research and plays an influential role in the 
negotiations. Whether the US position assumes a cautionary approach to the 
agricultural trade issue or an outright opposition to the BSP can have vital influence 
on those negotiating parties to the protocol which rely heavily upon market access to 
the US, such as Canada. Third, it will be at least 7 years before the BSP is in effect. 
Negotiations on the provisional labelling rules continue until 2002 while those for the
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provisional liability laws continue until 2004. Once settled, the BSP must be ratified 
by at least 50 signatories and then transposed into national laws. Yet, during this time, 
technological innovation in agricultural biotechnology will continue, perhaps making 
the BSP obsolete as an international regulatory development and integration 
agreement.
Therefore, it appears that the BSP came about more as a political compromise 
than as an actual attempt to establish an institutional structure for GM crop 
regulations. The most contentious issues remain ‘provisional’ (unresolved) and the 
time-consuming ratification and implementation process could ensure its 
obsolescence. Its major contribution was the illusion that an international agreement 
blending the scientific and social rationality approaches and the economic and social 
perspectives had been achieved.
4.3 Conclusions
From a policy perspective, social interest organisations play a vital role in 
finding the regulatory middle as their extreme concerns counteract the extreme global 
welfare promises of the Life Sciences companies.
In general, most of the social interest organisations are dissatisfied with GM 
crops because they contravene a particular belief system. It is reasonable to suggest 
that most of the opposition to GM crops is the result of how the technology has been 
applied, by whom and for whom, providing a foothold for vast coalition of special 
interests. Indeed, an interesting aspect of the European anti-GM campaign is that 
while GM crops are not commercially grown in Europe, environmentally 
unsustainable agricultural practices supported by the CAP, which account for over 
95% of EU production, continue without the concerted negative campaign targeted at 
GM crops. This is the case because GM crops provide a convergence of fear of the 
unknown associated with their credence factors and a perception of an invasion of 
foreign technology. Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, etc. would be unable to generate 
as much public exposure and support if they were taking direct action against the 
commercial crops of European farmers, instead of the field trials of multinational 
(American) Life Sciences firms.
In some cases the normative beliefs are so strong that the organisations simply 
won’t compromise and may be willing to take illegal action. Consider, for instance, 
environmental organisations. There has always been a minority element of eco­
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warriors whose extremism was not supported by all, and could often be linked to a 
more holistic rejection of capitalism, technology and modem society. However, in the 
case of GM crops, illegal action has shifted to more mainstream organisations. For 
instance, in the UK in 1998, field trials of GM crops were destroyed by the more 
extreme group Gentix Snowball. By 1999, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace were 
involved. The Director of Greenpeace UK, Lord Melchett, justified the illegal action 
by essentially claiming that ten years of legal protests did not result in regulatory 
policies adopting Greenpeace’s belief system. This is a dangerous challenge to 
pluralism, which necessarily demands compromise and concession. It sets a dangerous 
precedent to justify illegal action because of the dissatisfaction that normative beliefs 
are not met in their entirety in the regulatory system. An example of the unwillingness 
or inability of Greenpeace to compromise was revealed in late 1999 at the Greenpeace 
Business Conference in London. Lord Melchett issued a challenge to the then 
Chairman and CEO of Monsanto, Bob Shapiro:
I f  Monsanto will stop developing GM crops, get out ofproducing 
pesticides and reject the idea ofpatenting life forms, Greenpeace 
will work enthusiastically with you... to produce a new 
Monsanto... We could create a genuine life sciences company 
based on ecological, organic, holistic principles (Greenpeace,
1999).
In essence, this challenge is akin to asking Greenpeace to stop environmental 
advocacy.
Moreover, it is also reasonable to suggest that social interest organisations 
pursue their own self-interest in a manner which cannot be disentangled from the self- 
interest pursued by GM crop developers. Social interest organisations, such as 
Greenpeace, require membership to survive3. In this sense, many of the organisations 
are in competition with one another for members. Championing emotive issues 
through dramatic campaigns, or “picking good fights”(Bode, 1998) is an important 
method for sustaining public awareness of the organisations. Given the range of 
consumer concerns and the large (and growing) information gap between producers 
and consumers, there can be no doubt that GM crops is a good fight to pick because
3 It has been noted that in 1991 Greenpeace’s membership was 4.8 million and in 1999 it had fallen to 
2.5 million [Economist (1 August 1998) Vol. 348, No. 8079, p. 76]. The same article also notes that 
Greenpeace has considered the development of a Greenpeace Eco-label.
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they can easily be inaccurately portrayed, in order to develop particularly emotive 
issues.
This raises three important questions. First, despite the very public opposition 
to GM crops by many social organisations, do they really have significant regulatory 
and trade policy power? The answer is yes, and policy-makers ignore them at their 
peril. In the UK, Monsanto has admitted that the anti-GM campaign, which has been 
portrayed as an anti-Monsanto campaign, has been damaging to its business reputation 
and its share price (Independent, 5 September 1999). As a result, the Monsanto 
President and Chairman made efforts to establish a dialogue with the anti-GM 
campaigners. The interesting problem will be the willingness and ability of the 
organisations to compromise their belief systems. Have they created such a public 
resistance, that when they realise there are benefits from GM crops they will be unable 
to compromise? Suppose this were the case, it makes a strong argument for why 
regulatory development should be science-based and rules-based, rather than a knee- 
jerk approach to assuaging unsubstantiated concerns and non-substantiated risks.
Second, what would have happened if the first GM crops were developed by 
supporters of organic farming in a public research institute designed to employ the 
technology to assist the sustainable development needs of less developed countries, 
rather than by MNCs targeting intensive agricultural farmers in developed countries?
It is a question worth considering. Given the application focus of these interests, it is 
reasonable to argue that, indeed, if the initial commercialisations were different so too 
would be the reaction of many of the current opponents. Further, given that most of 
these social interest organisations would like to see the establishment of a strong 
international institution with as much, if not more power than the WTO to enforce the 
social rationality approach, it can hardly be said that they are anti-globalisation as 
well.
Third, although there has been a considerable range of civil society 
organisations united in opposition to GM crops, is this unity of opposition to GM 
crops sustainable in the medium- to long-term? For instance, consumer organisations 
are in support of higher domestic food safety and environmental protection standards. 
Social development organisations want better access to developed markets for LDC 
exports. Yet, setting income elastic food safety and environmental protection 
standards in developed markets could prohibitively bar the exports of LDCs. The
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incompatibility of all of these organisations lends credence to the argument that they 
have chosen GM crops because of its easily exploitable emotive characteristics.
In summary, the examination of the opposition to GM crops from consumer, 
environmental and social development organisations reveals several interesting 
results. First, it is not the GM crops per se that are the source of dissatisfaction.
Rather, they are rejected because the initially commercialised applications are 
produced for an agronomic system and by multinational corporations who play by the 
WTO’s trade rules that contravene the belief systems of the social interests 
organisations. Second, the opposition to GM crops is formidable and neither 
government regulators nor industry can ignore it. Third, the current unity of 
opposition to GM crops is not sustainable as the various organisations are in pursuit of 
incompatible objectives. Fourth, it appears that the opposition to GM crops resulting 
in calls for greater regulatory oversight and weaker intellectual property protection 
are, in fact, having the effect of increasing the concentration of agricultural Life 
Science firms. That is, multinational firms are forced into greater concentration in 
order to deal with the affects of stringent regulatory oversight and unclear intellectual 
property protection rules.
This examination of social interests reveals that regulatory policy must be 
sensitive to two social parameters. First, is must focus on the application, management 
and distribution concerns of the social interest organisations. Second, regulatory 
development cannot ignore the criticisms of social interest groups. They must have a 
policy voice.
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CHAPTER FIVE REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION
The discussion of the economic and social interests reveals that they support 
very divergent approaches to regulatory development and regulatory integration and 
that establishing a regulatory development and integration approach must be 
understood as a political exercise of balancing technological progress with 
technological precaution. Given the general discussion of the economic and social 
interests, it is now possible to analyse the development of GM crop regulations in 
order to identify the sources of regulatory instability and the limitations of the 
traditional trade approach to regulatory integration.
5.1 Regulating Technology: The Risk Analysis Framework
At the core of the debates on regulating GM crops is the broader issue of 
regulating technology. It is a challenging public policy problem because technological 
innovation, while promising opportunity, has always encountered public anxiety about 
its risks. Such anxiety has always been associated with agricultural innovations:
We have already advanced our knowledge o f genetics to the point 
where we can manipulate life in a way never intended by nature.
We must proceed with utmost caution in the application o f this 
new found knowledge (Burbank, 1906 in Bruhn, 1993).
This quote captures many of the current concerns about GM crops. It was written, 
however, in 1906 and it refers to the techniques of traditional plant breeding. 
Therefore, the techniques, which many now consider as the ‘safe old methods’, were 
met with anxiety and hostility similar to that currently facing GM crops.
Technological innovation is a dynamic process where research and 
development builds both capacity and the knowledge base, which in turn increases the 
potential for further innovations and for specific commercial applications. Yet, this 
simultaneously increases the information gap between producers and consumers and 
exacerbates the credence nature of advanced technology products such as GM crops. 
The increasing sophistication and credence nature of the technology decreases the 
ability of consumers to understand the actual risks and to act rationally on their own. 
Instead, consumers must rely upon others, such as industry, government regulators or 
a third-party, to address the credence concerns on their behalf.
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In this sense, the development of regulations to deal with GM crop 
technologies must focus on two broad objectives. First, regulation must strike a 
political balance between technological progress and technological precaution. There 
is no such thing as certainty in either the opportunities or the risks of new technologies 
and it is the acceptability of the relative trade-off between the risks and opportunities 
of a new technology that matters. Regulations cannot be expected to build consensus 
among normative views on technology (van den Daele et al., 1997). Uncertainty, risk 
and divergent normative views, as with all things, are an inherent part of GM crops, 
and the best that regulatory approaches can hope to achieve is a socially acceptable 
balance, not a risk free balance. Second, regulations must be dynamic and capable of 
keeping pace with the commercial applications of new technologies. This means that 
as GM crop applications deepen and widen regulation must consider the regulatory 
issues that arise from new production and output improved GM crops and from novel 
Bio-Engineered products. This puts pressure on the limited resources of government 
regulators implying that regulatory resources must be strategically targeted. For 
instance, it has been argued that the regulatory goal should not be to develop a 
comprehensive regulatory approach of complete command and control because it will 
quickly become obsolete. Instead, the goal should be to develop a dynamic 
management approach capable of steering “the matured technology in beneficial 
directions”(Fincham and Ravetz, 1991).
Risk Analysis is widely considered by both economic and social interests to be 
an effective framework for simultaneously addressing both the complexities and the 
limitations facing regulatory development as a result of sophisticated technologies 
such as GM crops. The Risk Analysis framework was first outlined in 1983 by the 
Redbook of the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS, 1983). According to this 
publication, Risk Analysis is composed of three parts; risk assessment, risk 
management and risk communication.
Risk assessment has the goal of, to the extent possible, developing objective, 
neutral, transparent and consensual information about the risks without normative 
influence. Risk assessment involves hazard identification, exposure assessment and 
risk characterisation according to a sound scientific basis using accepted analytical 
methods and statistical inference techniques. The information gathered in the risk 
assessment stage, is then used to inform the risk management process.
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The goal of risk management is risk prevention and risk reduction. This 
involves incorporating the objective risk information into a regulatory response. As 
risk management is where the regulatory position is adopted, this stage must also 
address the broader economic, political, social, moral and ethical factors beyond a 
scientific basis. In this sense, risk management explicitly requires compromise and 
concession as it balances the rights and interests of all stakeholders in order to 
establish an acceptable regulatory framework.
The Redbook specified that risk assessment techniques should be 
institutionally separated from risk management procedures. Essentially, it is vital to 
disentangle the objective, scientific risk assessment from the normative public 
response to risk.
Risk communication is a two-way flow of information between risk 
assessment and risk management as well as between regulators, industry and the 
public. While the scientific risk assessment information must flow to the regulatory 
development process in risk management, it is also necessary for the social parameters 
of risk management to flow back into the risk assessment techniques (MacKenzie, 
1993). As was shown in Chapter 2, there has been a failure of risk communication 
with respect to GM crops. Much of the information provided to consumers has been 
either the industry’s global welfare promise or from the highly critical environmental 
lobby. Such a polarity of information has left many consumers confused and given 
their propensity to trust third-party non-governmental organisations, many consumers 
have an unsubstantiated negative perception of GM crops. In this sense, the goals of 
risk communication would be to reduce the credence factors and the information gap 
and to increase confidence in the regulatory framework through greater transparency.
A vital contribution of the Redbook’s Risk Analysis framework was the 
integration of scientific analytical procedures into the regulatory development process. 
There are two important reasons why science matters. First, scientific analysis has 
long strove to disentangle normative values from scientific discovery. Although a 
complete separation has, and will never occur there is a level of universality to 
‘science’ that is not present in social beliefs, morals and ethics. As regulations apply 
across a wide range of social beliefs, morals and ethics, they should endeavour to be 
as normative-free as possible. For instance, food safety regulations should be focused 
on human safety, equally applicable to all citizens, and not on regulations that support 
the social values of some, while contravening the values of others.
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Second, while scientific disagreement can, and does frequently occur, the 
analytical methodology of science permits debate on disagreement subject to 
relatively accepted rules of evidence1, unlike normative disagreements which, based 
on beliefs, have no apparent methodology or process for resolution. The Risk Analysis 
framework seeks to establish a sound scientific basis for risk assessment in order to 
develop, as much as possible, neutral and objective information to advise the risk 
management process, while risk communication is intended to provide transparency to 
the entire regulatory development process.
Despite the widespread support for the Risk Analysis framework, there are 
seven general or framework debates representing a conflict between the Risk Analysis 
framework supported by economic interests and that supported by social interests. 
Within the context of these framework debates on regulating technology are five 
specific debates on GM crop regulatory principles, which are examined after the 
general debates. It will be shown that GM crops regulations are unstable as they shift 
within the Risk Analysis parameters according to the competing influence of 
economic and social interests. As these debates fundamentally influence the path of 
regulatory development within a jurisdiction and the prospects for regulatory 
integration between jurisdictions, it is crucial to examine each one.
5.1.1 Scientific Rationality v. Social Rationality in Risk Assessment
Often Risk Analysis, especially the risk assessment procedure, is portrayed as 
an approach congruent with the scientific rationality paradigm and incongruent with 
the social rationality paradigm. This debate is at the heart of the conflict between the 
economic and the social interests identified in the previous two chapters. It is now 
possible to define these concepts in a regulatory context.
According to the scientific rationality or traditional rational thought 
perspective it is possible to derive scientific facts that are universal and that lead to 
certainty. In one approach, it has been argued that researchers can ask either scientific 
empirical questions or social normative questions (van den Daele et al., 1997). 
Empirical questions can be assessed according to accepted analytical methods with 
specified causal-consequence mechanisms to show risk. Such questions for GM crops 
would include does a risk exist? and how likely is it to happen? Empirical questions
1 See Chapter 7 for an illustrative example of how scientific rationality dealt with disagreement in the 
case of Dr. Pustzai.
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produce ‘matters of knowledge’ which can be based on consensus while normative 
questions involve consideration of different systems of belief not based on any 
analytical method. Social normative questions for GM crops would include is the risk 
acceptable? These questions are not prone to consensus and there is no obvious 
method for resolving conflicts among belief systems. In comparing the two, scientific 
rationality posits that empirical questions are logically prior to normative questions, 
hence, empirical questions can produce neutral, objective and universal facts that 
should be the basis of risk assessment procedures.
On the other hand, the social rationality paradigm rejects the idea of universal 
facts. Instead, empirical questions and answers are considered to be scientific myths 
because facts cannot exist without value and social dimensions cannot be separated 
from science. The social rationality paradigm suggests that neutral and objective risk 
assessment is a flawed concept. It challenges the scientific Risk Analysis framework 
as an effective framework for developing regulations for new technologies (see 
Grove-White et al., 1997) because the scientific Risk Analysis framework fails to 
address the complex interactions between technology and society (Grove-White,
1997; Sheppard, 1997; Giddons, 1994).
This debate represents a fundamental conflict in regulatory development and 
integration, and it is the basis for the remaining framework debates on the role of 
science in GM crop regulations. Economic interests view scientific risk assessment as 
a means for disentangling actual risk from perceived risk and normative social 
preferences. It is held that empirical analysis according to accepted methods and 
causal-consequence models provide a degree of universality to risk assessments of 
GM crops providing a certain, rules-based foundation for regulations. Social interests 
view social risk assessment as a necessary requirement for establishing socially 
responsive regulations. In this sense, they do not distinguish between actual and 
perceived risk because perceived risk is held as an equally legitimate trigger for 
regulatory change and development. Given this difference it is vital to recognise the 
influence of the economic and social interests within the regulatory development 
process of a jurisdiction as will be done in Chapters 6 and 7.
5.1.2 Type of ‘Risk’ Targeted in Risk Assessment
Another important debate associated with the Risk Analysis framework 
involves the type of risk targeted where three types may be identified: recognisable
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risks, hypothetical risks and speculative risks (van den Daele et al., 1997). 
Recognisable risks can be identified through experience (data) and the application of 
accepted analytical methods such as statistical inference and probability theory, and 
they include a clear causal-consequence mechanism. Hypothetical risks lack 
experience or data, but, with the help of assumptions and/or likelihood functions they 
can be assessed within an accepted analytical method. Speculative risks lack 
experience, data, a causal-consequence mechanism and an accepted analytical method 
for assessment. They are logical possibilities; irrefutable, but untestable as well .
An added dimension to the type of risk is the risk consequence. There are two 
types of consequences; dread and diffuse. Dread consequences are sudden and 
catastrophic while diffuse consequences are long-run and cumulative but not 
catastrophic. It has been argued that dread consequences have important implications 
on risk-related behaviour. They can upwardly bias the perception of both consumers 
and regulators about possible recurrence (Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989). And, they 
can create ambiguity-averse behaviour where consumers and regulators over-estimate 
the risk of products because of the credence factors (MacLaren, 1997). For example, it 
appears that the French decision in 1999 not to lift the ban on British beef is a 
combination of speculative risks and dread consequences. Further, this ‘fear factor’ 
spread to both Germany and the European Commission who wanted to review the 
French scientific risk assessment before making any further decisions on the beef ban 
(Times, 9 October 1999).
New technology always faces either hypothetical or speculative risks because 
by definition there is no experience or data about the risks. The controversy arises 
over the extent to which GM crops should be assessed according to hypothetical or 
speculative risks. Many supporters of a social rationality paradigm have made dire 
predictions of ‘genetic pollution’ and ecological disaster because of the use of GM 
crops (Rifkin, 1998; Ho, 1998). They appear to focus on speculative risks and argue 
on the basis of logical possibilities targeted to public concerns about the credence 
factors of GM crops and alluding to dread consequences. Due to these speculative 
risks, which cannot be refuted, they claim that scientific Risk Analysis is an
2 For examples of statements of speculative risks of GM crops see: Sheppard (1997a,b); Consumers’ 
Association (1997); The Ecologist (1998). Although only a brief list, these references clearly indicate 
the widespread use of speculative risks with respect to GM crops. In each, no recognisable or 
hypothetical risks are proposed. Instead, they all refer to dread consequences of GM crops based on 
speculative risks.
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insufficient framework and without a sufficient regulatory approach GM crops must 
be banned3.
Supporters of the scientific rationality approach tend to argue, however, that 
the problem is not with Risk Analysis, but with the deliberately vague nature of 
speculative risks (Fincham and Ravetz, 1991; van den Daele et al., 1997). They agree 
that speculative risks cannot be proven wrong as “it is scientifically impossible to 
prove the impossibility of an unwanted event; and this may seem to be what is 
demanded by protesters” (Fincham and Ravetz, 1991). However, they counter that 
speculative risks cannot be proven right either. Regulatory risk assessment can only 
address a finite set of risks, but there are infinite logical possibilities. Speculative risks 
are the safe-harbour for those uninterested in a genuine dialogue about new 
technology and are inappropriate because regulations are about balancing the rights 
and interests of supporters and critics requiring dialogue, debate and compromise.
A social rationality regulatory approach targeting speculative risks would 
result in no new technology ever being approved because speculative risks can always 
be found. Yet, an infinite number of speculative risks can also be identified for 
previously approved old technologies such as traditional plant breeding techniques. So 
must they too be rejected? Of course, they wouldn’t be because, due to experience and 
data, they are now associated with recognisable risks. Banning a technology because 
of speculative risks prohibits the shift from hypothetical to recognisable risks. 
Scientific rationality posits that speculative risk assessments are not an acceptable 
basis for regulatory development and instead hypothetical risk assessments must be 
the basis for managing the application and distribution of new technologies.
5.1.3 Substantial Equivalence in Risk Assessment
The regulatory equivalence of GM and non-GM crops is a very significant 
controversy associated with GM crop regulations based on the Risk Analysis 
framework. Substantial equivalence is a regulatory principle implying that regardless 
of the differences in the process and production methods the risks from a product are 
substantially equivalent to the risks from another Tike’ product. It is important to note 
that substantial equivalence does not imply that GM crops and GM foods are risk free. 
Realistically there are risks that cannot be denied. But, crucially, substantial
3 Also NCC (1998) defines hypothetical risk as ‘risk’ and speculative risk as ‘true uncertainty’ and then 
argues that risk assessment is problematic because it does not take account o f ‘true uncertainty’.
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equivalence simply means that the risks are not greater than those risks from other like 
products, such as from traditionally bred agricultural crops planted and consumed for 
thousands of years.
Social interests tend to claim that GM crops are not substantially equivalent to 
non-GM crops because it is the use of modem biotechnology, especially transgenic 
modification across the species barriers that changes the fundamental nature of GM 
crops and incurs special risks not evidenced in conventional plant breeding.
On the other hand, economic interests, supporting scientific rationality, claim 
that the key issue is not the application of modem biotechnology per se, but the 
novelty of the resultant crop (see Chapter 2.1.1 for a discussion of novelty). They 
argue that transgenic modification techniques are simply more precise and 
sophisticated plant breeding techniques, so-called ‘modem plant breeding’
(Economist, 25 July 1998). In support of this view, the UN’s World Health 
Organization published a report on the principle of substantial equivalence in safety 
evaluations of food products derived from GM crops (WHO, 1995). This report 
concluded that GM crops may be substantially equivalent to non-GM crops for risk 
assessment purposes and that novelty was the justification for new regulatory 
oversight, not the use of genetic modification per se. According to this perspective, 
most production trait GM crops and some output trait GM crops are substantially 
equivalent but Bio-Engineered products will not be substantially equivalent because 
they are, by definition, all novel. Substantial equivalence is a well-established 
principle in international regulations supported by institutions such as the WHO, the 
FAO, the OECD, the Codex and the IPPC.
Substantial equivalence may be assessed over both scientific factors (van den 
Daele et al., 1997) and normative factors (Nuffield Institute, 1999). Two popular 
arguments in support of the social rationality assertion that GM crops are not 
substantially equivalent are (1) that it is wrong to engineer living things and (2) that it 
is wrong to transfer genes between species4. With respect to the first argument, the 
notion of engineering plants cannot be limited to GM crops only. To reject GM crops 
on the basis that they are engineered, requires a rejection of all agricultural crops, 
including organic varieties, because it is impossible to disentangle the engineering of 
GM crops from the engineering of non-GM agricultural crops (Nuffield Institute,
4 These are bio-centric ethical or moral arguments based on the idea that nature has boundaries and it is 
not right for humans to be tampering with those boundaries.
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1999). Consider that GM crops are modified varieties of conventional crops already 
engineered and made unnatural by generations of traditional plant breeding. Similar to 
all conventional crops, GM crops have been developed to fit within an ‘unnatural’ 
agricultural production system, not to grow in the wild, and to express desirable traits 
for human use, where these traits are not designed to confer any natural advantage to 
these crops relative to wild plants. It has been noted that “by itself genetic 
modification does not normally confer qualities that will make an organism more 
harmful to mankind or the environment” (Fincham and Ravetz, 1991). In other words, 
to argue that it is wrong to engineer living things and reject GM crops on this basis 
requires a similar rejection of all agricultural crops that also have been engineered to 
grow in an unnatural, man-made environment in order to meet human needs.
With respect to the second argument, from a scientific perspective, gene 
transfer and modification even across the species barrier is a naturally occurring 
phenomenon not specific to transgenic modification techniques5. Indeed, genetic drift 
has always occurred between non-GM crops, wild relatives, other vegetation and soil 
micro-organisms. In fact, it may be argued that GM crops involve more precise and 
specific modifications that are specifically monitored rather than the unmonitored 
random type that naturally occur, conferring much greater control to the plant breeder 
than previously possible.
Examining the scientific and normative factors tends to support the substantial 
equivalence of GM and non-GM crops for risk assessment procedures. Given this 
substantial equivalence, it is not a legitimate argument to reject GM crops because 
they are harmful to biodiversity (van den Daele et a l , 1997). By definition, all 
agricultural production is harmful to biodiversity. It must be accepted that production 
takes priority over biodiversity on agricultural land. The objective, given the priority 
of production, must be to minimise the impact of agricultural production upon 
biodiversity and there is no reason why GM crops cannot assist in minimising the 
impact.
Hence, from a regulatory perspective, the key issue is not the transgenic 
modification per se, but the ‘artificialness’ of the modification, such as the transfer of 
the anti-freeze gene of arctic fish into crops to protect them from freezing. This is an 
application-specific concern focused on novelty, not a process-based concern
5 Ho (1998) notes that viruses have the natural ability to transfer genes between unrelated/sexually 
incompatible species, therefore, transgenic modification cannot be seen as unnatural.
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associated with transgenic modification. This implies that for risk assessment 
procedures, some GM crops are substantially equivalent provided they are not novel.
An important example of the debate over substantial equivalence concerns the 
relationship between GM crops and organic crop varieties. A common position is that 
organic produce provides consumers with a GM-ffee alternative. However, the debate 
arises because many seed developers reject the notion that GM seeds cannot be used 
in an organic production system. They argue that organic refers to a more labour- 
intensive production process, eliminating the use of artificial fertilisers, chemicals and 
pesticide residues replacing them with a more integrated crop rotation and pest and 
weed management system. In this sense, organic is about the production method, and 
GM crops developed to be congruent with such a production method are substantially 
equivalent to conventional organic varieties. Critics of the substantial equivalence 
principle argue that it is the use of GM techniques which fundamentally changes the 
nature of GM crops and makes them incompatible with organic systems.
5.1.4 Science v. Other Legitimate Factors in Risk Assessment
Within the context of risk assessment, there is debate over whether risk should 
only relate to science-based, empirical definitions of safety or to broader socio­
economic factors. From a food safety perspective, there are four different regulatory 
targets or hurdles that may be employed in assessing the ‘risk’ or safety of foods 
derived from GM crops. The first target is food safety defined as the absence of short­
term illness immediately after consumption; the classic food poisoning case. The 
second target is long-term human health such as the cumulative impacts of 
consumption over time. The third target involves assessing the quality or efficacy of 
the food product relative to other products in the same-use category. The fourth target 
includes assessments of the broader socio-economic impacts of the use of GM foods 
in the food supply. This includes, for instance, assessing the ‘risks’ of GM crop 
production upon the welfare of farmers who produce them and upon those who 
produce complements or alternatives. For example, in the fall of 1999 Thailand 
imposed a provisional import ban on GM material pending proof of its social benefit, 
not just its safety. It was argued by Thailand’s International Economic Relations 
Policy Committee that imports should not resume “until the public accepts that GM 
food provides more benefits than drawbacks” (World Food Law Monthly No. 19, 
1999).
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Most foods are analysed according to the first target; a scientific assessment of 
their potential to cause short-term illness only. Fast foods and junk foods with 
recognisable risks of severe long-term health implications are approved as safe and are 
widely available in the marketplace. In approving such foods, little consideration is 
given to long-term health consequences and to food quality and none is given to the 
socio-economic impacts upon, for example, the health care system or worker 
absenteeism because of chronically unfit consumers.
Social rationality supporters generally argue that GM crops should be assessed 
according to all four targets or regulatory hurdles. Scientific rationality supporters 
dispute this argument for three reasons. First, it is inconsistent with the traditional 
science-based approach to food safety assessments. The 1995 amendments to the 
Codex procedural manual supported only the first regulatory hurdle (CAC, 1995; see 
also Chapter 3.2.1.C). Second, there is no justification for assessing GM crops any 
differently than conventional crops in the food supply because of their substantial 
equivalence. Third, even hypothetical risks associated with the safety of foods from 
GM crops have not been shown. In fact, a paradoxical development in the UK is the 
removal of GM ingredients from the products of the top ten fast food restaurant 
chains. No hypothetical risks to human safety and health have been shown from GM 
crops, yet there is considerable information on the recognisable risks from fast food. 
This development is simply not about food safety.
Similarly, hypothetical risks to environmental biodiversity from GM crops 
may be analysed according to an empirical scientific assessment or according to a 
broader socio-economic assessment of other legitimate factors. For instance, the UK 
Economic and Social Research Council argued:
Current approaches to environmental risk assessment exclude 
wider dimensions o f risk, such as justification, need, benefit, the 
context o f use, and public confidence in the trust worthiness o f 
regulatory provisions and institutions themselves ...the 
mechanisms in question are not appropriate for addressing such 
issues adequately and there are no other fora for addressing these 
dimensions (in Mayer et al., 1996)6
6 Also see Sheppard (1997a) who argues that “A re-evaluation of the risks, need and justification for 
GM foods, one that extends beyond what is normally thought of as ‘risk assessment’ is urgently 
required”.
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Again, this would include, for instance, an assessment of the impact of GM crop 
production upon the social welfare of other economic sectors both complementary to 
and competing with GM crops. The serious problem arises when a critic’s 
dissatisfaction with ‘need’ and ‘justification’ is manifested through speculative, 
unsubstantiated and spurious warnings or dire predictions of the safety of GM crops.
In short, scientific rationality supports primarily the first hurdle for regulatory 
oversight while social rationality supports all four regulatory hurdles.
5.1.5 Burden of Proof in Risk Assessment
The traditional regulatory approach to new technology, supported by economic 
interests, generally reflects a scientific rationality approach where new technological 
innovations are innocent until proven guilty. That is, unless an innovation is proven to 
be harmful there is no justification for a restriction or a ban on the technology.
From a statistical probability theory perspective there are two types of risk or 
errors to consider. With respect to GM crops, Type I risk would be the risk that the 
crops are rejected as unsafe, when in fact they are safe. While Type II risk would be 
the risk that the crops are accepted as safe, when in fact they are unsafe. The 
controversy arises, because Type I and II risks cannot be simultaneously minimised, 
and, instead, if one type of risk or error is decreased, the other is increased (Greene 
1997). The debate is how to decide between the two.
The traditional burden of proof minimises Type I risk (rejected when safe) and 
supporters argue that this paradigm has been proven effective at ensuring an 
acceptable level of relative safety of products while encouraging further innovation. 
Generally, this requires the assumption that firms actively minimise safety risks while 
pursuing innovation. It has been argued that firms are both able and willing to ensure 
both food and environmental safety because a crisis is a commercial disaster (Spriggs 
and Isaac, In Press). According to this view, despite claims of ‘reductionist’ science or 
captured scientists, the market is working in internalising the costs of risk because 
producers who minimise commercial risk are simultaneously minimising food and 
environmental safety risks. Indeed, an important aspect of ensuring that firms do 
internalise food and environmental safety risks as commercial risks is to have 
stringent product liability laws to compel the firms to ensure safety.
The traditional burden of proof has important commercial advantages. It 
enhances regulatory stability and certainty for firms encouraging the management of
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product applications of new technologies. This allows for hypothetical risks to begin 
to move towards recognisable risks, increasing regulatory experience and decreasing 
the time and costs required for regulatory oversight. Ultimately increasing the 
competitiveness of the advanced technology firms (Lavoie and Sheldon, 1999). It is 
also argued that too much regulation is not optimal for technological innovation 
because it confers advantage to large established firms who have the resources to deal 
with complex regulations (Zilberman et al., 1997). This decreases the diffusion of 
technology and decreases the number of potential commercial applications, which in 
turn decreases consumer choice. In other words, the social rationality approach, 
opposed to multinational Life Sciences firms may actually be supporting the 
competitive position of these firms by calling for greater regulatory oversight to meet 
public fears because only these firms have the resources necessary to deal with the 
complex regulations.
The social rationality approach to regulating new technologies tends to want 
the burden of proof reversed so that the focus of risk assessment is on minimising 
Type II risk (accepted when unsafe). In this case, GM crops and food produced from 
GM crops are assumed to be unsafe until they can be conclusively proven to be safe.
In fact, some critics want the burden of proof not only reversed but also extended to 
include other legitimate factors as well. GM crops and GM foods would be rejected 
unless they could be proven safe and socially beneficial and hence, meet all four 
regulatory hurdles from 5.1.4 above.
It appears that the keys to this debate are the type of risk targeted and the 
principle of substantial equivalence. For instance, if the burden of proof is reversed 
and the critics were arguing from the perspective of speculative risks about non­
equivalent GM crops, then GM crops would never be approved because there would 
be no way to disprove the logical possibility of Type II speculative risks. Further, 
there would be no accepted analytical methods for identifying and then minimising the 
speculative Type II risk. The implication is that regulatory responses would be biased 
against the techniques of modem biotechnologies and in favour of the more random, 
imprecise techniques of traditional plant breeding, even though traditionally bred 
crops are also associated with speculative risks.
Yet, reversing the burden of proof in risk assessment appears unnecessary if 
risk assessment is based on hypothetical risk and GM crops are substantially 
equivalent to the same use conventional crops. In this case, focusing on hypothetical
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risks means that accepted analytical methods may be employed to identify and 
minimise Type I risks. There would be no scientific or empirical reason to shift from 
the minimisation of Type I risks to Type II risks because GM crops would be 
considered substantially equivalent.
5.1.6 Risk Tolerance in Risk Management
Once the risk assessment is complete, determining what level of risk is 
acceptable is a risk management procedure. The standard approach is to establish 
tolerance levels because zero risk is not possible. “The concept of zero risk to the 
consumer from the food supply although attractive and the ultimate aim of food 
safety, given the current level of knowledge is not a feasible option” (Majewski,
1997). Yet, despite this reality there have been pressures for zero tolerance risk 
management policies associated with GM crop regulations. The controversy arises 
because risk management must balance the economic interests of supporters who 
support a risk tolerance level for the presence of GM material in food products, with 
these social interests who demand zero risk.
Tolerance levels are established for the presence of many types of possible 
materials in food products such as the content of rat hair in macaroni, bugs in flour, or 
pesticide levels on vegetables7. Also, organic labelling policies also accept tolerance 
levels. For example, the EU organic labelling regulation (EC 2092/91) states that a 
food product must have at least 95% organic ingredients in order to be legitimately 
labelled as organic. Also, while some want zero tolerance policies on the presence of 
GM materials in food products, a specific level of pesticide residue is tolerated. 
Pesticide residues and GM material are conceptually similar in the sense that they are 
generally in food products without the consumer knowing, or at least being sure. Yet, 
there are important differences. First, GM crops have not been shown to have even 
hypothetical safety and health risks, while there is considerable information about the 
recognisable safety and health risks of pesticides. Second, while humans are designed 
to digest proteins, they are not designed to digest synthetic chemicals. Scientific 
rationality supporters would argue that it is an irrational result that synthetic chemicals 
with known recognisable risks are tolerated to a certain level, while protein-based
7 See the Food and Drug Administration of the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services website on permissible food adulteration.
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genetic modifications that have not been to shown to have even hypothetical risks to 
human safety and health are the target of zero tolerance pressures.
5.1.7 Science v. Other Legitimate Factors In Risk Management
According to the Risk Analysis framework, risk assessment must be free of 
normative considerations to the extent possible, while the risk management process is 
where the rights and interests of all stakeholders must be balanced. There are three 
debates associated with this.
The first controversy arises because, as was shown in Chapter 4, many of the 
critics base their rejection of GM crops upon a belief system that is not open to 
compromise or concession. For instance, rejection of GM crops because of moral, 
ethical or religious beliefs about genetic engineering are not usually open to 
compromise8. Another example is critics of GM crops who support organic farming. 
Such critics often reject GM crops because of their rejection of the broader paradigm 
of intensive agricultural production. Instead of comparing an insecticidal GM variety 
of com to a non-GM variety in terms of the benefits accrued because of the reduction 
in pesticide used in an intensive system, they compare the GM variety to an organic 
variety in an organic system and conclude that GM varieties are just not good enough. 
The problem here is that supporters and critics are arguing from different frames of 
reference (van den Daele et al., 1997) and it is difficult to achieve compromise 
between different frames of reference.
The second debate arises because some argue that risk management should be 
based on scientific risk assessment and it should remain as objective and neutral as 
possible, not a venue for political compromise and concession. According to this 
view, the objective of risk management is the reduction and prevention of 
scientifically determined risk and this can be achieved without normative influence or 
consideration of other legitimate factors. For instance, proposed US regulations are 
analysed by the Office of Management and Budget to ensure that they are capable of 
achieving desired outcomes and that they are not the product of political objectives 
(see Chapter 6). The risk management is expected to focus on the reduction and 
prevention of hypothetical risk, not on the assuaging of public fears and concerns 
about speculative risks.
8 Akerlof, G. and W. Dickens (1982) argue that consumer beliefs persist over time and are difficult to 
change.
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The third debate arises because if it is accepted that risk management is 
inherently a political function, then it must be performed by elected officials. Yet, it 
has been argued that consumers do not believe that elected officials can appropriately 
play this role (Grove-White et al., 1997). If this is the case, then who should take the 
risk management decisions? The responsibility appears to slide back down to the 
scientific risk assessors (who must necessarily be free of normative factors in order to 
arrive at independent risk information), yet the public allegedly does not trust the 
scientists either. How can regulatory development escape this conundrum? It has been 
argued that non-governmental organisations can fill this role by acting as honest 
brokers in precautionary regulatory development (Grove-White et al., 1997), however 
this results in the entirely unacceptable situation of an unaccountable third-party 
interest groups responsible for regulations.
5.2 Principles of GM Crop Regulations
The seven general debates associated with the Risk Analysis framework reveal 
the existence of a significant range of views on the appropriate way to regulate 
advanced technologies. This gives rise to a challenging exercise of compromise and 
concession in the regulatory development process in an effort to balance technological 
progress with precaution. This challenge is exacerbated, however, by the development 
and commercialisation of GM crops because there are five specific debates over the 
fundamental principles for regulating them.
The objective of this section is to identify the five specific regulatory debates. 
The key point is that while two jurisdictions may claim to have Risk Analysis-based 
regulations, the range of views and debates means that the approaches can, in fact, be 
significantly divergent.
5.2.1 The Precautionary Principle
Most countries claim to base their GM crop regulations on the precautionary 
principle. Yet, the use of the precautionary principle in GM crop regulations is 
associated with a significant degree of misunderstanding. In general, the precautionary 
principle implies that in the face of uncertainty regulators must over-estimate risk. 
However, in an operational sense the precautionary principle has two somewhat 
different interpretations and regulatory jurisdictions can employ either of the two 
interpretations. The first interpretation, supported by scientific rationality, considers it
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to be a scientific risk assessment tool while the second, supported by social rationality, 
considers it to be a social risk management tool.
As a scientific risk assessment tool, the precautionary principle refers to the 
manner in which hypothetical risks are assessed. Recall that hypothetical risks are 
those that lack experience or data, but, with the help of assumptions and/or likelihood 
functions risks may be assessed within an accepted analytical method. Applying the 
precautionary principle at this stage would entail setting very risk averse assumptions 
or parameters in the likelihood functions to ensure that uncertainty is sufficiently dealt 
with. Then hypothetical risks are calculated by credible experts according to accepted 
analytical methods and according to the traditional burden of proof. The hypothetical 
risks are ‘precautionary’ because the precautionary principle has been built into the 
risk assessment process. This approach accepts that regulators can only be reasonably 
certain of no adverse affects. It still supports the research, development and 
commercialisation efforts that further the knowledge base and lead to greater 
understanding of the risks. Further, the hypothetical risk assessment information is 
then used to advise the risk management procedure.
As a social risk management tool, the precautionary principle is the vehicle for 
allowing speculative risks into the risk management procedure. Recall that speculative 
risks lack experience, data, a causal-consequence mechanism and an accepted 
analytical method for assessment. They are irrefutable logical possibilities where a 
scientific risk assessment cannot be performed. Instead, speculative risks are ‘best 
guesses’ introduced into the risk management procedure with no analytical or 
empirical method of evaluation.
The social interpretation has its roots in environmental literature (Tait and 
Levidow, 1992). The Rio Declaration stated that:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach 
shall be widely applied by states according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats o f serious or irreversible damage, lack o f 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.
The concern is that ecosystems are so poorly understood that precaution must be taken 
in approving the environmental release of products that may have irreversible or 
irreparable impacts. Anticipating the worst, regulators pursue zero risk in the sense
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that under the precautionary principle they must be certain of no adverse affects. They 
heavily scrutinise research and development and do not permit commercialisation 
until it can be proven to be free of risk. Further, because the risk management 
procedure involves balancing the rights and interests of supporters and critics, many 
different actors can introduce speculative risks into the risk management procedure, 
which is unlike hypothetical risk assessment where the risk information is compiled 
by credible ‘experts’.
Clearly, the interpretation of the precautionary principle employed can lead to 
significantly different regulatory outcomes. The scientific interpretation is favoured by 
international standards-setting institutions such as the Codex and the IPPC. The social 
interpretation has been established in the Biosafety Protocol and is supported by social 
interests groups (TACD, 1999b; Consumers’ Association of Canada, 1994).
The dual interpretation of the precautionary principle has created the unusual 
situation in the Codex where Canada and the US claim that Codex does employ the 
precautionary principle while the EU claims that it does not. In fact, the dual 
interpretation can be expected to cause trade tensions. Consider, for instance, that 
IPPC employs the scientific interpretation in developing phyto-sanitary measures, yet 
the environmental tradition is to use the social interpretation. As Members enact 
phyto-sanitary measure against GM crops, these measures will be evaluated in terms 
of their scientific justifications. In this case, the TBT Committee or the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism will be charged with making the unenviable decision on which 
interpretation of the precautionary principle is acceptable and which is not.
5.2.2 Regulatory Focus: Products v. Processes
Domestic regulations on biotechnology focus either on the products created 
through the use of biotechnology or on the processes (i.e. how the products are made). 
This is the so-called products v. processes debate.
Regulating products, not processes, is the traditional regulatory approach to 
regulating advanced technologies. Product-based regulations for GM crops and 
products derived from GM crops would be congruent with the traditional approach. 
This is the regulatory approach supported by economic interests focused on 
application-based, novelty regulations.
On the other hand, regulating according to the use of modem biotechnology, 
x especially transgenic modification, is not congruent with the traditional approach.
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Modem biotechnology is employed across many sectors, such as agriculture, forestry, 
fisheries, pharmaceuticals, medicine, and the environment. These sectors have been 
regulated independently, pursuant to specific, often divergent mandates. Regulating 
the process requires regulations applicable to all sectoral applications, despite the 
divergent mandates. Social interests regard this approach as more capable of ensuring 
technological precaution.
5.2.3 Regulatory Structure: Vertical v. Horizontal Regulations
Closely associated with the products v. processes debate, is the decision to 
regulate biotechnology according to existing, vertical regulations or via new, 
horizontal legislation. Regulating products of biotechnology is congruent with the 
existing, vertical regulatory jurisdictions in most countries. The key result is that 
existing vertical jurisdictions may be used to regulate GM crops, building on the 
accumulated expertise, capacity and trust in vertical agencies. This is the approach 
supported by economic interests because it is viewed as the best way to ensure 
technological progress.
On the other hand, regulating the process usually requires the development of 
new horizontal regulations which can address issues that existing, vertical structures 
may not. Given that the fundamental features of biotechnology remain virtually the 
same regardless of the application, regulating the technology potentially provides a 
more integrated approach than using divergent regulations in different vertical 
agencies. As the mandates of vertical regulatory agencies in most cases were 
developed prior to the biotechnological revolution it is argued that they were not 
designed to address the risks associated with this new technology (Rogers, 1990). A 
new, horizontal regulatory approach focused on the technology could possibly provide 
a more appropriate level of oversight, regardless of the product application. New 
horizontal regulations, however, face the inevitable political challenges of appeasing 
all actors, which is time-intensive and can lead to over-regulation and anti-competitive 
restrictions on the market (Cantley, 1998).
5.2.4 Regulatory Decision-Making in Risk Management
There are two aspects of regulatory decision-making to consider (1) the type of 
decision-making procedure employed and (2) the participation in the decision-making 
procedure.
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With respect to the type of decision-making procedure, it can be either judicial 
or consensual. Judicial regulatory decision-making is done, for instance, through 
voting procedures among all the participants or among appointed ‘judges’. After 
hearing the scientific evidence, a judgement is taken. Consensual decision-making, on 
the other hand, requires the unanimous support of all participants before regulations 
may be enacted.
Similarly, with respect to the participation in the regulatory decision-making 
procedure, it can be either the narrow participation of ‘experts’ or the broad 
participation of a wide range of actors. For instance, in a traditional, vertical 
independent regulatory jurisdiction, such as agriculture, regulatory development and 
decision-making generally has a narrow set of involved actors such as farmers and 
agro-chemical companies. Issues associated with the regulation of GM crops have 
tended to dramatically increase the number of interested actors because of the broad 
range of consumer concerns involved. The greater the number of actors, the greater 
will be the number of competing interests and, by implication, the regulatory decision­
making procedure will be more complex.
In Table 5.1 is a cross-comparison of regulatory decision-making. In general, 
judicial decision-making creates winners and losers however it circumvents the need 
to build unanimity. Judicial and narrow decision-making is the most timely and 
specific type of decision-making, although it lacks credibility because it is exclusive 
and elitist. In fact, the discussion on the Codex (3.2.1.C) revealed that Codex decision­
making has shifted from a consensual to a judicial basis because of the linking with 
trade agreements causing criticism about its credibility in establishing harmonised 
international regulations. In contrast, consensual and wide decision-making is the 
most credible because it is inclusive, however it is time-intensive and lacks specificity 
with so many interests and concerns involved.
Narrow Participation Wide Participation
Judicial/Voting Most Timely 
Winners and losers 
Elitist/Exclusive
(WTO DSM, Can, US, IPPC DSM)
Winners and losers 
(EC Parliament Vote)
Consensual
(OECD, Codex, IPPC IPSMs)
Most Time-intensive
Credible/Inclusive
(BSP, Other UN Initiatives)
Table 5.1 Regulatory Risk Management Decision-Making
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5.2.5 Regulatory Instruments: Mandatory Labelling Policies
Labelling is a risk communication tool, along with public service 
announcements, advertisements and public seminars, that transfers knowledge from 
the supply-side to the demand-side of the market (Phillips and Isaac, 1998; Caswell, 
1999). Labelling is often a voluntary private instrument that firms are both able and 
willing to pursue in order to differentiate their products in the market place. Voluntary 
labels require a consumer willingness to search out and to pay for the differentiated 
products.
Labelling may also be a mandatory public instrument. In fact, mandatory 
labelling regulations for products made from GM crops are currently an important 
principle for the development of overall GM crop regulations because many states 
have developed or are developing mandatory schemes.
There are two motivations for mandatory labelling schemes: labelling for 
safety reasons or labelling for the consumer’s right to know. The former is the 
traditional approach, where the label is used to connote some kind of safety or health 
risk from the product, such as warning labels on cigarette packages or labelling the 
presence of allergens in a food product. In the absence of any hypothetical safety 
risks, GM labelling schemes are often justified as meeting the consumer’s right to 
know that GM crops have been used in the processing or production of the food 
product. There are both advantages and disadvantages to mandatory labelling schemes 
based on the consumers’ right to know. It is advantageous in the sense that it meets a 
consumer demand to know whether the food product contains or has been derived 
from any GM material. It provides for informed consumerism because it is 
information that can build trust and ensure choice. However, labels not based on 
health and safety information are normative social statements appeasing only those 
interests who have raised speculative, unsubstantiated claims. This provides 
undeserved credibility to the critics and creates the misimpression that GM crops and 
foods are unsafe or inferior to conventional products.
The UK has adopted a mandatory labelling scheme based on the consumers’ 
right to know, not based on safety considerations. This is a second best policy in the 
sense that it is a reaction to public fears, not to safety. The cost burden falls on the 
retail food outlets (supermarkets, caterers, restaurants, etc.) who are on the front-line 
between producers and consumers. Therefore, this second best labelling policy for the 
consumer’s right to know, has lead to an inequitable distribution of costs. Further,
157
given the credence nature of GM crops, there is a practical issue associated with 
labelling for the consumer’s right to know; does a label indicating the presence or 
possible presence of GM material really allow for informed choice? While the label 
would allow consumers to know, it does not add to true informed choice because as 
shown in Chapter 2 overall consumers still remain uninformed about GM crops.
Recent research supports the importance of labelling to meet the consumer’s 
right to know and it concluded that choice is paramount for consumers’ risk 
perception. It also concludes, however, that in the case of rbST in milk, labelling 
brought premiums for the voluntary label on non-rbST products (Zepeda et al 1999). 
The implication of this analysis is that a voluntary label for non-GM foods is both 
economically more efficient and consumer beneficial than a mandatory labelling 
scheme not rooted in health or safety concerns. A voluntary labelling program would 
more equitably distribute the costs of labelling according to consumers’ willingness to 
pay for GM-ffee alternatives. Based on this logic, in the US, the American Com 
Growers Association (ACGA) is developing a voluntary, GM-Free crop certification 
scheme, supported also by the National Grain and Feed Association (NGFA)(World 
Food Monthly No. 19, 1999).
5.2.6 Summary of Regulatory Debates
Together, the debates associated with the general and specific GM crop 
regulatory principles reveal two distinct regulatory paradigms -  a scientific rationality 
paradigm and a social rationality paradigm. Essentially, these two paradigms establish 
the regulatory parameters of a jurisdiction and the precise regulatory approach must 
strike a politically acceptable balance within these parameters (Table 5.2).
There are two crucial features of the GM crop regulatory development process. 
First, and perhaps the most important feature is that the fundamental regulatory 
principles have not been established. For instance, the definition of ‘risk’ for 
regulating new technologies or the applicability of the substantial equivalence 
principle in regulations remain highly contentious debates. As a result, GM crop 
regulations are unstable as various economic and social interests lobby for either the 
scientific or the social rationality approach. Moreover, the regulatory instability 
associated with GM crops at national as well as international levels is a unique feature 
distinct from other social regulatory barrier issues. For instance, while the transatlantic 
trade of beef products has been controversial on health and safety grounds, at least the
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fundamental regulatory principles for regulating beef safety are very much universal 
(Spriggs and Isaac, In Press). Until the fundamental principles are established, 
regulatory instability will remain and GM crop regulations will shift within the 
regulatory parameters according to the influence of the competing interests.
Scientific Rationality Social Rationality
General Regulatory Issues
Belief Technological progress:
Enhances growth and development 
leading to higher social regulations 
-  a regulatory race to the top.
Technological precaution: 
Technology cannot be separated 
from socio-economic factors -  
must be socially responsive.





Substantial Equivalence Yes No
Science or Other in Risk 
Assessment
First regulatory hurdle based on 
identified safety or hazard risk
All four regulatory hurdles
Burden of Proof Traditional: Minimise Type I 
(Rejected when safe)
Minimise Type II 
(Accepted when unsafe)
Risk tolerance Minimum Zero tolerance
Science or Other in Risk 
Management
Safety or Hazard-based 
Risk Management is for risk 
reduction and prevention only
Broader socio-economic concerns 
Risk Management is for social 
responsiveness
Specific Regulatory Issues
Precautionary Principle Scientific Interpretation Social Interpretation
Focus Product-based, Novel Applications Process- or Technology-based
Structure Vertical, Existing structures Horizontal, new structures
Participation Narrow, technical experts 
Judicial decision-making
wide: ‘social dimensions’ 
Judicial decision-making
Labelling Safety or Hazard only 
Voluntary, market-based for the 
consumers’ right to know
Mandatory, process-based for the 
consumers’ right to know.
Table 5.2 Comparison of Scientific and Social Rationality Regulatory Approaches
Another crucial feature of the GM crop regulatory development process is the 
path dependency of the regulatory paradigms. Initially, the particular regulatory 
trajectory is determined by the independence and discretion of the regulators and the 
role of science in the regulatory development process. If scientific rationality is the 
tradition, then subsequent regulatory principles tend to hold an important role for 
science in determining the appropriate level of regulatory oversight. Conversely, if 
social rationality is the main paradigm, then subsequent regulatory principles tend 
focus more on social responsiveness despite the scientific underpinnings for the 
regulatory stance. In addition, the path dependency is also influenced by the 
competitive position of the jurisdiction state in the new technology. A 
commercialisation lead affords a jurisdiction more time to become acquainted with the
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credence factors of a new technology and may even allow the unknown risks to 
become known. On the other hand, a commercialisation lag ill-prepares the consumers 
within a jurisdiction for the sudden appearance of advanced technologies developed 
elsewhere.
Once established, the regulatory trajectory is influenced by the dominant 
interests in the regulatory development process. For instance, dominant social interests 
in an otherwise traditionally scientifically rational jurisdiction may be compel a social 
rationality regulatory response. When both economic and social interests have 
influence, such as in the case of GM crops, regulatory instability is certain to emerge.
The path dependency of GM crop regulations makes it difficult to integrate the 
two paradigms. For instance, a regulatory trajectory focused on technology-based 
oversight is difficult to combine with a trajectory focused on application or product- 
based legislation according to novelty. Similarly, substantial equivalence can be either 
accepted or rejected within a jurisdiction; there is really no middle ground with this 
regulatory principle.
The two distinct paradigms along with the regulatory debates identified in 
Table 5.2 can be used to characterise the GM crop regulatory development process 
within a regulatory jurisdiction. In order to do so, the commercial position of the 
jurisdiction, the traditional regulatory role of the state, the influence of the various 
economic and social interests must be identified. This will be done for the North 
American and the European Union’s regulatory approaches in Chapters 6 and 7, 
respectively. However, prior to this, it is now vital to link the regulatory approach 
with the integration strategy. This is the objective of the next section.
5.3 Regulatory Integration
While two jurisdictions may claim to have Risk Analysis-based GM crop 
regulations employing the precautionary principle, the previous sections have revealed 
that their approaches may be drastically different. The result is the creation of social 
regulatory barriers and regulatory regionalism as GM crops approved for market 
access in one jurisdiction face regulatory delay and perhaps rejection under the 
regulatory approach within another jurisdiction.
Social regulatory barriers represent a trade challenge quite unlike traditional 
border measures such as tariffs and quotas, which tend to be quantitative, easily 
identifiable and driven by commercial protectionism. Instead, social regulatory
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barriers are non-quantitative and involve social preferences and concerns. Regulations 
for food safety and environmental protection tend to be inwardly focused, reacting 
only to domestic interests with little tradition for considering their potential market 
access impacts. Although regulatory barriers to trade are at present a limited source of 
market access barrier9, their use in the trade of GM crops is already a significant 
transatlantic trade tension.
In this section, the prospects for the integration of GM crop regulations, given 
the possible divergence in approaches between jurisdictions, are examined.
Essentially, regulatory integration is a function of the regulatory approach adopted. A 
scientific rationality approach to regulating GM crops tends to be congruent with an 
international economic integration strategy supported by the international trade 
regime. Alternatively, a social rationality approach tends to be congruent with an 
international social integration strategy incongruent with the traditional trade 
approach.
Therefore, social regulatory barriers incur a conflict between economic 
interests who support scientific rationality and shallow economic integration and 
social interests who support social rationality and deeper social integration. This 
regulatory integration conflict will be illustrated with reference to several trade 
disputes involving issues that may be reasonably extrapolated to disputes involving 
GM crop social regulatory barriers. Then, based on this analysis of the conflict over 
social regulatory barriers, the three choice parameters for regulatory integration 
identified in Chapter One will be assessed.
5.3.1 Analysis of Trade Agreements and GM Crop Measures
In order to illustrate the difference between economic and social integration 
strategies two trade dispute cases and one current trade tension are summarised. To 
control the development and commercialisation of GM crops some Members of the 
World Trade Organization have proposed regulatory measures such as an outright ban 
on GM crops and GM foods or mandatory labelling schemes for GM foods. Both food 
safety and environmental protection justifications have been cited to support these
9 Roberts et al., (1998) conclude from a comprehensive evaluation of market access barriers facing US 
agricultural exports that most barriers are imposed to protect the economic interests of domestic 
producers, not to protect the concerns of domestic consumers.
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measures. Are these measures compatible with the rights and obligations of Members 
under the WTO?
These examples were chosen because they are relevant for potential food 
safety, environmental protection and labelling disputes over social regulatory barriers 
to GM crops. They will be examined in order to understand how food safety and 
environmental protection-type social regulatory barriers restricting market access for 
GM crops and GM foods may be dealt with according to the economic integration 
approach.
This assessment reveals the significant limitations of the economic integration 
approach when dealing with social regulatory barriers because of the failure to deal 
appropriately with social concerns. The implications of this on trade diplomacy efforts 
will be assessed following the case studies.
A. Food Safety Ban: EU and Canada -  US Beef Hormones Dispute
The use of hormones in the production of beef has been a controversial issue in 
Europe for over twenty years. In March 1988, an EU Directive (88/146/EEC) banned 
the use of six hormones in beef production in both domestic and foreign (imported) 
beef products. The EC directive identified six separate growth hormones—three 
natural occurring ones (oestradiol-1713, progesterone, and testosterone) and three 
synthetic ones (trenbolone acetate, zeranol and melengestrol acetate (“MGA”)) and 
applied a zero-tolerance policy. As a result, North American beef containing such 
hormones was effectively prohibited from EC markets, regardless of the fact that 
hormone use had been approved as safe in North America.
In 1988, the ban was not in violation of the GATT 1948 because it was being 
applied according to the principles of non-discrimination. In 1995, when the WTO 
came into force, those Parties of Export who felt that the ban was scientifically 
unjustified protectionism now had the legitimate opportunity to challenge the ban 
under the safety-related provisions of the SPS Agreement.
Canada and the US complained, on behalf of beef producers, to the WTO that 
the EU regulations against beef imports into Europe treated with growth hormones 
violated the EU’s obligations under the SPS Agreement10. They argued that the ban 
was not consistent with Codex standards and that there was insufficient scientific
10 European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones); Panel, 18 
August 1997; Appeal 16 January 1998; Arbitration; 29 May 1998.
162
justification for the EU to impose a standard higher than the Codex standard. The 
Codex ruled, in 1995, on the maximum residue limits for the safe use of these 
hormones in beef production (CAC, 1995; McDondald, 1998). Similarly, in 1995, an 
EU conference reported that the hormones were safe and within normal physiological 
ranges (Europe Drug and Device Letter, 5 February 1996). Yet, despite the advice 
from its own scientists, the European Commission maintained the ban.
The WTO dispute panel decision ruled against the EU ban, and the EU 
promptly appealed the decision. In its decision, the Appellate Body of the WTO was 
careful to argue that its decision was a ‘procedural ruling’ on the basis of the wording 
of the SPS Agreement and not a decision about the permissible use of health and 
safety regulations by Members. In fact, it has been argued that the Appellate Body 
does make efforts to uphold the sovereignty rights of Members when making 
decisions about their obligations under the trade agreements (Jackson, 1997).
The Appellate Body ultimately held that the EC directive did violate the SPS 
Agreement, because the measures were not based on an appropriate risk assessment 
and were not scientifically justifiable. No risk assessment had been done for the MGA 
hormone and scientific evidence from both North America and Europe along with the 
Codex standard suggested that the other five hormones were safe if properly 
administered. The evidence presented concerning the carcinogenic potential of 
increased hormone ingestion was found to be unrelated to the six hormones in 
question. The panel also found no evidence that any of the six hormones were being 
improperly administered on a widespread basis.
Further, the Appellate Body also considered the justification for the ban under 
SPS Article 5:7, the use of the precautionary principle. This was found to be an 
insufficient justification because (1) a provisional ban must be temporary while the 
ban was a permanent EU Directive, (2) the ban is justified if there is insufficient 
scientific evidence, yet there were numerous scientific studies from both Europe and 
North America. On this matter, the Appellate Body concluded that “the precautionary 
principle has not been written into the SPS Agreement as a grounds for justifying SPS 
measures that are otherwise inconsistent with the obligations of Members set out in 
particular provisions of that Agreement" (Appellate Body Ruling Article 124).
The ruling may be interpreted as requiring Members to employ the scientific 
interpretation of the precautionary principle. That is, Members must prove more than 
just public fear to support a claim of precaution. Instead, hypothetical risk assessments
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or highly conflictive scientific conclusions are an appropriate justification. In the 
hormones case, even the EU scientists found no evidence to justify the ban. The 
Appellate Body of the WTO therefore ruled against the EU ban and the EU’s use of 
the social interpretation of the precautionary principle, recommending that the EU 
bring its measures into conformity with its SPS obligations.
This order has yet to be implemented. The EU informed the WTO that it must 
complete a new risk assessment and then implement new SPS measures to continue to 
ban hormone-treated beef. An arbitrator had ordered that the EU must comply with the 
panel ruling within 15 months; which was by 18 May 1999.
The WTO Appellate Body ruling raises the question as to what is a sufficient 
scientific risk assessment under the WTO? With respect to the regulatory debates 
assessed above the answer is that a legitimate risk assessment must be a 
comprehensive hypothetical risk assessment focused on the identifiable hazards to 
support the trade-restricting measure. Risk assessments based on vague, non-specific 
speculative risks or the social interpretation of the precautionary principle would not 
be deemed legitimate assessments according to these principles.
An important point is that the economic integration approach of the WTO is 
directly in conflict with the social integration approach supported by the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). For instance, ECJ decided in favour of the ban because it was 
willing to consider the validity of non-science and non-safety objectives. The ECJ 
ruling claimed “traders were not entitled to expect that a prohibition on administering 
the substances under question to animals could be based on scientific data alone” 
(Scott, 1998). This difference should be expected because while the WTO is pursuing 
the traditional trade model of shallow, economic integration the role of ECJ is to 
facilitate the deeper social integration of EU Member States. In this sense, the ECJ 
should be considering broader socio-economic issues, while such issues are not in the 
remit of the WTO.
By extension, any EU ban on GM foods must fulfil the same scientific 
justification and risk assessment requirements in order to be trade compliant.
Scientists in North America and in Europe have consistently argued that there are no 
justifiable grounds for banning GM foods on the basis of food safety concerns, other 
than the conventional concerns about allergens that are associated with non-GM foods 
as well. In fact, in most cases the unilateral bans by EU Member States on particular 
GM crops have resulted from politicians over-ruling the advice of their own scientific
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advisory committees, because of consumer concern (see Chapter 7). Therefore, at the 
present time, an EU ban on GM foods appears to violate the WTO’s SPS Agreement 
because there is not a sufficient scientific justification to declare that GM foods are 
unsafe.
Such a WTO decision on social regulatory barriers would surely be 
condemned by social interests for three reasons. First, it adopts a rigid scientific 
rationality approach to Risk Analysis requiring a focus on hypothetical, not 
speculative risks. Second, it limits the social responsiveness of risk management 
because it requires the evidence of actual risk to impose a ban, not simply perceived 
risk. Third, and perhaps most crucially, it supports the scientific interpretation of the 
precautionary principle over the social interpretation favoured by social interests.
B. Environmental Protection Ban: Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle
The Tuna-Dolphin trade dispute was based on a Mexican challenge to a US 
import ban on tuna products where so-called dolphin-friendly catch techniques had 
not been used. The US cited evidence about the recognised risk of certain tuna catch 
techniques on dolphin mortality rates and concluded that certain techniques were 
unacceptably risky. Consequently, tuna products in which the risky techniques were 
used faced an import ban. The dispute was pre-WTO and it went before the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the GATT.
Essentially, the US import ban was an environmental protection measure taken 
against the non-product-related PPMs of imported products. The method of catch had 
no impact at all upon the safety or quality of the tuna product, instead it had an 
environmental impact upon dolphins. The tuna imports were targeted with a second- 
best measure; an import ban designed to send a signal that US consumers prefer 
dolphin-friendly catch techniques.
The GATT dispute panel found in favour of Mexico. The ruling, congruent 
with the scientific rationality paradigm, concluded that the US had violated its GATT 
obligations by imposing a discriminatory import ban according to non-product-related 
PPMs. The ruling was sympathetic with US environmental preferences however, and 
suggested that a voluntary ‘tuna-friendly’ labelling scheme was the first-best measure 
to signal to consumers which non-product-related PPM had been used in the tuna 
catch. Such a scheme met two important criteria. First, it was a first-best and market- 
based strategy and second, it avoided the use of unjustifiable trade barriers based on
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non-product-related PPMs and the extra-territorial extension of environmental 
preferences.
Similarly, the Shrimp-Turtle trade dispute was based on a challenge, brought 
to the WTO by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand, to a US import ban on shrimp 
that were caught in nets that also caught and killed sea turtles. Similar to the Tuna- 
Dolphin case, the Shrimp-Turtle import ban was based on the non-product-related 
PPMs of a traded product. The DSB panel ruled against the US import ban, which the 
US appealed. The WTO Appellate Body ruled that the US import ban violated the 
TBT Agreement by imposing a discriminatory trade ban according to non-product- 
related PPMs. Again the alternative suggestion was a voluntary labelling scheme. 
Additionally, the Appellate Body suggested that the involved countries could 
negotiate a multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) based primarily on the 
environmental concerns, outside the WTO framework.
Both cases reveal that environmental trade measures based on preferences for 
non-product related PPMs are not consistent with the rights and obligations of the 
international trade agreements. According to the WTO, a Member cannot unilaterally 
impose second-best extra-territorial environmental preferences for non-product-related 
PPMs upon other Members because this violates the non-discrimination principle and 
the product focus of trade agreements. Instead, two alternatives are more effective. 
First, is a voluntary labelling scheme connoting that a product has used an 
environmentally acceptable non-product-related PPM. Second, is a MEA pertaining 
explicitly to the environmental concern at issue as a first-best measure to address the 
environmental problem.
By extension, these cases suggest that an outright import ban on GM crops 
based on non-safety-related environmental protection justifications is not a trade 
compliant strategy. First of all, there remains significant uncertainty about whether 
transgenic modifications to crops are even non-product-related PPMs (see Chapter 3). 
Second, supposing that transgenic modifications were considered to be PPMs, the 
approved GM varieties have been approved on the basis of substantial equivalence, 
hence, the PPMs would be non-product-related. According to both the Tuna-Dolphin 
and the Shrimp-Turtle trade dispute rulings, an environmental protection ban based on 
non-product-related PPMs is not trade compliant and an environmental protection ban 
on GM crops based on a preference for non-GM PPMs is likely to be found non-trade 
compliant as well. The alternative then is a voluntary labelling scheme to connote the
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use of a non-product-related PPM, which is examined below, or a MEA such as the 
Biosafety Protocol (see Chapter 4.2).
Caution must be taken, however, in extending the Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp- 
Turtle cases to GM crops. The reason for this is because of the unresolved controversy 
surrounding the social interpretation of the precautionary principle in environmental 
protection objectives. In the cases of Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle the recognised 
risk of either dolphin or turtle unfriendly techniques to their mortality was known. 
With GM crops, many of the environmental concerns used to support an outright ban 
are based on speculative risks, not recognised or hypothetical risks. Unlike food safety 
issues, environmental protection issues traditionally and legitimately use the social 
interpretation of the precautionary principle in risk management. Therefore, while 
food safety justifications must employ hypothetical risk assessments and the scientific 
interpretation of the precautionary principle, non-safety-related environmental 
protection justifications in reaction to speculative risks -  some of which may be of 
dread consequence -  may employ the social interpretation of the precautionary 
principle, permitting a much broader justification for a trade ban in order to protect 
environmental biodiversity.
In addition, an environmental protection ban against GM crops justified as 
protecting the safety of plants, natural fauna, etc. would fall under the jurisdiction of 
the SPS Agreement. In such a case, the regulations would have to meet the scientific 
justification requirements established by the IPPC. Similar to a food safety ban, an 
environmental plant safety-type ban on GM crops must be based on hypothetical risks, 
focused on safety only and with no scope fro the use of the social interpretation of the 
precautionary principle. To date, there is insufficient scientific evidence that GM 
crops pose an environmental plant safety risk necessary to justify such a ban.
Therefore, an environmental protection ban on GM crops, either safety or non- 
safety-related, would likely violate trade agreements. Yet such a decision would be 
widely condemned by social interests. In this case, the lack of legitimacy given to 
domestic environmental preferences (non-product-related PPMs) under the traditional 
trade framework would be an important source of dissatisfaction because it fails to 
account for normative preferences in the regulatory measures. The analysis of the 
trade approach to an environmental ban also highlights the different interpretations of 
the precautionary principle. Again, the economic integration approach essentially 
rejects the social interpretation.
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C. Labelling GM Foods
The labelling of products of modem biotechnology is an important regulatory 
integration issue currently facing Codex. Labelling polices are being developed by 
Member governments without the international guidance of Codex, which has yet to 
establish a Codex standard on this issue (see Chapter 3.2.1.C). In the EU, there have 
been pressures for a mandatory and comprehensive labelling policy for all food 
products produced from GM ingredients as a means of controlling the use of GM 
crops in the food supply (see Chapter 7). The purpose of this section is to examine the 
relationship between such a labelling policy and the Codex, the SPS Agreement and 
the TBT Agreement; is such a labelling policy trade compliant?
There are two important aspects of labelling to consider. Labelling for food 
safety reasons, such as for the presence of allergens, is an SPS issues. Labelling for 
non-food safety reasons such as the consumers’ right to know is a TBT issue.
With respect to mandatory labelling for food safety reasons, such a policy 
would require a scientific justification for declaring foods produced from GM 
ingredients to be unsafe, similar to the food safety ban discussed in A, above. If there 
exists evidence that foods produced from GM crops are unsafe, however, then the 
first-best measure would be a ban, not a labelling strategy. The discussion in regards 
to a ban on foods produced from GM ingredients is relevant here. Again, as there 
seems to be insufficient scientific justification for a safety-related ban, a mandatory 
labelling measure based on the safety of GM foods would not be in compliance with 
the SPS Agreement.
With respect to mandatory labelling for the consumers’ right to know, a label 
would indicate that the product is made of GM material or was exposed to GM 
material during the production process. If there is no evidence that such food products 
are unsafe, but consumers remained concerned, then the first-best policy is to label the 
products based on the consumers’ right to know. The controversy arises because the 
consumer’s right to know is not a universal justification for labelling. Consider two 
cases, the approved GM ingredient, rennet11 widely in cheese production in Europe 
and the GM bakers’ yeast approved for use in the UK in 1990. In both cases, the GM
11 Rennet is a natural enzyme found in the stomach of veal calves and used in cheese making. A GM 
micro-organism with a duplicated calf gene codes for the enzyme which can then be industrially 
produced via fermentation rather than harvested from the gut of slaughtered calves (Harlander, 1993).
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version was considered to be substantially equivalent to the conventional version, and 
there were no labelling requirements justified by the consumers’ right to know about 
the use of either GM rennet or yeast.
The precedence for labelling based on the consumers’ right to know about a 
food’s process or production method has been established by the Codex guidelines on 
labelling irradiated meat products. But in the case of irradiated meat there is an agreed 
Codex standard. The Codex standard was agreed in 1983 and amended in 1989. The 
issue of labelling GM foods at Codex has not produced a Codex guideline that 
supports the consumer’s right to know. In fact, the only Codex recommendation on 
the issue, from the Codex Secretariat, supports labelling only for novel GM products, 
not for the consumer’s right to know about process and production methods for non­
safety reasons.
The Codex Committee on Food Labelling (CCFL), currently chaired by 
Canada, considers international food labelling issues; drafts labelling provisions (and 
amendments) that are applicable to all foods; and, endorses labelling provisions in the 
standards, codes of practice, guidelines and recommendations prepared by other 
Codex Committees. The CCFL has discussed the labelling of biotechnology products 
at five separate meetings without reaching a conclusive Codex position. At the first 
meeting (October 1994) the key issue was whether to develop a mandatory and 
comprehensive label scheme to apply to all foods derived from biotechnology or to 
apply only to novel products. On one hand, Australia, Canada and the US argued that 
the science and safety-based Codex was not the proper venue for consideration of the 
consumers’ right to know product information about social preferences over process 
and production methods. On the other hand, the EU position supported by the 
consumer and environmental organisations, was that social preferences could not be 
separated from food standards. In 1995, at the request of the CCFL, the US produced a 
position paper on biotechnology labelling which argued for a case-by-case, product- 
based approach to labelling, not a broad mandatory policy on labelling the use of 
modem biotechnology in food production (Horton, 1997). At the 43rd Session of the 
Codex Executive Committee, the issue of mandatory labelling for other than safety 
reasons was also considered, but with no resolution (CEC, 1996).
At the second meeting (May 1996), the two general positions were reiterated. 
The CCFL requested that the Codex Secretariat prepare a discussion draft on the 
biotechnology labelling issue for the next meeting.
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At the third meeting (October 1997) the Codex Secretariat’s discussion draft 
was presented. The two crucial recommendations from the Codex Secretariat were (1) 
labelling should only cover non-equivalent or novel products, and (2) labelling should 
focus on health risks including allergens. These recommendations were very 
consistent with the scientific rationality position on labelling only novel products, and 
they did not support the consumers’ right to know as a justification for a mandatory 
labelling policy. But other delegations could not agree to these recommendations. 
Little progress was made at the fourth meeting in May 1998. Some leading 
agricultural exporters, such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand, Peru and the 
US supported the adoption of both proposals but many European delegations along 
with India continued to block agreement.
At the latest meetings of the CCFL, in April 1999, there was still no success in 
establishing a Codex standard on a mandatory labelling policy for foods produced 
through modem biotechnology techniques. The US delegation, along with major 
agricultural exporters reasserted support for the Codex Secretariat’s recommendations. 
The German delegation, on behalf of the EU, supported a mandatory comprehensive 
labelling policy based on the use of biotechnology. Many delegations informed the 
Codex Committee that they were unilaterally developing mandatory labelling policies 
for the consumers’ right to know, with or without the endorsement of Codex. They 
argued that essential or substantial equivalence was a useless term when the 
justification was the consumers’ right to know. Consumers’ International (Cl), argued 
that the consumers’ right to know must be the basis for the Codex labelling policy 
(Consumers’ International, 1999a), as it was with irradiated meat. Cl also supported 
the alteration of terminology to focus on GM, not on the use of modem biotechnology 
in general (Consumers’ International, 1999b). The Canadian hosts of the CCFL 
proposed that the ambiguity around the use of the term substantial or essential 
equivalence should be clarified by a working group (CAC, 1999).
The regulatory integration issues associated with labelling GM foods is also on 
the agenda of the TBT Committee. Technical labelling requirements are justified 
under the TBT Agreement according to the protection of consumer health and safety 
and according to the consumers’ right to know in order to prevent deceptive practices. 
The US has submitted a request to the EU and the WTO’s TBT Committee that the 
regulation be amended to reflect the trade concerns of the US and other agricultural 
exporters such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The submission claims that the
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EU regulation (1) does not achieve a legitimate objective and (2) that the 
implementation of the regulation is problematic and creates an unjustifiable barrier to 
trade. With respect to the first claim, the US argues that GM crops do not differ as a 
class from conventional varieties. As other GM techniques, besides transgenic 
modification, such as mutageneisis and somoclonal variation, do not have to be 
labelled as such, there is no justification for differentiating transgenic crop varieties. 
With respect to the second claim, the US argues that the regulation is not non- 
discriminatory as required under the TBT Agreement as it would discriminate 
between those exporters where GM crops are produced and exporters where GM crops 
are not produced. Further, with respect to the 1% tolerance threshold for adventitious 
contamination agreed in the EU, the US is concerned that there is a lack of both 
standardised and accurate testing methodologies so that different tests will produce 
different test results. In the event that testing methods between jurisdictions differ, this 
raises concerns about the liability of a positive test and, perhaps, a rejection of an 
export shipment.
Therefore, although not consensual, the current Codex Secretariat 
recommendation for the mandatory labelling of biotechnology-based products 
supports labelling for novel products only, not for the consumers’ right to know about 
non-safety process and production methods. Recall, all Codex standards, codes, 
guidelines and recommendations are considered ‘standards’ according to both the SPS 
and TBT Agreements. As a result, the establishment of a mandatory comprehensive 
and extensive labelling scheme is sure to initiate a trade challenge, and in all 
likelihood would be found non-compliant with the WTO for two reasons. First, there 
would be insufficient scientific justification for a mandatory labelling policy based on 
food safety concerns under the SPS Agreement. Second, the labelling 
recommendation of the Codex Secretariat does not support the use of a mandatory 
comprehensive labelling policy for the consumers’ right to know non-safety issues. 
Additionally, although a voluntary labelling scheme for products made from GM 
crops would be compliant with trade rules, a voluntary scheme is unlikely to be 
acceptable to social interests because it would lack the sanctions to ensure that the 
consumers’ right to know is met.
There does exist a curious situation in EU-US discussions over labelling.
While the EU demands the labelling of foods produced from GM ingredients based on 
the consumers’ right to know, it has rejected US offers to label hormone-treated beef
171
as ‘US beef in order to meet the consumers’ right to know. The US beef label would 
connote to European consumers that it is hormone-treated beef without appearing as 
an hazard warning similar to warnings about the presence of nuts in food products.
D. Discussion: Implications for Trade Diplomacy
It appears that both an outright ban on the use of GM products, on either food 
safety or environmental protection grounds, and a mandatory and comprehensive 
labelling scheme would contravene international trade law. Yet, a WTO decision 
against either a ban or a comprehensive labelling scheme would essentially be a ruling 
against the social rationality approach to regulations including the social interpretation 
of the precautionary principle and the right to consider other legitimate factors such as 
consumer concerns which may not be grounded in scientific evidence.
Given the distinct conflict between economic and social interests, the objective 
is to assess the implications upon traditional trade diplomacy. Can the WTO approach 
(embodying its agreements and affiliated international institutions) facilitate the 
integration of food safety and environmental protection regulations for GM crops in 
order to prevent social regulatory barriers to trade? While there are strengths to the 
WTO approach there remain crucial weaknesses, which seem to indicate that the 
economic integration approach of the WTO cannot, and indeed should not, facilitate 
social regulatory integration. In other words, trade diplomacy must be amended if it is 
to remain a viable force in the international integration of GM crop regulations.
On one hand, there appears to be several strengths of the WTO in facilitating 
regulatory integration. Indeed, there is support for this role of the WTO (Buckingham 
et al., 1999; Perdikis et al., 1999). In general, the WTO is institutionally more capable 
of facilitating the centralisation of domestic regulatory policies in order to encourage 
trade liberalisation, than was the international trade regime under the GATT 1948. 
There are three aspects to note. First, membership in the WTO is an important national 
priority where Members take the objective of trade liberalisation and the ensuing 
rights and obligations of membership very seriously. Indeed, gaining membership is 
an important priority for non-Member states (i.e. Russia and China). Second, the 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism, with its binding decisions, is better equipped to more 
equitably deal with the market access disputes that contravene the rights and 
obligations of WTO Members (Jackson, 1996). In fact, since many of the disputes 
have involved either the EU or the US (or both), the panels are often composed of
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smaller country representatives who have exercised important influence over DSB 
precedence so far. Also, as the dispute settlement decisions are binding, despite their 
power, the US and the EU are compelled to fulfil the obligations of a panel decision 
rather than employing the ‘might is right’ principle. Consider both the Tuna-Dolphin 
and the Shrimp-Turtle disputes. The US lost both disputes to developing countries. In 
this sense, under the DSB, the obligations of the WTO are a gift from the strong 
Members to the weak Members. Third, the Agreements on Agriculture, TBT and SPS 
measures have clarified the permissible role of national governments in establishing 
regulations with potential trade impacts.
With respect to food safety specifically, the SPS Agreement is a rules-based 
agreement focused on hypothetical risk assessment and employing the scientific 
interpretation of the precautionary principle. According to this approach there is 
certainty and stability built into the trade rules. There is considerable scope for 
Members to unilaterally impose social regulatory barriers provided they are 
scientifically justifiable.
With respect to environmental protection measures, the conviction of Members 
to honour their obligations possibly prevents Members from making environmental 
commitments that they don’t keep, which has been a familiar complaint about 
multilateral environmental agreements. The WTO has considerable experience with 
multilateral agenda setting among often very divergent national interests. This 
experience could be channelled towards establishing an international environmental 
agenda. The primary benefit of this approach is that an internationally consistent, 
rules-based regime may be developed. This is a desirable outcome in the sense that it 
would lend real international discipline and certainty to very contested environmental 
protection issues and it would ensure that multilateral environmental externalities are 
dealt with. Additionally, any initiatives to come out of this framework would increase 
trade compatibility eliminating or reducing both market fragmentation and trade 
threats.
Yet, despite the apparent strengths, there are weaknesses with the WTO 
approach. Principally, it is an institution focused on trade liberalisation and based on 
the traditional trade model of economic integration and regulatory competition. 
Regulatory competition does not effectively deal with broader, populist issues as the 
struggles of the CTE indicate. Instead, the WTO’s regulatory competition approach 
continues to encourage traditional, closed-door and non-transparent trade diplomacy.
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In fact, despite a few high profile dispute resolution cases, most trade tensions are 
dealt with according to the traditional trade diplomacy model. The trade framework 
inappropriately deals with other legitimate objectives for regulatory development and 
regulatory barriers to trade will be evaluated according to trade principles -  their 
sufficient scientific evidence and whether or not they minimise trade disruption -  and 
not according to whether or not they achieve their legitimate social objectives. In 
short, regulations based on non-scientific justifications are unlikely to be found trade 
compliant, even though they may be both socially responsive and legitimate.
When disputes are taken to the WTO, DSB decisions are ‘forced’ on Members, 
creating winners and losers, increasing public dissatisfaction among losers and 
subsequently decreasing overall support for trade liberalisation efforts. In this context, 
it is difficult for Members to reject calls for unilateral protectionism since the trade 
agreements fail to accept socially responsive regulations.
With GM crops, trade protection is demanded by social interests while trade 
agreements have historically developed to deal with protectionist pressure from 
producers (Perdikis et al., 1999). The question then arises; are some regulatory issues 
emotive enough that Members, or a group of Members, would tolerate non- 
compliance with the WTO rules? Such an outcome would have disastrous results for 
the institutional credibility and authority of the international trading regime. In fact, 
this has already happened with the EU -  US beef hormone dispute where the EU is 
prepared to remain in permanent contravention of the WTO rules.
The scientific basis for justifiable regulations and the scientific interpretation 
of the precautionary principle limit the political scope for domestic regulators to 
respond to public concern. During the risk management process economic trade 
analysis often concludes that ‘science’ will be the final arbiter of trade disputes (see 
Jackson, 1999; Buckingham et al., 1999). Yet, there is no agreement on the legitimate 
and credible role of science. A common argument against the scientific basis of WTO 
agreements and the DSB decisions is that they are crucially flawed. They rely on 
international organisations, such as the Codex, to develop international standards. The 
Codex, however, can no longer be interpreted as establishing consensual international 
standards because it has adopted judicial (voting) decision-making that creates 
winners and losers and does not reflect international consensus. The focus on science 
has created a ‘your scientist’ v. ‘my scientist’ ethos where trade lawyers will define 
appropriate science, food safety and environmental protection regulations.
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EU regulators, along with some of its Member States, have continually ignored 
the advice of its own scientists over beef-hormones, antibiotics and GM crop 
approvals in an effort to be seen as socially responsive. The WTO’s scientific 
rationality approach does not accommodate the social rationales such as the social 
interpretation of the precautionary principle in risk management. A WTO decision 
against either a ban or a comprehensive labelling scheme would essentially be a ruling 
against (1) the social interpretation of the precautionary principle, (2) the consumers’ 
right to know about a product’s PPMs and (3) the right to consider other legitimate 
factors such as consumer concerns that may not be grounded in scientific evidence. As 
these are considered to be ‘unalienable rights’ within the social rationality approach 
such a decision would lead to condemnation of the WTO from social interests.
With respect to environmental protection measures there are several specific 
weaknesses of the WTO. First, trade objectives may not be consistent with 
environmental objectives and in the event that the objectives are not congruent, trade 
objectives will dominate. Second, the WTO lacks credible environmental expertise or 
the legitimacy to adjudicate environmental disputes (Economist, 9 Oct. 1999) and the 
CTE has struggled to develop a rigorous environmental agenda. Third, as a 
multilateral institution focused on ‘top-down’ approaches to enhancing trade, the 
WTO may be insensitive to legitimate national differences in environmental concerns, 
which are the basis for national environmental protection measures. Fourth, 
developing a ‘top-down’ environmental agenda acceptable to all Members at varying 
levels of development risks the establishment of an agenda that reflects the lowest 
common denominator approach rather than the establishment of an agenda that 
reflects the highest environmental standards. Fifth, the science-based approach to 
phyto-sanitary measures under the IPPC is in conflict with traditional environmental 
approach employing the social interpretation of the precautionary principle. Sixth, the 
WTO provides inadequate participation in decision-making for social interests such as 
consumer and environmental organisations. The Members of the WTO are 
governments and it is expected that consumer and environmental organisations make 
their positions to the national delegations, not directly to the WTO. Social interests 
tend to argue, however, that WTO Members, who may all be approaching an issue 
from a narrow commercial or national self-interest point of view may collectively fail 
to appreciate the global externalities of environmental problems. Hence, they argue
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that they should have full access to and participation in the WTO to ensure that the 
externalities are addressed.
Given these significant weaknesses, the WTO appears to have reached its level 
of competence and will be unable to support the international integration of food 
safety and environmental protection regulations and thus deal with social regulatory 
barriers as issues become increasingly socio-economic in nature and calls for 
protection emerge from non-traditional sources.
The question then arises, should the agreements be broadened in order to 
address these concerns? Or should new agreements under the WTO be established? 
Recent research argues that neither the SPS nor the TBT Agreements should be re­
negotiated to incorporate these concerns (Perdikis et al., 1999). Instead it is proposed 
that a separate Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Consumer Concerns (TRACC) 
be negotiated within the WTO framework. Further, the international standards for this 
agreement would be established by a professional, social science based institution, the 
Commission on Consumer Issues and Trade.
The problem with the WTO framework is, however, much deeper than the 
limitations of the SPS and TBT Agreements. In fact, it is the traditional trade model 
and the regulatory competition paradigm which limits the WTO as a framework for 
facilitating social regulatory integration and it is unlikely that the WTO can shift 
enough within this paradigm to accommodate the broader concerns. To incorporate 
broader social dimensions would require deeper integration, which is not an objective 
of the traditional trade model. The proposals for new agreements in the WTO do 
nothing to address the fundamental principles of the organisation. For instance, the 
proposed TRACC and its affiliation with the Commission on Consumer Issues and 
Trade would be designed to facilitate ex post regulatory convergence through market 
competition and the dispute settlement mechanisms not ex ante regulatory co­
ordination. The winners would still force regulatory convergence onto the losers. 
Further, although social interests have agreed on many aspects of GM crop 
regulations, it is a mistake to think of the organisations as a homogenous group (see 
Chapter 4). The groups petitioning the Commission on Consumer Issues and Trade on 
behalf of consumer concerns will range from those with cautious support for the WTO 
to those who want to see it drastically changed or even abolished. It is unlikely that an 
agreement within the WTO framework would be an acceptable or credible venue for
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these groups. Without their participation it can be expected that their ‘extremism* will 
continue outside the WTO.
Therefore, the WTO cannot effectively facilitate the international integration 
of GM crop regulations. The key issue is that when fundamental regulatory principles 
have not been established the WTO cannot develop top-down regulatory rules for risk 
assessment and risk management. Instead, dominant jurisdictions must establish their 
own approach subject to endogenous political economy factors and then seek to 
integrate that approach with other jurisdictions. In other words, while the WTO can 
remain effective at administering and monitoring regulatory rules, it cannot facilitate 
framework making. Every effort should be made by all Members to avoid bringing 
social regulatory barrier disputes to the WTO. This way, the WTO can continue its 
valuable trade liberalisation efforts, on behalf of Members without having to risk its 
credibility and legitimacy by making risk management judgements against the social 
regulatory approaches of Members.
5.3.2 GM Crop Regulatory Integration
In Chapter One (1.2.3) it was proposed that, with respect to social regulatory 
barriers, a regulatory jurisdiction faces three choice parameters for regulatory 
integration: level of integration, depth of integration, and strategy of integration (Fig. 
5.1). These parameters may now be applied to the specific challenge of social 
regulatory barriers to GM crops, and they will be assessed in this order below.
1. Integration Level
I. II.













Fig. 5.1: Integration Parameters Facing a Regulatory Jurisdiction
A. Level of Integration
This study proposes that the appropriate level of integration is the transatlantic 
level. There are several reasons for this. First, North American and European 
agricultural biotechnology firms have the greatest capacity to develop and 
commercialise GM crops. As a result, both regions have had to develop regulatory
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oversight in this rapidly expanding sector. Second, with high levels of income, both 
regions have implemented stringent income elastic social regulations for food safety 
and environmental protections. Third, transatlantic trade tensions play a pathfinder 
role for solving trade issues where frontier market access issues, such as social 
regulatory barriers, must be addressed at the transatlantic level before they can be 
effectively multilateralised (Woolcock, 1998). This is because while North American 
and European markets can normally compel other countries to unilaterally converge 
their regulations in order to gain market access, when the barriers are transatlantic 
these two regions cannot compel one another to converge, and thus, must embark on a 
dedicated integration strategy. In the absence of a consensual transatlantic regulatory 
approach it is virtually impossible to develop an international regulatory approach. 
Instead, international regulations for GM crops are a fragmented collection of 
standards, codes, guidelines and recommendations. Fourth, social regulatory barriers 
have already had significant trade impact with respect to the transatlantic dispute over 
hormone-treated beef.
Agricultural trade issues have been, and will continue to be significant 
impediments to multilateral trade negotiations (Scher, 1999; Wigan, 1998; Phillips, 
1991; Kramer, 1989). It has been argued that agricultural competition has been at the 
heart of all EU-US agricultural trade disputes, not food safety or environmental 
protection (Coffey 1993; Lister 1996). Given the competition issues in both regions, 
agriculture will remain a highly protected sector despite recent attempts to introduce 
multilateral trade discipline through the Agreement on Agriculture of the WTO.
The growing regulatory regionalism produced by the North American and the 
European approaches to food safety and environmental protection may undermine 
efforts to develop a multilateral trading regime. In fact, the discussion on the 
Biosafety Protocol (Chapter 4.2) indicates the difficulties in international regulatory 
integration when there is no transatlantic consensus. These two regions have long 
been the pillars at the international level. Greater regulatory intransigence at the 
transatlantic level effectively prevents the establishment of a much needed co­
ordinated international approach to regulating GM crops. Essentially, all other issues 
surrounding agricultural biotechnology are stalled until transatlantic co-ordination is 
achieved. Unfortunately, this includes the crucial North-South capacity gap and 
international concerns regarding the transboundary movement of living modified 
organisms and biopiracy. In this sense, establishing transatlantic regulatory co­
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ordination is time-sensitive and vital to the economic development of less developed 
countries.
In order to understand the prospects for transatlantic regulatory integration, it 
is useful to discuss the transatlantic relationship with respect to social regulations as 
well as biotechnology. Traditionally, transatlantic economic relations have been 
regarded as a part of the larger strategic agenda of managing the global economic 
order to promote security and stability (Frost, 1998). From this perspective, the ‘low 
politics’ of economic relations are inherently linked to the ‘high politics’ of global 
security and stability, as increased trade produces increased prosperity which, in turn, 
produces economic and social stability. Indeed, Article 2 of the 1949 NATO Charter 
commits members “to seek to eliminate conflict in their economic policies” and 
encourages “economic collaboration between any or all of them” as part of the 
broader strategic objective (Frost, 1998). However, is this link between low and high 
politics still a factor? Recent transatlantic trade tensions involving bananas and 
hormone-treated beef have occurred during UN action in the Gulf and NATO action 
in Yugoslavia, suggesting that the link between the ‘high politics’ of global security 
and stability and the ‘low politics’ of transatlantic economic relations has become very 
weak.
In the past two decades, there have been several proposed initiatives between
both Canada and the EU and the EU and the US designed to enhance transatlantic
economic relations. In 1976, Canada and the EC completed the Framework
Agreement for Commercial and Economic Cooperation designed to facilitate bilateral
1 0consultation on trade issues . In fact, this agreement was the EC’s first co-operation 
agreement with an industrialised nation. This was followed in 1990 with the 
Transatlantic Declaration on EU-Canada Relations. Similar to the 1976 Framework 
Agreement, the declaration was focused on facilitating bilateral consultation in order 
to promote both economic and political stability.
In Ottawa, Canada on 17 December 1996, Canada and the EU adopted the 
Joint Political Declaration and Action Plan which consists of four parts: economic 
and trade relations; foreign policy and security issues; transnational issues; and 
fostering further links. This Action Plan was an attempt to reinforce bilateral
12 EU-Canada: A Solid Economic Relationship June 1999
(www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg01/eucanen4.htm) and EU-Canada: Historic Friends June 1999 
(www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgO 1 /eucanen 1 htm)
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economic and political relations after several conflicts such as the beef hormones 
dispute and the Atlantic fisheries dispute between Canada and Spain. As a result, 
Canada -EU economic relations have been re-coupled with larger strategic issues.
Finally, the trade and economic relations component of the 1996 Action Plan 
was further developed into the 1998 EU-Canada Trade Initiative (ECTI). The ECTI 
established an agenda for bilateral economic and trade relations. Bilateral 
consultations have focused on broad frameworks for mutual recognition, equivalence 
and regulatory co-operation in areas of technical barriers to trade. For instance, the 
recent EU-Canada Veterinary Agreement 1999 is an example of a bilateral agreement 
based on the mutual recognition of sanitary measures applied in both Canada and the 
EU. The ECTI is held to be the vehicle for addressing bilateral trade friction 
associated with agricultural biotechnology products. Therefore, despite the economic 
and political focus of the 1996 Action Plan, it is the economic component which has 
received the most attention, again, decoupling low politics from high politics.
With respect to EU-US bilateral relations, the transatlantic tensions associated 
with agricultural liberalisation during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations gave rise to three EU-US proposals. The first was the broad Transatlantic 
Declaration on EU-US Relations in 1990, which identified shared, long-term goals 
and linked the economic relations to political and security relations. The second 
initiative was the EEC-US Hague Summit in November 1991 followed closely by the 
third initiative, the EEC-US Declaration in West Berlin in December 1991. All three 
initiatives were aimed at breaking the agricultural impasse at the multilateral trade 
negotiations and together were successful efforts in economic diplomacy (Coffey, 
1991).
In 1995, there were three EU-US proposals to enhance transatlantic relations. 
The Transatlantic Treaty proposal involved the establishment of a security, political 
and economic arrangement, effectively strengthening the link between economic 
relations and the political and security relations. This represented deep integration 
with formal and binding rules. There was also a proposal for a transatlantic free trade 
agreement (TAFTA). Supporters argued that there were three significant benefits from 
a TAFTA. First, the EU and the US are the most compatible markets with similar 
demands, tastes as well as social and political values (Gaster and Prestowitz, 1994). 
Second, a TAFTA would represent an inter-regional trade liberalisation strategy, 
removing the limitations of regulatory regionalism and enhancing multilateral trade
180
(Preeg, 1996). Third, efforts to enhance trade liberalisation between the two globally 
dominant regions would compel other protectionist states or regions to liberalise 
(Yeutter and Maruyapma, 1995). Critics argued that a TAFTA creates transatlantic 
regionalism built on similar income levels and social values that would both 
antagonise other countries and regions and harm the prospects for multilateral trade 
liberalisation (Bergsten, 1996). A TAFTA would have enhanced trade and economic 
cooperation, not deeper integration although it would have involved formal and 
binding rules. Finally in 1995 was the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) proposal, 
focused on promoting global peace, stability, democracy and economic development 
while both contributing to the expansion of world trade and enhancing transatlantic 
economic relations. One particular initiative of the NTA was to establish the New 
Transatlantic Marketplace (NTM). Within the NTM was a proposal to establish a US 
-  EU biotechnology task force to encourage dialogue between the US FDA (see 
Chapter 6) and the EU DG III (Industry) (see Chapter 7). It is important to note that, 
as will be discussed in more detail below, the FDA and DG III agree on many 
fundamental principles about biotechnology regulations. The regulatory regionalism 
with respect to GM crops is the result of the dominance of DG XI (Environment) in 
EU regulations because DG XI has a much different regulatory philosophy than that 
adopted in North America. The NTA was a policy document with no binding 
discipline and as a result it lacked the power to compel both sides to address, in a 
meaningful way, the most contentious issues facing transatlantic economic relations 
(Wigan, 1998). The NTA represented a framework for shallow integration and formal 
and binding rules were absent. In this sense, the transatlantic proposals in 1995 
indicate a marked shift from attempts to develop formal and binding integration across 
economic, social and political issues to attempts to simply outline a non-binding 
framework for shallow integration across primarily commercial or economic issues.
Coinciding with the NTA, were three separate initiatives; the Transatlantic 
Business Dialogue (TABD), the Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue (TACD) and the 
Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue (TAED). These initiatives sought to bring 
together relevant stakeholders in the three broad policy areas, including government, 
industry and non-governmental organisations, in order to address transatlantic issues. 
For instance, the TABD, established in Seville, Spain in November 1995, is an 
informal group of companies and industry associations who develop joint EU- US 
trade policy recommendations for dealing with regulatory barriers to trade from an
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industry perspective. The TABD’s 1997 Communique (Rome) noted that “our 
regulatory agencies can no longer continue to function solely on the basis of national 
considerations” and it urged the respective administrations to pursue regulatory 
harmonisation (Zampetti, In Press). However, it has been argued that TABD’s 
attempts at resolving regulatory structural market access issues have only had limited 
success (Frost, 1998).
The most recent EU-US transatlantic initiative has been the Transatlantic 
Economic Partnership (TEP), adopted at the EU-US London Summit of May 1998. 
The TEP is a bilateral agreement to discuss key transatlantic issues ranging from, for 
example, market access barriers in goods and services to environment and competition 
law. It is non-binding and focused largely on the integration of commercial or 
economic issues. In the US, the relevant agencies are USTR, USD A, FDA and EPA 
(Chapter 6.1). In the EU they are DGs I (Foreign Affairs: Trade), III (Industry), VI 
(Agriculture), XI (Environment) and XXIV (Consumer) (Chapter 7). Under the 
agreement, the US and EU are committed to bi-annual political summits supported by 
more frequent cabinet-level meetings. Then the TEP Steering Group monitors the 
daily efforts of the TEP sectoral consultations. However, the TEP is only a framework 
agreement, it is not a legally binding commitment for the US or the EU. It has been 
argued that this administrative approach has been proposed because dealing with 
transatlantic issues in isolation does not create the political momentum to move 
forward (Zampetti, In Press). Focusing on tensions in isolation only serves to highlight 
failures, not successes. However, as already discussed, given the populist nature of 
GM crops, trade issues cannot be dealt with in the traditional trade diplomacy 
framework. Therefore, although linking issues into a progressive convergence strategy 
is important, it remains crucial that the strategy meets the public demands for open 
and non-technical dialogue.
The TEP is focused on specific transatlantic market access issues rather than 
the broader integration agenda of both the treaty and the NTA proposals or the 
comprehensive trade agenda of the TAFTA proposal, which has very little support 
within both regions. Instead, it is meant to provide global leadership in agenda setting 
for the upcoming round of multilateral trade negotiations. Efforts involve identifying 
shared objectives and priority areas, establishing regular dialogue, and improving co­
operation among scientists, regulators and all relevant stakeholders in order to 
enhance regulatory co-operation. The TEP is also an attempt to increase participation
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in trade policy for domestic interests such as consumer and environmental 
organisations who have long felt left out of the discussions. In this sense, the TEP is 
an ex ante regulatory co-ordination approach to increased convergence focused on the 
removal of barriers through mutual recognition.
An identified area of bilateral action under the TEP is agricultural issues 
associated with biotechnology (TEP, 1998). Both the EU and the US support the need 
for studying the regulatory structural market access barriers to agricultural 
biotechnology products within the auspices of the TEP (Wigan, 1998; Schwarz, 1999). 
It is claimed that the trade friction is related to regulatory processes and is exacerbated 
by the fact that the dialogue takes place in several different fora. The identified 
objective is to establish a transatlantic group with a two-fold mandate:
to monitor progress o f the dialogue on the various technical issues carried 
out in existing groups, and to take into account their potential trade effects 
with the objective o f reducing unnecessary barriers to trade; 
to seek to increase and enhance scientific and regulatory cooperation and 
information exchange and promote transparency and information to 
consumers (TEP Action Plan: 14).
Further, it is recommended that the regulatory divergence be studied through a pilot 
project that monitors the results of simultaneous applications for scientific 
assessments in the EU and in the US. Although the target date for this project was the 
end of 1998, and the sectoral consultation group met in February 1999, there has not 
been much accomplished at the TEP perhaps because of the current agricultural trade 
conflict associated with EU market access for hormone-treated North American beef 
and beef products.
Another relevant area of bilateral discussion under the TEP is the Environment 
Group. The objective of this group is to negotiate a strategy for dealing with the 
relationship between trade agreements and environmental agreements; currently an 
important issue at the WTO’s Committee on Trade and the Environment. The 
Environment Group has five objectives: to identify common US -EU positions to 
simultaneously pursue at the international level; to enhance scientific and regulatory 
co-operation; to improve the horizontal co-ordination of environmental issues with 
other sectoral discussions; to identify common methods for developing multilateral 
environmental agreements; and to improve co-ordination with and participation of the 
TAED.
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Therefore, the TEP approach is one of technical, low-politics consultations 
among technocrats. There are two problems with this approach. First, according to 
Frost (1998) regulatory integration needs a high-level political push. Yet, transatlantic 
economic relations in the past decade have steadily shifted from ‘high politics’ to ‘low 
politics’. As high politics, national economic interests were subordinate to the larger 
strategic aims. Now, transatlantic economic relations are decoupled from the strategic 
aims and do not have the same political encouragement for integration. A trade war 
tends to elevate transatlantic economic relations to high politics, but generally not in a 
beneficial way. Disputing countries become adversaries, not partners, and the final 
outcome is a zero-sum game of forced convergence, which creates winners and losers 
rather than mutual beneficiaries. It has been noted that, given the market access 
difficulties faced by Monsanto in gaining approval for a GM variety of maize, the 
Clinton Administration has put pressure on the British government to approve this 
variety (Independent of Sunday, 5 September. 1999). Such an application o f ‘high 
political’ pressure is not constructive to neither transatlantic economic relations nor to 
the objective assessment of the safety of GM crops, and it should always be avoided. 
Second, populist issues are not congruent with traditional trade diplomacy. Without 
transparency and broader participation, a sceptical public will dismiss any technical 
regulatory integration decisions as insufficient. Regulatory integration must proceed 
within a context of national competitiveness on the one hand, and populist concerns 
and fears on the other.
B. Depth of Integration
Given the dominance of the transatlantic level in dealing with social regulatory 
barriers to GM crops, the next integration parameter is identifying the appropriate 
depth of regulatory integration. This is, essentially, a conflict between shallow 
economic integration and deeper social integration.
The discussion of the development of GM crop regulations has revealed that 
social interests have played a fundamental role in the regulatory development process. 
The implication of this is that the integration must be deep enough to address the 
social issues and concerns driving the regulatory approaches. In other words, social 
rationality matters and in dealing with social regulatory barriers to GM crops trade 
diplomacy cannot sustain the traditional divide between economic and social 
integration. Instead, it must endeavour to include crucial social interests fully in the
184
trade negotiations. Failure to go ‘deeper’ immediately anatagonises social interests, 
and undermines the domestic support for integration through trade agreements.
C. Strategy of Integration
Once the integration level and depth are determined, is crucial to identify the 
relevant strategy. Recall the choices are essentially between regulatory competition 
and regulatory co-ordination. The discussion on the traditional trade approach has 
revealed significant social concerns with the traditional trade approach of regulatory 
competition, favouring instead a regulatory co-ordination approach.
There are two types of regulatory co-ordination strategies to consider; 
harmonisation and mutual recognition. Harmonisation represents deep integration as it 
ultimately leads to the establishment of identical regulations in different sovereign 
states. Under this co-ordination strategy, national regulatory differences are 
systematically adjusted to be congruent with regulatory approaches in other states 
(Wiegele, 1991). Harmonisation has several benefits. First, from an economic 
perspective it can eliminate market fragmentation based on divergent regulatory 
approaches, and in essence, level the playing field. Of course, reduced market access 
difficulties would reduce trade tensions and enhance economies of scale. Second, 
from a social perspective, harmonisation is congruent with addressing regulatory 
externalities such as food safety and environmental protection.
There are, however, crucial limits to the harmonisation of national regulations 
because of important subsidiarity forces. Harmonisation requires national regulatory 
compromise. From an economic perspective, the potential for agricultural 
biotechnology in determining future national comparative advantage pressures 
authorities to retain full control over regulations. Proposed regulatory compromises 
might not be in the interest of national competitiveness. Indeed, this is exacerbated by 
the current North American commercialisation lead in agricultural biotechnology over 
Europe. From a social perspective, regulatory compromise might contradict with 
domestic consumer or environmental protection concerns. Indeed, it would be unwise 
for the national governments to concede regulatory authority or compromise in 
politically sensitive jurisdictions such as consumer and environmental protection.
Additionally, from an institutional perspective, since agricultural 
biotechnology is a horizontal issue, many domestic government departments and 
agencies have a regulatory role to play. There are two complications associated with
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this. First, securing a package of harmonised regulations across these national 
regulatory jurisdictions would be difficult let alone the complications of then 
harmonising the regulations with another state. Second, in an era of government 
downsizing and streamlining, departments and agencies may be unwilling to concede 
regulatory authority over portfolios that carry political weight. Therefore, transatlantic 
regulatory co-ordination must recognise that crucial subsidiarity forces drastically 
limit the efficacy of harmonisation as an appropriate co-ordination strategy.
The second type of regulatory co-ordination strategy is mutual recognition. 
This strategy allows for divergence in regulatory approaches and does not pursue the 
same depth of integration. For instance, states can recognise the hypothetical risk 
assessment of other states, but then conduct their own risk management procedure. 
Regulatory co-ordination is achieved when states agree that although their regulatory 
approaches differ the approaches achieve equivalent outcomes. Mutual recognition 
limits the need for regulatory compromise.
Yet mutual recognition has some limitations as well. First, it is limited when 
regulatory divergence is significant because equivalency requires at least some degree 
of similarity in approach. It has been argued that where there are serious 
disagreements about Risk Analysis even identifying basic shared objectives is 
difficult, jeopardising integration (Gatsios and Holmes, 1998). Indeed, it has been 
revealed that the fundamental regulatory principles have not been established making 
equivalency at even a minimum level extremely difficult. Second, mutual recognition 
may fail to address regulatory externalities such as consumer and environmental 
protection. Two states may mutually recognise their respective approaches, yet either 
approach may not address the externalities.
Given the benefits and limitations of both harmonisation and mutual 
recognition, it may be asked; what type of co-ordination can result in regulatory 
integration that addresses regulatory externalities while simultaneously remaining 
compliant with powerful subsidiarity forces?
The literature on European integration has dealt extensively with regulatory 
co-ordination among national governments unwilling or incapable of harmonising 
regulations. To overcome this problem, a European ‘new approach’ to regulatory co­
ordination has been adopted (Woolcock, 1996). The new approach is the result of a 
1985 White Paper on the Internal Market (European Commission, 1985). It was 
proposed that “harmonisation could be accelerated if the European Council withdrew
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from the details of regulation”. Instead, the Council would agree to a framework and 
the relevant service of the European Commission would develop the regulatory 
approach. It was decided that beyond essential minimum requirements, ‘politics’ 
produces bad regulations because it complicates regulatory development. The irony of 
this, of course, is that European development of GM crop regulations has attempted to 
reintroduce politics into regulatory development both within Europe (discussed further 
in Chapter 7) and within international institutions.
Under the new approach essential minimum requirement (EMRs) are 
established for a particular regulatory issue. These are set at an acceptable level of 
oversight, creating a regulatory floor and preventing a regulatory race to the bottom. 
The EMRs are set either by the Council of Ministers or by the European Court of 
Justice. At the level of EMRs, some degree of harmonisation is necessary (Majone, 
1993). EMRs are inherently normative issues of acceptable social objectives setting 
the regulatory parameteres. On top of the EMRs is a co-ordination strategy of mutual 
recognition.
Is the new approach to European regulatory co-ordination an appropriate 
approach for the transatlantic regulatory co-ordination of agricultural biotechnology? 
Perhaps, but there remain significant challenges. Unlike the European example, where 
countries broadly agreed upon the minimum public interest, the problem with 
agricultural biotechnology is the harmonisation of essential minimum requirements. 
There is significant difference in the respective transatlantic positions on the 
framework debates, let alone the specific debates. Also, in the case of transatlantic 
trade, there is no court of justice or council of ministers to impose EMRs if none can 
be established.
In order to identify the appropriate transatlantic regulatory co-ordination 
strategies for GM crops, it is necessary to understand the domestic political economy 
factors of the North American and the EU regulatory approaches in order to 
characterise the regulatory approaches according the framework and specific 
regulatory debates discussed above. Chapters 6 and 7 in Part III examine the North 
American and the EU regulatory approaches to GM crops, respectively.
5.4 Conclusions
In Part II, Chapters 3, 4 and 5, the conceptual framework for analysing social 
regulatory barriers to GM crops has been developed. The crucial conclusion is that the
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regulatory approach, which is a function of endogenous political economy factors, 
determines the prospects for regulatory integration. Economic and social interests 
support divergent regulatory trajectories characterised by seven framework debates 
and five specific regulatory debates. Indeed, a unique feature of GM crop regulations 
is that even fundamental regulatory principles have not been established resulting is 
significant regulatory instability.
The instability of the regulatory development process hinders the potential for 
regulatory integration. Economic interests support the international economic 
integration approach of scientific rationality exemplified by the international trade 
regime. Social interests support the international social integration approach. Due to 
this conflict, there is no obvious international institution, including to the WTO, to 
achieve regulatory stability and integration. Instead, the most important level of 
regulatory integration is the transatlantic level where the integration must be capable 
of meeting the social aspects of domestic regulations.
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PART III TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY REGIONALISM
The objective of Part III is to examine the transatlantic regulatory regionalism 
associated with the development and commercialisation of GM crops in order to 
identify the prospects and limitations for regulatory integration.
Both the North American and the European regulatory approaches are based 
on the Risk Analysis framework. In fact, until 1990 they were on the same regulatory 
trajectory with largely congruent positions on the regulatory principles reflecting a 
scientific rationality paradigm. By 1990, however, endogenous political economy 
factors resulted in a shift of EU regulation away from this common trajectory and 
towards a significantly divergent framework more closely reflecting the social 
rationality paradigm.
The result has been the creation of transatlantic regulatory regionalism and 
regulatory market access barriers facing GM crops. Essentially, GM varieties of 
agricultural crops approved in North American marketplace have not gained similar 
approval in the EU. Instead, applications have faced significant regulatory hold-up 
and rejection. For example, a GM variety of flaxseed, CDC Triffid, approved for 
commercial release in Canada, has not been approved nor rejected in Europe. Since 
1997 the application remains in regulatory limbo. This has created trade tensions 
because about 90% of Canadian flax is exported and the EU is the largest export 
destination. Although approved in Canada, Canadian producers and distributors 
voluntarily refused to commercially plant the GM variety because without an EU 
accepted identity preservation production (IPP) system, exports to the EU could not be 
guaranteed as free of the GM variety and all Canadian flax exports would be banned. 
In fact, this is exactly what has happened to Canadian canola exports and US com 
exports to the EU in the period 1997 -  99. In Canada, a total of seven GM varieties of 
canola have been approved for commercial release and are widely planted. Yet, only 
four of the seven have been approved in the EU, while the remaining three 
applications are held-up in the EU’s regulatory approval system (discussed in Chapter 
7). Without an IPP system, segregation of the approved from the non-approved 
varieties cannot be ensured nor can segregation of GM from non-GM varieties. As a 
result, Canadian exports of canola to the EU have fallen dramatically. In the US, it has 
been estimated by the US Department of Agriculture that EU regulatory hold-up has 
resulted in over $US 200 million in lost com sales.
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In order to understand the divergent regulatory approaches, each jurisdiction 
must be characterised according to its competitive position and its regulatory features. 
With respect to the former, the current capacity must be assessed along with efforts in 
the jurisdiction to promote the development and commercialisation of GM crops. With 
respect to the latter -  the jurisdiction’s regulatory features -  several aspects must be 
characterised including the traditional regulatory role of the state, the interests 
involved in regulatory development, the structure of the regulatory regime along with 
an assessment of the stability of the approach and a forecast of the trajectory. The 
North American regulatory approach will be characterised in Chapter 6 while the 
European approach will be characterised in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER SIX NORTH AMERICAN REGULATORY APPROACH
6.1 Introduction
The North American regulatory approach is employed in Canada and the 
United States although similar approaches may be found in Australia, Mexico and 
Japan. The objective of this chapter is to characterise the North American regulatory 
approach to agricultural biotechnology products by examining its development in the 
United States and in Canada. This includes identifying the public initiatives to 
promote biotechnology as well as the efforts to regulate agricultural biotechnology. In 
this chapter is also an examination of the degree of Canada -  US regulatory 
integration made possible because of the similarities in regulatory approach.
Prior to discussing the North American approach to regulating GM crops, it is 
useful to understand the social context of agricultural production. Unlike in many 
parts of Europe, agricultural land is not also ‘wilderness’, so the emotive consumer 
concerns associated with environmental biodiversity are not focused on agricultural 
production land. In this sense, the North American agricultural sector is primarily an 
industry for making food stuffs and does not double as the protector of the wilderness 
as in Europe. This is not to say, however, that North American agricultural producers 
are not themselves concerned with the environmental impact of their activities, and 
indeed, many take great efforts to adopt sustainable practices. It is only to suggest that 
the broader public does not envisage a special ‘multifunctionality’ role for the farming 
community to the extent found in Western Europe (to be discussed in Chapter 7.1).
6.2 Agricultural Biotechnology in the United States
The United States is the global leader in biotechnology capacity in general, 
and is the dominant country in agricultural biotechnology in particular (OTA, 1991).
In essence, the US experience with biotechnology has significantly influenced the 
promotion and regulation of biotechnology in the rest of the world.
6.2.1 US Promotion of Agricultural Biotechnology
The global dominance of the US in biotechnology capacity has occurred 
without strategic industrial targeting programs. It is argued that the US has lacked, and 
indeed continues to lack a comprehensive industrial development strategy aimed at 
building biotechnology capacity (Wiegele, 1991). Instead, public policies are more
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broadly targeted at the development of all industrial initiatives employing knowledge- 
based, innovative, advanced technologies. Public funding through the federal 
government is available to assist basic, non-commercial research in these areas in 
collaboration with universities, research institutes and private companies. Funding for 
commercially oriented research is generally left to the financial market. Lavoie and 
Sheldon (1999) have argued that the US regulatory framework has had more to do 
with the private sector led, commercialisation of agricultural biotechnology products 
than any commercial public policies of industrial targeting. In 1991, the President’s 
Council on Competitiveness recommended two key principles of US biotechnology 
regulations. The first was a focus on product standards rather than technology or 
process standards while the second was to regulate under existing vertical or sectoral 
regulatory departments. The importance of these recommendations is that the 
regulatory approach was linked explicitly to the competitiveness of US biotechnology. 
Further, as will be noted below, they established explicit support for a scientific 
rationality trajectory of US biotechnology regulations.
On 30 November 1999, the US-based Alliance for Better Foods held a news 
conference in Seattle, Washington to outline US support for agricultural 
biotechnology and for the US regulatory system. Supporters included US senators and 
congressmen, industry participants as well as leading international scientists. Most 
notable was as statement of support for agricultural biotechnology and GM crops and 
the US regulatory approach under-signed by 330 scientists (AgraFood Biotech No. 20, 
1999).
Other organisations involved in the promotion of US biotechnology include 
the: Industrial Biotechnology Association (IB A); Association of Biotechnology 
Companies (ABC); American Society for Biotechnology (ASB); Biotechnology 
Industry Organisation (BIO); Grocery Manufacturers of America; American Farm 
Bureau Federation; National Grain and Feed Association; Food Distributors 
International; International Food Information Council; National Food Processors 
Information; and the American Feed Industry Association. An important common link 
between these organisations is widespread support for the regulatory framework that 
has been adopted in the US, as opposed to framework adopted in the EU.
In short, the US enjoys a substantial commercialisation lead in agricultural 
biotechnology, especially over the EU (James, 1999).
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6.2.2 The US Regulatory System
Due primarily to the global capacity lead, the US has led the rest of the world 
in developing a regulatory base for biotechnology products. The initial regulatory 
approach was driven by scientists many years before there were any market-ready 
commercialisations of biotechnology-based products. It was based upon the desire of 
these scientists to proceed with caution in genetic modification techniques.
With respect to the traditional US regulatory role, it has been argued that 
regulatory intervention in follows a regulatory independence approach (Majone,
1990). Congruent with the economic perspective, the regulatory independence 
approach prescribes government regulatory intervention only in reaction to market 
failure1 where regulations seek to ensure market efficiency or effectiveness rather than 
replace the market. In this sense, the market decides the effectiveness of regulations, 
not regulators. Indeed, with respect to modem biotechnology, it is quite appropriate to 
suggest that US regulations have been pro-competitive, and focused on removing 
market failure to enhance market efficiency and effectiveness.
This traditional regulatory role has been congruent with the development of a 
scientific rationality approach to US biotechnology regulations. In June 1973, the 
Gordon Conference on Nucleic Acids recommended that the life science participants 
send a letter “to the US National Academy of Sciences and the US Institutes of 
Medicine calling attention to possible biohazards from new viral strains emerging 
from laboratory research” (Wiegele, 1991). In response, the National Academy of 
Sciences and the Assembly of Life Sciences of the US National Research Council 
appointed a panel of scientists to examine the biohazard concern raised by the Gordon 
Conference participants. The ensuing report recognised that there is a potential risk 
(either a hypothetical or speculative), rather than a recognisable risk from 
biotechnology, but nevertheless encouraged a voluntary moratorium on some types of 
experiments until the international scientific community could discuss the risks (Berg 
et al., 1974). This recommendation appears to indicate that the initial interpretation of 
the precautionary principle on the part of the world’s leading scientists was the
1 Market Failure: “The inability of a system of private markets to provide certain goods either at all or 
at the most desirable or ‘optimal’ level.. .The existence of market failure is usually held to provide a 
case for collective or government action to improve allocative efficiency” Pearce (1996).
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scientific interpretation because ‘precaution’ was linked to the gathering of further 
scientific risk information.
Following the report’s recommendations, in February 1975 the National 
Academy of Sciences convened the International Conference on Recombinant DNA, 
known as the Asilomar Conference in Pacific Grove, California. The Asilomar 
conference focused on two points. First, was how to minimise ‘potential’ risk, and 
second, how to appropriately involve the public. With respect to minimising the risk, 
the participants agreed on the establishment of a two-stage graduated scale for 
assessing risks: low risk and high risk. It has been argued that the low risks were 
hypothetical risks while the high risks were speculative risks (van den Daele, 1997). 
With respect to involving the public, the participants recognised both the presence of a 
significant information gap and the adverse effects undue public fears could have on 
important and vital research. Therefore, conference recommendations were keen to 
establish guidelines that the public would consider appropriate and acceptable. 
Essentially, although the guidelines were established to deal with hypothetical risks, 
there was awareness that speculative risks (i.e. high risks) could be the basis for 
concerns and fears that would, in turn, jeopardise research efforts. In this sense, the 
scientific community recognised that speculative risks could not be ignored.
The Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC), established in 1975 by 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH), played an influential role in setting guidelines 
and recommendations for research using genetic modification techniques (Ager,
1990). In 1976 the National Institutes of Health issued the first guidelines related to 
rDNA research, the ‘National Institutes of Health (NIH) Guidelines for Research 
Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules’. These guidelines were only focused on 
controlled research not on experimental or commercial environmental release. There 
were two important aspects of the guidelines. First, it was argued that there was no 
significant risk inherent in the use of biotechnology requiring technology-based 
regulations. Second, it was recommended that the degree of regulatory oversight 
should vary based on both the degree of research containment and on the scientifically 
determined hypothetical risk. The guidelines reflected a commitment to both the 
principle o f ‘substantial equivalence’ and the scientific interpretation of the 
precautionary principle. This provided the base for the US regulatory structure.
Within five years of the Asilomar Conference and the NIH guidelines, most 
scientists had reassessed their initial judgements about the safety hazards of rDNA
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research because of continued experimentation and accumulating risk information. As 
a result, there was substantial support for a relaxation of the guidelines in light of this 
information (Ager, 1990; Wiegele, 1991). This indicates a discernible shift from 
hypothetical risks to recognisable risks made possible by the scientific interpretation 
of the precautionary principle. Although imposing initially restrictive, precautionary 
guidelines, it allowed for the R&D necessary to better understand the hypothetical 
risks, which in turn led to a relaxation of the guidelines, based on known or 
recognised risks, in turn fostering further research and development and the 
accumulation of risk information.
In 1983, the National Academy of Sciences of the National Research Council 
published the ‘Redbook’ on regulating the risks of advanced technologies (NAS, 
1983). The important aspect of this publication was that it set out a new regulatory 
paradigm based on the concept of Risk Analysis. This paradigm significantly shaped 
the US regulatory approach to modem biotechnology (Mackenzie, 1993). The 
Redbook identified the now familiar Risk Analysis trilogy of risk assessment, risk 
management and risk communication (see Chapter 5.1).
With the growth of research and development in agricultural biotechnology, 
pressure began to mount for guidelines to deal with imminent environmental release 
of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). There were two guidelines that responded 
to this pressure. In 1985, a co-ordinating committee, the Biotechnology Science 
Coordination Committee (BSCC) was established by the President’s Office of Science 
and Technology Policy (OSTP) and staffed by senior academic and industry scientists 
(Wiegele, 1991). The BSCC, through the OSTP published the first guideline to deal 
with environmental release, the ‘Co-ordinated Framework for Regulation of 
Biotechnology’ (OSTP, 1986). The second guideline was the National Research 
Council’s ‘Field Testing Genetically Modified Organisms: Framework for Decisions’. 
These guidelines were very similar and they both concluded that although some 
biotechnology applications would create novel products with novel hazards, other 
applications would not. With respect to GM crops it was concluded that the hazards or 
risks from GM crops were substantially equivalent to the hazards from conventional 
varieties or, in other words, some GM crops are substantially equivalent. Both 
guidelines supported the application-basis of the scientific rationality paradigm by 
suggesting that there was no significant risks inherent in the application of 
biotechnology per se, hence, they did not support new technology or process-based
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regulations. It has been argued, however, that these conclusions should not be 
interpreted as suggesting that GM crops are not different from non-GM crops, indeed 
they are different, but not in the risk or hazard that they pose (Mackenzie, 1993). 
Instead, both guidelines suggested that additional regulations for GM crops combined 
with inter-agency co-ordination were necessary, but as part of the existing vertical 
regulatory oversight.
In 1990, the BSCC was replaced by the Biotechnology Research 
Subcommittee, and indication of the ‘permanence* of the biotechnology issue on the 
US industrial landscape. Further, in 1991, the President’s Council on Competitiveness 
recommended two key principles of US biotechnology regulations. To focus on 
product standards and to regulate under vertical or sectoral existing regulations. These 
principles were viewed as necessary to ensure the safety of biotechnology-based 
products while simultaneously enhancing the competitiveness and commercialisation 
lead of the US biotechnology industries.
Clearly, since 1973, US biotechnology regulations have been on a scientific 
rationality trajectory employing safety or hazard-based definitions of risk, the 
substantial equivalence principle and the traditional burden of the proof. The result 
has been a product or application-based regulatory approach under the jurisdiction of 
existing, vertical departments and agencies and employing the scientific interpretation 
of the precautionary principle.
Three agencies currently share responsibility for the regulation of GM crops. 
The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USD A) is responsible for environmental assessments of 
plant risk, issuing permits for field testing (Environmental Use Permits or EUPs), and 
for regulating the importation and interstate movement of genetically modified plants. 
USDA’s APHIS examines all organisms and products altered or produced through 
genetic engineering that are or have the potential to be plant pests. The APHIS 
regulatory procedures have been simplified twice. In 1993, six GM varieties were 
‘delisted’ meaning that they only required notification for field-testing, not an 
Environmental Use Permit. This action was based on the confidence of accumulated 
field trial experience in the US. Under the second simplification, adopted to speed the 
application review, APHIS regulations provide for a petition process where the 
proponent can request their product be granted a non-regulated status. The proponent 
submits the necessary evidence to prove that the GM plant does not pose a plant pest
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risk. APHIS reviews the evidence, and if approved, the plant product (and all its 
offspring) no longer requires APHIS review for interstate movement or environmental 
release in the US. The necessary evidence involves a scientific risk assessment.
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for the 
environmental release of both bio-engineered pesticides and bio-engineered plants 
with pesticidal characteristics, such as Bt-com and Bt-cotton varieties. Novel GM 
crops with pesticidal characteristics are subject to EPA assessments considering the 
impacts upon the target organisms, non-target organisms including humans. For 
instance, the main impact on GM varieties of herbicide resistant crops is the 
requirement that the EPA establish tolerances for residues of herbicides used on GM 
herbicide-tolerant crops. It has been argued that the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TCSA), administered by the EPA, explicitly employs the scientific interpretation of 
the precautionary principle since, “the language of the statute express Congress’s clear 
intent that research and development activities involving small amounts of substances 
be exempt from regulation”(Rogers, 1990). In late 1999, the EPA’s Ecological Effects 
Team announced that “companies developing GM crops will face changes in testing 
requirements over the coming years” (AgraFood Biotech No. 20, 1999). This reflects 
two trends. First, the increase in novel applications in GM crops necessitates new 
testing requirements including more comprehensive scrutiny. Second, the growth in a 
predictive ecology framework for risk assessment methods will better guide regulators 
to improve the accuracy and acceptability of environmental risk assessments. In other 
words, these changes must not be interpreted as a dramatic u-tum in EPA policy, 
instead, they are simply the natural evolution of regulations as GM crops move from 
production trait varieties to both output improved varieties and bio-engineered 
commodities and as regulators gain more data on recognised risks.
The third institutional arrangement in the US regulatory system is the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS). The FDA has traditional responsibility over ensuring the safety of food and 
feed use crops. It is important to note that FDA consultation is not mandatory but 
recommended prior to the market release of genetically modified foods and feeds. 
According to a 1992 FDA Statement, the focus of FDA oversight is on the novelty of 
food plants, not on the use of biotechnology per se (FDA, 1992). In fact, 
biotechnology-based products only come under direct FDA jurisdiction if they are 
determined to be a food additive according to the authority of the Federal Food, Drug,
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and Cosmetic Act. The 1992 Statement concluded, however, that the transferred genes 
are not additives because there is no a priori reason to conclude that transferred 
genetic material would create new hazards not present with conventional products 
(Koster and Balf, 1998). Accordingly, the FDA regulates the use of biotechnology 
under the substantial equivalence principle; only if it is from a novel plant 
significantly different in structure, function, or composition from plants currently used 
in food products. Many of the GM crops currently being developed for food use do 
not contain substances that are significantly different from those already in the diet 
and thus do not require FDA’s pre-market approval.
It is important to note that while FDA consultation is voluntary, there have 
been no GM products approved for commercial use that have not gone through FDA 
consultation. Simply, industry recognises the important confidence boost that an FDA 
endorsement gives to products. Also, FDA consultation is de facto standard because of 
US product liability laws. From the firm’s perspective, commercial risk is minimised 
and consequently food safety risk is minimised through FDA consultation which in 
turn limits liability risk. Many GM supporters, however, recognise that the FDA 
consultation is vulnerable to attack by critics because of the fact it is voluntary, 
despite the reality that the consultation is de facto standard. This has led some to argue 
that as the consultation occurs anyway, it would be useful from a public concern 
perspective to formalise the pre-market consultation in order to stem the potential 
criticisms2.
There is a horizontal regulation in the US with oversight for environmental 
issues hence, it is relevant for GM crops. The National Environmental Protection Act 
(NEPA) requires that all departments and agencies must perform an adequate 
environmental assessment on all activities falling under their jurisdiction that will 
have an impact upon the environment. With respect to agricultural biotechnology, this 
includes all deliberate releases for the field-testing or commercial planting of GM 
varieties. The US federal regulatory approach is presented in Table 6.1 below.
There also exists state-level regulatory oversight in the US (Rogers, 1990). 
Before commercialisation, GM plants must also conform with standards set by State 
and Federal marketing statutes such as State seed certification laws but there are no
2 Jeffrey Barach, National Food Processors Association (1999) Comments at the FDA Public 
Consultation of Agricultural Biotechnology in Washington DC, 30 November 1999 in AgraFood
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national requirements for varietal registration of new crops. One issue that has arisen 
at various times and in certain places is the potential for States and local governments 
to enact their own laws to address environmental concerns. Several states have 
enacted legislation regulating field trials requiring either notification of the release of 
GM varieties (Hawaii, Illinois, Wisconsin) or requiring formal permits for trials 
(Minnesota and North Carolina). Nevertheless, once the product has been approved 
for unconfined release at the federal level, the individual States lose regulatory 
oversight and cannot prohibit the unconfined release of GM crops.
Agency Products Regulated Additional Info.
U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (APHIS)
Plant pests, plants, 
veterinary biologies




new uses of existing 
pesticides, novel 
microorganisms
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act (FEFRA) - 7 USC 136 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) 
-21 USC 9
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) - 15 USC 
53
Food and Drug 
Administration
Food (except meat, poultry, 
and egg products), feed, 
food additives, veterinary 
drugs
GRAS status
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) 
-21 USC 9






Requires all actions, which will have an environmental impact, to be subject 
to an adequate environmental risk assessment by the relevant regulatory 
agency.
Table 6.1 US Agricultural Biotechnology Regulations
The regulatory decision-making process according to the US approach may be 
characterised as having narrow participation in the process. Under the hypothetical 
risk assessment the ‘experts’ are left to perform the assessments where the experts are 
either federal regulators or the risk assessment personnel of the proponent GM crop 
developer. Under the risk management procedures, the decision-making is made 
within the relevant vertical regulatory jurisdictions. It has been argued that the 
decision-making power rests with “a small cadre of scientists, venture capitalists and 
government bureaucrats, most of whom have a vested interest in the growth of the 
genetic engineering industry...” (Rogers, 1990). Yet, on the contrary, others have 
argued that despite the limited participation in the decision-making procedures, there
Biotech (1999) ‘FDA Closer to a New GM-Free Foods Label Policy’ No. 19, 8 December 1999 
(London: AgraEurope Ltd.).
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is considerable opportunity for public comment on the draft policies at both the risk 
assessment and risk management stages (Fuchs, 1993). In fact, in 1992, each of the 
three regulatory agencies, APHIS, FDA and EPA, all published draft regulatory 
guidelines for public comment3.
An added dimension to US regulatory development is the regulatory 
evaluation by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The OMB assesses 
proposed US regulations and legislation to ensure that new regulations will generate 
the desired outcome while limiting the political influence behind them. The OMB 
evaluations actually support a scientific rationality approach to regulating advanced 
technologies. In fact, the OMB approach does not support engaging all stakeholders in 
the risk management process because such involvement can potentially distort 
regulatory development beyond the goal of market failure correction (Belzer, 1998). 
OMB’s regulatory evaluation framework is composed of four objectives. First, to 
identify the market failure used to justify the intervention. Second, to analyse the 
impact of the identified market failure to determine both its presence and its 
significance in distorting market outcomes (e.g. impact on competition, equity, 
employment, public health, etc). Third, to analyse existing federal regulations and 
legislation to determine whether amendments to existing frameworks are capable of 
addressing the identified market failure. Fourth, to analyse all regulatory alternatives 
in order to determine the optimal regulatory approach. With respect to the Risk 
Analysis framework, the OMB evaluation supports risk assessment based on 
hypothetical risks, focused on safety or hazards only as well as risk management 
limited only to the goal of reducing or preventing risk, not the goal of assuaging 
public fears and concerns.
The US Regulatory system is subject to an independent scientific review by 
the National Academy of Sciences in 2000 and 2001. A major focus of this review is 
not on human health, but on the “environmental impacts associated with 
commercialisation of biotechnology derived plants and to provide guidance on how 
best to assess and mitigate risks” (World Food Law Monthly No. 19, 1999). The focus
3 APHIS: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (1992) ‘Genetically Engineered Organisms and 
Products; Notification Procedures for the Introduction of Certain Regulated Articles; and Petition for 
Non-Regulated Status’ (Washington DC; Federal Register Draft Guidelines 12 June 1992 57:40632 and 
Final Policy March 1993 58:17044); EPA: Environmental Protection Agency (1992) ‘EPA Proposal to 
Clarify the Regulatory Status of Plant Pesticides’ (Washington DC; Federal Register 57:55531); FDA: 
Food and Drug Administration (1992) ‘Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties’ 
(Washington DC; Federal Register 29 May 1992 57:22984)
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on the environmental impacts is a direct effort to address the speculative risks raised 
by critics through a science-based analytical approach to environmental risk 
assessment.
The mandatory labelling of GM crops and foods produced from GM crops in 
the US has been influenced by the regulatory development assessed above. For 
instance, the determination of substantial equivalence along with the FDA’s 1992 
decision that GM material in itself is not an additive do not support the consumers’ 
right to know justification for labelling. It has been argued that the traditional 
justification for mandatory labelling is for hazard warning, not for the consumers’ 
right to know (Korwek, 1993). Further, it has been argued that US case law reveals 
that “consumer interest alone is not enough” for mandatory labelling and that a 
production method that has no discernible impact on the safety or quality of a final 
product is not a sufficient justification either (Koster and Balf, 1993). The FDA policy 
on labelling irradiated meat products was however a mandatory labelling policy 
justified by the consumer’s right to know. The key to this decision is found under the 
labelling section of the Federal Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics Act (FFDCA) Section 
403(a) 1 which requires that mandatory labelling must reveal ‘material facts’ in order 
to prevent misbranding. Irradiation, as a production method was considered to be a 
material fact (Koster and Balf, 1993).
What is the difference between irradiation technology and GM technology? It 
appears that GM technology which is used in the seed development and not in the 
crop production and the food processing stages escapes this context of material facts. 
If GM technology was applied while crops were growing or when they were being 
processed, than this would be a material production fact that consumers would have a 
right to know about. Instead, because of the substantial equivalence principle, GM 
crops are slotted into the same production and processing system as same-use non-GM 
crops and there are no material differences in the processing procedures.
There is currently considerable pressure on the FDA’s position on mandatory 
labelling. For instance, the FDA’s policy on substantial equivalence is under legal 
challenge by the US-based International Centre for Technology Assessment (ICTA), a 
non-governmental organisation that monitors the social implications of technological 
innovations (Economist, 19 June 1999). There are two important aspects of this 
challenge. First, the ICTA wants the FDA policy on GM material altered so that GM 
material is considered to be an additive and therefore subject to FDA pre-market
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approval. Second, the ICTA wants a mandatory US labelling policy on foods 
produced from GM crops according to the consumer’s right to know. The outcome of 
this challenge is currently unknown. Also, Democrat Representative (Ohio) Dennis 
Kucinich presented a bill to Congress calling for mandatory labelling of GM Foods 
based on the consumer’s right to know and requiring a 0.1% level of adventitious 
contamination. As a result of these pressures, as well as the broader public concern, 
especially in Europe, the FDA is consulting with the public on its labelling policy.
This is an important development because the FDA recognises the need for 
regulations to move beyond just scientific parameters and to assuage public fears in 
order to prevent a collapse in consumer confidence. The outcome of these 
consultations is likely to be that the FDA will not adopt a mandatory labelling policy 
based on the consumer’s right to know and instead it will develop legal standards for 
using a voluntary GM-Free label.
With respect to the international integration of biotechnology regulations, the 
US is involved in bilateral and multilateral negotiations for both the development of 
an international regulatory approach and for the enhancement of regulatory 
convergence between countries. Bilateral efforts include those taken under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement and those under the Transatlantic Economic 
Partnership. Multilateral efforts include US involvement in the establishment of 
Codex Alimentarius food safety standards and the various committees administering 
World Trade Organization Agreements. In 1996, the Clinton administration published 
a report on the desired future for US food regulations (Clinton and Gore, 1996). 
Among other things, this report identified, as a priority, efforts by US regulatory 
agencies to promote the international harmonisation of food regulations. As a result, 
agricultural trade policy, developed by the relevant agencies (FDA, EPA, FSIS and 
APHIS of USDA) is concerned with the presence of technical barriers to trade in US 
food stuffs in order to address the concerns of US exporters. For instance, the Foreign 
Agricultural Service (FAS) of the USDA attempts to identify trade barriers and to 
challenge their use through consultation in international fora including the TBT and 
SPS Committees. Public participation in trade policy development is through the 
Advisory Committee on Trade Policy Negotiations. When trade concerns become 
trade tensions, the US Office of the Trade Representative (USTR) takes over. The 
USTR seeks to consult on the reduction or removal of trade barriers and acts as the 
relevant US agency in the event that trade disputes under international agreements
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arise. The US also has legislation to act unilaterally to address perceived unfair trade 
practices of other countries, outside the scope of international agreements. According 
to Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974, the Department of Commerce can take 
action against the imports of foreign goods in response to “unfair and discriminatory 
practices or breaches of trade agreements” by trading partners (Horton, 1997). This 
unilateral action is controversial and many trading partners feel that it undermines the 
rules-based trading regimes outlined in international trade agreements.
The US Regulatory System and regulatory responses cannot be fully 
characterised without some mention of US Product Liability Laws, briefly mentioned 
above. These laws confer legal liability on the product manufacturer. That is, in the 
event of a food or environmental safety incident a consumer only has to show that the 
manufacturer was responsible for the product, not that the manufacturer was 
negligent. US Product Liability Laws are an important factor in the internalisation of 
food and environmental safety risks by US manufacturers because a safety risk 
quickly becomes a commercial crisis. Firms minimising commercial risks in the US 
are simultaneously minimising safety risks.
Therefore, the US Regulatory System may be characterised according to the 
scientific and social rationality paradigms identified in Chapter Five (Table 6.2). The 
general interpretation of the US regulatory approach is that it is overwhelmingly a 
scientific rationality approach. Essentially, the US regulatory system is based on the 
belief that the new techniques of genetic engineering are an extension of traditional 
breeding techniques and biotechnology-based products are simply an extension of 
existing product classes (APHIS, 1999). In this sense, regulations have been 
developed which build on the experience and expertise of and the public confidence in 
US regulators.
With respect to the five specific regulatory debates associated with GM crops, 
the US approach employs the scientific interpretation of the precautionary principle. 
Indeed, there is considerable confidence that over 25 years of scientific assessment 
has shown that the risks from genetic modifications are not inherently different than 
the risks from conventional crops. Second, US regulations are focused primarily on 
novel products of agricultural biotechnology not on agricultural biotechnology as a 
process or production method. Third, US regulatory authority is under traditional, 
vertical regulatory jurisdictions based on existing statutes with amendments to deal 
with novel products. It is held that there is not an appropriate horizontal statutory
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approach because of the broad spectrum of applications, and that existing health and 
safety laws provide immediate regulatory protection based on long-standing expertise. 
Fourth, because agricultural biotechnology products are considered within existing 
vertical regulations, participation in decision-making remains largely limited to the 
traditional actors and decisions are judicious. Fifth, US labelling policies are not 
currently in support of either mandatory labelling of the GM techniques or mandatory 
labelling for the consumers’ right to know. Instead, mandatory labelling is focused on 
novelty and safety or hazard justifications only. Although, as noted the US labelling 
policy is under legal challenge, and the outcome of this challenge is currently 
unknown.
Scientific Rationality Social Rationality
General Regulatory Issues
Tradition S  Regulatory Independence
Belief S  Technological progress: 
Enhances growth and development 
leading to higher social regulations 
-  a regulatory race to the top.
Type of Risk S  Recognised 
S  Hypothetical
Substantial Equivalence S  Yes
Science or Other in Risk 
Assessment
S  First regulatory hurdle
Burden of Proof S  Traditional: Minimise Type I 
(Rejected when safe)
Risk tolerance S  Minimum
Science or Other in Risk 
Management
S  Safety or Hazard-based 
Risk Management is for risk 
reduction and prevention only
Specific Regulatory Issues
Precautionary Principle S  Scientific Interpretation
Focus S  Product-based, Novelty
Structure S  Vertical, Existing structures
Participation S  Narrow, technical experts 
S  Judicial decision-making
Labelling S  Safety or Hazard only 
Voluntary, market-based for the 
consumers’ right to know
Table 6.2 US Regulatory Approach Checklist
There are two perspectives from which to view the US Regulatory System; an 
economic perspective and a social perspective, which includes consumer concerns 
about food safety, environmental protection along with moral and ethical concerns.
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Economic Perspective
From an economic perspective, the US system provides industry with 
predictable and timely decisions. A GM crop regulatory submission requires three 
types of information (Kraus, 1998). First, the firm must submit information on the 
genetic characteristics of the host and recipient organisms, on the vector of transfer 
employed and on the resultant genetic characteristics of the GM crop. Second, 
information on the purpose, method of data collection and harvest procedures for the 
field trial must be submitted. Third, information on the field trial location and the 
supervision procedures must also be submitted. Once approval has been given on the 
particular GM crop variety, the only regulatory responsibility is an annual field trial 
report. This field trial regulatory approach has been commercially friendly. For 
instance, APHIS received more than 920 requests for the environmental release of 
GM varieties between 1988 and 1998. Of these requests, 886 were approved. Also, 
between 1992 and 1999, APHIS received 65 petitions for deregulation, where 49 were 
approved in an average of four months, while 11 were voluntarily withdrawn and 5 
were rejected. The EPA approved 34 proposals for the environmental release of 
biopesticides between 1987 and 1996. The FDA reviewed and approved the 
commercial release of 43 GM crops between 1994 and 19984.
With respect to regulatory requirements for GM crops for human food use, 
Fuchs (1993) has detailed the regulatory compliance efforts of Monsanto in seeking 
approval for the GM potato variety resistant to the Colorado potato beetle (CPB)5. The 
Monsanto strategy was two-fold. First, to establish that the GM potato was 
substantially equivalent to conventional varieties and, hence, not subject to novelty 
regulations. This involved comparative testing of the potato’s (1) nutritional and 
natural composition, (2) the level of macro-nutrients (e.g. protein, fat, carbohydrates, 
dietary fibre), (3) level of vitamins (e.g. C, B6, Thiamine, Niacin, Folic Acid and 
Riboflavin) and (4) the level of minerals (e.g. calcium, copper, iron, iodine, 
magnesium, phosphorus, potassium, sodium, zinc). This comparative testing 
supported Monsanto’s claim of substantial equivalence, except in the category of 
insect resistance, which of course was the reason for the development of the GM
4 Regulatory decisions from: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) March 1999 (www.aphis.usda.gov/oa/new/ab.html).
5 Fuchs (1993) ...
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variety in the first place. The second strategy was to provide required data on human, 
animal and environmental safety performance of the GM potato.
Of course, US agricultural biotechnology firms favour the predictability and 
stability of the US regulatory approach because it clarifies the information 
requirements that firms must meet. This is reflected in high rates of application 
approvals with few regulatory hold-ups. It has been argued that “the US plant 
biotechnology industry has been positively affected by domestic regulation and finds 
itself at a comparative regulatory advantage to its European counterpart” (Kraus,
1998). In short, the US scientific rationality approach to regulating GM crops benefits 
the economic interests by ensuring a predictable framework encouraging 
technological progress.
Social Perspective
From the social perspective, it has been argued that the US regulatory 
agencies, such as the FDA and the EPA, are trusted by the public to protect both the 
food supply and the environment (Hoban, 1998). It has also been argued that “it is not 
an overstatement to suggest that the level of scientific research and testing involved in 
biotechnology [agricultural] is at least as good as that available in the health care 
field” (Balk, 1993). Indeed, public trust in US medical regulations is high, and 
capturing that level of trust is a crucial part of establishing socially acceptable 
regulations. An important concern of US regulatory development was that attempts to 
develop a new set of horizontal regulatory rules or a new regulatory agency might 
have undermined the public trust. Kraus (1998) argued that the decision to keep 
regulatory oversight within the traditional vertical jurisdictions is the reason for 
increased consumer confidence and public acceptance in the US.
The US approach does, however, have significant shortcomings in dealing 
with the social dimensions of agricultural biotechnology. For instance, the important 
role of APHIS may be construed as a conflict of interest since the USDA is playing 
the dual role of promoting the agricultural sector while at the same time regulating it. 
This raises concerns about regulatory capture and who are the clients of the USDA; 
industry or consumers? In fact, other countries such as Canada and the UK have taken 
steps to separate the promotion and regulation activities into different regulatory
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agencies6. Further, limited actor participation in the regulatory decision-making 
process may increase fears that agricultural biotechnology is being approved without 
adequate public consultation or consent. Indeed, if GM foods become as politicised in 
the US as they currently are in the UK, the US regulatory system will be under 
considerable pressure to consider the social dimensions of agricultural biotechnology, 
yet it may be poorly equipped to do so. The ability to transform the vertical regulatory 
agencies into a manner sufficient to the interest groups, without changing the 
underlying regulatory principles on which the system is based, appears very limited.
This threat has been at the heart of proactive, co-ordinated efforts in the US by 
government and industry to stop any “social contagion” resulting from UK and 
European consumer reactions (Economist, 19 June 1999). The strategy is to 
investigate scientific, economic and social concerns through broad participation in 
advisory committees supported by the National Economic Council and the USDA. As 
well, the Grocery Manufacturers of America, an industry association, is determined to 
prevent consumer concerns from forcing product reformulation on its members as 
happened in the UK. In other words, industry is working in co-ordination with 
government to protect against potential regulatory instability that could have serious 
commercial implications.
6.3 Agricultural Biotechnology in Canada
Biotechnology in Canada is considered to be vital to future growth prospects. 
Although global capacity leadership is enjoyed in several specific areas such as the 
genetic modification of oilseeds, overall, biotechnology capacity in Canada tends to 
lag the US as well as Japan and several European countries.
6.3.1 Canadian Promotion of Agricultural Biotechnology
Unlike the US, public policy in Canada directly targets the deepening and 
widening of the Canadian biotechnology capacity. According to the Canadian 
Biotechnology Strategy (CBS), the application of biotechnology in the production of 
agricultural, industrial and medical goods is held to be a potential cornerstone of the 
economy (Industry Canada, 1997). Further, the Canadian Institute of Biotechnology
6 In Canada, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) promotes while the new Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency (CFIA) and Health Canada (HC) regulates and in the UK the Ministry of
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(CIB), argues that “biotechnology is an important driver of economic growth in 
Canada. It has become an important tool that, when used appropriately, can increase 
the competitiveness of all sectors from agriculture to health care” (CIB, 1997).
The Canadian federal government, along with some provincial governments 
have been very proactive in the development and commercial application of modem 
biotechnology to Canadian products. In 1983, the National Biotechnology Strategy 
was established committing approximately $C 13 million/year to biotechnology 
research through National Centres of Research Excellence. It has been estimated that 
government promotion has averaged SC 250 million/year or over SC 1.5 billion for the 
decade 1987-1997 (CIELAP, 1997).
Industry associations include national associations such as Canadian Institute 
of Biotechnology (CIB), Industrial Biotechnology Association of Canada (IB AC), 
Biotechnology Human Resource Council (BHRC), National Biotechnology Network, 
and Food Biotechnology Communications Network. There are also regional 
associations in all provinces. In 1996, the IBAC developed a Voluntary Code of 
Conduct to guide the interactions between industry, government regulators and the 
broader public.
While Canada does not hold a commercialisation lead in agricultural 
biotechnologies over the US, it does have a lead over the EU. The result, of course, is 
a North American commercialisation lead.
6.3.2 The Canadian Regulatory System
In Canada, traditional regulatory role has been primarily influenced by the US, 
due to the economic importance of the US market to Canadian products, although 
there has been, of course, some European influence. Indeed, in some respects the 
Canadian approach blends the regulatory independence approach of the US, with the 
European regulatory accountability approach. As in the US, the regulatory 
independence approach prescribes government regulatory intervention only in reaction 
to market failure. However, unlike in the US, Canadian regulators also examine the 
‘effectiveness’ of regulations. This is more closely associated with the European 
approach employing the fourth regulatory hurdle (i.e. safety, quality, efficacy and 
effectiveness or social benefit, see Chapter 5.1.4). Canadian regulatory decision-
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) promotes while the proposed Food Standards Agency (FSA) 
will regulate.
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making is traditionally done by regulators limiting the influence of populist politics 
and day-to-day public interests on the regulatory system. Therefore, the traditional 
Canadian regulatory role, although allowing for the evaluation of social benefit, does 
hold market correction as the fundamental role of regulatory intervention. Indeed, 
with respect to modem biotechnology, it is quite appropriate to suggest that Canadian 
regulations have been pro-competitive.
The Canadian regulatory system for GM crops was driven endogenously by 
the development of GM canola/rapeseed varieties and exogenously by the rapid pace 
of R&D and commercialisation of GM crops in the US. In earlier periods the health 
and safety regulatory system supported and assisted the canola industry to develop and 
tended to take its lead from the industry (Phillips and Khachatourians, In Press). 
Although the same regulatory base is being used, the system has been expanded to 
incorporate more intensive examinations of new biotechnology-based products. For 
instance, following the rulings that canola was acceptable as a food and feed, the 
regulatory system operated smoothly, with the single largest hurdle being the 
provision in the Seeds Act that required new varieties be better than a reference 
variety. There was little or no further review of the varieties for their health or safety 
risks. In the mid 1980s, two major changes took place. First, the Seeds Act was 
revised, allowing any new varieties that were equivalent with the reference variety to 
be registered; shortly thereafter rules were enacted to allow for “confined” releases to 
assist with breeding and regulatory compliance. By 1988, the federal government had 
reviewed and worked to co-ordinate the existing system of regulations and added the 
Novel Foods Guidelines to complete the system that would review biotechnology- 
based products. The test of the system was the herbicide tolerant canola varieties 
produced by Monsanto and AgrEvo. They successfully applied for approval for 
confined field trials and began the field work. By 1992 each of the companies had 
identified the cultivars they would seek regulatory approval to commercialise 
(discussions with companies). Over the 1989-94 period, the two companies 
conducted more 400 confined field trials each, first to select their commercial lines 
and then to provide the scientific evidence to satisfy the regulatory system (CFIA 
homepage). Over the 1992-95 period, the companies provided data and information to 
Health Canada to meet the Novel Foods Guidelines, to Agriculture Canada for animal 
feed approval and variety registration and to Environment Canada for environmental 
approval. In each case, the approvals were bunched into a short time period (all
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approvals to proceed came within six months of the others for each variety, CFIA). 
Since then, the regulatory system has been streamlined, with the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency assuming responsibility in 1997 for all the regulatory function 
except the Novel Foods Guidelines, which continues to be managed by Health 
Canada. The lead regulatory division of the CFIA is the Plants Products Division, 
which is advised by the Advisory Committee on Plant Biotechnology Regulation. The 
objective of the Advisory Committee is to assist the Plant Products Division in 
identifying and developing principles and protocols in the regulation of genetically 
modified plants.
In Canada, pressure to develop the ‘Guidelines for the Assessment of Novel 
Foods’ (Sept. 1994) not only came from developments of GM canola, but also from 
the imminent approval of GM varieties of com, soybeans, tomatoes, cotton and squash 
in the US. Therefore, it was crucial for Canada to develop an acceptable level of 
regulatory oversight for the presence of novel plants in the Canadian food supply. 
Further, in late 1999, Health Canada announced amendments to the Canadian Food 
and Drugs Law, established to clarify the approval process for novel foods. The 
amendments involved seven years of consultations with all stakeholders (World Food 
Law Monthly No. 19, 1999). There were three main amendments. First, a detailed 
definition of novel foods was established:
a) a substance, including a micro-organism, that does not have a history o f  
safe use as a food;
b) a food that has been manufactured, prepared, preserved or packaged by a 
process that:
i) has not been previously applied to that food,
ii) causes the food to undergo a major change, and
c) a food that is derived from a plant, animal or microorganism that has been 
genetically modified such that:
i) the plant, animal or microorganism exhibits characteristics that
were not previously observed in that plant, animal or 
microorganism
ii) the plant, animal or microorganism no longer exhibits 
characteristics that were previously observed
iii) one or more characteristics no longer fall within the 
anticipated range for that plant, animal or microorganism
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The definition also specified that there are three types of variations that place the 
foodstuff outside the anticipated range: variations in the composition, structure or 
nutritional quality outside the conventional range; variations in the manner in which 
the food is metabolised in the body; and variations in the microbiological safety, the 
chemical safety or the safe use of the food relative to conventional products. Second, 
it established mandatory pre-market notification for the commercialisation of novel 
foods. Health Canada had considered pre-market approval but found that this would 
add little to the safety while adding extensively to the cost. Pre-market notification 
requires 45 days prior notice to HC before sale or advertisement of any novel food.
HC must give its response on the acceptability of the novel food within the 45 days. 
Additionally, HC can suspend the sale or advertisement if additional information is 
required. Third, the amendments also detailed procedures for assessing the safety of 
novel foods. A notable concept here is that of ‘prior safe use as a food’ which allows 
HC to approve the notification of a novel food that has been accepted by certain other 
countries. In this sense, this concept represents a form of regulatory mutual 
recognition.
There is a horizontal regulatory safety net in Canada, Environment Canada’s 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA). Novel products that do not fall 
under the regulatory oversight of either the CFIA or Health Canada are under the 
notification of new substances requirements of the CEPA. The federal regulatory 
system is identified in Table 6.3.
An important aspect of Canadian regulatory oversight for GM crops is that, 
unlike US regulations, there is scope for Canadian regulators to base decisions upon 
‘effectiveness’ or social benefit. As will be shown (Chapter 7), this is similar to the 
European fourth hurdle of regulatory oversight (safety, quality, efficacy and 
effectiveness). As was previously discussed, US regulatory decisions tend to adopt the 
position of letting the market decide a product’s social benefit, provided the product is 
safe or of sufficient quality and exhibits its claimed attributes.
The Canadian policy on labelling products made from GM crops is similar to 
that in the US. As the Canadian regulatory system is based on novelty, not the use of 
GM techniques, the labelling policy does not support process-based labelling for the 
consumer’s right to know that GM techniques have been used. An added dimension to 
the Canadian labelling policy is that Canada is currently the chair of the Codex 
Committee on Food Labelling (see Chapters 3.2.l.C and 5.3.l.C).
211
Product Act Contacts
Agri-food products (meat, 
dairy, eggs, fruits, 
vegetables, honey, maple 
products)
• Meat Inspection Act
• Canada Agricultural Products Act
CFIA, Science & Technology 
Services
Livestock feeds, additives 
(e.g. novel feeds)
• Feeds Act
• Guidelines for the Assessment of 
Plants with Novel Traits as 
Livestock Feed (Proposal 94-04 
22 Nov. 1994)
CFIA, Feeds Section, Plant 
Products Division
Fertilizers, supplements (e.g. 
biofertilizers)
• Fertilizers Act CFIA, Fertilzier Section, Plant 
Products Division
Plants (including plants with 
novel traits and with 
genetically engineered 
micro-organisms)
• Seeds Act (field trials)
• Plant Protection Act 1990
• Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act (1 Sept. 1997)
• Procedures for the Registration of 
Crop Varieties (1 October 1994)
• Field Testing Plants with Novel 
Traits (Directive 95-01 6 Jan 
1995)
• Assessment Criteria for 
Determining Environmental 
Safety of Plants with Novel Traits 
(Directive 94-08 16 Dec 1994)
CFIA, Plant Biotech Office, 




• Regulated in the same manner as 
that produced by conventional 
methods.
• Approved for safety prior to 
reaching the food production 
system
• Novel Food Guidelines of the 
Food and Drugs Act.
• no labelling required
Health Canada, Food 
Directorate, Food Inspection 
Directorate
Source, http://www.cfia-acia.agr.ca/english/
Table 6.3 Canadian Agricultural Biotechnology Regulations
Canadian efforts at international regulatory integration are led by the CFIA’s 
Biotechnology Strategies and Coordination Office. This Office co-ordinates Canadian 
regulatory policies with those developed at international fora such as the WTO and the 
international negotiations for the Biosafety Protocol. This Office advises trade policy 
makers and trade negotiators in AAFC and the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (DFAIT).
Similar to the US regulatory system, the Canadian system may be 
characterised according to the regulatory principles of the scientific and social 
rationality approaches (Table 6.4). The general interpretation of the Canadian 
approach is that it is largely congruent with the scientific rationality paradigm. There 
is, however, an important deviation regarding the debates over science v. other
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legitimate factors in risk assessment and risk management. In the risk assessment 
procedure, the Canadian approach permits food products to be assessed according to 
all four regulatory hurdles. In the risk management procedure, the Canadian approach 
permits other legitimate factors such as socio-economic factors in risk management 
decisions rather than just a narrow focus on risk reduction and prevention.
With respect to the specific regulatory principles associated with GM crops, 
the regulatory approach employs the scientific interpretation of the precautionary 
principle. Second, the system is novel product based where substantial equivalence is 
assumed for all non-novel GM products. Third, regulatory authority is associated with 
vertical jurisdictions. Fourth, participation in the regulatory decision-making process 
is limited to specific, traditional actors. Finally, labelling policy does not support GM 
labelling for the consumers* right to know.
Scientific Rationality Social Rationality
General Regulatory Issues
Tradition S  Regulatory Independence
Belief S  Technological progress: 
Enhances growth and development 
leading to higher social regulations 
-  a regulatory race to the top.
Type of Risk S  Recognised 
S  Hypothetical
Substantial Equivalence S  Yes
Science or Other in Risk 
Assessment
S  Risk assessments may be based 
on all four regulatory hurdles
Burden of Proof S  Traditional: Minimise Type I 
(Rejected when safe)
Risk tolerance S  Minimum
Science or Other in Risk 
Management
S  Risk management may 
consider other legitimate factors 
beyond on risk prevention and 
reduction: Socially Responsive
Specific Regulatory Issues
Precautionary Principle S  Scientific Interpretation
Focus S  Product-based, Novelty
Structure S  Vertical, Existing structures
Participation S  Narrow, technical experts 
S  Judicial decision-making
Labelling S  Safety or Hazard only 
Voluntary, market-based for the 
consumers’ right to know
Table 6.4 Canadian Regulatory Approach Checklist
The Canadian regulatory approach may be assessed from both an economic 
and a social perspective.
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Economic Perspective
From an economic perspective, the Canadian system has operated relatively 
efficiently, approving by 1997 more than 3,800 field trials, 29 plants with novel traits 
for feed and 3 novel foods. It has been able to achieve this flow of regulatory 
decisions by assuming substantial equivalence and by limiting participation in the 
decision-making process to the proponent and the regulators. The commercial 
effectiveness of Canadian regulations to GM crops is favoured by the biotechnology 
industry. A 1994 survey revealed that ‘improving the regulatory approval process* 
was considered the most important task for government by the biotechnology industry, 
and support for the industry has influenced regulatory development (Ernst and Young, 
1995).
Social Perspective
Citizens, consumer and environmental organisations along with provincial 
governments, while allowed relatively free access to applications and specific decision 
documents through the CFIA website, are not allowed to have any say in the science 
based system. So far, in Canada, that has not created any backlash by either the major 
lobby groups or the general public.
From a social perspective, the Canadian system for food safety in general has 
been proactive in establishing an institutional framework designed to build consumer 
confidence. In 1997, all food inspection and assessment functions were transferred 
from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) and to the new Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency (CFIA). Essentially, governmental promotion of the agriculture 
sector was separated from regulatory activities associated with agri-food and 
environmental protection issues. By all accounts, this institutional restructuring has 
further enhanced consumer confidence in the government’s regulatory role. 
Specifically, regulatory oversight for agricultural biotechnology is shared between 
Health Canada, which assesses novel GM foods and the CFIA and Environment 
Canada which address specific consumer and environmental health and safety issues 
associated with GM agricultural products. However, similar to the US regulatory 
system, the Canadian system may have difficulty incorporating social dimensions into 
the regulatory process in the event that the use of GM materials in the both the food 
supply and environment becomes a highly politicised issue. Citizens, consumer and 
environmental groups as well as provincial departments and agencies, who have
214
relatively little access to the decision-making process, may demand both greater 
transparency and participation. The Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee 
(CBAC) has been established as the federal government’s conduit for the two-way 
flow of information between regulators and the general public. As well, in late 1999 
the Federal Government announced the creation of a Scientific Advisory Committee 
to examine what type of agricultural biotechnology products are coming, what are the 
anticipated short- and long-term health implications, what are the international 
developments in this area and, consequently, what type of scientific regulatory 
capacity is required in Canada in order to ensure the safety of agricultural 
biotechnology products. This scientific committee will advice Health Canada, the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency and Environment Canada.
6.4 North American Regulatory Integration
Given the significant linkages between Canadian and US agriculture, and 
especially the respective research efforts, regulatory integration was necessary to 
provide consistent regulatory oversight for industry promotion and consumer and 
environmental protection.
The two lead regulatory agencies (APDHIS of the USDA and CFIA) have 
worked to streamline the approvals of products in the two countries. In the past the 
two agencies have undertaken simultaneous reviews of GM plants prior to their 
commercialisation and have shared data and observations informally. In 1998,
USDA, CFIA and Health Canada regulatory officials met to compare and harmonise, 
where possible, risk assessment procedures such as the molecular genetic 
characterisations components of the regulatory review process for GM plants. That is, 
they examined opportunities to streamline the science-based and rules-based approach 
to risk assessment
The Canadian -  US integration of agricultural biotechnology regulations is 
congruent with agricultural trade liberalisation commitments made under the original 
Canada-US Trade Agreement (CUSTA) and continued in the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Both agreements are free trade agreements based on 
sovereignty and regulatory competition with no goal of deep integration. The 
objective, in general, is to engage in a long-term regulatory integration but within a 
traditional trade framework. For instance, under the CUSTA, the US and Canada 
established Technical Working Groups (TWG) to deal with specific sectoral trade
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issues. The most important TWG for the issues dealing with GM crops is the TWG on 
seeds. Under the NAFTA the TWG were trilateralised and two permanent committees 
were established to ensure continual dialogue on issues of regulatory barriers to trade; 
the Committee on Standards Related Measures and the Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures. Further, according to a 1995 NAFTA Memorandum of 
Cooperation (MoC) called for both the regular reporting of food standards to improve 
co-ordination efforts and to co-ordinate a ‘NAFTA’ position on food standards in 
international fora such as Codex and the WTO.
This level of regulatory integration between the two countries is made possible 
because the regulatory approaches have each adopted the scientific rationality 
approach to regulating GM crops. Further, the regulatory integration ensures that there 
are few insurmountable social regulatory barriers to trade.
There are, however, important limits to the type of regulatory integration 
pursued under the NAFTA. Most importantly, the regulatory integration remains 
subject to the traditional trade principles of regulatory sovereignty and host country 
control. That is, the regulatory integration would not likely work in the event that the 
one jurisdiction employed a scientific rationality approach while the other jurisdiction 
employed the social rationality approach.
6.5 Conclusions
The North American approach to regulating GM crops is summarised in Table 
6.5. In general, it reflects a scientific rationality approach to technological progress 
driven initially by scientists many years before commercialisation issues were raised.
It is supported and influenced by economic interests and, as a result, it is conducive to 
the North American commercialisation lead in agricultural biotechnologies.
While being commercially friendly, this approach does have some significant 
drawbacks in its social responsiveness. It is unlikely that that the North American 
approach can shift enough towards the social rationality paradigm to meet social 
interests without abandoning the scientific regulatory principles. In other words, 
should a crisis of confidence emerge in North America in the magnitude of that in the 
UK (Chapter 7.3.1) the North American approach may have to make some rapid 
amendments in favour of social rationality principles.
Regulatory integration dealing with social regulatory barriers is made easier 
when two jurisdictions have adopted the same regulatory principles as with Canada
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and the US. The difficulty is, of course, integrating regulatory approaches that have 
adopted divergent paradigms.
North American Regulatory Approach
Tradition Regulatory Independence
Paradigm Scientific rationality
Precautionary Principle Scientific Interpretation
Focus Product or Application-based, Novelty
Structure Vertical, existing regulatory agencies
Decision-Making Narrow participation 
Judicious
Labelling Voluntary, market-based
Integration Economic Integration according to Regulatory Competition
Table 6.5: Characterisation of North American Regulatory Approach
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CHAPTER SEVEN EUROPEAN REGULATORY APPROACH
7.1 Introduction
Similar to the North American regulatory approach the European approach 
must strike a delicate balance between technological progress in order to remain 
competitive in the frontier technology and technological precaution in order to 
assuage politically powerful concerns about consumer and environmental protection. 
The objective of this chapter is to examine both the promotion and regulation of GM 
crops at the EU level and within the United Kingdom.
Prior to this, it is crucial to identify the European perception of the agriculture 
sector as this provides important context or background to European efforts to both 
promote and regulate GM crops. As previously mentioned, in North America 
agriculture is perceived to be an industry. This is very different from the general 
perception of the agricultural sector in Europe which is generally perceived 
(especially Western Europe) is perceived to be more than just an industry. It fulfils a 
‘multi-functional’ role including supporting the rural way of life, preserving the 
culture and heritage of the countryside, ensuring the welfare of animals (both 
livestock and wildlife) and protecting the environment. According to this EU model of 
agriculture, farming is a special kind of endeavour forming the last line of defence 
between the country and urbanisation. In addition, European consumers have faced 
several severe food safety crises that have undermined the public trust in regulators 
and scientists (NCC, 1998; Consumers’ Association, 1997; Grove-White et al., 1997; 
Sheppard, 1997). The implication of this for credence goods such as GM crops is that 
there is little trust among consumers in the traditional sources of risk information. 
Combining the multi-functionality role with the lack of public trust results in a 
European agricultural sector under considerable scrutiny as a well-politicised issue.
7.2 Agricultural Biotechnology in the EU
The EU has considerable capacity in agricultural biotechnologies. For 
instance, European firms on the frontier of GM crop development include Agrevo 
(Germany), Astra-Zeneca (UK), Hoechst (Germany), Novartis (Switzerland) and 
Rhone-Poulenc (France). This capacity must reconcile both strong national 
competitiveness drivers in Member States with the EU model of agriculture and the
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significant public concern about the use of GM crops in the food supply and in the 
environment.
An additional dimension to the European promotion and regulation of GM 
crops is the relationship between the EU-level and the approaches and initiatives of 
the various member states. The competing forces of regulatory centralisation and 
subsidiarity exist not only between the EU level and trading partners, but within the 
EU between European services and Member States.
7.2.1 EU Promotion of Agricultural Biotechnology
Developing a competitive posture in biotechnology has been a strategic 
priority in Europe for nearly two decades. Originally, DG XII (Science, Research and 
Development) led the push, although there have been several initiatives including 
(from Haerlin, 1990; Soij et al., 1989; Theodorakopoulou and Kalaitzandonakes,
1999):
1. Biotechnology Framework Programme (BFP), 1983 -  promotion and marketing
2. Biotechnology Engineering Programme (BEP), 1982-86 -  ECU 15 million
3. Biotechnology Action Programme (BAP), 1986-89 -  ECU56 million
4. Biotechnology Research and Innovation for Development and Growth (BRIDGE)
5. Euro Collaborative Linkage of Agriculture and Industry through Research 
(ECLAIR) -  ECU 80 million to develop new plants for industrial uses
6. Food-Linked Agro-Industrial Research (FLAIR) -  ECU25 million for 
transnational food safety, quality and competitiveness projects, creating value for 
agricultural biotechnology products
7. European Commission’s Innovation Program: a supply-driven initiative to support 
the commercialisation of advanced technologies.
In 1983, DG XII of the European Commission examined the competitive 
position of European biotechnology relative to the respective positions in the US and 
Japan. The Commission’s report, entitled Biotechnology in the Community (Europeam 
Community, 1983) sought to develop a comprehensive biotechnology strategy for the 
EEC that would improve its global competitiveness.
In 1991, the Commission’s Biotechnology Co-ordinating Committee presented 
a paper to the Council and the Parliament entitled Promoting a Competitive
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Environment for Industrial Activities Based on Biotechnology Within the Community 
outlining regulatory reform required to improve competitiveness.
In 1994, the importance of biotechnology in the EU was again highlighted by 
the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment stating that “the 
growth rate of industries based on modem biotechnologies is expected to be 
substantial.” (European Commission, 1994). Specifically, capacity in agricultural 
biotechnology is an important competitveness issue because restructuring of the CAP 
would involve the retreat of domestic farm support and agricultural biotechnology can 
potentially fill the gaps. Further, other nations, especially in North America, continue 
to invest both publicly and privately in the research, development and 
commercialisation of new agricultural biotechnology products. In fact, recent research 
has concluded that continued restrictive regulatory policies in the EU will produce a 
global allocation of biotechnology capacity where North America will be the 
dominant region for the R&D into biotechnology and Southern countries will become 
the producers of resultant GM crops while Europe will become the dominant producer 
of labour-intensive sunset technologies (Weatherspoon, et al., 1999). Such a result 
seems unacceptable from the point of view of the 1994 White Paper.
Joly and Lemarie (1998) have argued that Europe is already at a competitive 
disadvantage in GM crop technologies targeted at production-improved varieties and 
due to cumulative innovation effects it is unlikely to catch up (Joly and Lemarie,
1998). From a competitiveness position, the solution is more direct promotion of GM 
crop development focused on output-improved varieties, Bio-Engineered products and 
genomics. Indeed, a recent industrial initiative in France has the mandate of closing 
the technology gap. The GenoPlante Initiative is targeting the development of GM 
varieties of rice, com, wheat and colza, which are important crops in French 
agricultural production. Through this initiative public research (INRA, CIRAD, 
ORSTOM, CNRS) is co-ordinated with private research efforts (LimaGrain/ 
BioGemma and Rhone-Poulence). If successful, it can be expected that this type of 
initiative will also be adopted at the EU level (Joly and Lemarie, 1998).
Along with France, other member states also have biotechnology promotion 
initiatives (Financial Times, 20 April 1999). For instance, in 1995 the UK launched 
the ‘Biotech Means Business’ initiative followed up in 1998 by the £13 million pound 
BioWise program designed to encourage industry to use biotechnologies. It has been 
estimated that up to 1998, the UK has spent £176 million through the Biotechnology
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and Biological Sciences Research Council (Sheppard, 1997). The dominant 
biotechnology program in Germany has been BioRegio an initiative that provides 
matching Federal-Lander funds for start-up biotechnology companies. However, in 
late 1999 Germany announced a new initiative, the ‘BioProfile Programme’ which 
aims to spend DM100 million on the promotion of Germany biotechnology to 
establish Germany as the European leader in the field (AgraFood Biotech No. 18,
1999).
There are also several organisations actively promoting agricultural 
biotechnology in the EU. This includes: EuropaBio; European Science Foundation 
(ESF); European Molecular Biology Organisation (EMBO); and the European 
Federation of Biotechnology (EFB).
The EU promotion of GM crop development has, however, come under 
pressure from critics. Mindful of the implications of a loss in consumer confidence, 
the European Commission has recently suggested that it may cut the overt support to 
GM crop development because of consumer concern. Spending will continue in 
support of basic biotechnology techniques and procedures.
The EU is certainly behind North America in the commercialisation of GM 
crops. Yet, significant research efforts, both public and private are underway to close 
this gap.
7.2.2 The EU Regulatory System
It has been argued that the European regulatory approach reflects an 
accountability tradition of government regulatory intervention dominated by concerns 
over the democratic accountability of the discretionary decision-making power of 
regulators (Majone, 1994). In achieving accountability, regulatory decision-making 
resides with elected public officials. As a result, regulatory development and 
administration is very much subject to the day-to-day public interests dominating the 
concerns of elected officials.
Both food safety and environmental protection regulations in the EU have 
always pursued a dual objective: to ensure the free movement of products in the 
internal market while protecting consumers and the environment. Yet, there are 
important differences between food safety and environmental protection regulations. 
The legal basis of EU food safety regulations is derived from Article 100a of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Communities in which facilitation of the internal
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market is the primary objective. On the other hand, the legal basis of environmental 
protection regulations tends to be Article 130r Title XVI Environment of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Communities in which protection of the environment is 
paramount, not facilitating the internal market. Hence, while food safety regulations 
are compelled to be market sensitive, environmental protection regulations are not. It 
will be argued that this difference in the legal basis encourages a shift in European 
GM crop regulations from food safety justifications to environmental protection 
justifications subject to less common market requirements.
It is important to place the development of both food safety and environmental 
protection regulations in the context of the 1985 White Paper on the Internal Market. 
This paper proposed to remove the politics from regulatory convergence among 
member states. In this sense, the food safety and environmental protection regulations 
for GM crops, based on consumer fears and subsequent political actions conflicts with 
the EU new approach to regulatory integration seeking to eliminate the politics from 
European regulatory development.
Policy development may be characterised according to a three-step procedure. 
The Commission initiates, the community debates and the Council, and increasingly 
the Parliament, decides (Phillips, 1991). Article 155 of the Treaty of Rome authorises 
the Commission to “formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt 
with in this treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Commission considers it 
necessary”. According to Article 149 the Commission then takes an active role in 
formulating policy development at all three stages. Under Article 145, however, it is 
the Council which has final decision-making power, generally based on council 
consensus although voting procedures may apply. Hence, the Council can override the 
Commission and enact any regulatory approach it likes.
There are competing views on the nature of regulatory decision-making in the 
EU. On one hand, it is argued that the decision-making is narrow and technocratic and 
focused only on facilitating the internal market, with little scope for broader 
participation. On the other hand, it is argued that this is an oversimplification of 
European governance and that the case of biotechnology policy making demonstrates 
the significant political influence of social concerns in regulatory development 
(Landfried, 1997).
Given this regulatory context, the objective now is to identify the development 
of GM crop regulations in the EU. It is important to note that there were, and continue
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to be, divergent views between Member States and the EU services and also divergent 
views within the various services of the EU on the opportunities and risks of 
agricultural biotechnology. These divergent views have been crucial in the regulatory 
development process. With respect to divergent views of Member States, there have 
been several cases where Members have imposed unilateral moratoriums on the field 
trial plantings of GM crops. While these instances will be examined in greater detail 
below it is important to note that membership in the EU has meant that members lose 
the sovereign right to impose unilateral regulatory actions, and the legality of these 
moratoriums is in doubt.
The first European policy proposal dealing with biotechnology regulations was 
developed by DG XII in 1978. This proposal was for a binding Council Directive that 
would require all biotechnology research and other work to notify and seek 
authorisation from the competent national authority, who in turn would advise DG XII 
on approvals in order to build up a base of biotechnological knowledge about risks, 
problems and experiences. This proposed directive was notable for three reasons.
First, it employed the scientific interpretation of the precautionary principle which was 
also recommended in the 1976 US NIH guidelines. That is, controlled laboratory 
research was permitted even though the risks were uncertain because such research 
would produce risk information leading to a better understanding of the risks.
Second, the proposed directive was horizontal in nature, applying to the 
process and production methods of all biotechnology research regardless of the 
proposed or intended end-use. The reason for horizontal guidelines was to create an 
essential minimum requirement for research activities across all Member States. Yet, 
this proposal was in conflict with the NIH guidelines that suggested there were no 
significant risks associated with the use of biotechnology, rather the risk was linked to 
the proposed end-use. The NIH recommended product-based regulations while the 
proposed directive was for technology-based regulations.
Third, the proposed directive allowed competent authorities in each Member 
State to approve or reject research initiatives, rather than centralising decision-making 
at the EEC level.
In 1980, the directive proposal was replaced by a proposal for a non-binding 
recommendation adopted by the Council in June 1982 as the Council 
Recommendation Concerning the Registration o f Work Involving Recombinant 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid. The proposed directive was softened to a non-binding
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recommendation in reaction to the relaxation of guidelines by the NIH. Essentially, 
the scientists active in the nascent research on biotechnology projects realised that 
previous, precautious assumptions about the risks from genetic modification were 
exaggerated, and guidelines and recommendations were relaxed.
From a regulatory perspective, DG XII’s 1983 report Biotechnology in the 
Community, was notable for two reasons. First, the report did not explicitly call for a 
horizontal regulatory policy for biotechnology, which was part of the 1982 Council 
Recommendation. Instead, it supported the product-based regulatory approach which 
appeared favourable to competitiveness in the US. Second, anticipating the public 
response to modem biotechnology, it sought “to ensure regulatory provisions to 
maintain national standards of public safety; and to this end, to monitor the social 
dimensions of biotechnology” (European Commission, 1983). Including the vague 
reference to the social dimensions of biotechnology is essentially how many actors 
gained direct participation in the regulatory process. That is, the scientific and 
technocratic participants were joined in the decision-making process by social 
interests such as consumer and environmental organisations who claimed to represent 
the social dimensions of biotechnology.
In 1986, the Commission submitted a Communication to the Council entitled A 
Community Framework for the Regulation o f Biotechnology (European Commission, 
1986). This communication was the EC response to the OECD recommendation on 
how to deal with biotechnology regulation. It called for a “clear, rational and evolving 
basis for biotechnology regulation” and for regulatory harmonisation of the EC 
regulations with other countries. Indeed, it may be argued that North American and 
European regulatory approaches to biotechnology shared regulatory principles and 
were, at this point, on a similar trajectory. The focus on product-based regulations, the 
scientific interpretation of the precautionary principle and the jurisdiction of existing 
regulatory frameworks were supported by the OECD and other international 
organisations. At this point, international harmonisation appeared to be a real 
possibility. This was not to last. Internal European conflicts significantly challenged 
the regulatory principles. These conflicts existed between Member States, between the 
European Parliament and the Commission and between directorates within the 
Commission.
In 1987 the European Parliament’s Viehoff Report made recommendations on 
appropriate regulations for environmental release of genetically modified organisms
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(European Parliament, 1997). This report was an initiative of the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Energy, Research and Technology, and the rapporteur was 
Phili Viehoff. Six Parliamentary Committees were involved: Environment and 
Consumer Protection; Economic Affairs and Industrial Policy; Agriculture and Food; 
Energy, Research and Technology; Social Affairs and Employment; Legal Affairs and 
Citizens’ Rights. The report recommended that the “Commission give priority to 
studying the problems posed by the potential release into the environment of 
genetically engineered natural micro-organisms” and demanded a moratorium on such 
releases “until binding Community safety directives have been drawn up”. The report 
also called for the harmonisation of Member States’ procedures for risk assessment in 
order to establish common environmental protection measures.
The Viehoff Report was notable for several reasons. First, the range of 
parliamentary committees involved, indicative of the broad range of consumer 
concerns, established a precedent for what was meant by the social dimension of 
biotechnology. Second, the report’s recommendations explicitly suggested that 
technology-based, binding Community directives were necessary, rather than a 
patchwork of national regulatory approaches. Community regulatory harmonisation 
and centralised decision-making was viewed as the only appropriate way to deal with 
the transnational uncertainties and risks associated with the environmental release of 
genetically modified materials. In fact, this was a direct attempt to prevent unilateral 
member state action, in favour of a co-ordinated Community regulatory approach. 
Third, the report focused directives on Community environmental safety and health, 
rather than on facilitating the Single Market. This was a crucial development, as will 
be shown, because the report provided a foundation for DG XI (Environment) to argue 
- * that regulatory precaution must be according to the social interpretation of the
precautionary principle and that the legal basis of horizontal biotechnology directives 
must be Community protection under Article 130r of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Communities. The report called for a moratorium on research until binding, 
harmonised and horizontal directives were in place. Therefore, the Viehoff Report 
departed significantly from the scientific rationality regulatory trajectory of product- 
based regulations employing the scientific interpretation of the precautionary 
principle. Indeed, this report represented first move towards the social rationality 
trajectory.
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With respect to the inter-Commission conflict, it has been argued that it was 
due both to genuine differences in regulatory ideology and philosophy and to 
territorial disputes between vertical regulatory jurisdictions (Patterson, 2000). In terms 
of ideological and philosophical differences DG III (Industry), DG VI (Agriculture) 
and DG XII (Science, Research and Technology) all supported the scientific 
rationality regulatory principles adopted in the NIH guidelines, and supported by 
Canada and the US. Further, with respect to regulatory integration, these directorates 
tend to reflect the economic integration approach. For instance, a November 1999 
European Commission Report by DG II (Treasuries and Financial Affairs) claimed 
that agricultural liberalisation, not protectionism, is the way for developed countries to 
experience substantial welfare gains and improvements in environmentally sound and 
sustainable agriculture (European Commission, 1999). The client base of these 
directorates was mostly industry and hence, commercial objectives remained 
influential. This is not to suggest, however, that these directorates were not interested 
in protecting human and environmental health and safety. They simply perceived that 
the potential risks or hazards were from products, not from technology.
On the other hand, the ideology and philosophy of DG XI (Environment), with 
support from DG XXIV (Consumer), favoured a social rationality approach to 
regulating risks, employing new horizontal directives that cut across the various 
mandates and jurisdictions of vertical directorates. Further, wide actor participation 
was supported in regulatory decision-making in order to preserve the focus on the 
social dimensions of biotechnology. The social interpretation of the precautionary 
principle was to be employed to ensure the highest level of consumer and 
environmental protection in the face of speculative risk or uncertainty. This regulatory 
philosophy was congruent with the Viehoff Report and, hence, enjoyed significant 
support from the European Parliament. Since the client base of the two directorates 
included consumer and environmental NGOs, an important objective of the regulatory 
focus was on assuaging public concern and fear by creating the impression that 
biotechnology was well controlled in both the food supply and in the environment 
(Patterson, 2000). In essence, the regulatory focus was on consumer perceptions of 
risk rather than hypothetical risk demonstrated through scientific risk assessment 
procedures.
In terms of the territorial disputes across vertical regulatory jurisdictions, it has 
been argued “no DG wanted to cede autonomy and regulatory authority to another DG
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in an area which they believed fell squarely into their policy domain” (Patterson,
2000). Yet since biotechnology is a process facilitating product development across a 
wide spectrum of product categories, jurisdictional overlap was inevitable.
There were several inter-Commission initiatives established to deal with 
jurisdictional overlap and to facilitate improved regulatory co-ordination within the 
Commission. As a response to the 1983 Commission report on European 
competitiveness in biotechnology, the Biotechnology Steering Committee (BSC) was 
established in 1984 (Cantley, 1995). There were four directorates which initially 
participated; DG III, DG VI, DG XII and DG XIII (Information, Market and 
Innovation), however, participation was open to all DGs where concerned. 
Administratively, DG XII chaired the BSC while the directorate’s Concertation Unit 
for Biotechnology in Europe (CUBE) was the secretariat. DG XI became involved in 
the BSC when potential environmental risks were identified and discussed. 
Characteristic of all discussions about biotechnology, the topics covered by the BSC 
were of a very technical, scientific nature. In order to effectively deal with the 
technical nature across the various regulatory jurisdictions the BSC formed the 
Biotechnology Regulations InterService Committee (BRIC) (Cantley, 1995).
Despite the differences between the European Parliament and the Commission 
and the differences within the Commission, the need to develop integrated, 
Community-wide measures clarifying the use of biotechnology remained. In fact, 
three horizontal directives were being developed in the late 1980s. The first two 
legislative efforts were focused on establishing measures for the contained use of 
genetically modified micro-organisms to ensure protection of human health and the 
environment. These legislative efforts resulted in Council Directive 90/219/EEC of 23 
April on the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms (European 
Commission, 1990a) and Council Directive 90/679/EEC on the protection of workers 
from the risks of exposure to biological agents (revised by Council Directive 
93/88/EEC). The third legislative effort resulted in Council Directive 90/220/EEC of 
23 April 1990 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified 
organisms (European Commission, 1990b). The focus of the following discussion will 
be on Directives 90/219 and 90/220.
With respect to Directive 90/219 both DG III and DG XI were responsible for 
developing the legislation, that is they were co-chef de file. The importance of chef de 
file lies in the fact that the DG, in developing the legislation, is responsible for setting
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the policy parameters, such as the legal basis for the legislation. Further, the chef de 
file then presents the draft directive to the corresponding Committee at the Council of 
Ministers. Recall that there were significant philosophical differences between the 
directorates regarding the regulation of biotechnology. Reconciling these differences 
required compromise. For example, DG III and DG VI were both initially successful 
in exempting specific product categories traditionally under their jurisdiction from the 
draft directive. That is, 90/219 would only apply to those products not covered under 
existing product legislation. However, the efficacy of the compromises was limited by 
the fact that DG III had much less resources to devote towards the legislative 
development than did DG XI (Cantley, 1995). There are two results of this. First, DG 
XI changed the legal basis of the directive from Article 100a of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, to Article 130r. Second, DG XI dropped the 
compromise with DG III and DG VI to exclude traditional product categories. These 
unilateral amendments prevailed because the draft directive was then put before the 
Council of Minister’s Committee of Environmental Ministers. Therefore, despite the 
fact that the directive is supposed to represent the entire Commission, in reality 
directives can be dominated by particular directorates and their philosophies, which is 
then supported by the corresponding committee at the Council (Patterson, In Press). 
Indeed, it has been argued that even the inter-service BRIC had little influence upon 
the final directive because neither it, nor the BSC were decision-making bodies, they 
were only consultative groups which could be, and were ignored (Cantley, 1995).
The final Directive 90/219 was focused on protecting Community health and 
the environment from the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms. 
Similar to the 1976 NIH guidelines, 90/219 divided risks into two groups. Also, new 
facilities must notify competent national authorities of their intention to conduct 
genetic modification research so that the authorities can ensure that appropriate 
protection measures are in place and that DG XI is notified. The directive also 
permitted Member States to consult as widely as deemed appropriate to incorporate 
the social dimension in research approvals. Finally, the directive contained provisions 
about mandatory responses to emergency situations1.
The Directive 90/220 on the deliberate release into the environment of 
genetically modified organisms was intended to provide a comprehensive horizontal
1 For a legislative summary see: www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/121157.htm
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regulatory oversight ensuring uniform internal market conditions while promoting 
human and environmental health in all Member States. The scope of the directive was 
plants, animals and micro-organisms where environmental release for either field 
testing or commercial applications required an environmental risk assessment. It 
shared many developmental aspects with 90/219, except for one major difference; DG 
XI was sole chef de file for this legislation. The legal basis of 90/220 was also 
changed from Article 100a of the Treaty Establishing the European Community to 
Article 130r (Patterson, 2000) and there were no product exemptions from the final 
legislation despite some early compromises. The importance of this development lies 
with the fact that this directive also established the measures relevant to placing 
products made from GM crops in the European marketplace. Similar to 90/219, both 
DG III and DG VI sought product exclusions from the draft directive. The original 
compromise excluded product categories such as medical products, veterinary 
products, animal feeds and foodstuffs from the horizontal legislation because they 
were subject to risk assessments according to specific European product legislation 
(European Commission, 1988). However, this compromise was dropped and the 
relevant clause was changed in the Directive to read:
Consent may only be given for the placing on the market o f  
products containing or consisting o f GMOsprovided that...the 
products comply with the relevant Community product legislation 
and the products comply with this part o f the directive, 
concerning the environmental risk assessment (European 
Commission, 1990b).
Therefore, GM products faced regulations from both vertical product legislation and 
from the horizontal regulations under 90/220 before they could be placed on the 
market (Patterson, In Press). Similar to Directive 90/219, Directive 90/220 was also 
presented to the Council’s Committee of Environment Ministers. The Directive 
outlines that:
Any person wishing to undertake a deliberate release o f a 
genetically modified organism (GMO) must submit a notification 
to the competent authority o f the Member State within whose 
territory the release is to take place. This notification shall 
include a technical dossier o f information including a full risk 
assessment, appropriate safety and emergency response measures
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and, in the case o f products, precise instructions and conditions 
for use2.
Further, according to both the Directives, once a product is approved under either 
90/219 or 90/220 a GM product cannot be restricted, prohibited or impeded by 
individual Member States for deliberate environmental release or market placement.
The original Directive 90/220 had two important exemptions. First, it did not 
include products derived from GMOs, only live GMOs. It was intended that vertical 
or sectoral legislation would be developed to deal with products derived from GMOs. 
Second, the directive did not initially mention labelling requirements for the 
consumer’s right to know. The regulatory requirements for labelling and packaging 
were amendments to the directive.
It is important to note that neither 90/219 nor 90/220 considered any risk 
category as being so great as to require a moratorium. It has been argued that this 
meant that despite the strong environmental influence the directives did not accept 
speculative risk as a basis for regulations and, hence, did not go as far as many 
environmental NGOs would have liked (Wheale and McNally, 1990). In this sense, 
although the original directives supported precaution in the application of 
biotechnologies, they did not support an outright ban. With respect to precaution, 
Article 16 of 90/220 allows Member States to unilaterally impose a provisional ban 
given “justifiable reasons to consider that a product which has been properly notified 
and has received written consent under this directive constitutes a risk to human health 
or the environment, it may provisionally restrict or prohibit the use and/or sale of that 
product in its territory”. An amendment to Directive 90/220 which proposed a five- 
year partial moratorium on environmental release was defeated by a margin of only 
one vote in the European Parliament in June 1989 (Schmid, 1989; Dickman, 1989). 
Also, the report by the European Parliament’s Committee on the Environment called 
for strict legal liability applying to firms conducting deliberate releases. This would 
mean that any individual or organisation claiming for damages due to environmental 
release would not have to prove that the responsible agent acted negligently. Instead, 
the claimant simply has to show that the damages were caused by the actions of the 
releasing agent (European Parliament, 1989). The logic behind this, is that those 
releasing GMOs, knowing that they are subject to strict liability laws, would be more
2 Legislative summary: www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/121158.htm
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diligent in ensuring that the release is safe. This type of liability is similar to US 
liability. In fact, this amendment was supported by a 1989 report of the UK Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution which went further by recommending also 
that released GMOs should contain a unique and publicly registered genetic marker so 
that the source of organisms in the environment can be readily identified (Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1989). Therefore, at this point, the EU 
regulatory approach still reflects aspects of the scientific rationality paradigm.
Another crucial criticism of both directives is that neither included provisions 
for the public dissemination of information nor provisions for public inclusion in the 
decision-making process (Haerlin, 1990). Therefore, despite the explicit broadening of 
the remit of the directives to include the social dimensions of biotechnology and the 
provisions for Member State consultation on approvals, there was still significant 
dissatisfaction with the degree of public input in the approval process.
With respect to 90/220, the entry point for seeking EU approval is through a 
competent national authority of a Member State, known as the rapporteur, chosen by 
the company making the submission. The competent authority must review the 
application including the technical dossier with the full risk assessment within thirty 
days and provide a direct recommendation to the Commission for approval or 
rejection along with an application summary. The Commission then circulates the 
rapporteur’s recommendation along with the application summary to Member States 
for a sixty-day comment period. Member States may hold public consultations to 
discuss the application. In the event of approval by all Member States, the rapporteur 
grants deliberate release or product placement consent to the applicant. In the event of 
rapporteur approval but a rejection by another Member State, the Commission takes 
the final decision according to an Article 21 Committee of qualified majority voting. 
Consent is binding on all Member States.
The two Council Directives, 90/219 and 90/220 were met with significant 
criticism from scientists, industry and from trading partners, especially the United 
States. Scientific communities claimed that after nearly two decades of research, there 
was no evidence that rDNA techniques were associated with an increased level of risk 
and hence, there was no justification for technology-based regulations. Moreover, they 
claimed that both directives were based on non-scientific criteria and were unduly 
burdensome to the research process (Cantley, 1995). Essentially, the scientific 
community argued that scientific rationality should prevail over social rationality.
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Industry participants were also very critical of the horizontal, technology- 
based directives. In June 1989, several pioneering biotechnology firms in Europe 
formed the Senior Advisory Group on Biotechnology (SAGB) in order to lobby at the 
European level for legislation conducive to biotechnology research and development 
(Patterson, In Press). Although the SAGB was unsuccessful in altering the directives, 
it was notable for its horizontal lobby efforts. This group was especially concerned 
with the scope of regulatory consultation beyond a science-basis.
Other countries, especially the United States, were concerned about the 
significant departure of the EU regulatory approach from the regulatory principles 
supported by the US, along with Canada and the OECD. Both directives represented a 
deviation from the initial similar regulatory trajectory developed in North America 
and within several international organisations (Chapter 5.2.6). The worry was that 
divergent approaches would yield divergent regulatory outcomes whereby products 
approved for deliberate release and commercial use in one jurisdiction, would not be 
approved in another jurisdiction. Indeed, this worry has become reality for GM crops 
approved as safe in North America.
In response to the negative reaction in 1990, the Commission established 
another inter-service body to consider the criticisms and to reform and co-ordinate the 
EU biotechnology policies. The Biotechnology Co-ordinating Committee (BCC) 
identified that the directives lacked focus on commercial issues relating to the 
functioning of the internal market. Essentially, the competitiveness issues associated 
with biotechnology were identified. This was outlined, for example, in two papers. 
First, was a communication from the Commission to both the Parliament and the 
Council entitled Promoting a Competitive Environment for Industrial Activities Based 
on Biotechnology within the Community (European Commission, 1991), largely 
drafted by the BCC. There were three main goals:
1. to ensure a coherent regulatory approach and an efficient and simplified 
interaction between sectoral and horizontal legislation (to eliminate the 
dual regulations)
2. to ensure existing legislation is kept under review to reflect rapid 
developments and technical and scientific progress
3. to streamline testing and authorisation procedures required for biotech 
products
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The second paper was the 1994 White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, and 
Employment (European Commission, 1994) which included biotechnology as a key 
sector. This paper called for
1. constant review of the dynamic developments
2. regulatory harmonisation with established international practice
3. greater public investment
Yet, critics argued that these two papers placed too much emphasis upon 
competitiveness, and too little emphasis upon the ‘social dimensions’ of 
biotechnology. For instance, it has been argued that governments within the EC are 
too focused on international competitiveness and are devising their science and 
technology policies to meet this goal. As a result, the public sector is claimed to be too 
involved with the private sector in promoting biotechnology and the traditional public 
protection roles are forgotten (Haerlin, 1990).
The pressures for regulatory approaches that facilitate international 
competitiveness remained very strong. Hence, given the negative reaction from 
scientists, industry and trading partners and given the apparent adverse impacts upon 
European competitiveness, reform of Directive 90/219 became a priority of the 
Commission and the remit of the BCC. Inter-service consultations were held as well 
as consultations with industry, environmental groups, scientific organisations and 
trade unions. The first amendment to 90/219 was drafted by the BCC and became 
Council Directive 94/51 /EC (European Commission, 1994). This amendment was 
very contentious. The amendment was designed to facilitate greater European 
competitiveness in biotechnology. The Commissioner for the Environment, Ritt 
Bjergaard was displeased with the focus on competitiveness and the internal market. 
She drafted her own proposed amendments, which were much more sympathetic to 
consumer concerns about safety and environmental protection, regardless of the risk 
basis for these concerns. In fact, this proposal very much reflected a social rationality 
approach to regulating technology. This proposed amendment was presented to the 
College of Commissioners. This led to a counter proposal by DG-III and DG-XII, 
which was passed by vote in December 1995.
The second amendment to 90/219 was Council Directive 98/81/EC of 26 
October 1998 (European Commission, 1998). The objective of this amendment was to 
reconcile 90/219 with the scientific knowledge and expertise of the risks that had been
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acquired since the directive first came into force. There were three main amendments3. 
First, the administrative procedures for applying for and receiving approval for 
contained research were simplified. Second, the requirements for notification were 
linked to the graduated scale of risk, essentially making low risk research much easier. 
Third, based on the significant accumulated knowledge about GMOs, a list of GM 
micro-organisms that pose no risk to human health or the environment was included in 
the legislation.
In June 1994, the Commission announced its intention to review 90/220 
however, this intention did not enjoy the same urgency as 90/219 for two reasons.
First, DG-XI was sole chef de file of this directive and did not share a passion for 
‘competitiveness-based’ regulations. Second, at this time, there was little European 
experience with deliberate environmental release of GM crops since their 
development was not as advanced as in North America.
The timeliness of the policy issue seemed to be farther off. The first 
amendment to 90/220 was Commission Directive 94/15/EC of 15 April 1994 
(European Commission, 1994). Similar to the amendments of directive 90/219, the 
first amendment was motivated by desires to increase the focus of the directive on 
European competitiveness in biotechnology and on enhancing the internal market.
An important issue for the market placement aspects of 90/220 is labelling 
issues. The labelling of products derived from GMOs was, and remains an important 
social issue in Europe. The initial position of the EU on the labelling of the approved 
varieties of GM soya was that mandatory “labelling is only necessary when the final 
product has been substantially modified, which is not the case with ‘Round -up- 
Ready’ soya” (World Food Chemistry News, 1996). Further, according to the 
labelling policy the consumers’ right to know was not considered an appropriate 
justification for a mandatory labelling scheme covering GM soya that was approved as 
safe because it was deemed substantially equivalent to non-GM soya. There was 
considerable dissatisfaction among consumer organisations, retailers and industry 
regarding the lack of concern for the consumers’ right to know whether GMOs had 
been used in the product. These groups demanded a mandatory labelling policy for the 
consumers’ right to know about the use of biotechnology in final goods, regardless of 
the safety or substantial equivalence of the GM product.
3 For a legislative summary: www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/121157.html
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The regulatory reaction to these demands was the Novel Foods Regulation 
(EC) No. 258/97 (European Parliament, 1997). This regulation took four years to 
develop and was the first community-wide labelling legislation primarily focused on 
the consumer’s right to know. The intent of the Novel Foods Regulation was to 
broaden EU regulatory oversight to include products derived from novel GM material, 
not just products containing viable novel GM material. This was a product-based 
regulation where the assessment of safety remained the jurisdiction of 90/220, the 
Novel Foods regulation was only for mandatory labelling requirements. This 
regulation was intended to fast-track regulatory approvals by increasing the 
transparency, certainty and stability of European regulations for Novel Foods. Further, 
there was considerable support for the Novel Food Regulations in both the European 
Council and the Parliament (World Food Chemistry, 1996).
As the name indicates, the Novel Foods Regulation was intended to deal with 
novel foods and food ingredients “whose nutritional value, metabolism or level of 
undesirable substances had been significantly changed by the production process”. 
Such products were required to be labelled where the label must include: reference to 
how the product had been changed to make it novel; the presence of ingredients that 
might affect health (e.g. allergens); the presence of ingredients that might give rise to 
ethical concerns; and the presence of a genetically modified organism to meet the 
consumers’ right to know. The attempt was to develop scientifically based mandatory 
labelling requirements consistent with international obligations and designed to 
convey neutral and transparent information about novel products. Specifically, with 
respect to the presence of novel GM material, mandatory labelling was required where 
the presence of modified protein was certain or where its absence could not be 
certified (as in the case of non-segregation). The Novel Foods Regulations encouraged 
the voluntary labelling of products that certainly do not contain novel GM material. 
And, similar to 90/220 Article 16, the regulations allow Member States to impose a 
unilateral ban “if new information or a reassessment of existing information suggests a 
risk or hazard to either human health or the environment”.
However, there are two important aspects of the original Novel Foods 
regulations. First, the regulation is not applicable to food additives, flavourings or 
extraction solvents, which all may be GM material, because other community 
legislation dealt with these issues. Second, as discussed in Chapter 2.1.1 GM crops 
can be novel plants or alternatively they could be non-novel and substantially
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equivalent to non-GM crops. As a result, the Novel foods directive did not explicitly 
address the consumer’s right to know about the use of GM crops in foodstuffs, only 
the use of novel GM crops.
The second amendment to 90/220 represents DG XI’s reaction to the Novel 
Foods Directive. The second amendment was Commission Directive 97/35/EC of 19 
June 1997 (European Commission, 1997) enacted under DG XI’s emergency 
allowance to amend community legislation. Annex III of the directive sets labelling 
and information notification requirements for all products made from GM material, 
whether novel or not. This Annex was essentially designed to override the vertical 
product legislation on Novel Foods developed by DG III, with the horizontal 
regulations of 90/220. DG XI aimed to fill the gaps by requiring mandatory 
technology or process-based labelling of all GM products approved for market 
placement in the EU, not just for novel products, by calling for mandatory labelling of 
GM products approved after 18 June 1997. DG XI wanted specific labelling rules for 
foods produced from GM crops, not just general labelling rules for all novel foods 
because novel foods are not necessarily foods produced from GM crops. Further, 
under Directive 97/35/EC firms were encouraged to voluntarily adopt the labelling 
requirements laid out in this directive for products made from the GM soya or maize 
crops approved prior to the 18 June 1997. Essentially, Annex III o f90/220 shifted the 
mandatory labelling policy from a novel, product-based focus to a technology-based 
focus. Then in September 1997, Council Regulation 1813/97 was adopted, effective 1 
November 1997, which required mandatory labelling for the GM soya and maize. 
Thus DG XI used this amendment to dominate European product legislation with the 
horizontal biotechnology regulations.
The third amendment to Directive 90/220 was IP/97/1044 of the 26 November 
1997. This was another labelling amendment which was focused on establishing the 
precise requirements referred to in the emergency Directive 97/35/EC. It included 
specific and mandatory label content rules.
Together, the Directives 90/219, 90/220 and the Novel Foods regulations are 
the three principle legislative texts dealing with GM crops in the European Union. 
However, there are other important regulations to identify, such as the general EU 
labelling laws as well as vertical, product legislation relevant to GM crops.
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Council Regulation 1139/98: The Soya/Maize Regulation
The broad context of European foodstuff labelling law is outlined by the 
Council Directive 79/112/EEC (European Commission, 1979). This directive is 
intended to harmonise the legislation on the mandatory labelling of foodstuffs so as to 
ensure that products can move freely in the internal market and that consumers are 
informed and protected. The directive outlines that the label must contain, among 
other information, a list of the product ingredients; a requirement that is relevant for 
GM foods. In fact, follow-up work on the directive has been driven by continued 
concern with the use of GM soya and maize not considered novel and approved prior 
to the 18 June 1997 date established by the amendment to 90/220. Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 1139/98 (European Parliament, 1998) was established to replace the ad hoc 
measure Council Regulation 1813/97. It addresses the mandatory labelling of certain 
foodstuffs produced from GMOs, where certain foodstuffs are those containing DNA 
resulting from genetic modification techniques, instead of the protein requirement 
outlined in the Novel Foods Regulation. It supported earlier efforts to develop 
mandatory labelling requirements for the consumers* right to know. The regulation 
claims that mandatory labelling requirements are “necessary to ensure that the final 
consumer is informed of any characteristic of food property, such as composition, 
nutritional value or nutritional effects or the intended use of the food, which renders a 
food or food ingredient no longer equivalent to an existing food or food ingredient”.
In other words, this labelling legislation was increasingly shifting to the social 
rationality paradigm, although it maintained the substantial equivalence principle.
Regulation 1139/98 requires harmonised rules for the additional and specific 
labelling of foods and food ingredients produced from GM soya or maize, and that 
still contain GM DNA or rDNA. Under the regulation the following indications must 
appear on the label4:
1. ‘produced from genetically modified soya (maize)’ where the product consists of 
more than one ingredient
2. ‘contains ingredients produced from genetically modified soya (maize)’ where an 
ingredient is designated by the name of a category
However, the statement that a product ‘may contain GM material’ was determined to 
be unacceptable.
4 From legislative summary: www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/121090.html
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Similar to both the directive 90/220 and the Novel Foods Regulations, the 
Soya/Maize regulation does outline possible exemptions from harmonisation. For 
instance, it permits Member States to unilaterally derogate from the requirements in 
order to protect human health, the environment or industrial or commercial property.
At the 21 October 1999 meeting of the European Council’s Standing 
Committee for Foods, two notable amendments to the Soya/Maize regulation were 
approved (World Food Law Monthly No. 19, 1999; EU Food Law Monthly, 1999). 
First, with respect to labelling, the official EU policy on mandatory labelling is for the 
consumer right to know about the presence of GM material in food products. Key to 
such a mandatory labelling regulation is the tolerance level for ‘adventitious 
contamination’ which is the acceptable presence of a maximum amount of detectable 
GM material where over that amount a product would have to be labelled as 
containing GM material. The Committee approved a 1% tolerance threshold and a 
commitment to review the tolerance level as new detection technology is developed 
and comes into use. These were approved with a vote of 14/15 in favour (with one 
abstention, Spain). The European Parliament was dissatisfied with this Committee’s 
approvals for two reasons. It wanted to see the regulation establish a specific risk 
assessment procedure attached to labelling approval and it pursued a 0.1% threshold 
level (European Parliament, 1999); a level also supported by non-governmental 
environmental organisations such as Friends of the Earth. Inversely, the Confederation 
of Food and Drink Industry wanted a 02% threshold level. By comparison, Japan 
recently approved a mandatory labelling law with a tolerance threshold of 05% of 
adventitious contamination.
The second amendment to the Soya/Maize regulation was the addition of GM 
derived additives and flavourings included under the mandatory labelling scheme (EU 
Food Law Monthly, 1999). This proposal was approved with a vote of 12/15 (with 
two against; France and Spain and one abstention; Ireland). The key to this 
amendment is that GM derived additives and flavourings must be labelled if they:
1. are, contain or consist of GMOs;
2. give rise to particular safety (allergy) or ethical concerns;
3. are not equivalent to their conventionally produced counterparts (i.e. when 
containing protein or DNA resulting from genetic modification); and
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4. are used in ‘sufficient quantity’ where sufficient quantity is likely to mean 
01% threshold of adventitious contamination as well (European Parliament, 
1999).
In this sense, the regulation is entirely focused on the process and production methods 
of the final food products.
Council Directive 94/114/EC (Amended 70/524/EC)
DG VI has also developed product legislation relevant to agricultural 
biotechnology. First is the development of a Novel Feeds Directive, under the Council 
Directive 94/114/EC outlining the measures governing the proper use of animal feeds. 
The motivation for this legislation is derived from the fact that over 80% of the soya 
imported into the EU goes into animal feedstuffs and given the significant proportion 
of soya that is GM, it is clear that animal feedstuffs include GM soya along with non- 
GM soya. The amending regulation 70/524/EC introduced new categories of feed 
additives including feed containing or consisting of GMOs. This legislation is unique 
because it is a process or technology-based regulation implemented in a vertical 
regulatory agency.
Second, DG VI is developing a Novel Seeds Directive which is a proposed 
product legislation pertaining to the release of GM agricultural crops. Decision 
94/730/EEC established simplified procedures for the release of GM agricultural 
crops, while Commission Directive 98/95/EC of 14 December 1998 established terms 
and conditions for the Community wide seed registry for GM varieties of crops in 
official categories.
EU Regulatory Administration
Administratively, DG XI is the responsible institution for the horizontal 
regulations 90/219 and 90/220, including all amendments. In reality, DG XI is the 
dominant actor in the EU regulatory approach and hence, it is reasonable to assume 
that Community consumer and environmental protection will remain crucial 
regulatory objectives despite the competitiveness pressures from DG III, VI and XII.
Along with DG XI, the regulatory role of DGXXIV has also increased. The 
Consumer Policy and Health Protection Directorate administers the relevant consumer 
health and scientific committees which advise in regulatory development. The 
relevant expert advisory committees for GM crops issues include:
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1. Scientific Steering Committee, which oversees all of the expert scientific 
advisory committees;
2. Scientific Committee for Foods;
3. Scientific Committee for Plants;
4. Scientific Committee for Animal Nutrition; and
5. Scientific Committee for Pesticides.
For instance, the Scientific Committee on Plants is responsible for the technical issues 
relating to plants for human or animal consumption, production or processing of non­
food products as regards characteristics liable to affect human or animal health or the 
environment, including pesticides. The Directorate’s Consumer Action Plan 1999- 
2001 has four objectives. First, the development of a community-wide scientific basis 
for regulatory development under recognised risks. Second, when risk are unknown, 
regulatory development should employ the precautionary principle. Third, regulatory 
development must involve consultation with the Institute for Health and Consumer 
Protection. Fourth, food safety policy should include broader social and ethical 
considerations. The problem with first two objectives is their ambiguity. They do not 
specify the type of unknown risk, hypothetical or speculative. If the focus is on 
unknown but hypothetical risks, then the subsequent interpretation of the 
precautionary principle would be the scientific one. On the other hand, if the focus is 
on unknown but speculative risks, then the interpretation of the precautionary 
principle would be the social one. The remaining two objectives address ‘social 
dimensions’.
Both DG III and DG VI remain responsible for their relevant product 
legislation, however, as was shown with the amendment to 90/220 following the 
Novel Foods regulations, DG XI’s horizontal directives must be considered as 
dominant to the vertical product legislation.
The European Parliament must be considered as an increasingly important 
actor in EU regulatory development as well. For instance, in 1998, the Parliament 
voted 407 to 2 to censure the Commission’s approval of a European variety of GM 
maize and to suspend imports of all GM maize. In late 1999, the Parliament 
Environment Committee Chairperson, Caroline Jackson, released a resolution (14 
December, Strasbourg) calling for joint EP and Council of Ministers decision-making 
power on issues pertaining to GMO regulations. The basis is that the Parliament is the 
only directly elected body which gives it authority over issues of public concern.
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However, like other EU development, this resolution further politicises the issue of 
food safety in the EU.
All the directorates are subject to the advice and guidance of various 
committees (Nature Biotechnology, 1996). Community rules on consumer protection 
and food safety issues are subject to the advice of the Scientific Committee for Food. 
Established under Commission Directive 97/579/EEC (European Commission, 1997), 
this committee is charged with providing excellent, independent and transparent 
advice to the Commission. The committee must be consulted on consumer health and 
food safety issues by the Commission. However, the committee may also, on its own 
initiative provide advice to the Commission on regulatory issues considered within its 
remit.
Along with the Scientific Committee for Food is the Advisory Committee for 
Foodstuffs established under Commission Decision 80/1073/EEC (European 
Commission, 1980). The Advisory Committee is charged with ensuring the close co­
operation between the Commission and all relevant Community stakeholders in food 
law issues. Similar to the Scientific Committee, the Advisory Committee is either 
consulted by the Commission, or it provides the Commission with advice on issues 
relating to the harmonisation of all foodstuffs legislation. The fact that the Advisory 
Committee was established two decades ago, indicates the commitment of European 
food legislation to the whole range of consumer interests and concerns. An important 
difference with the Scientific Committee is that the Commission is not legally 
required to consult the Advisory Committee, because the advice is not considered to 
be independent like it is with the Scientific Committee.
Member States’ scientific bodies may also provide advice and guidance to the 
Commission on issues of food legislation through the framework established by 
Council Directive 93/5/EEC (European Commission, 1993). The competent national 
authority must send to the Commission a list of institutes in the Member States that 
may provide technical assistance in areas including biology, mircobiology, 
biotechnology and novel foods and processes, methods of analysis, risk assessment 
techniques.
Current Regulatory Developments in the EU
On 23 February 1998, the Commission presented a proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council Directive again amending Directive 90/220 (European
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Commission, 1998). The aim of the proposal is two-fold. First, to make the procedure 
for granting consent to the placing on the market of GMOs more efficient, certain and 
transparent for industry. Second, to make the procedure more accountable and open, 
including greater public access to the decision-making process, in order to build 
public confidence.
There are several industry-oriented proposed revisions. First, the proposal 
provides for the establishment of harmonised Community-wide methodologies for risk 
assessment for environmental release; currently under the discretion of the rapporteur 
country. Key to this harmonised risk assessment is the specification of two categories 
of releases. Category I releases are those, in compliance with Annex V, for which 
there is sufficient knowledge about the safety for human and environmental health and 
if the release is similar to previously approved releases that have not shown evidence 
of risk. Notification would be made only to the competent authority of the releasing 
Member State and an annual register of all Community-wide notifications for 
Category I releases would be published. Under the proposal, the competent authority 
must respond to the Category I notification within 30 days, however, it is unlcear 
whether or not the notifier must await formal consent before release. Category I 
releases resemble an approval fast-track procedure, similar to the USDA’s non­
regulated status. Category II releases are for GMOs for which there is not sufficient 
prior risk information or regulatory experience. Second, the proposals also include 
clarifying the type and quantity of technical information required for an application 
such as personnel training and supervision, monitoring schemes and emergency 
response plans. Third, timetables for either approving or rejecting applications are set 
out, in order to prevent the endless regulatory hold-up that currently burdens the 
approval process of GM crops. Fourth, the duplication of regulations under both 
horizontal and vertical regulations is to be removed, so that a risk assessment 
performed for one, is acceptable for the other.
There are also several proposed consumer confidence-oriented revisions of 
90/220. First, is to include a fixed time market approval period, after which approval 
would have to be renewed. A current time period under consideration is seven years. 
Second, a potential revision is the compulsory monitoring of all approved products. 
Third, the proposal includes a mechanism to allow approvals to be modified, 
suspended or terminated where new risk information becomes available. Fourth, 
approvals by the Commission could be overturned by the Council of Ministers by a
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simple majority vote on the recommendation of the relevant scientific committee, such 
as the Scientific Committee for Food. In fact, the proposals include mandatory 
consultations with the Scientific Committee for Food prior to any Commission 
approval. Fifth, the proposed amendments include a provision for full legal liability 
legislation for damages caused to human or environmental health. This was proposed 
because several Member States have developed or are developing their own liability 
laws for the environmental release of GMOs in order to create a credible incentive for 
private firms to minimise the release risks. Sixth is a proposed amendment to make 
consultations with the EU Ethics Committee and the broader public mandatory prior 
to any approvals.
The proposed amendments to 90/220 attempt to strike a very delicate balance. 
On one hand, they seek to create a streamlined, stable and certain regulatory process 
with a scientific basis on hypothetical risk and the removal of regulatory duplication. 
On the other hand, despite the attempts to establish a rules-based approach, the 
approval process has also become more politicised with Parliamentary voting for 
approvals and Council voting for the withdrawal of approvals. But can regulations be 
everything to everyone?
On the 11 February 1999 the European Parliament approved the proposals 
with 68 amendments. The amended proposal was presented to the Council for the 
establishment of a common position on 26 March 1999 (European Commission,
1999). These proposed changes are indicative of the politicisation of the 
biotechnology issue and the desire to regulate agricultural biotechnology according to 
its social dimensions.
More recently, EU environment ministers claimed that they have agreed on 
several aspects of the proposed amendments. First, they are all in favour of 
eliminating the fast-track procedures proposed under the dual category notification 
requirements. Second, they want a negative list of GM applications that can never be 
approved in the EU, including GM crops that use antibiotic resistant marker genes. 
Third, they have agreed to a moratorium on new commercial authorisations of GM 
crops while amendments to 90/220 are being made. Some Members, such as 
Denmark, France, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg argue that the moratorium should 
remain at least until amendments can be transposed into Member State legislation, a 
process expected to take until 2002 (Financial Times, 25 June 1999). Other Members 
have been hesitant to endorse this position because of concerns over its legality both at
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the European Court of Justice and at the WTO (Independent, 25 June 1999). Recall, 
the position of the Environment ministers is crucial, because DG XI is the co-chef de 
file of the Directive and will take the amendment to the Council Committee of 
Environment Ministers for approval. However, from a commercial perspective, 
regardless of the official status of the moratorium, there is in essence a de facto ban on 
approvals anyway because there is currently not enough support in the European 
Council for a majority approval. Further, once the Ministers have agreed to the 
reforms, the amended legislation will then be put to the European Parliament for 
endorsement before it can become community law (Financial Times, 24 June 1999). 
The European Parliament included 39 amendments to the proposed directive most of 
which were accepted by the Commission in the fall 1999.
In January 2000, the EU Council of Ministers released its ‘Common Position* 
on the various amendments to the directive 90/220, although France, Ireland and Italy 
abstained from the Common Position (AgraFood Biotech No. 20, 2000). The Council 
accepted all proposals from the Parliament including some which were not accepted 
the Commission. Of particular note is acceptance of the Parliament’s interpretation of 
the precautionary principle (Article 17) which is essentially a legal definition of the 
social interpretation. The Common Position also indicates that an EU export and trade 
position will not be defined until after the January negotiations of the Biosafety 
Protocol (see Chapter 4.2) in order that the directive is consistent with international 
agreements. This is an important development because the EU trade position is 
explicitly linked with an international environmental agreement, rather than a trade- 
oriented framework supported in North America.
With respect to mandatory technology-based labelling rules for products 
derived from GM material, Community sectoral legislation for GM seeds, animal 
feeds, and pesticides are being developed in order to extend the mandatory labelling 
requirements into a more comprehensive framework based on the consumers’ right to 
know.
An alternative to the mandatory labelling of products that contain GM 
material, is the Community-wide development of a voluntary labelling scheme for 
organically produced products. Indeed, despite the controversy associated with the 
mutual exclusivity of organic and GM crops the Commission is pursuing ‘organic’ as 
an alternative to foods that may have been produced from GM crops. The Commission 
is currently developing a certification framework, in light of the consumer concerns
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with GM crops, to ensure that the organic label is used properly and consistently. The 
EU approach is based on Council Regulation 2092/91 which defines when farm 
produce may be labelled as organic and when produce may carry an EU organic 
quality mark or label. This regulation was amended in November 1992 Council 
Regulation 3713/92 requiring an inspection certificate to accompany organic food 
imported into the EU. This raises important trade issues when the definition of 
‘organic’ means something different in another regulatory jurisdiction.
There are also two proposed EU institutional arrangements that could each 
play an important role in the regulatory system governing GM crops. The first is the 
European Foods Standards Agency (EFSA) and the second is the European Veterinary 
and Phytosanitary Inspection and Control Agency (EVPICA). The EFSA remains a 
vague proposal and the scope and depth of its regulatory authority currently remain 
unresolved. On one hand, some argue that it must be a transparent European 
institution with real regulatory power and transnational decision-making ability (EU 
Food Law Monthly No. 95,1999). Others argue instead that it should be a forum for 
reconciling differences in Risk Analysis between Member States, but not a substitute 
for independent Risk Analysis in the Member States. The implication of this is that 
politics will remain inextricably linked to the development of food safety and 
environmental protection legislation in the EU. In fact, with respect to the proposed 
EFSA, the EU food safety commissioner David Byrne recently noted that 
responsibility for political decisions such as the detail and application of the 
precautionary principle, will remain with politicians (Eurofood, November 1999). Of 
course, according to the social interpretation of the precautionary principle, precaution 
is a political decision however this is in contrast with the scientific interpretation of 
the precautionary principle employed in North America which attempts to disentangle 
precaution for safety from precaution for political reasons.
The second proposed institutional arrangement which would have significant 
influence over GM crop regulations is the European Veterinary and Phytosanitary 
Inspection and Control Agency (EVPICA) (Horton, 1997). The objective of the 
EVPICA would be to enforce EU regulations in the plant and animal health fields.
The new agency, already approved by the Council, would be located in Ireland and 
would take over the present inspection activities of DG-VI in other member states and 
in countries who export to the EU. Like the European Medicines Evaluation Agency
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in London, the new EVPICA would be independent of other European Institutions 
such as the Commission or the Council.
In the fall 1999, the Commission proposed a Draft White Paper on Food Safety 
indicating the political priority that food safety has become on the European 
regulatory agenda. Indeed, it can be expected that the White Paper on Food Safety will 
represent a strong European food safety message in order to gain public confidence in 
the regulatory system. For instance, among the notable public-oriented proposals of 
the White Paper are:
1. the creation of a European Food Safety Agency;
2. changes to the system of scientific advice from the various advisory 
committees;
3. increased and mandatory traceability in the entire European food chain; and
4. the creation of a rapid alert food hazard warning system.
With respect to the creation of a EFSA, as previously discussed, the scope and the 
depth of the agency remain undecided and a bit controversial. For instance, it has been 
noted that the consumer directorate (DG XXIV) is not keen on an independent agency 
with real authority as it would overlap the consumer directorate’s jurisdiction (EU 
Food Law Monthly No. 95, 1999). With respect to the changes to the standing 
advisory committees, these committees are currently composed of officials from 
member states who vote on key food issues pertinent to their particular remits. The 
proposed changes would see the creation of a single standing committee for all food 
issues, or at most two standing committees (food and animal nutrition & health).
An important EU regulatory development with respect to the market access of 
GM crops occurred in late 1999. The EU Environment Commissioner (DG XI),
Margot Wallstrom, signalled that she would ask EU member governments to break the 
de facto EU moratorium on GM crop approvals and authorise 18 GM crop varieties 
currently help-up in the EU regulatory system. The condition on the approvals is that 
the applicant Life Sciences firms must voluntarily agree to adhere to the proposed 
amendments to directives 90/220, 258/97 and 1139/98 even though they have not yet 
been enacted. In fact, the Life Sciences firms have readily accepted the conditions 
(EU Food Law Monthly No.95, 1999). If member governments fail to agree to lifting 
their unilateral bans, then the EU may find itself compelled to take legal action against 
the bans, which is not a desirable situation.
246
There are several areas where further EU regulatory development is likely to 
occur. First, it may be expected that the Soya/Maize Regulation will be extended to 
apply in full to all GM crops commercialised in the EU. Second, given the unilateral 
Member State action, it is likely there will be pressure for the development of a 
centralised regulatory review-process although the extent that risk assessment and risk 
management are both centralised at the EU level remains unknown. Third, an 
important aspect of a mandatory labelling policy is the clarification of acceptable, 
standardised and accurate test methodologies for adventitious contamination. As well, 
standardised enforcement and monitoring protocols must be established.
7.3 Agricultural Biotechnology in the United Kingdom
In this section is an examination of the regulatory approach of the United 
Kingdom because it has experienced the most recent and dramatic rise of consumer 
concern about GM crops and subsequent pressure to adapt the regulatory approach to 
social issues.
7.3.1 The United Kingdom
The regulatory approach to biotechnology in general and agricultural 
biotechnologies in particular in the UK had initially been very proactive and appeared 
to be effective at balancing technological progress with precaution. Despite the 
apparent effectiveness, the regulatory approach has been heavily criticised by social 
interests such as consumer and environmental organisations, generating public doubt 
about its ability to protect consumers and the environment. In fact, it will be argued 
that social interests have pulled the UK regulatory approach off its initial scientific 
rationality trajectory and towards a social rationality trajectory. The result has been 
the creation of significant regulatory instability in the UK.
There are two sections to this discussion. First is an examination of the 
evolution of the UK regulatory approach and a discussion of its current structure. 
Second, is a simultaneous examination of the dramatic rise in consumer concerns 
about GM crops in the UK and the regulatory changes and proposals that have come 
about because of the dramatic rise in concern and opposition.
A. UK Regulatory Approach
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The first UK advisory group for biotechnology regulations was the Genetic 
Manipulation Advisory Group (GMAG), established in 1975. The GMAG was under 
the jurisdiction of the Department of Education and Science and was responsible for 
monitoring research involving genetic modification techniques. The GMAG had focus 
on self-regulation (Patterson, In Press). The primary contribution of the GMAG was to 
establish a ‘graduated’ risk assessment scheme for various types of rDNA research 
(Ager, 1990). The GMAG employed the scientific interpretation of the precautionary 
principle in an attempt to balance the need for control and the need for continued 
research. For instance, hypothetical risk assessments were precautionary in the sense 
that the parameters and assumptions about risk were deliberately risk averse, to ensure 
that they over-estimated risk. The GMAG relied upon a network of local biological 
safety committees to assess the risks of and to monitor rDNA experiments conducted 
within their jurisdictions.
The first regulatory oversight was under the Health and Safety at Work Act 
(HSW) 1974, which had general provisions that employers take those actions as 
reasonably practicable to protect employees and the environment. The Health and 
Safety Commission (HSC) of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) are the 
responsible agencies for ensuring that the provisions of the HSW 1974 are adhered to. 
In 1978, the Health and Safety (Genetic Modification) Regulations were developed 
under the authority of the HSW 1974. The regulations called for the mandatory 
notification for all contained genetic modification work to the Health and Safety 
Commission (HSC). These regulations continued the initial scientific rationality 
trajectory of GMAG.
In 1984, the GMAG was disbanded and replaced by the Advisory Committee 
on Genetic Manipulation (ACGM) under the authority of the Health and Safety 
Executive. The ACGM, although not under the direct jurisdiction of any government 
department, provided advice and information on technical and scientific safety issues 
associated with biotechnology. The ACGM developed guidelines for those researchers 
employing genetic manipulation techniques through working groups chaired by an 
ACGM member and composed o f ‘specialists’.
In 1989, the HSC issued new genetic manipulation regulations in order to deal 
with the imminent environmental release of GM material. The relevant regulation is 
under Part VI of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. The basis for the Act was the 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Chaired by Lord Lewis (Royal
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Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1989). The Act set provisions for the 
establishment of the Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment (ACRE) 
which is a statutory and independent committee of experts appointed by the Secretary 
of State. ACRE provides advice to the HSE and the relevant government departments 
and agencies on the environmental and human health and safety issues relating to the 
deliberate environmental release of genetically modified organisms5.
In 1991, the UK-based Council for Science and Society released its expert 
panel report on the benefits and risk of genetically engineered organisms (Fincham 
and Ravetz, 1991). The Council was established in 1973 to provide independent and 
authoritative expert advice for policy-makers and the public on the implications of 
scientific innovation on society. The report concluded that UK regulations had 
effectively managed scientific progress with social precaution; “the effectiveness of a 
proper attitude is confirmed by recent experience of planned releases. Where public 
concern has been respected, as in this country, there have been no problems; 
elsewhere the record is mixed” (Fincham and Ravetz, 1991). Of course, by the late 
1990s this conclusion was proven to be too premature.
The Deliberate Release Regulations under the Environmental Protection Act 
were amended in 1992 (SI 1992/3280) and 1995 (SI 1995/304) in order to transpose 
EU Directive 90/220 into UK legislation. These modifications required environmental 
risk assessment, notification, and consent from the Secretary of State for Agriculture 
prior to the release or marketing of GMOs. An advisory committee of scientific and 
medical experts, the Advisory Committee for Novel Foods and Processes (ACNFP) 
advises the Secretary of State on applications for consent.
In November 1994, the UK government held public consultations on plant 
biotechnology, administered by an independent steering committee established by the 
Science Museum, in order to gauge the social dimensions of biotechnology. The 
participants chose the questions to ask and the experts to pose them to. The final 
report was published through the British Biotechnology and Biological Sciences 
Research Council (Science Museum, 1994). The public technology assessment dealt 
with a wide range of concerns from human and environmental health and safety to 
socio-economic impacts, ethical and moral implications (Madden, 1995).
5 See www.environment.detr.gov.uk/acre
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Currently, the UK regulatory approach involves both the Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) and the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food (MAFF). The approach is co-ordinated by the Cabinet Sub- 
Committee on GM Technology. In order to release GM crops for field testing, a 
Deliberate Release Form must be secured from DETR who receives advice from the 
ACRE . The cost of each application is £3000. An application can be renewed or 
varied for a £700 fee, however, a variation cannot include a change in the size of the 
field trial or in the duration of the field trial. A recent Field Trial Consent for the 
planting of a herbicide tolerant rapeseed was revoked because it was found to have 
contravened the conditions of the variation process. Agrevo, the applicant firm, 
applied for, and received approval for the variation of a previous field testing consent. 
But Agrevo should have filed for a new Field Trial Consent, because the intended 
variations were both to increase the size and duration of the trial (Times, 18 
September 1999). Also providing environmental advice is English Nature, a 
government advisory body on general wildlife issues.
For commercial approval to use a GM crop in the food supply, the firm must 
apply to MAFF while the application is considered by the Advisory Committee on 
Novel Foods and Processes (ACNFP), which is the UK Competent Authority. This is 
the UK transposition of the Novel Foods Regulation 258/97. If the GMO is to be 
marketed alive or viable (e.g. a GM tomato) then additional approval must also be 
secured from the DETR, which is the UK transposition of the 90/220 Directive. In 
January 2000, the ACNFP and the Advisory Committee on Animal Feedingstuffs 
(ACAF) held a joint meeting to examine the overlap of their respective remits with 
respect to assessing novel foods and novel feeds, particularly GM foods and feeds. 
They agreed to develop complementary assessment approaches.
Finally, the labelling of novel products and products derived from GM 
material is under the jurisdiction of the Food Advisory Committee (FAC). In 1983, the 
Food Advisory Committee (FAC) chaired by Sir Colin Campbell, concluded that there 
was no justification to insist on labelling from a safety point of view, and it did not 
support labelling for the consumer’s right to know. Initially, the ACNFP was 
responsible for establishing UK labelling requirements for GM products according to 
the EU Novel Foods Directive. However, in early 1999, this responsibility was passed 
to the Food Advisory Committee. Anti-GM critics claimed that this proved the lack of 
expertise of the ACNFP, and thus signalled the incompetence of the UK regulatory
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system (Wadsworth, 1999). On the contrary, however, this was a reasonable decision 
because the remit of the ACNFP is to ensure the safety of novel foods, not to establish 
labelling policies predicated on the consumers’ right to know. Indeed, the former 
activity is a risk assessment function while the latter is a risk management function 
and the two should have been separated. In 1998, the UK developed a voluntary 
labelling scheme for producers to label foods containing GM DNA. In 1999, the 
government announced the schedule for mandatory labelling of food produced with 
GM material. Food retailers, such as supermarkets had to label the presence or 
possible presence of GM material as of 19 March while restaurateurs, cafe owners and 
landlords (e.g. pubs) had to do the same by 19 September 1999.
In 1997, the Centre for the Study of Environmental Change at Lancaster 
University argued that the UK regulatory approach “appears to be failing to reflect 
important public concerns arising from acknowledged uncertainties and unknown 
potential risks from the technology (however low their probabilities)” (Grove-White et 
al., 1997). To remedy this situation, it was suggested that the UK must actively 
consult the public through, for example, statutory obligations and that the Risk 
Analysis framework must be replaced with broad consultations based on ascertaining 
the social intelligence, not the scientific intelligence of risk.
The UK was the first country to approve a genetically engineered organism for 
use in the food supply (Harlander, 1993). The approval, in March 1990, was for a 
strain of bakers yeast (Saccharomyces cerevisiae) that produces elevated levels of 
carbon dioxide. Further, this GMO was determined to be substantially equivalent, 
hence, there were no labelling requirements. More specifically, with respect to 
approved GM crops, three varieties of GM crops have been approved including one 
GM variety of herbicide tolerant rapeseed and one GM variety of herbicide tolerant 
soybean and one GM variety of tomato have been approved for commercial release in 
the UK by the Department of the Environment on the basis of advice provided by the 
ACFNP6. The GM soybean, approved in 1994, was Monsanto’s herbicide tolerant 
‘Round-up-Ready’ variety. The basis for these approvals was very much the scientific 
rationality approach.
Yet, following the scientific rationality approach, the ACNFP has also rejected 
a commercial application for a GM maize. The Commission approval for Ciba-
6 Regulatory Developments in Biotechnology in the United Kingdom: www.oecd.org/ehs/ukreg.htm
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Geigy’s (now Novartis) GM maize was rejected in the UK by the ACNFP, even 
though it had been approved by the rapportuer country, France. The ACNFP rejected 
it over concerns regarding the use of the antibiotic resistant marker gene. The GM 
crop was rejected outright because it was felt that this was a safety issue, at least a 
secondary safety issue, in the sense that the use of antibiotic resistant genes in crops 
could add to the growing antibiotic resistance of pathogens harmful to human health. 
The ACNFP concluded that the GM maize was safe for use in food products where 
the GM DNA and protein would be processed out, however, with respect to use as a 
raw animal feed, there was recognised uncertainty about the safe use (ACNFP, 1995). 
Labelling was considered insufficient because antibiotic resistance affected all and 
was not a consumer choice or right to know issue. Despite this concern in the UK, the 
EU Scientific Committees for Food and for Animal Nutrition both assessed the risk as 
remote or virtually zero and approved the GM Bt maize for use in the food supply and 
as an animal feed. Labelling was insufficient because antibiotic resistance affected all 
and was not a consumer choice or right to know issue7.
There are two important developments in the UK regulatory approach. The 
first development is the formation of an industry association designed to proactively 
deal with consumer concerns about GM crops. The Supply Chain Initiative on 
Modified Agricultural Crops (SCIMAC) was informally developed in 1997 and 
formally established in June 1998. The three main objectives of the SCIMAC are to:
1. establish industry-wide protocols (Codes of Practice) for best practice in the 
commercial introduction of GM crops;
2. provide practical guidance to growers on the management of specific 
agronomic traits, such as herbicide tolerance; and
3. maintain an active and open dialogue on GM crop issues with other interested 
parties.
SCIMAC is composed of farmers, seed traders, agro-chemical firms, plant breeders 
and biotechnology firms and its creation was driven by the exogenous rapid adoption 
of GM crops in North America and the endogenous lack of public confidence in the 
UK regulatory system. The intent is to find the equitable balance in regulatory
7 See: Scientific Committee for Food (1996) Opinion of the Potential for Adverse Health Effects from 
the Consumption of Genetically Modified Maize. Expressed on 13 December 1996; and Scientific 
Committee for Animal Nutrition (1996) Report of the SCAN on the Safety for Animals of Certain 
Genetically Modified Maize Lines Notified by Ciba-Geigy in Accordance with Directive 90/220 for 
Feedingstuff Use. Expressed on 13 December 1996.
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approach between an industry led approach and a overly precautionary approach of 
most GM critics. The approach is based on the successful 30 year programme of 
preserving the purity and quality of certified seed. In other words, the need to preserve 
the identify of crops is not a new phenomenon, and sophisticated and successful 
strategies to achieve this have been in place for decades although the public were not 
aware of this. To date, several SCIMAC initiatives are worth noting. First, it has 
announced a voluntary moratorium on the commercial release of GM crops until such 
time as the government regulators have fully assessed the field trials for safety. 
Second, SCIMAC has developed a Code of Practice on the Introduction of GM crops 
for both field-testing and the future commercial release. Third, it has proposed a farm- 
scale ecological monitoring programme comparing GM and non-GM crops in 
intensive agricultural system in order to address the concerns of the most vocal anti- 
GM critics. This programme would be jointly administered by the DETR, MAFF, 
English Nature and the Royal Society of Plant Breeders.
The second important development in the UK regulatory approach is the 
imminent establishment of the Food Standards Agency (FSA). The FSA emerged out 
of the BSE crisis as an attempt to institutionally separate the functions of consumer 
protection and industry promotion. A public body of 12 independent members from 
public interest backgrounds will govern the FSA in an open, transparent and 
consultative fashion. The regulation of GM crops will fall under the jurisdiction of the 
FSA, rather than under the jurisdiction of DETR and MAFF. The FSA will implement 
and assess the safety of novel foods and processes and have approval authority over 
releases into the environment.
B. UK Opposition to GM Crops and Regulatory Responses
As a result of recent public resistance to GM foods, the UK regulatory 
approach has been reformed and amended in an attempt to stem the public concern. 
The opposition in the UK is extremely polarised with social interest organisations 
such as Friends of the Earth and the Soil Association arguing that there is no middle 
ground; the government must choose either GM crops or organic production. The key 
point is that the recent public resistance and put pressure on the UK regulatory 
approach to shift towards a social rationality approach.
Much of the public concern appears to have risen from claims made by Dr. 
Arpad Pustzai in August 1998 about the damage which GM potatoes had caused to the
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health of rats. Dr. Pustzai, a researcher at the Aberdeen Rowett Institute, was 
researching the effect of GM potatoes, engineered with a lectin protein from the 
snowdrop plant, on the health of rats. This research effort was driven by an apparent 
lack of scientific evidence on the health affects of GM crops. The early research 
results, reported by Dr. Pustzai, were that the GM potatoes damaged the immune 
systems, stunted the development of internal organs and led to defective brain 
development in the rats. After reporting his preliminary conclusions, Dr. Pustzai faced 
harsh criticism from the government, the Rowett Institute and from other scientists. 
The scientific criticisms were from those who believed that he broke the rules of 
scientific disclosure while the government felt that his preliminary comments 
undermined the public confidence in the regulatory approach. Dr. Pustzai’s 
conclusions became the justification for a broad range of concerns about the consumer 
and environmental impacts of all GM applications, rather than just concern about the 
safety of GM lectin potatoes.
Concerns about GM crops have produced a range of reactions from cautious 
acceptance to outright rejection across a broad range of groups. Environmental 
organisations include Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, Earth First!, This Land is 
Ours, English Nature, Gardeners GMO Group and the Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds. Consumer groups include the Consumers’ Association and 
Consumers’ International. Other organisations include the Soil Association, Christian 
Aid, the National Federation of Women’s Institutes and the British Medical 
Association. Also, notable opposition comes from both the Prince of Wales, a long­
time supporter of organic farming practices, and the Independent Newspaper with its 
‘Stop GM Foods’ campaign launched on 7 February 1999.
An interesting aspect of the opposition to GM crops or ‘Frankestein Food’ in 
the UK, is the portrayal of GM crops as ‘Monsanto’s science’8. Yet, some of the most 
advanced GM crop developers are European firms such as Agrevo (Germany), Astra­
Zeneca (UK), Hoechst (Germany), Novartis (Switzerland) and Rhone-Poulenc 
(France). In fact, the most controversial EU approval was for Ciba-Geigy’s (Novartis) 
GM maize and the ‘illegal’ field trials in the UK were undertaken by Agrevo.
8 See especially Independent (12 October 1999) ‘GM Foods: The Debate, A Special Report Produced in 
Association with Iceland’; and also Mail on Sunday (6 June 1999) ‘Up with Prince Charles’ Letter by 
Veronica Pride; The Express (18 September 1999) ‘Sound Taste in Food’; Independent on Sunday (3 
October 1999) ‘The Humbling of a GM Giant’ by Geoffrey Lean
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In February 1999, the UK government announced the mandatory technology- 
based labelling of the presence or possible presence of GM material in a food product 
for food retailers and small food service establishments. Food retailers, such as 
supermarkets had to label the presence or possible presence of GM material as of 19 
March while restaurateurs, cafe owners and landlords (e.g. pubs) had to do the same 
by 19 September 1999. While this was the UK’s transposition of the EU labelling 
requirements, it was also importantly driven by the severity of the domestic opposition 
to GM crops.
Opposition to GM crops also came in the form of commercial threats to those 
producers who might seek to plant them. For instance, the Soil Association warned 
that producers would lose their organic certification. In fact, a field trial of Agrevo’s 
GM rapeseed was destroyed by the farmer for this very reason (Metro, 8 June 1999). 
Also, the Institute of Chartered Surveyors advised farmers that growing GM crops 
could threaten the value of their land and put producers at risk of legal liability action 
in the event that environmental damage could be proven.
At the end of March, environmental protesters destroyed field trials of GM 
rapeseed in Devon, England. Such direct action occurred previously, in July 1998 in 
Oxfordshire, but was taken by a more radical environmental organisation GenetiX 
Snowball. The difference now was that the mainstream environmental lobby, not just 
the radical fringe, was willing to take direct action and destroy the field tests. For 
instance, Lord Melchett, the Chairman of Greenpeace was arrested for participating in 
the direct action. Lord Melchett defended the illegal action on the grounds that, 
basically, over a decade worth of lawful protest did not impose their beliefs on the 
regulatory approach and they were dissatisfied with this fact9. Despite the illegal 
destruction of GM crops and vandalism of agricultural lands, there has been little 
willingness for the authorities in the UK to seek prosecution against the ‘eco- 
warriors’.
In May 1999, the Commons Environmental Audit Select Committee, an all­
party committee examining environmental policies, recommended four immediate 
policy responses to the public concern. A moratorium on commercial plantings of 
GM crops, tighter rules on field trials, broader regulatory consultations encompassing
9 The frightening extension of a ‘Greenpeace Argument for Illegal Action’ is its adoption by other 
groups, such as right-wing fascist groups, that illegal action is acceptable if ten years worth of 
protesting does not impose their beliefs on the regulatory approach.
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ethical issues and more public funding of GM crop development to counter act the 
perception that it was a private technology (Financial Times, 14 May 1999; 
Independent, 14 May 1999). The basis for the recommendations was that the 
increasing public concern would create a loss of public confidence in the regulations. 
Therefore, in order to be socially responsive, this recommendation called for tighter 
regulations to assuage public concerns regardless of whether or not the concerns were 
driven by speculative risks.
In defence of the scientific UK regulatory approach, Profs. Janet Bainbridge, 
Chair of the ACFNP and John Beringer Chair of the ACRE testified to the Commons 
Science and Technology Committee that a ban on the field testing or commercial 
cultivation and sale of GM crops would not increase consumer and environmental 
safety. Instead, its only impact would be to severely impact the competitiveness of the 
UK GM technology industry (Independent, 18 March 1999).
In May, a government review of the UK regulatory approach was released.
The review was authored by England’s Chief Medical Officer Prof. Liam Donaldson 
and by Sir Robert May, the government’s Chief Scientific Adviser. The review 
concluded “there is no current evidence to suggest that genetically modified 
technologies used to produce foods are inherently harmful” (Financial Times, 22 May 
1999). However, it also called for the creation of two new advisory committees and a 
National Surveillance Unit to rebuild confidence in the regulatory approach. The two 
new advisory committees are the Human Genetics Commission and the Agricultural 
and Environment Biotechnology Commission. The key feature of there two new 
advisory committees is the deliberately broad participation base. The National 
Surveillance Unit is proposed to monitor the long-term health and nutritional impacts 
of GM material in the food supply. Critics of the review included the Consumers’ 
Association, which raised concerns about the review’s failure to deal with long-term 
risks, the British Medical Association and the Friends of the Earth, which called the 
report “miserably inadequate”(Daily Telegraph, 22 May 1999).
Also in May, the Royal Society, the UK’s senior scientific academy, 
announced that the independent review by six scientists of Dr. Pustzai’s research 
found that the conclusions claimed were not supported by the evidence. The Royal 
Society report concluded that the research was “flawed in design, execution and 
analysis” and that there was “an incorrect use of statistical tests”. It also concluded 
that no conclusions could be drawn about the safety of GM foods, in general, from
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research on one animal species, one type of food, one type of gene and one genetic 
transfer technique. Further, the report noted that the difficulty with scientific 
innovation is that “nothing can be absolutely certain in a field of rapid scientific 
technological development”. Yet, this uncertainty has given rise to public fear which 
has “been echoed, and sometimes cynically distorted, by tabloid newspapers and 
special interest lobby groups”(Daily Telegraph, 22 May 1999; Independent, 19 May 
1999).
In September 1999, Sir Richard Sykes (1999 President of the British Science 
Association) called for secret trials of GM crops in order to advance the technology 
while protecting it from direct, illegal action or vandalism. He argued that without the 
trials, Britain would fall behind in capacity and competitiveness.
In September 1999, Friends of the Earth successfully challenged the DETR 
over the field trial consent given to Agrevo for its GM rapeseed. Indeed, Agrevo had 
violated the conditions for when an applicant can make a variation to a Field Trial 
Consent, and when an applicant must make a new Field Trial Consent. When the 
illegal action was discovered, Agrevo had already planted three of four fields, and the 
intended fourth planting was put on hold. While admitting that Agrevo had violated 
the law, the Environment Minister (Michael Meacher) argued the previous three trials 
should continue because it was a technical error and not a health and safety issue. The 
reaction by the Friends of the Earth was that the UK government was willing to bend 
the law to support biotechnology companies (Times, 18 September 1999; The 
Express, 18 September 1999). Yet, the UK government has ‘bent the rules’ to the 
benefit of critics as well, as it has not pursued legal action against protesters who 
destroyed legal field trials of GM crops.
Also in September, Friends of the Earth announced that research by the 
national pollen research unit, in Oxfordshire, UK, has revealed that pollen from GM 
crops can be found up to three miles away from the field test site. At issue is not the 
fact that cross-pollination can occur, instead, it is what kind of tolerance is demanded. 
In Chapter 5.1.6 it was noted that there exists controversy between those who support 
zero tolerance and those who support some minimum tolerance of risk. Friends of the 
Earth, along with the Soil Association, support a zero tolerance policy and regard the 
research findings as completely unacceptable. In defending the regulatory policies, 
Prof. Allan Gray of the ACRE acknowledged that there is a minimum risk of cross­
pollination and that the field testing regulations were designed to minimise that risk to
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an acceptable level, not to eliminate it completely. Further, he points out that safety is 
the real issue, and since the GM crop is safe, there is no safety concern if it cross- 
pollinates.
The latest development in the research of Dr. Pustzai was the announcement 
by the British medical journal, The Lancet, that it will publish the complete study on 
the affects of GM potato consumption on the immune system of rats. This has been 
heralded as a vindication of Dr. Pustzai’s claims (Independent on Sunday, 3 October 
1999). Yet, far from a vindication of Dr. Pustzai, this represents a triumph of good 
science and an example of why the scientific methodology must be used in dealing 
with risk assessment. It has been noted that “good science is difficult to achieve, and 
bad science is all to easily hyped into a scare story” (Independent, 19 May 1999). The 
original evidence of harm was based on incomplete and impartial research findings 
and was subsequently denounced by other scientists. In this case, Dr. Pustzai has 
provided The Lancet with the complete research which has been peer-reviewed and 
found to be credible. Yet, as noted by the Royal Society, the fact remains that this is 
research about one genetic transformation technique on a potato and from a specific 
plant (snowdrop) not currently used on any commercialised GM crops. It is not 
evidence that GM techniques in general are unsafe.
In October, the UK government announced an initiative to embark on broad 
participation negotiations on the future regulatory approach to GM crops, including 
the participation of consumer and environmental groups, the biotechnology firms and 
government (Independent on Sunday, 10 October 1999). In fact, regulatory 
development in the UK can be expected to be focused on assuaging public concerns 
about GM crops through the risk management procedure of Risk Analysis, rather than 
through the hypothetical risk assessment process. For instance, the regulatory 
negotiations are to be facilitated by the Environment Council with a view to finding 
common ground between the supporter and critics, a political balance.
On the 13 October 1999, the government announced that the ACNFP will 
routinely disclose non-commercially confidential information on novel foods under 
assessment on a web-site, prior to making its recommendations. Further, once an 
assessment is complete, there will be a public comment period before it is forwarded 
to the European Commission. This is development is aimed at enhancing the 
transparency of the assessment process and to ensure that the UK recommendation on 
novel foods reflects public concerns more fully.
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On 5 November 1999, the UK Environment Minister Michael Meacher 
announced that instead of a ban on commercial plantings, a voluntary agreement with 
the GM crop developers and seed companies to resist commercial-scale plantings until 
2002, at the earliest, had been reached. The industry was represented by the Supply 
Chain Initiative on Modified Agricultural Crops (SCIMAC), developed a ‘Code of 
Conduct’ for producers using GM crops. The Code of Conduct includes advice on the 
distances at which GM crops must be grown from either non-GM or organic crops. 
Further, these voluntary guidelines are underpinned by Technology Use Agreements 
between the GM seed companies and the farmers. This agreement allows for four full 
years (1998 -  2002) of field trial evidence to be collected and assessed. However, GM 
crops grown elsewhere, and approved as safe in the UK will be allowed to be 
imported and used in the food supply.
Therefore, the UK regulatory approach, initially on a scientific rationality 
trajectory, can be expected to focus primarily on the speculative risks fuelling public 
resistance to GM crops as it shifts to a social rationality approach. The implication of 
this shift is that as long as GM crops remain a highly politicised issue in the UK, the 
regulatory approach will remain unstable and unpredictable. The paradox is that 
attempts to answer the very questions about GM crops that the critics are basing their 
resistance on are being thwarted by vandalism in the name of ‘direct action’. Indeed, it 
appears that the critics are willing to undermine due scientific process because of the 
threat that it will contravene their interests in the exact same way that they accuse 
multi-national biotechnology firms of doing.
7.4 EU-Member State Regulatory Integration
The EU-Member State strategy for regulatory integration, according to the 
‘new approach’, is a strategy of deeper social integration blending regulatory co­
ordination with regulatory competition. The basis of this strategy is the establishment 
of minimum essential requirements (MERs), harmonised across all Member States.
For controversial issues, the minimum essential requirements may be decided by the 
Council of Ministers or by the European Court of Justice (Woolcock, 1996). An 
important feature then is that in the absence of agreement among all Member States, 
the EU MERs are top-down regulatory principles imposed on the Member States.
On this foundation, is a process of ex ante regulatory co-ordination through 
mutual recognition. This has been an effective strategy for removing the politics out of
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many regulatory integration efforts, however, this strategy has not been successful in 
all areas, especially GM crops regulations.
When Member State regulatory action contravenes policy positions of the EU 
the European Commission may bring legal action against the member state in the 
European Court of Justice. The member may be ordered to pay fines for failing to 
comply with community rules. Lister argues, with respect to food safety regulations, 
that the European Court of Justice has made it clear that “by becoming members of 
the European Community, Member States had given up their sovereign authority to 
write food laws as they saw fit. Rather, they had only limited ability as member states 
to restrict marketing within the EU of foods so long as they meet minimum essential 
requirements” (Lister, 1992).
The possibility of Member State regulatory divergence has been exemplified 
by Austria and France who have both imposed unilateral bans on GM crops which 
have been determined to be unjustified at the EU level. For instance, Austria imposed 
unilateral bans on Ciba-Geigy’s (Novartis) GM Bt maize in December 1996 and on 
Monsanto’s GM Bt maize (MON810) in May 1999 on the basis of evidence presented 
to the European Commission’s Scientific Committee for Plants. This evidence 
allegedly indicated a link between GM maize and environmental damage and the 
action was taken under Directive 90/220’s Article 16. In October 1999, the Scientific 
Committee ruled that Austria’s ban is not justified under Article 16 and Austria will 
be expected to lift the ban; although no time frame is set for this. Similarly, in an 
opinion, the ECJ indicated that the French ban on GM Bt maize is unjustified. Also, 
the recent French refusal to endorse the safety of British Beef despite the 
endorsements by Britain and the European Commission is indicative of member state 
regulatory divergence. When France first refused to lift their ban, the European Food 
Safety Commissioner (David Byrne) threatened legal action in the European Court of 
Justice. In response, French health scientists presented new proof to the European 
Commission’s Scientific Experts and the 12 member BSE Working Group, that 
apparently supports their claim that British beef is still not safe. Faced with new 
evidence, the Commission stepped back from its legal action threat and announced 
that it would review the new evidence. The review concluded that the scientific 
evidence presented by France was insufficient justification for the continued ban. The 
intransigence of the French has led to doubts in Germany about the safety of British 
beef as the German Health Minister (Andrea Fischer) announced that Germany would
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also review the new evidence before lifting its ban. So whose science is right? British 
beef producers, confident of the safety in their beef staged boycotts of French products 
and dock-side embargoes of French food imports, which were successful on the 11 
October 1999. And ever responsive to commercial opportunities, UK supermarkets 
announced particular initiatives to show support for British farmers and to capture 
positive media attention, similar to their anit-GM positions. The UK-based National 
Farmers Union has suggested that the ban is nothing more than regulatory 
protectionism and that the “so called new evidence was nothing more than a sham, a 
charade and a complete work of fiction”10.
In short, unlike the degree of regulatory integration between Canada and the 
US based on shared regulatory principles, regulatory integration between the EU-level 
and Member States is not necessarily a foregone conclusion because the approaches 
can differ significantly. For instance, the examination of the EU, the UK and the 
Danish regulations reveals that the EU regulations sit somewhere in between the 
regulatory approaches of the two Member States. The social interpretation of the 
precautionary principle in Denmark could easily produce domestically transposed 
regulations far more stringent and technologically precautious than found in the UK, 
despite the fact that they are based on the same EU directive. In this sense, it is 
inaccurate to think of the ‘EU* as a homogenous regulatory jurisdiction. Instead, 
awareness of the limitations of EU-Member State regulatory integration is crucial.
7.5 Conclusions
The EU regulatory approach is summarised in Table 7.1. The most important 
point is that despite an initial scientific rationality trajectory, internal factors have 
caused the EU approach to shift to a distinctly social rationality trajectory built on the 
tradition of regulatory accountability or political control over discretionary regulatory 
decision-making. The dominant actors are DG XI and DG XXIV, the environment and 
consumer directorates, respectively. This means that social interests, the clients of 
these directorates, can be expected to exert more influence over the EU regulatory 
development process than economic interests. The regulatory belief is that with social 
regulations it is not possible to disentangle actual from perceived risks according to a 
scientific rationality paradigm. Instead, perceived risks are a legitimate regulatory
10 Ben Gill, NFU President quoted in Times (9 October 1999) ‘Climbdown on Beef Threatens Fresh 
Crisis’ by Martin Fletcher and Valerie Elliot.
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target despite the lack of scientific justification for such a perception. For example, in 
1997 the EU approved GM maize initially approved by the rapporteur member,
France. However, in the meantime, French elections brought in a new political 
administration less supportive of GM crops. The new Prime Minister overruled the 
recommended approval of the French competent authority, causing the chair of the 
authority to resign (Nature Biotechnology, 1997). Currently, four GM crops 
applications have been approved as safe by scientific committees but have been 
rejected by politicians fearful of the public backlash, should they endorse the GM 
crops11. In fact, in November 1999, EU member governments voted against the 
scientific approvals for commercial introduction. The vote was taken in an Article 21 
committee and the rejection was based on a claim that more information was required 
(Public Ledger No. 72 139, 1999). It has been argued that in general, the perception of 
‘technocratic’ decision-making in the EU is incorrect because social dimensions have 
been a significant part of biotechnology policy in the EU (Sclove, 1996). Landffied
(1997) argued “the diverse mixture of national, supranational, technocratic and 
political interests within the Commission, Council, Parliament and committees”. 
Moreover, it has been argued that GM crops have become enmeshed in the political 
and social world of European food politics where social interests exhibit relatively 
more policy power than in North America.
The process o/*[food safety] policy formation in Europe is a 
considerably more complex and nuanced system than appears to 
be the case in the USA. The power o f vested interests and social 
democratic impulses makes the final policy position taken in 
Europe a far less scientific and rigid proposition than is expected 
in the Sanitary andPhytosanitary Agreement ...[which] ... 
contains a rather fundamentalist model o f regulation that is out o f 
kilter with the political economy o f regulation in a European 
environment (Evans, 1999).
And that, in general, “Europe has a history of prohibiting new food technologies that 
are used widely in America” (Economist, 14 September 1996).
Further, the EU regulatory approach is technology-based according to 
dominant horizontal regulations employing the social interpretation of the
11 These crops include: Monsanto’s GM sugar beet and Maize, along with two varieties of GM oilseed 
rape developed by Agrevo.
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precautionary principle. For example, in May 1999 the Commission decided to freeze 





90/219/EEC of 23 April 
1990
On the Contained Use of Genetically Modified 
Micro-Organisms
Covers any contained use of genetically-modified 
microorganisms (GMMs), both for research and 
commercial purposes;
Annex I contained the crucial definition of 






90/220/EEC of 23 April 
1990 and Directive 
94/15/EC
On the Deliberate Release of Genetically 
Modified Organisms into the Environment 
Covers experimental and marketing-related 
aspects of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs), which covers any R and D release of 
these organisms into the environment and 
contains a specific environmental risk assessment 
for the placing of any product containing or 
consisting of such organisms onto the market
Implemented DG-XI
Reg 258/97/EC, May 15, 
1997
Regulation on Novel Foods regulates the placing 
on the market of foods and food ingredients for 
human consumption containing, consisting of, or 
derived from GMOs. However, Novel Foods 
Directive still granted ‘essential equivalence’
Implemented DG-III
Annex III of the 90/220 
as amended 18 June 
1997
Sets labelling and new information notification 
requirements for all new GMO approvals for 
putting products on the market in the EU. This 
annex superseded the Novel Foods directive by 
eliminating the essential equivalence, and making 
all GMOs subject to labelling.
Implemented DG-XI




Proposed that authorisations to place GMOs on 
the market, issued under 90/220, be valid for a 
period of seven years only; if the authorisation is 
not renewed after the seven-year period, the 
product must be withdrawn from the market
Pending, 








Feeding stuffs. This amendment introduced new 
categories of additives, including, among others, 
additives containing or consisting of GMOS into 
the existing legislation: the amendment will enter 
into effect as of 1 October 1994
Implemented DG-VI
Decision 94/730/EEC Establishing simplified procedures for the release 
of genetically modified crop plants (first 
simplified procedure)
Implemented DG-VI
Directive 98/95/CE, 14 
December 1998
Establishes terms and conditions for the 
registration of GMO varieties in official 
catalogues; specifies that GMO varieties must be 
indicated in catalogues
Pending DG-VI
Table 7.1 EU Agricultural Biotechnology Regulations
The EU regulatory system also provides for wide actor participation in the 
regulatory decision-making to ensure that the social dimensions of agricultural
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biotechnology have been addressed. It has been argued that in 1991, the development 
of EU agricultural policy was difficult because of the involvement of agriculture and 
budget, foreign and trade ministers (Phillips, 1991). With GM crops, consumer, 
environmental, technology and industry ministers can also be added to this mix, 
further complicating policy development. Also, labelling is based on the consumer’s 
right to know whether GM material has been used in the production of all food and 
feed products, regardless if they have been approved as safe and substantially 
equivalent.
Given the mix of horizontal and vertical legislation, the breadth of regulatory 
participation and the uncertainty surrounding the many proposals for revision, the 
current EU regulatory framework for GM crops is enigmatic and unstable. Essentially, 
the EU is attempting to redesign the regulatory system to meet the spectrum of 
concerns from scientists and industry about R&D and competitiveness to the whole 
range of consumer interests and concerns. Further, it must do this with the highly 
politicised issues associated with agricultural biotechnology specifically and with the 
food safety and environmental issues in general. As a result, legislative amendments 
are made incrementally, while the regulatory principles remain in tact.
There are three important aspects of the EU regulatory approach to consider. 
First, the EU regulatory approach is unstable leading to significant commercial 
uncertainty. As social interests tend to hold the balance of power in the regulatory 
development process EU regulations are unstable as they react to perceived public 
risks in order to be accountable and socially responsible. Indeed, GM crop 
applications, approved in North America, in compliance with EU regulations and in 
fact approved by European scientific committees have been rejected by politicians 
leaving the application in a suspended state of regulatory hold-up.
Second, the EU approach has created a regulatory floor not a regulatory 
ceiling. That is, Member States, according to Article 130r Title XVI Environment of 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community, can and do unilaterally impose 
national regulations more stringent than corresponding Community regulations. For 
instance, the UK, France and Denmark have called a partial halt on GMO approvals, 
while France, along with Austria, Greece and Luxembourg have imposed unilateral 
bans on certain new crops. Austria has also imposed both a complete ban on the 
commercial release of GM crops and a complete ban on the patenting of life. This 
action was driven by a public petition endorsed by 20% of the electorate (Ho, 1998).
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Yet, if Member State legislation is in contravention of EU law, then why doesn’t the 
Commission challenge the legality of this action before the European Court of Justice? 
Several cases have indeed gone before the ECJ12 but essentially the social rationality 
approach and the politicisation of the GM crops issue combine to ensure that although 
Member States are in contravention, the Commission simply lacks the political 
support to pursue regulatory integration through legal channels. The result is 
fragmentation of the Single Market and considerable uncertainty surrounding the 
approval of GM products in Europe. Therefore, while the European ‘New Approach’ 
was developed to specifically deal with the problems of mixing politics with 
regulatory development, it appears that with respect to GM crop regulations, the EU 
regulatory approach has shifted to a social rationality paradigm that necessarily mixes 
the politics of accountability and social rationality with the regulatory development 
process.
The third important aspect of the EU regulatory approach is that it appears to 
fail to meet either the demands of economic or social interests. Similar to the North 
American regulatory approach, the European regulatory approach may be assessed 
according to a commercial and a social perspective. From a commercial perspective, 
the European approach has failed to establish stable and certain regulations necessary 
for industrial development. Approval applications have been paralysed within the 
complex and time-intensive approval process frustrating GM crop developers and 
creating trade tensions. In fact, the European approach has sacrificed commercial 
objectives to meet social objectives. Yet, despite this effort, the regulators face severe 
criticism that they are too commercially-oriented. The result is that the European 
approach, while striving to find the middle, has instead produced a regulatory 
approach that fails to meet both commercial and social needs.
Given the regulatory difficulties, would EU food laws be better served as 
regulations rather than directives? Directives are developed and accepted at the EU 
level but then are transposed into the legal framework of each member state. In order 
to aide transposition, directives sacrifice detail in favour of general principles. The 
result EU regulatory instability as the legislation of member states can vary 
considerably. As an alternative, EU food regulations must be accepted ‘as is’ by 
member states and often are more detailed and specific allowing less possible
12 A France ban on Novartis GM Bt Maize was ruled as unjustified in an opinion by ECJ Advoate- 
General Jean Michel, released in November 1999. The final ruling is expected in April 2000.
265
variation. This, of course, makes the development and negotiation of regulations more 
onerous, but they are explicitly efforts in regulatory co-ordination and once developed 
they yield both regulatory detail and stability.
In summary, Table 7.2 presents the regulatory checklist for the EU. The 
general interpretation is that the EU regulatory approach is predominantly congruent 
with the social rationality paradigm. This trajectory has come about since the late 
1980s as the result of endogenous political economy factors in the EU. Further, this 
trajectory is in conflict with the regulatory integration approach supported in North 
America and by the international trade regime.
Scientific Rationality Social Rationality
General Regulatory Issues
Tradition S  Regulatory Accountability
Belief S  Technological precaution: 
Socially responsive regulations 
increase public credibility and 
confidence
Type of Risk S  Recognised 
S  Hypothetical and 
S  Speculative
Substantial Equivalence S  No: Technology-based
Science or Other in Risk 
Assessment
S  All four regulatory hurdles in 
risk assessment
Burden of Proof S  Traditional: Minimise Type I 
(Rejected when safe)
Risk tolerance S  Minimum
Science or Other in Risk 
Management
S  Social Dimensions of 
biotechnology including other 
legitimate factors in risk 
management
Specific Regulatory Issues
Precautionary Principle S  Social Interpretation
Focus S  Technology-based
Structure S  Horizontal, new structures
Participation
S  Judicial decision-making
S  Wide, social dimensions
Labelling S  Mandatory, technology-based 
for the consumers’ right to know
Table 7.2 EU Regulatory Approach Checklist
With respect to the five regulatory principles for GM crops, the EU approach 
favours technology-based, horizontal regulations involving wide actor participation 
and employing the social interpretation of the precautionary principle. In addition, the 
EU also favours mandatory technology-based labelling policies based on the 
consumers’ right to know the presence of GM material, regardless of the scientific risk 
assessment of the product.
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While the EU regulatory approach has shifted to a social rationality trajectory 
in response to social interests, it has hindered the competitiveness of the EU 
agricultural biotechnology and failed to fully address the concerns of social interests. 
The result is an unstable regulatory approach that is unsatisfactory for both economic 
and social interests and appears to do very little in ensuring a level of safety and 




There are two objectives of Part IV. The first is to bring together Parts I, II, 
and III in order to analyse why the traditional trade diplomacy approach is incapable 
of addressing the transatlantic regulatory regionalism associated with GM crops and, 
hence, stands at a crucial crossroads. The second objective is to take the above 
analysis a step further and to propose and examine an amended trade diplomacy 
approach that addresses transatlantic regulatory regionalism in an economically and 
socially acceptable manner. Essentially, the second objective is to analyse the type of 
regulatory framework and consequently the type of regulatory integration strategy that 
trade diplomacy should support in order navigate the fundamental differences in the 
transatlantic regulatory frameworks and remain a viable force in international 
integration. While this ‘ideal’ regulatory framework may then be used to design 
specific regulations and regulatory procedures, this level of prescription will not be 
undertaken in this study. Finally, from this ‘ideal’ regulatory framework follows 
implications for governments, industry, international governmental organisations and 
international non-governmental organisations, which will be examined in the last 
section.
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CHAPTER EIGHT TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY INTEGRATION
8.1 Trade Diplomacy at a Crossroads
This study has focused generally on the trade diplomacy problem of regulatory 
regionalism and specifically on the problem of transatlantic social regulatory barriers 
facing GM crops. The thesis is that trade diplomacy stands at a crucial crossroads. 
Maintaining the traditional trade diplomacy approach that promotes regulatory 
development and integration from the economic perspective will increasingly erode 
public support for trade diplomacy and marginalise its ability to facilitate international 
integration. Amending the traditional trade diplomacy approach to better account for 
the social dimensions influencing regulations will, instead, enhance the prospects that 
trade diplomacy can effectively deal with regulatory regionalism and promote 
international integration. In other words, as trade diplomacy reaches deep into areas of 
national competence in order to enhance regulatory integration it must be sensitive to 
the political economy factors shaping the development of the regulatory framework 
and subsequent regulations within a particular jurisdiction.
This study has revealed that domestic regulations are a function of endogenous 
political economy factors. These include various interests and events along with the 
traditional regulatory role of the state and the competitiveness of the jurisdiction with 
respect to the particular regulatory issue. Specifically, with respect to the development 
of GM regulations, regulatory instability is the most important policy challenge. This 
instability is caused by the competing influences of the economic and social 
perspectives where the former supports scientific rationality and technological 
progress while the latter supports social rationality and technological precaution. The 
result is seven debates regarding the regulatory risk analysis framework as well as five 
specific debates regarding GM crop regulatory principles.
With respect to regulatory integration, this study has revealed that a regulatory 
jurisdiction faces three integration parameters: the level of integration; the depth of 
integration; and the strategy of integration (Fig. 8.1). For the regulatory regionalism 
associated with GM crops the dominant level of integration is the transatlantic level. 
The integration depth must deliberately target deeper social integration beyond the 
shallow economic integration favoured in the traditional trade model. The integration 
strategy must involve proactive regulatory co-ordination and not be limited to reactive 
regulatory competition only. From Figure 8.1, the proposed regulatory integration
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strategy straddles IIC and IID. Therefore, traditional trade diplomacy cannot deal with 
social regulatory barriers because it is only a very narrow approach to regulatory 
















Fig. 8.1: Integration Parameters Facing a Regulatory Jurisdiction
In short, this study has so far revealed that traditional trade diplomacy stands at 
a crucial crossroads. It is clear that in order to remain a viable force in international 
integration, trade diplomacy must be amended. Essentially, the goal of trade 
diplomacy must not be to defend the traditional economic integration approach at all 
costs. Instead, the goal of trade diplomacy must be to encourage international 
integration in an economically and socially acceptable manner. The objective now is 
to propose and examine how trade diplomacy may be amended in order to achieve this 
goal. In the remainder of Chapter 8, the features of an ‘Ideal Regulatory Framework’ 
will be discussed (8.2), followed by a discussion of the implications and relevant 
policy recommendations (8.3).
8.2 Ideal Regulatory Framework
The thesis of this section, following from the analysis of Parts I, II and III, is 
that a regulatory framework combining the pragmatism of the scientific rationality 
approach with the responsiveness of the social rationality approach could address the 
integration challenges of social regulatory barriers to GM crops. This so-called Ideal 
Regulatory Framework must promote regulatory stability and integration subject to 
several important parameters. First, the framework must balance the competing 
economic and social interests calling simultaneously for technological progress and 
precaution. In this sense, the approach must achieve an acceptable political 
compromise.
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Second, the regulatory framework must be precise enough to be operational. 
That is, in order to deal with regulatory externalities, eliminate instability and avoid 
trade tensions, the regulatory framework must have precise rules that clearly outline 
regulatory procedures. It should avoid vague or ambiguous regulatory principles that 
lead to delay and indecisiveness.
Third, the regulatory framework must be strategically targeted. The regulatory 
resources of governments are crucially limited, yet technological innovation is a 
dynamic phenomenon. In this sense, the regulatory framework must be a dynamic 
approach focused on the application, management and distribution of GM technology 
capable of keeping pace with technological innovation, rather than a complete 
command and control approach that quickly becomes obsolete.
Fourth, with respect to regulatory integration, the regulatory framework must 
avoid autarky. It must disentangle those regulatory aspects that can be co-ordinated 
with regulations in other jurisdictions from those regulatory aspects that, because of 
crucial domestic pressures, must remain under the complete control of the jurisdiction. 
Further, it must be considerate of relevant international obligations.
Given these important parameters, the Ideal Regulatory Framework employs a 
Risk Analysis-type framework to the regulation of GM crops. As identified in Part III, 
both the North American and the European regulatory approaches are within the Risk 
Analysis Framework, yet they differ substantially on several important framework 
principles and specific principles for regulating advanced technologies such as GM 
crops.
Comparing the North American and the European regulatory approaches 
reveals the sources of regulatory regionalism. Essentially, while the North American 
regulations remains congruent with the scientific rationality approach, the European 
regulations have departed from this trajectory and shifted to a distinctly social 
rationality approach to regulating GM crops, which tends to be more congruent with 
its regulatory tradition. Table 8.2 compares the two approaches over the framework 
and specific regulatory principles identified in Chapter 5.
The comparison in Table 8.2 reveals that the transatlantic regulatory 
regionalism and social regulatory barriers facing GM crops are caused by structural 
differences in the regulatory approaches employed in North America and Europe. In 
order to promote stable regulatory integration, the Ideal Regulatory Framework must
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overcome the significant structural regulatory differences in the Risk Analysis 
approach employed in the two dominant jurisdictions.
North American Approach European Approach
Tradition Regulatory Independence Regulatory Accountability
Belief Separation of economic objectives 
from social objectives because 
intervention: increases costs and 
decreases productivity, 
competitiveness and economic 
prosperity.
Market is embedded in social 
factors which cannot be separated 
from economic factors because 
intervention: increases 
participation increasing 
productivity, competitiveness and 
economic prosperity.




Effectiveness Economic interpretation of market 
efficiency
Political economy interpretation of 
success in meeting social 
dimensions: Social responsiveness
Paradigm Scientific Rationality Social Rationality
Type of Risk Recognised or hypothetical Recognised, Hypothetical and 
Speculative
Substantial Equivalence Yes No
Science or Other in Risk 
Assessment
First regulatory hurdle based on 
identified safety or hazard risk
All four regulatory hurdles
Burden of Proof Traditional Traditional; pressures to reverse
Risk tolerance Minimum Minimum; pressures for zero 
tolerance
Science or Other in Risk 
Management
Safety or Hazard-based Broader socio-economic concerns
Precautionary Principle Scientific Interpretation Social Interpretation
Focus Product-based, Novel Applications Process- or Technology-based
Structure Vertical, Existing structures Horizontal, new structures
Participation Narrow, technical experts 
Judicial decision-making
wide: ‘social dimensions’ 
Judicial decision-making
Labelling Safety or Hazard only: voluntary, 
market-based for the consumers’ 
right to know
Mandatory, process-based for the 
consumers’ right to know.
Integration Regulatory Competition New Approach:
Regulatory Co-ordination and 
Regulatory Competition
Table 8.1 Comparison of North American and European Regulatory Approaches
Although both Risk Analysis approaches have their strengths, neither approach 
is the most appropriate for addressing the issue of social regulatory barriers to GM 
crops. For instance, the North American approach, while supported by economic 
interests, is simply not socially responsive enough to address social interests and 
would be vulnerable to a dramatic public crisis over GM foods as has occurred in the 
UK. Yet, the EU approach, which has shifted to meet the demands of social interests 
has failed to establish an approach supported be either economic or social interests. It 
does not have a solid enough foundation of risk assessment to be stable and
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predictable and is constantly reacting to perceived risk regardless of the scientific 
justification for the public concern. Therefore, both approaches must be amended to 
more equitably address the legitimate economic and social interests in a stable, 
transparent and socially responsible manner.
The Ideal Regulatory Framework aims to be socially responsive in the 
regulatory development process but not to the detriment of regulatory framework 
stability and integration. The key to this is to employ the scientific rationality 
approach to risk assessment, providing a solid foundation for risk, yet to employ the 
social rationality approach to risk management, providing a socially responsive 
framework to meet social interests. Beck (1992) argues that despite the apparent 
mutual exclusivity of the scientific and social rationality paradigms, they can be 
integrated because they are mutually reinforcing- “scientific rationality without social 
rationality remains empty, but social rationality without scientific rationality remains 
blind”.
In short, the Ideal Regulatory Framework essentially builds social credence 
into the scientific rationality paradigm. This is accomplished by combining a scientific 
risk assessment approach with a social risk management approach and a transparent 
risk communication strategy. This Ideal Risk Analysis-based Regulatory Framework 
will be discussed below in its three constituent parts: risk assessment, risk 
management and risk communication.
8.2.1 Risk Assessment
The objective of risk assessment procedures is to produce neutral and 
transparent risk information to inform the risk management process. Risk assessment 
can enhance regulatory stability and regulatory integration by producing clear and 
precise procedures establishing minimum essential requirements (MERs) for safety 
applicable in all regulatory jurisdictions.
In order to integrate the scientific and social rationality paradigms in the risk 
assessment procedures, the only principle of scientific rationality that must be 
abandoned is the idea that empirical questions are logically prior to normative 
questions. The reason for this is that a decision must be made as to the type of risk that 
the risk assessment will focus on. This is a normative question that is in fact prior to 
the empirical question. But once it is made, empirical questions may be asked and
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assessed by recognised experts in the field, resulting in legitimate, credible, neutral 
and transparent risk information to assist in the risk management procedure.
With respect to the type of risk targeted in risk assessment, the focus of risk 
assessment must be on asking empirical questions about hypothetical risks, not 
speculative risks. In other words, risk should be something that can be defined 
empirically and is testable with empirical means rather than based on unsubstantiated 
logical possibilities. Empirical questions have the important ability to clarify risk 
according to accepted analytical methods and causal-consequence mechanisms, while 
limiting the social and political influence over the risk assessment procedure.
Is this approach acceptable? Indeed, even within the scientific community 
there is considerable disagreement over empirical conclusions. Yet, disputes among 
hypothetical risks can at least be assessed through further study and analysis. In fact, it 
has been argued that this is the approach used in medical risk assessment and it enjoys 
widespread confidence from all stakeholders (Balk, 1993). Speculative risks based on 
logical possibilities cannot be ‘refuted’ by the scientific process and are the refuge of 
those uninterested in a genuine risk dialogue. In this sense, speculative risks are not an 
operational regulatory principle.
Focusing on hypothetical risks because they are subject to accepted analytical 
methods does not mean that new analytical methods cannot be developed nor does it 
imply that ‘no evidence’ means ‘no risk’. It has been argued that the problem with 
current Risk Analysis approaches to GM crops is the lack of a predictive ecology 
framework (Rogers, 1993; CIELAP, 1997). Without such a framework, critics argue 
that they must bypass risk assessment based on hypothetical risks and rely instead on 
risk management that assumes speculative risks. Yet, this approach adds nothing to 
risk information and seems to undermine the development of an alternative analytical 
method because of the lack of research and development. Indeed, it would be 
irresponsible to abandon biotechnology because biotechnology and genetically 
modified organisms are an inevitable feature on the industrial landscape. 
Developments in biotechnology in general benefit specific applications, hence, 
technology will continue, even with a ban in one specific area such as agricultural 
biotechnologies. Also, due to the significant economic stakes of agricultural 
biotechnology, a regulatory ban in one jurisdiction will only lead to a redistribution of 
GM crop development, not a halt. It is in the interest of the most advanced nations, 
with the most advanced scientific capacity and regulatory systems to regulate the
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hypothetical risks of GM crops according to the best analytical methods at their 
disposal in order to set the global standards.
Further, when scientific risk assessments do not yield conclusive results, it is 
an imperative part of the scientific precautionary approach that no evidence from 
inconclusive results implies more investigation, and not a conclusion of no risk. 
Therefore, the development of new analytical methods, such as predictive ecology, 
must be a regulatory priority. The new methods may prove that past hypothetical risks 
were under-estimated, however, they may equally prove that past hypothetical risks 
were over-estimated as they were at the initial Asilomar Conference in 1975.
With respect to the risk assessment debate regarding the principle of 
substantial equivalence of some GM crops, there appears to be no scientific or moral 
reason to assert that production improving and some output improving GM crops are 
not substantially equivalent to non-GM varieties for regulatory purposes. Instead, 
from a regulatory perspective, risk assessment should be focused on the hypothetical 
risks of the novel features GM crops, not on the use of genetic modification per se. 
This is similar to long-standing regulatory control over exotic plants and pests 
regulated according to their novelty. Hence, from a regulatory perspective it is 
reasonable to conclude that GM and non-GM crops are substantially equivalent unless 
the GM crops are novel. This should not be interpreted, however, to mean that 
consumers do not have a right to know whether a crop is GM or conventional. Of 
course, if consumers want to know they must have access to this information. In this 
sense, substantial equivalence is only a useful principle for establishing the necessary 
level of regulatory oversight for risk assessment, but it cannot be a dominant principle 
for establishing risk management responses. Instead, the consumers’ right to know 
must be an important principle in risk management, which is discussed in greater 
detail below (8.2.2).
Should risk assessment focus on other legitimate factors? In risk assessment, 
where the goal is to develop empirical questions to gain neutral, transparent and 
credible information about the hypothetical risks of GM crops, there is no role for the 
normative ‘other legitimate factors’ including food quality and socio-economic 
impacts. That is, once the definition of risk is established, a science-basis predicated 
on hypothetical risks and the best available analytical methods should be the only 
factors in risk assessment. Risk assessors should only be charged with ensuring a food 
is safe, not assuaging consumer fears and proving social benefit.
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With respect to the debate over the regulatory principle of burden of proof, a 
logical and legitimate compromise is to maintain the traditional burden of proof 
(minimise the risk that a technology is rejected when it is in fact safe) but regulate 
new technology more stringently. However, this is then a risk management activity 
and will be discussed in greater detail below (8.2.2).
Participation in the risk assessment procedures must be reserved for experts 
only and the real issue is finding independent and credible scientific experts to 
perform the hypothetical risk assessment; a process requiring considerable consensus 
building (Mackenzie, 1993). The experts must be as independent of industry as 
possible and can include known supporters and critics. This ensures wide participation 
among the experts and ensures that broad concerns will remain on the agenda. Yet, at 
the same time, the involvement of scientific experts decreases the variance in 
normative preferences. Decision-making by the participants must be judicious and 
rules-based, not consensus-based, in order to ensure timeliness in risk assessments in a 
field characterised by rapid technological innovation. Finally, the deliberations and 
decisions of participants must be fully transparent to all interested stakeholders.
The ideal risk assessment procedures are more congruent with the North 
American approach than the European approach and are generally supported by the 
OECD, the WHO and the FAO. In this sense, the European approach must shift 
towards a rules-based and science-based risk assessment procedure for GM crops 
adopting the scientific interpretation of the precautionary principle and limiting the 
risk assessment to short- and long-term human and environmental safety, not to other 
legitimate factors. It must also adopt a product or application-based focus. In 
addition, it also must increase the transparency of the assessment procedures and it 
must resist the temptation to overturn assessment decisions that are incompatible with 
political decisions. Making these amendments solves the European problems of 
instability and inoperability.
Although largely congruent with the North American approach, the ideal risk 
assessment procedures do require the North American approach to include greater 
participation in the procedures. Experts from a broader range of interests, yet familiar 
with the specified frame of reference and the analytical methods, would participate 
and wield policy power, not just the GM crop developers and government regulators.
The ideal scientific risk assessment procedures benefit both regulatory stability 
and integration. Stability is increased because the language of risk, safety and
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precaution is harmonised, eliminating confusion and ambiguity associated with 
divergent risk assessments and effectively levelling the playing field for all 
stakeholders. Technological precaution is explicitly built into the assessment 
procedures through risk averse assumptions and likelihood functions allowing 
credence goods to shift to experience and search goods in a controlled manner. Non- 
market regulatory objectives, such as human and environmental safety would be dealt 
with by specifying the frame of reference at the outset establishing regulatory floors 
based on shared MERs. Participation would be greatly increased making critics part of 
the scientific risk assessment procedure rather than excluded actors claiming 
unsubstantiated risks from outside the regulatory development process.
The prospects for regulatory integration are also increased because of the 
harmonised risk assessment procedures. This limits the problem that could arise 
because there is no supranational institution to decide on MERs. It also limits the 
degree of possible normative disagreement because scientific disagreements can be 
dealt with subject to accepted rules of scientific debate. Essentially, the ideal risk 
assessment procedures establish regulatory principles that are operational in an 
international integration framework because the conditions for risk information are 
precise and stable.
The likelihood that both the North American and the European regulatory 
approaches can and would adopt the ideal scientific risk assessment procedures are 
good, despite the necessary modifications. The analysis of the economic and social 
interests has revealed that in most instances opposition to GM crops is not actually 
opposition to the technology per se. Instead, it is opposition to the application of the 
technology. The ideal scientific risk assessment focuses on the risks of these 
application issues rather than obfuscating the debates by widely condemning the 
technology of genetic modification. Further, in both regions there is a desire to avoid 
the ‘my scientist v. your scientist’ debates which occurred in the WTO beef-hormones 
dispute. More recently, this debate occurred in the fall of 1999 when British beef 
approved as safe in Britain and by the EU Food Safety Committee had not been 
approved as safe by French authorities, and France refused to lift its ban on British 
beef. Both sides repeatedly claimed that they had science on their side. Adopting the 
ideal scientific risk assessment procedures would prevent or drastically limit 
regulatory barriers being justified according to controversial debates over science.
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8.2.2 Risk Management
While it is necessary to centralise and harmonise the scientific risk assessment 
procedures, the objective of risk management must be to build social credence into the 
scientific regulatory approach. Although the goal of the risk management process is 
risk reduction and prevention, it is undeniably an inherently political exercise of 
balancing the rights and interests of both supporters and critics. In this sense, it is 
incorrect to characterise risk management as just a process of creating economic 
instruments to correct market failures where the only indicators of regulatory 
effectiveness are economic measures of market efficiency. In other words, once based 
on a common framework of risk information, risk management decisions must retain 
the freedom to be socially responsive.
An important feature of the risk management stage is that endogenous or 
internal pressures lock risk management at the national level. Essentially, the 
economic and social stakes are too high to give up authority over risk management. 
Therefore, it is impractical to expect an international regulatory approach to emerge in 
the short or even medium term. Instead, risk management remains the domain of 
regulatory jurisdictions and cannot be effectively centralised or harmonised at the 
multilateral level.
Within this context, the ideal risk management process aims to ensure that 
regulatory development, while being socially responsive, is simultaneously 
considerate of both the scientific risk assessment procedures and the obligations to 
other countries under various international agreements.
Under the ideal risk management process science matters and the risk 
management deliberations must be based on a common foundation of informed risk 
information provided by the risk assessment procedure. With respect to the regulatory 
debate associated with risk tolerance, risk management must accept that zero tolerance 
is not a realistic goal. Instead, the focus must be on the relative risk of the GM crop 
application subject to some tolerated level of risk permitting the technological 
progress necessary to increase risk information. Without this basis, risk management 
is arbitrary and vulnerable to both regulatory capture and to criticisms that it is 
scientifically unjustifiable. One solution is to introduce a “technology penalty” (van 
den Daele et al., 1997) at the risk management stage designed to build consumer 
confidence in the regulatory control over new technologies. In fact, it has been argued 
that greater scrutiny of GM crops has already been established in this way, without
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having to reverse the burden of proof. Ager (1990) and Fincham and Ravetz (1991) 
both argue that GMOs have faced greater regulatory scrutiny in the UK despite the 
fact that there is no empirical evidence to justify this. In this case, risk management 
regulations are primarily for confidence building to address the credence factors and 
not for enhancing safety. Yet, given the discussion on the UK (Chapter 7.3.1) it is 
clear that the technology penalty must also be accompanied by a more concerted effort 
by proponents to address the information gap created by the commercialisation of 
their own applications. In essence, the burden of proof remains the traditional 
principle, but the new technology must meet more stringent conditions on product or 
application performance and on dealing with credence factors.
Therefore, unlike risk assessment, science cannot be the final arbiter of risk 
management, it can only inform the regulatory development process. With respect to 
the risk management debate over the use of science or other legitimate factors, the 
ideal risk management must consider the social dimensions of GM crops and involve 
the participation of all stakeholders from either end of the support -  opposition 
spectrum. In this sense, risk management cannot be independent or normative-free 
because it cannot be disentangled from the interests and concerns of both supporters 
and critics.
Crucially, this requires compromise and concession on the part of both 
supporters and critics and the realisation that the goal of risk management is not to 
build normative consensus, rather it is only to strike an acceptable balance. On one 
hand, private firms must endeavour to assess GM crops to the highest level of 
consumer and environmental protection available. They also must respect the social 
dimensions and credence nature of GM crops by meeting the consumers’ right to 
know, even in the absence of safety issues. Recall from Chapter Two that the failure 
to preserve consumer choice among GM and non-GM crops has had disastrous 
consequences in Europe, despite the absence of safety issues or justifications. In 
addition, product liability laws should be included in regulatory approaches to make 
sure that the risk to human and environmental safety becomes internalised by the firm 
as commercial risk, which the firm then minimises. Indeed, it has been argued that 
with product liability laws “regulators may have significantly more freedom... in 
coercing the market toward efficient outcomes” (Holloway, 1999).
On the other hand, critics cannot expect regulatory approaches to fully reflect 
their belief systems and must be prepared to compromise without illegal action. They
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must participate in and respect the risk information provided in the risk assessment 
procedure and some level of risk tolerance must be accepted in risk management, as 
there is no such thing as zero risk. They must be prepared to engage in co-operative, 
non-antagonistic actions during the risk management process.
* The ideal risk management process also requires governments to abandon the 
inward focus common for food safety and environmental protection regulation. 
Instead, governments must give equal consideration to the impact of their risk 
management decisions upon other countries as well according to their obligations 
under various international agreements. There is no such thing as ‘autarky’, and as 
regulations impact market access, risk management policies must consider those 
impacts. Governments must resist domestic pressures to impose regulatory barriers 
unjustified according to either the scientific risk assessment or to acceptable measures 
agreed to in, for example, trade agreements.
To achieve this, mutual recognition must be built into the domestic risk 
management process. The reason for this is because domestic regulations represent a 
political balance and once a balance is achieved, it is crucial for the political stability 
that regulatory framework prevents foreign GM crops from circumventing the 
domestic requirements, thus creating concerns which destabilise the balance. If 
governments cannot resist establishing unjustified regulatory barriers than they must 
be prepared to acknowledge that the barriers are driven by unjustified factors in 
violation of the international obligations. Hence, although governments can opt out of 
their obligations, they cannot do so without cost, in this case, paying compensation to 
affected foreign firms in a manner which they have already agreed under international 
agreements. In this sense, national governments are free to choose whatever risk 
management regulatory response they wish, but they are not free to use controversial 
scientific justifications.
Additionally, the intergovernmental discussions on mutual recognition must 
abandon traditional trade diplomacy features such as limited participation and 
untransparent, closed door discussions. Instead, discussions of mutual recognition 
must occur with both an open dialogue and wider participation. The key result of the 
open, transparent mutual recognition strategy is that while national governments are 
free to pursue those regulatory responses that are domestically necessary, they must 
accept the regulatory responses of other governments as equivalent to their own. Of 
course, this further supports the centralisation of scientific risk assessment procedures
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so that a domestic government can ensure that the safety assessments are domestically 
acceptable.
The ideal risk management process is more congruent with the European 
regulatory accountability approach where regulatory development responds to the 
social dimensions, not just to market failures. In order to achieve the ideal risk 
management process, the European approach must fully commit to scientific risk 
assessment procedures as an important foundation for risk management and it must be 
prepared to support a level of tolerable risk, even in the face of public pressure. 
Further, social risk management decisions taken in absence of a scientific justification 
must be considered in the context of international rights and obligations where 
contravention, although permissible, is not without cost.
Meanwhile, the North American regulatory approach must accept the 
legitimacy of other factors in risk management, beyond scientific factors. In other 
words, it must accept a social risk management process. This includes provisions to 
address the credence nature of GM crops by permitting regulations predicated on the 
consumers’ right to know, even in the absence of safety concerns. For instance, this 
means that non-product-related PPM based labelling rules must be developed and 
accepted and not challenged under narrow international trade law that fails to 
adequately account for a social approach to risk management.
Essentially, in dealing with regulatory barriers to trade the ideal risk 
management process is crucially focused on building social credence into the 
scientific rationality approach. It accepts the fact that regulations are political and that 
political factors differ between countries and regions making it impossible to establish 
international risk management responses. Divergence in regulatory approach will 
occur, but this divergence will be minimised by basing risk management on 
centralised scientific risk assessment procedures. Further, the proactive regulatory co­
ordination strategy of mutual recognition prevents the tensions and disputes that arise 
under regulatory competition.
The ideal risk management approach can increase regulatory stability by 
ensuring that it is based on a foundation of credible, harmonised scientific risk 
assessments procedures. It preserves sovereignty or autonomy over regulatory 
responses meeting crucial subsidiarity pressures. It acknowledges the critical role of 
political and social factors in regulatory development and it supports the legitimacy of 
these other factors beyond the limited market failure and scientific factors.
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The ideal risk management approach also enhances regulatory integration 
through regulatory co-ordination by promoting co-operative, proactive efforts to 
develop mutual recognition agreements avoiding the forced convergence of regulatory 
competition. Mutual recognition avoids both the difficulties of harmonising risk 
management across countries and regions with divergent economic, social and 
political factors and the potential democratic deficit created when international 
institutions wield regulatory authority in the absence of clear accountability 
provisions. It promotes greater commercial certainty through stable market access 
rules creating economies of scale and reducing transactions costs. Although this 
strategy cannot prevent regulatory barriers it can discipline their use in a framework 
more capable of meeting the concerns that make disciplining regulatory barriers under 
a regulatory competition framework at the WTO unacceptable. Finally, the ideal risk 
management process can prevent a competitive deregulation or regulatory race to the 
bottom because it explicitly provides for the inclusion of legitimate, non-market 
objectives in domestic regulatory responses.
8.2.3 Risk Communication
The biggest failure with the Risk Analysis framework in both North America 
and Europe has been a lack of transparency, the failure to provide adequate and 
accurate risk communication. GM crops exhibit credence factors poorly understood by 
consumers because of a significant information gap. Both supporters and critics have 
failed to provide accurate information, and instead have manipulated information to 
meet their own interests. Consider, for instance, supporters and their global welfare 
promises and critics and their sensational dread predictions based on emotive, 
speculative risks. Governments, pulled in opposite directions to meet the interests of 
both supporters and critics, have understandably chosen to quietly deal with GM crops 
in an attempt to keep them out of the political agenda. Together, the polarity of views 
and the untransparent government approach represent a completely unacceptable 
strategy of risk communication.
The ideal risk communication strategy is a complete commitment, by all 
stakeholders to the two-way flow of transparent information between scientific risk 
assessment procedures and the risk management process. The risk information 
produced in the scientific risk assessment procedures must be available to all 
interested stakeholders, including interested parties in other countries. To make this
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possible, GM crop developers must abandon both their global welfare promises and 
their over-used claims of ‘proprietary information’. Consumers have a right to know 
and a lack of transparency is easily construed to imply that there is something to hide. 
Providing the results of in-house human and environmental risk assessments does not 
reveal crucial proprietary knowledge, but it does significantly limit the vulnerability of 
firms to spurious, sensational criticisms. Further, the results of the scientific risk 
assessment procedures, as well as the deliberations must be completely available to all 
stakeholders in the risk management process. In turn, however, the social dimensions 
of the risk management process must also flow back into the scientific risk assessment 
procedures in terms of the scientific precautionary principles, for instance.
The goals of the ideal risk communication strategy are to reduce the 
information-gap caused by the credence nature of GM crops and to increase public 
confidence in the regulatory approach. To achieve this the North American approach 
must accept that the risk communication of GM crops must meet the consumers’ right 
to know about the non-safety aspects. The European approach must increase its 
transparency to eliminate the unacceptable regulatory hold-up without explanation. 
Both approaches must better acknowledge the unavoidable regulatory externalities or 
global aspects of GM crops. By addressing the credence nature of GM crops, the 
polarity is minimised resulting in informed consumerism based more appropriately on 
the actual benefits and risks, and fully in support of consumer choice. Given the 
enormous economic, human health and environmental benefits it is difficult to believe 
that consumers, truly informed, would reject GM crops. Instead, they would 
understand that it is the application that matters and that applications are best 
controlled through a risk management framework. In short, the ideal risk 
communication strategy enhances stability and integration by enhancing transparency 
and public confidence.
8.3 Conclusion and Implications
The Ideal Regulatory Framework essentially builds social credence into the 
scientific rationality approach resulting in a stable framework congruent with deeper 
social integration according to a regulatory co-ordination strategy. Social credence is 
built in by ensuring consumer information, trust and choice. This approach meets the 
prerequisites of balancing the competing interests within an operational, dynamic, 
rules-based approach capable of managing the applications of advanced technologies.
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There are significant implications of this Ideal Regulatory Framework upon 
governments, the GM crop industry, international organisations and non-governmental 
actors, which will be discussed below in this order.
8.3.1 Implications for Governments
Within the transatlantic regulatory regions, governments must reconcile the 
divergence in their regulatory frameworks. With respect to risk assessment 
procedures, the EU approach must become more like the North American approach 
while for the risk management process the North American approach must become 
more like the EU approach with greater stakeholder participation. For risk 
communication, both the North American and EU approaches must endeavour to be 
more transparent and accessible.
In dealing with the problem of regulatory integration, governments must 
engage in proactive regulatory co-ordination, not regulatory competition. In this sense, 
the North American approach must become more like the EU and could learn a great 
deal from the European experience with integrating economies. Also, recognising the 
severe weaknesses in dealing with regulatory integration, governments must refuse to 
take disputes over social regulatory barriers to the WTO.
The Ideal Regulatory Framework allows countries to unilaterally pursue their 
own social regulatory approaches and they may even ban GM crops if they wish 
according to the scientific interpretation of the precautionary principle. However, it 
prevents them from misusing ‘science’ in order to support domestic political concerns 
and holds them accountable to obligations that they have already agreed to under 
international treaties.
8.3.2 Implications for the GM Crop Industry
The GM crop development industry in both North America and Europe must 
accept both that regulations are not instruments used only to correct market failures 
and that consumers are not just economic agents. Instead, regulations play a 
legitimate, crucial role in meeting broader social concerns and they must not be 
viewed only as economic costs. The industry must take a proactive role in addressing 
the information-gap associated with their products through accurate and transparent 
risk communication. The consumer does have a right to know whether or not products 
are derived from GM crops. In meeting this right, industry must endeavour to identity
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preserve, regardless of the incremental costs. As segregation is necessary for both 
output trait GM varieties and Bio-engineered products, this simply speeds up the 
introduction of effective segregation procedures.
Industry must also accept that science cannot be the final arbiter and, instead, 
there must be scope for the use of the scientific interpretation of the precautionary 
principle in regulatory approaches. The scientific precautionary principle is a 
legitimate regulatory objective and it may be used to restrict or ban particular GM 
crop varieties.
Finally, industry must accept that the comprehensive range of concerns 
associated with GM crops requires an international regulatory integration approach 
broader in remit than the traditional trade approach. In this sense, industry must accept 
that the WTO cannot be the dominant international institution and they must be 
prepared to avoid using the WTO to adjudicate on the appropriateness of domestic 
risk management regulations. Therefore, industry must engage fully in a regulatory 
co-ordination strategy through, for instance, simultaneous approval applications in 
North America and the EU in order to highlight the common, shared objectives rather 
than the differences. Moreover, they must accept the social need for international 
protocols focused more on socio-economic issues, such as the Biosafety Protocol.
8.3.3 Implications for International Institutions
International organisations must facilitate regulatory co-ordination where 
possible, and where not possible, must be prepared to stay out of the way. The key 
lesson is that when the fundamental regulatory framework is unstable and divergent in 
North America and the European Union there is very little hope that an international 
regulatory framework will be imposed top-down. The implication of this is that 
international organisations such as the OECD, Codex along with the WHO and FAO 
should continue to assist the risk assessment procedures for the safety of GM crops, 
yet they should avoid involving themselves in the risk management process for fear of 
tarnishing their independence and credibility.
Similarly, the WTO should be kept out of social regulatory integration when at 
issue is the development of the fundamental regulatory principles. It cannot credibly 
rule on which regulatory framework ought to be used because it is fundamentally built 
on the economic perspective, yet social regulations are most often driven from the 
social perspective. This is not to say that the WTO is not a valuable institution.
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Indeed, it should continue to focus on trade liberalisation through the administration 
and enforcement of rules and in areas of little controversy it can play a role in 
brokering international rules. But it should not be charged with establishing the 
fundamental regulatory framework and adjudicating whether or not social regulations 
are compatible with trade objectives. Such a role only serves to seriously undermine 
support and confidence in an otherwise very valuable institution.
Of course, this raises an important question about what to do with the SPS 
Agreement -  a trade agreement right in the middle of the controversy between trade 
objectives and social regulations. Clearly, the SPS Agreement should not be 
renounced, but careful guidelines on its applicability must be established. Essentially, 
it is vital to determine whether or not the regulatory barrier under investigation has 
created trade tensions because of disagreements over framework principles or specific 
principles. If, for instance, there is widespread international agreement on framework 
principles then the trade dispute over specific regulatory interpretations can be 
reasonably brought to the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. If, on the other hand, 
the dispute arises because two jurisdictions disagree on a fundamental framework 
principle, then it is obvious that the WTO cannot credibly deal with this dispute.
8.3.4 Implications for International Non-Governmental Organisations
The international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) that compose the 
social interests must accept that regulatory development is a political exercise 
requiring compromise and concession. While the ideal Risk Analysis Framework 
amends the regulatory approaches to more effectively deal with their concerns, at the 
same time, INGOs must be prepared to participate in the entire regulatory 
development process even if their belief systems are not met in their entirety. For 
instance, criticisms of the risk assessment procedures can only be considered valid if 
the organisations are involved in the procedures, rather than raising sensational 
speculative risks from the sidelines. They must be fully engaged in the risk 
management process and accept that their interests are not the only ones that 
regulations must consider. Finally, and perhaps most crucially, they must also commit 
to an accurate and transparent risk communication strategy with the objective of 
increasing informed consumerism. They wield enormous power in capturing the 
media on emotive issues and this power must be wielded responsibly. In fact, their 
greatest contribution would be as an active participant in the development process,
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engaged in finding common ground among the stakeholders, rather than as just a critic 
on the sidelines.
8.3.5 Looking Ahead
There should be no doubts about the difficulty of meeting the challenge of 
social regulatory barriers to the trade of GM crops. Dealing with these barriers 
requires drastic structural changes to the traditional trade diplomacy framework as 
well as crucial compromise and concession from all involved stakeholders; both 
supporters and critics. This is not an issue of extremes. Instead, all stakeholders must 
endeavour to find the elusive common ground of a more reasoned and rational 
approach. Only then can the benefits of trade liberalisation and socially acceptable 
regulatory oversight be simultaneously achieved.
Once the transatlantic rules for establishing a regulatory approach capable of 
balancing technological progress with precaution are developed, the approach must be 
taken to the international level to begin the process of multilateralisation. Admittedly, 
this next step is also fraught with enormous challenge because it must reconcile the 
often-competing interests of developed and developing countries; the so-called North- 
South divide. In this sense, transatlantic regulatory co-ordination is time-sensitive as 
perhaps more pressing or urgent North-South issues will continue to be insufficiently 
addressed until the pillars of the international economic order reconcile their 
transatlantic differences.
Finally, only when a multilateral regulatory framework is established can the 
WTO then play its role as the principle trade liberator, clear of the controversies 
associated with social regulatory integration.
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